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Summ 
Beginning with an analysis of the nature of the Morality play and its near 
relative, the moral play, this thesis finds both forms to be founded on an adversarial 
view of the world (Chapter One). The nature of the adversary is variable, and that 
variation is, in turn, revealing about the plays' philosophical position. 
The theories of Jacques Lacan suggest a reading of Mundus & Infan s, The 
Castle of Perseveraunce, and Youth as descriptions of selfhood via language- 
acquisition (Chapter Two). Psychoanalytic theory also suggests that otherness may 
involve both the rule-making Other of authority and a transgressive 'other', broadly 
analogous to repressed desire. The moral plays discuss the latter version of 
otherness through their construction of an increasingly elaborated 'vice figure'. A 
reading of Mankind demonstrates the interpretative power of this approach (Chapter 
Three). 
In the 1560's and 70's, vice behaviour becomes more complex, and so more 
ambiguous. Deconstructive theories suggest that this change can usefully be read as 
equivalent to the tendency of linguistic terms towards meaninglessness. The Tyde 
Tarrieth No Man is an example. Otherness comes to be located in certain 'abjected' 
social groups. In addition, vice play radically alters the original structure of the 
moral play, tending to replace narrative with showmanship. Enough is as Good as a 
Feast and Like Will to Like demonstrate this point. All For Money, however, uses 
dramatic structures symbolically, restoring meaning to vice play (Chapter Four). 
Feminist theory leads me to consider the place of woman as other in the 
moral plays. In The Play of the Wether, the endightement of mother messe and 
Lin the 'female vice' figure is developed (Chapter Five). The social 
implications of that figure are considered through analyses of The Rare Triumphs of 
Love and Fortune and Lingua (Chapter Six). Finally, the figure of the 'good 
woman' is found to undergo increasing criticism, as the plays come to encode virtue 
as undesirable, and perhaps impossible (Chapter Seven). 
A Conclusion summarizes the main arguments of the thesis. 
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references, with the following minor variations. When a text has been available to 
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date and language of the first edition in the citation. With regard to early works, 
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play. Where scholarship has suggested a date of composition earlier than that of the 
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PREFACE 
The human condition is characterised at once by the necessity to choose and 
by the impossibility of choice. Such is the thesis that the moral plays dramatize in 
the simplest form and for the widest audience. They purport to offer examples of 
virtuous choices, but in doing so supply a discussion of the nature of evil, and the 
nature of the threat that physicality carries for the spiritual well-being of humanity. 
The human task, they insist, is to discover and follow godliness, while 
recognizing and rejecting evil. When evil is characterised as the physical, a perfect 
rejection of temptation is scarcely to be achieved by a creature which must eat, 
sleep, clothe itself and (increasingly) earn money in order to exist. Founded in 
paradox, functioning through the deceits of stagecraft, and teaching a subtle 
spiritual competence, the Morality and its derivative forms contain much more than 
the simple knockabout fun amongst vulgar 'vices' for which they are famous. ' 
Recent scholars have focussed on these plays' theatrical virtues, with 
considerable success. 2 Others find their connections with contemporary political 
events particularly illuminating. 3 Their status as source material for Shakespeare 
and his contemporaries is frequently of interest. 
I use modern critical methods, notably psychoanalysis, deconstruction and 
feminism, to approach the corpus of Moralities and related plays, aiming to 
demonstrate that their intellectual and psychological content amply explains the 
continued popularity of the form. It is, however, still unusual to apply post-modern 
perceptions to these texts, even though these are felt to be appropriate to texts by 
later Renaissance dramatists, and powerful productions have been based on such 
interpretations. 
Each of the chapters that follows is to some degree self-contained, in that 
each focusses on a separate group of plays, and a historical progression governs the 
sequence in which the plays are discussed. There is, however, an over-arching 
theoretical scheme which connects the separate discussions. 
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In Chapter One, I consider what it is that constitutes the genre of the moral 
play. Descriptions of binarism, the nature of stage allegory, and the critical concept 
of 'otherness' follow. Illustrative examples are taken from Mankind. 4 
In Chapter Two, I use Lacanian theory to examine the persuasion of the 
mankind figure in the earliest moral plays, concentrating on Mundus & Infans, with 
Youth and The Castle of Perseveraunce developing the discussion into further areas. 
Because persuasion involves a movement by two characters from a divided opinion 
to a shared, single opinion, its processes are of interest both from the point of view 
of theories about binarism, and also from that of theories about identification. 
Again, because the whole-life plays in particular display the mechanics of that 
moment when moral maturity is achieved by the individual, theories of 
psychological development are especially apt. In a number of plays the 
internalisation of the law-giving Other, as language, produces the mankind figure as 
socialized and transcendent. This chapter also considers the implication that 
maturity is, by its nature, linguistic: a theoretical position held both by the moral 
plays and by post-modern psychoanalysis. 
In Chapter Three I use evidence from the body of moral plays in general to 
scrutinize how the plays characterize the concept 'enemy' or 'vice figure'. Given 
that the term is subject to enlargement into a multiplicity of forms, it is necessary to 
consider its constituent details, and then the significance of those details for the 
plays' view of 'otherness'. I then demonstrate how the classification thus 
established can be productive of critical insight, by applying it to Mankind. 
Following from this, Chapter Four shows how the clearly oppositional 
relationship between self and other becomes unstable as the plays of the mid-century 
explore the theatrical possibilities of the vice figure. The principal play used here is 
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Wapull's The Tarrieth No Man. Ulpian Fulwell's Like Will To Like, 
W. Wager's Enough is as Good as a Feast and Thomas Lupton's All For Money 
then revise the picture of the 'other' that earlier plays established. The concept of 
'otherness' as expressed by the vice figures tends to slide along the chain of 
signifiers. In so doing, the vice figure gathers seemingly endless extra details of 
stage-convention. Chapter Four documents that insatiability, through which the 
history of the moral play was permanently affected. 
Chapter Four also observes the movement from discussion of the individual 
to discussion of society. Here the creation of 'abjected' classes out of the figures of 
otherness is located within the theatrical logic of the plays' discourse. This chapter 
concludes with a resume of the major theoretical implications of the thesis up to that 
point. 
The approaches developed in Chapters Three and Four are used in Chapter 
Five to consider the position of those female characters which function as 'other' in 
certain moral plays. I begin by considering William Punt's endightment of mother 
messe, continue with The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune and conclude with 
Lingua. In the course of the investigation, the existence of a 'female vice' character 
is detected, a convention whose existence has implications for many later plays 
which fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
Chapter Six examines some results of the translation of the moral 'otherness' 
of the vice figure into the social 'otherness' of women. 
In Chapter Seven I consider that female character which is a reversal of the 
'female vice' : the character of the 'virtuous woman'. Interesting examples of the 
'virtuous woman' character are found in the Digby Mary Magdalene, Medwall's 
Fulgens and Lucres, Lewis Wager's Merry Magdalen, W. Wager's Virtuous and 
Godly Susanna and John Phillip's Patient Grissel. These plays chart a transition in 
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the representation of the 'virtuous woman' which echoes other transitions in the 
moral play, and hence in its representations of the moral world. 
I conclude the thesis with an overview, summarizing the ways in which the 
moral plays use the concept of otherness. 
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NOTES TO PREFACE 
1I use lower case 'vice' and 'vice figure' in order to include the subordinate 
characters who typically abet the main vice figure, and who can share the attributes 
of the principal Vice among themselves. This convention is especially useful when 
describing characters who behave like vice figures at some times but not at others, 
and for plays where vice characteristics are distributed amongst several characters. 
Upper case 'Vice' is reserved for those figures described as the Vice in the 
original text of the play. 'Principal Vice' also refers to a prominent vice figure, 
and is useful to distinguish such a figure from other members of the vice crew. 
2 Understanding has been furthered by Glynne Wickham, in Early En English 
ages 1300-1660 (London and New York, 1959-1981), by Richard Southern, in 
The Medieval Theatre in the Round (London, 1957) and The Staging of Plays 
Before Shakespeare (London, 1973), by T. W. Craik, in The Tudor Interlude 
(Leicester, 1962), and other theatre historians. 
3 The debate about Heywood's Play of the Wether, for example, tends to 
centre on its status as advice to Henry VIII. D. M. Bevington 'Is John Heywood's 
Play of the Weth er Really About the Weather? ' Renaissance Drama, 7 (1964), 
pp. 11-19, is followed by Peter Happ6's introduction to his edition of the play, 
which specifically locates Jupiter as Henry VIII: The Plays of John Heywood, 
Tudor Moral Interludes, 6 (Cambridge, 1991). 
4 References to moral plays are always to the edition in the bibliography. 
Where more than one edition is mentioned, reference is to that marked with an 
asterisk. In addition, I footnote the full relevant reference at the beginning of each 
substantial discussion of a play. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE MORAL PLAY: BINARISM AND ALLEGORY 
'Youe the-crowe-is-white youe, youe the-swanne-is- 
blacke youe. ' 1 
Proverbial accusations of lying mimic our main problem with the moral 
play, for everyone knows that a real liar does not exactly call the crow white - such 
a lie would be inefficiently obvious. Instead, a liar may delude one into believing 
some shade of grey. But the Moralities offer a world of black-versus-white morals. 
There, the mankind figure is a virtuous white until he errs, when he becomes 
wholly sinful (occasionally even literally 'blacked up' ). 2 Repentance finally 
bleaches him again. And we, recognizing their implausibility, categorize the moral 
plays as naive, unprofitable, incredible - any term that labels the archaic as 
defective. 
An alternative reaction to the moral play is to probe more deeply into its 
overtly black-and-white world, trusting that a form that enjoyed durable popularity 
at all social and intellectual levels must have had something more to offer. 
In this chapter, I begin by defining the group of moral plays. The 'black- 
versus-white' attribute suggests that they involve binary modes of thought. Next I 
discuss the issue of staged allegory, for this is the dominant mode of presentation of 
the plays. Finally, the binarist black-versus-white' suggests that modern theories 
of otherness will illuminate the plays' founding principle. 
No commonly-accepted description exists which defines the plays I wish to 
consider as a coherent group. It is therefore useful to begin by setting out the 
characteristics which they share. The period of the 'moral Play', extending for my 
Purposes from The Castle of Perseverance (c. 1400) to Lingua (1607; written 
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c. 1595-1600), contains numerous examples of the form. While recognizing that 
many plays are marginal cases, it is clearly necessary to determine as accurately as 
possible which texts belong to the class of 'moral plays'. I suggest that moral plays 
have one or more of four broad characteristics in common. 
i) Moral plays are overtly concerned with philosophical matters, in 
particular, Christian morality and problems of ethical behaviour. They see the 
human being divided between spiritual and material goals, because that person 
cannot but enter into a relationship with the contaminated material world. From 
this they put forward discussions of what it means to be human, and of the 
processes of self-definition. Their discussion focusses particularly on the nature of 
language and considers the relation between language and truth. With humanity 
presented as self-constructing through a series of decisions taken in the course of 
life, it follows that essentially metaphysical discussions of cause and temporality are 
also implicit in many of the plays. 
ii) The plays typically view the world as structured on an adversarial model. 
Within the idea of the adversarial I include a cluster of several interrelated concepts. 
A play constructed in the adversarial mode perceives a debate or battle as an 
appropriate description of the decision-making process. With a few exceptions, 
3 the 
opposed forces are most commonly seen by the moral play as 'good' and 'evil'. 
The two sides are seen as fundamentally opposed to each other by their very 
natures. They are, therefore, external to each other, and this feature of externality 
is an important implication of the adversarial mode. 
iii) The use of allegory follows inevitably from the theatrical construction of 
the adversaries as abstract qualities of ' good' and ' evil' .4 With the refinements and 
choices available to the allegorist, allegorical representation readily feeds the plays' 
interest in both metaphysical and psychological analyses. 
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The presence of allegory, however, is not a necessary condition for 
regarding a play as a 'moral play,. Plays may satisfy criteria one and two while 
containing no overtly allegorical characters. Again, a play could conceivably be 
allegorical without being a 'moral play'. 
iv) Some scholars take the presence of a vice figure as an indicator of the 
genre of the morality play. The Vice has been the subject of numerous detailed 
studies. 6 As an allegorical figure of wrongdoing, the Vice embodies the concept of 
evil as external. The presence of a Vice or vice figure in a play raises the image of 
an external moral threat to the individual. In so doing, it defines the protagonist as 
relatively ignorant and in need of moral knowledge. Thus, by the late sixteenth 
century, the inclusion of such a familiar character is sufficient on its own to re- 
structure the emphases of a play into the alignments of the moral play, even if only 
in passing. Further, the highly ramified nature of conventional vice-play means that 
the concept of the vice figure can be extremely easily alluded to by a detail of 
behaviour in another character. 
Of these four characteristics, only the first two can be regarded as criteria 
for inclusion in the category: the third and fourth are useful as guidelines to the 
presence of a 'moral play', but also as indications of areas which need further 
analysis. Although the two criteria are conceptual, while the two guidelines are 
formal, these categories are inter-related when the presence of a formal structure 
reminds us, through long prior association, of one of the conceptual structures. The 
presence of a Vice, a vice figure, or behavioural allusions to these in a non- 
allegorical work may regularly be treated as indications that the play could usefully 
be read as a 'moral play'. 
In summary, then, I apply the term 'moral play' to all those plays, whether 
allegorical or not, which debate the relationship between mankind and the virtuous 
life, while considering what it is that opposes the realisation of goodness. 
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Developing a new way of listing the features of the moral play re-focusses 
attention on the issue of categorization, and on its functions. Although these 
guidelines are derived from a preliminary analysis of the plays, they also, in turn, 
determine the kinds of remarks that seem to be appropriate to individual plays, and 
to the inter-relationships of texts within the moral play corpus. For example, far 
from being tired homilies on ethical truisms, the plays reveal themselves as a 
polyvocal debate, in which play addresses and answers play in an intricate set of 
statements of themes, responses, and variations on themes. Their discussion is 
conducted by means of allusions and direct quotations of one another, both verbal 
and visual. 
The first criterion makes the suggestion that the plays may profitably be 
interrogated for their philosophical content. I see the moral plays as theorists, and 
quite probably influential ones, on various intellectual issues, which are not 
necessarily their overt subjects. 
In exploring the plays' attitudes to 'otherness' I focus on one of their 
principal concerns: moral and emotional self-definition. I suggest that there is a 
formulation for the moral plays' field of investigation comparable to that described 
by Howard.? How can a person reconcile a sense of the individual, choice-making 
self with the need to conform to normative moral dictates? 8 Where is moral 
meaning to be found, when language is deeply implicated in theological uncertainty, 
and interpretation, though the responsibility of each individual, is conducted in the 
face of opposed sets of spiritual advice? It is suggestive of a concern about the self 
that the sin which permeates the plays is the sin of Pride: that assertion of 
individuality and of a right to choose. 
In building up a picture of the intertextual debate, inclusive rather than 
exclusive guidelines are helpful. All four features enable many of the Romances 
and 'hybrid plays' of the mid- and late-sixteenth century, populated either largely or 
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totally by named characters, to be included in discussions of the moral play. 9 The 
Digby N[M Magdalene (c. 1500) and Lewis Wager's Mary Magdalene (1566); the 
Romance plays of Clyomon and Clamydes (c. 1576) and The Rare Triumphs of 
Love and Fortune (1589), not to mention Othello, can all be fruitfully read as 
belonging to this particularized branch of the moral play. When a hybrid or a 
Romance manifests the adversarial and externalizing mode, its place in the moral 
play genre is clear. Using more generous structural criteria clarifies the situation of 
the many late examples in which 'evil' has been re-worked as 'chance' or 'fate' - 
that is, evil with no motive. By including later plays and tangential forms in the 
genre, we are able to build up a fuller picture of the ramifications through which the 
adversarial mode of discussion passed. 
All the plays I would wish to include in the moral play genre explicitly 
assume that good and evil exist. They are concerned to establish exactly what both 
of these are, and how one may recognize them. The moral play form is thus a way 
of interpreting the world, but that interpretation is not a single one replicated 
identically, so much as a set of terms, which, in the variety of their constellations, 
construct a variety of pictures of the world. Such a structure sees human beings as 
divided but essentially moral decision-making creatures, located in a milieu whose 
physical condition constantly insists that choices be made. 
The concept of the 'adversarial' focusses attention on the moral play's 
inherent formulation of the moral world as a binary structure. Binarism itself opens 
several fruitful approaches to the plays. 
One might regard the corpus of plays as itself a debate, or set of discourses. 
The plots, the theatrical conventions and the characterizations within the plays 
constitute in turn the language, the syntax and the vocabulary which carry the 
meaning. Thus any play which codes moral meaning as 'good' versus 'evil' 
functions within a binary linguistic theory, attempting to construct signification out 
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of oppositions. In the course of the play, the meaning of the term 'mankind figure', 
for example, is in part defined, detail by detail, in opposition to the details 
ebulliently thrust upon us as the meaning of the term 'vice figure'. As one analyses 
these terms more deeply, one finds Derridean effects of variation according to 
context. What seems from a distance like a set of clear and repeated stereotypes 
becomes in close-up much more fuzzy, much less definable, and much more 
interesting. 
One linguistic manifestation of the adversarial world view is the dialogue, a 
form peculiarly suited to the philosophical analysis of abstract concepts. Dialogue 
works on several levels. The moral play contains a verbal debate in which both 
sides put forward arguments to influence the choice-making mankind figure-10 In 
addition to any verbal arguments that characters put forward, there is the 'argument' 
conducted by the meta-linguistic features of characterisation - the complex 
behaviour and the suggested motivations of the contending figures. These may even 
override their primary purpose: to put forward their contribution to the logical and 
narrative debates which are the plays' ostensible reason for existing. On the stage it 
is not merely impossible to ignore the human qualities of the presenter of the 
argument, those qualities become central to the presentation of the issues. Thus, 
when the plays represent an abstract quality such as 'evil' or 'otherness', the 
character to whom it is attributed, the behaviour of that person, and the results in 
plot terms are all relevant to the judgments that the play makes about that quality. 
This may be in harmony with the official assertions that occur as statements of fact 
within the play, or fruitfully in contrast to them. 
The binarism of dialogue and of debate is focussed towards an eventual 
unity: that acceptance of truth and abolition of falsehood which ideally takes place 
with successful persuasion. " For all that the vice figures may use worldly 
temptations, and play upon the mankind figure's physical frailties, it rapidly 
becomes clear that persuasive argument is always a key element in the dramatic 
construction. The vice characters' persuasions have the appearance of rational 
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argument, while functioning through other means, as will be made clearer in the 
next chapter. The mankind figure is persuaded to sin because the vice figures 
choose temptations which relate to the hero's immediate physical condition. Behind 
this instantaneous efficacy of simple temptation lies a popular belief in the semi- 
magical persuasive power of the Devil's language. The performance of a 
contradiction between language as morally dangerous and language as a method of 
seeking spiritual truth is the state of being of the moral play. It is because of this 
contradiction that the moral plays can be read as discussions of the relation between 
language and truth. 
Allegory 
Although allegory in poetry is widely discussed, the theory of theatrical 
allegory has received relatively little attention. 12 Clearly the debate form does not 
necessitate allegorical representation, although that is already present in the earliest 
sources of the moral play. However, another strand which feeds the moral play - 
the view of life as a moral pilgrimage - does require allegory. 
13 When the 
allegorical mode is used to image the world as adversarial, it renders visible the 
externality implicit in the moral plays' model of reality. A large group of critics 
sees the use of allegory as the defining feature of the moral play, and although I 
would not go so far, it is certainly present at the foundation of the genre. 14 On the 
stage, allegory gains extra complexity. In interpreting the sign offered by an actor 
playing ade, for example, we enter into several separate signifying codes, all 
functioning at once. 
Of these, the literary code is the initiator, and has been widely explored. By 
this I mean the code which conventionally reproduces the concept 'pride' as the 
name of a human figure in a text to be read rather than acted. Such a being must 
represent pride with all his attributes, and that representational need takes 
precedence over other considerations such as likelihood or consistency. This static 
Pride of poetry, art and civic tableaux is not an agent or a subject so much as an 
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opportunity for a visually aureate expansion on a term. It is this code of which 
Marion Jones says that allegorical characters are 'in the strictest sense inhuman'. 15 
Within any one allegorical figure numerous implicit attributes are available. In 
other words it is difficult to keep an allegorical figure pure. If spectators see simply 
the abstraction 'Pride' they see a thing to be reviled in all circumstances. If, 
however, this vision is transformed into one of 'a proud person', that must by 
definition be someone who is capable of salvation, though the symbolic needs of the 
play cannot allow such a move. By its very nature, then, stage allegory 
problematizes the moral plays' overt representation of the world as offering each 
individual a clear-cut choice between good and evil. It plays within a moral 
structure seen as fixed, in such a way as to de-stabilize it. Theatrical allegory, 
therefore, is peculiarly constructed to call into question any attempt to fix language 
and meaning. In this way it enters into the moral plays' debate on the nature of 
language. 
A second, closely related code, develops when this object in human form 
enters into relationships based on aphorisms. Thus, because 'Pride goeth before a 
fall', for example, the figure may stumble. As a result of the figure's intensified 
symbolic qualities, any movement it makes may be read in these terms. 16 In this 
way new statements may evolve, all the more impressive and convincing to the 
onlooker for being enacted allegorically. The symbol, then, when interacting with 
the real world, re-locates within its own structure of significations that aspect of 
reality which it encounters. However, in such a mixture of the compositional and 
the interpretive forms of allegory, interpretation is liberated. If, for example, the 
actor dressed as Pride kneels to the Queen, a significant but enigmatic tableau is 
created. The kneeling figure is open to numerous interpretations, each of which in 
turn re-symbolizes the figure of the Queen. 
When Pride steps onto a stage as a character, he enters into a narrative 
framework whose purposes are wider and more varied than those of the aphoristic 
statement. In the course of the narrative, demands may well be made on Pride as a 
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character which are no longer coherent with any rational rhetorical expansion on the 
concept of 'pride'. If, for the sake of the entertainment, Pride must steal a horse or 
make silly puns, he will do so. If he must leave the stage in a hurry to allow the 
plot to proceed, or to double another role, that, too, will take precedence over the 
requirements of allegorical coherence. 
An actor playing the abstract quality of Pride can only 'become' the ideal 
Pride up to a point. There is always an individual residue which exceeds the formal 
needs of the character. Words are to be spoken, and in some accent or other, which 
relates to a real world. All physical characteristics can be read as significant about 
Pride, in addition to being casual attributes of the actor. 17 Before an audience, this 
residue undergoes a re-symbolizing process, tending with time and reiteration to add 
its features to the original Pride-signifiers, so creating a new, composite convention. 
There is a similar code of the real that appears when the working, 
unregulatable human being is visible behind the role. Hints of that person's 
presence institute an actual, if highly formal, social relationship between audience 
and actor, which underwrites the theatrical character of Pride on a curious level: a 
provider of fun, a professional at work, above all a human being, and so someone 
with whom the audience might identify, and for whom they might reasonably have 
sympathy. t8 
I contend that, on the stage, attributes which are initially incidental readily 
come to be stereotypically associated with the character. Accidents of casting or of 
humour, especially if repeated, regularly become appropriated to the abstraction. In 
this way, representation of the allegorical character is progressively elaborated, 
permitting increasing realism of characterisation. 19 More dangerously, with the 
repetition on stage of these realistic qualities, it becomes very easy to attribute the 
moral defect, pride, to persons in real life who have the same, initially casual, 
attributes. 
Within the code of theatrical behaviour, some kinds of gesture are perceived 
as more realistic than others, some kinds of motivation or narrative are seen as more 
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probable. This relates more to our beliefs about life than it does to life as it is 
lived. More importantly, it relates to our ways of coding our ideas about the world. 
Even so-called 'realistic' characters are inevitably stereotyped, poeticized, artificial 
to some degree. 20 In the case of the longer and more elaborate allegorical roles, the 
`abstract' quality is inclined to appear as a fall-back position, when the realistic 
action flags, or else as a kind of running joke, satirizing behaviour seen as typical 
of a certain kind of person. The enacted abstraction is imbued with features which, 
if not strictly human in a naturalistic sense of the word, could at least be 'human' in 
the formal sense established by theatrical representation. Further, since audiences 
had (and have) considerable capacities for reading from the particular to the general 
even in the case of highly individuated, named characters, any attempted distinction 
between allegorical and literal drama on the basis of interpretation readily collapses 
into the much less radical distinction between compositional and interpretive 
allegory. 21 
Though the moral plays' aim may be 'the correction of vice in the 
audience', 22 their medium is the staged exemplary narrative. Like Robert Potter I 
see the analysis of the human experience as fundamental to the project of the 
plays. 23 To this analysis must be added an idea which is a necessary consequence 
of the allegory form, namely the assumption that any articulated concept is external 
to the figure of the self, as represented by the mankind figure. One result of 
allegory, then, is that human experience is divided into the internal and the external 
in unfamiliar and challenging ways. 
There is a contradiction between these two fundamental qualities of the 
moral play. The adversarial world view is grounded in binarism, but its expression 
through stage allegory leads towards multiple interpretations. Several modem 
theories of 'otherness' are helpful in considering this contradiction. 
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'Otherness' 24 
We are inclined to refer to the concept of the 'other' as if it was single and 
recognisable, when in fact it relies on a cluster of theoretical positions, not all of 
them mutually compatible, from which it derives its intellectual force. While one 
wishes to treat 'the other' as a concept essential to semiotics within the plays' 
theories of language, one must not forget that the plays are also both social 
representations and cultural artefacts. For that reason it is useful to take into 
account the position of the concept of 'the other' within psychoanalytic and 
sociological discourses. I intend to analyse moral plays with certain modern 
theoretical structures in mind as an enabling vocabulary, in order to see what kinds 
of 'otherness' the plays themselves enlist in their discussions. 
'Otherness' and 'the other' are terms in widespread, commonplace critical 
use, often functioning as apparently non-technical terms, or at least ones whose 
theoretical background is uniform and widely accepted. Joan Kelly can ask, without 
further explanation, 'What accounts for woman's situation as 'other, and what 
perpetuates it historically? '25 Exactly what we understand by 'other' here is rather 
variable, depending on whether we believe it to be an 'other' that is equal but 
opposite; the 'other' necessary for linguistic definition; the 'low other' of the 
Freudian unconscious; the Marxist 'other' of Bakhtinian carnival, and so on. 
At its simplest, 'otherness' implies a binary structure, as of 0-1, identical 
with one of the most straightforward explanations of the construction of meaning in 
language. It is useful to begin here, for this is the structure dictated by two of the 
founding conceptions of the moral play: the adversarial and the allegorical. It is 
convenient and appropriate to designate the alternate term in that opposition as 
'self'. Peter Stallybrass and Allon white describe an opposition between high and 
low which has much in common with the self/other distinction so useful in 
considering the moral play, since the plays also categorize the aspiring self in terms 
of a rise, and the opposition to this rise as a fall in both social and moral terms. 26 
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Equally, studies connecting the comic elements of the moral play with folk play and 
carnival call up the importance of Bakhtin's ' low' . 
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Greenblatt uses the concept of otherness in a way which is relevant to the 
moral plays. Most of his 'governing conditions common to most instances of self- 
fashioning' involve otherness: for example, 'Self-fashioning is achieved in relation 
to something perceived as alien, strange or hostile. This threatening Other - 
heretic, savage, witch, adultress, traitor, Antichrist - must be discovered or invented 
in order to be attacked and destroyed. '28 Where Greenblatt talks about the 
Renaissance 'self' y focussing on the intellectual orientations of the great, the 
moral plays offer a popularized version of otherness, providing a conceptual 
structure adapted to general use but comparable to those which he puts forward. 
Clearly, differences in usage abound, several of which are useful in a 
discussion of the moral plays. Some of those issues can be best introduced through 
an examination of a section of text. Of course, not every issue is contained in one 
short passage, but it provides a springboard into further theoretical discussion. 
At the beginning of Mankind, a speech by Mercy describes the spiritual 
condition of the human being. 29 Mercy is interrupted by Mischief, who confronts 
him on several levels. The seeds of much that relates to 'otherness' and 'the other' 
in the moral play genre are embedded in Mercy's opening lines, in the fact of 
Mischiefs confrontation, and in the content of their dialogue. 
Mercy's opening speech sets up an orthodox spiritual system which contains 
a relationship between God and man. 
Mercy: The very fownder and begynner of owr fyrst 
creacyon 
Amonge ws synfull wrechys he oweth to be 
magnyfyede, 
0.1-2) 
At first, sin (as disobedience) is an attribute of mankind, and located in a historic 
past, before the coming of Christ. 
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at for owr dysobedyenc he hade non indygnacyon 
To sende hys own son to be torn and crucyfyede. 
(L3-4) 
Mediation between God and humanity is conducted by Mercy himself and by the 
Virgin Mary. 
pat 3e may be partycypable of hys retribucyon. 
I haue be ýe very mene for yowr restytucyon 
Mercy ys my name, at mornyth for yowr offence. 
(1.16-18) 
ýe grett mercy of Gode, at ys of most preemmynence, 
Be medyacyon of Owr Lady ýat ys euer habundante 
To pe synfull creature ýt wyll repent hys neclygence. 
(1.21-23) 
At this point an oppositional term enters Mercy's scheme: 'For yowr gostly enmy 
wyll make hys avaunte, ' (1.27). The traditional term 'enemy', referring to the 
agents of evil as well as to the devil, is one which the moral play picks up and uses 
as a structural concept. So far, I have equated externality with otherness. Not 
every quality which is represented as external to mankind need be seen as other to 
him. In particular, the virtuous characters occupy a special position, identified with 
both the mankind figure's and the audience's presumed opinions. That this is the 
self which is presumed can be seen from the readiness with which the terms 'the 
enemy' and 'the antagonist' can be used to refer indiscriminately both to the vice 
figures and to the Devil as originator of their actions. 30 Thus the relationship 
between mankind, good and evil should not be viewed strictly as that between a self 
and two forms of otherness, nor should the mankind figure himself be seen as fully 
congruent with the self suggested by the play as a whole. There is an assumption of 
fallenness, of loss, of inadequate understanding in the mankind figure before he has 
achieved a concluding state of moral maturity. The presence of the good characters 
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is seen as pre-requisite to the mankind figure's acquisition of full selfhood, which 
he gains by taking on their fundamental qualities. The plays therefore contain a 
presumed self: the ideal but possible being whose moral position Mankitg,, (for 
example) occupies at the beginning and end of the play. The self is also the 
apparent point of origin of the moral plays' discourse, and its moral position is 
assumed to be the same as that of their addressee, the audience. The plays display a 
marvellous confidence that the audience subscribes to their homiletic content. Thus 
within a three-way system of God, man and devil, a binarism emerges, in which a 
stress on the forces of good collects them together, and includes the audience, as '0 
e souerens at sytt and e brothern at stonde ryght wppe' (1.29), into an alliance 
which faces 'e mortali enmye, at vemynousse serpente' (1.40). 
It is often suggested that the vice figure is a potent point of identification for 
the audience. He provides the fun, and interacts with the audience, often 
collusively. Such an approach implies a different location of the plays' presumed 
self from that suggested here. However, for an audience to find the vice figure 
entertaining is not necessarily to disrupt the virtuous self. Paula Neuss has shown 
that the vice figures in Mankind cause the audience to identify with 'naughty' 
behaviour by singing coarse songs and feeling bored with virtue. 31 In so doing the 
members of the audience discover that such behaviour is shameful, and then share 
in Mankind's conversion. Neuss thus demonstrates the homiletic effect of an 
attractive vice figure. 32 It follows that the play's presumed self is the virtuous self 
of the happy ending. In the earliest days at least, then, the self contains both the 
mankind figure and the representatives of virtue. The other to this self is simply the 
Devil and his assistants or descendants, the vice figures. 
The pattern of mankind figure and oppositional tempter suggests a reading of 
the tempter as an aspect of the mankind figure himself. Mankind himself is most 
easily led away from pious frugality when he is tired or hungry, or else when he is 
bored and discouraged. That sequence is repeated with variations through many 
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plays. Because it is the human condition to be encased in a body, and thus to have 
material needs, the tempter is in a position to offer what the mankind figure desires, 
in the sense of supplying his bodily wants. 33 In addition, the nature of those wants 
is frequently seen as connected to the particular age and stage of life that the 
mankind figure has reached. The familiar linkages between Avarice and old age; 
Lust and youth; Anger and middle age, and so on, are taken for granted in 
numerous plays. This model makes available a picture of 'evil' as inherently part of 
the psyche since the wanting or desiring that each of these deadly sins supplies is 
internal to the human psyche. 34 At first glance this view is very different from the 
picture of the mankind figure as opposed by an external force full of malice. These 
two readings of the moral play can be reconciled by presuming complex systems of 
projection and paranoia. If susceptibility to worldliness is presented as depending 
more on the nature of the person tempted than on the external temptation, then the 
play is a macrocosm, displaying the divisions and contradictions within the 
individual. 35 In this way, the allegorical mode demonstrates the Freudian process 
of projection, by which the effects of unwanted aspects of the self are allocated to 
external agencies. 36 
In many ways the play's human protagonist is clearly representative of the 
spectators. Nevertheless, they are also more experienced than he is. They know 
the expected progress of the play; they understand the official descriptions of good 
and evil; and they are often kept informed, through the vice figures, of the deceits 
in the plot. The dynamic of the play is thus to reinforce the audience's splitting. 
While it asks the spectators to look within themselves and reject a certain area of 
their behaviour this is done by categorizing that desire as 'other': by projecting it 
onto the vice figures, the fool or the tempter. As the hero comes to comprehend his 
narrative, inevitable moral decisions about his own 'self -development involve a 
rejection of certain parts of the self. The audience is invited to identify with that 
'knowing' aspect of mankind which develops towards the end of the play. 
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Similarly, as the mankind figure sees the error of his ways, he approaches more 
closely to the assumed position of the audience, which is constructed as fully aware. 
That the object of desire should be seen as 'evil', as deserving of punishment and in 
need of abolition, is coherent with the idea of repression and negative projection. 
Here, too, certain unacceptable urges are deemed either not to exist, or to exist 
elsewhere, that is, to be disowned. The price of this belief in the knowing self is 
that same repression. By scrutinizing the elements out of which the 'enemy' is 
constructed, we detect those aspects of the individual which are considered 
unacceptable. In psychoanalytic terms, the repressed, or perhaps more accurately, 
the unsuccessfully repressed, appears on stage as the enemy of the mankind 
figure. 37 The move to repudiate the wicked other by banishing the vices is not 
made on logical grounds, for as we have seen, the assumptions of the moral play 
form pre-judge the result of the pseudo-debate they offer. 
It is possible to take this psychoanalytic view further, and consider how that 
model, in which the characters of the moral play represent divisions of the 
individual's psychological structure, can be related to society as a whole. The 
macrocosm of the social structure is then read psychoanalytically, as containing 
repressions, desire, and so on. As Greenblatt has indicated, such a reading is 
always available. 38 The translation of psychoanalysis into the social sphere is 
particularly appropriate to the plays of the mid-century, when they transform the 
logic of the established moral play form from discussion of the individual to 
discussion of society. Here otherness is writ large into social terms. The reasoning 
behind a psychoanalytic reading of social moralities is not that this pattern is 
analogous with the individual's repressions, but that it is structurally identical with 
it. The attribution of otherness to entire social groups fits neatly with the 
generalizing tone of the moral plays. The dilemma for a social reading is that 
otherness is a directional concept: it depends on establishing in the first place the 
viewpoint from which both control and submission are identified. Where the notion 
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of repression may be easily expounded for the individual, it is less clear how it 
relates, other than metaphorically, to a society consisting of many conscious 
individuals. This social theory of otherness, therefore, conflates power and 
consciousness, a symbolic rather than an actual identity. 
Such a move is enabled by structuralist anthropology and taken up by New 
Historicist literary criticism. When the plays' model of the microcosmic individual 
soul can be expansively interpreted as a model of contemporary human society, the 
position of 'self' s occupied by certain empowered social groups, while 'other' 
involves the abjected39 groups of that historical period. In this move, individuals or 
groups representing evil allegorically, come to be treated as actually evil. On a 
naive level, such a reading naturalizes the allegory: it de-allegorizes the play, by 
reading the 'evil' characters metonymically as images of real people. These 
characters come to be read as examples of the class of people they seem to be drawn 
from, and so as signs summarizing the moral qualities of that class. 
The abjected groups represented in this way thus tend to lose their status as 
perfectible (and hence as fully human) in the eyes of those who deem themselves to 
be the perfectible if fallible selves of the plays. Those groups in turn infuse with 
their definitions the ideological/cultural artefacts which both mould and exemplify 
dominant opinions. 
One witnesses a representation of a structure of empowering/abjection in the 
moral play, but although such a representation is highly suggestive, it is not 
reasonable to base conclusions about actual social relationships on this alone. For 
that reason, the present study is principally to revise our estimation of the plays, and 
only secondarily to be used as part of a social/historical argument being built 
elsewhere. 
We have seen that the grouping of man/God/Devil can readily be treated as 
if conflated into good/evil or self/other. However, a contrary application of the 
self/other opposition can be observed when the plays focus on an opposition 
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between God and the mankind figure. Mercy raises this possibility when he refers 
to 'dysobedyenc' in 1.3 of Mankind. From the beginning of that play a system of 
laws is shown to exist, and the project of many of the plays is to explore the 
mankind figure's changing relationship with that system. In this case the self is the 
mankind figure, the struggling individual who exemplifies the condition of all 
human beings in the world. To this self, the other is a set of moral laws and 
contingencies which govern his condition by structuring it, and structure it by 
cutting into its pre-social urges. Such a social other, external to the individual, 
involves a wholly different category from the abjected sociological other described 
above. Impinging on the self, as an enforcing external structure, simultaneously 
linguistic and cultural, it resembles the paternal authority put forward by Lacanian 
theory, and is commonly described as the Other (capital O). ' That can be 
described as the location from which the Other speaks, announcing the structure into 
which the pre-verbal inchoate individual must accept its insertion, in order to 
become verbal, and thus a self, in the sense of becoming a speaking subject. This 
returns us, from another direction, to the idea already mentioned above that in many 
of the plays the mankind figure is somehow not a complete human being until the 
end of that learning process which is itself the plot. 
Seeing the acceptance of language as a kind of apotheosis of the immature 
self leads one into a more strictly linguistic view of the plays' self/other schemes. 
The opening scene of Manigind suggests some of the subversions to which a binary 
system of interpreting the world is vulnerable. Towards the end of the long opening 
speech, Mercy moves to consider another kind of opposition: one between virtuous 
and wrong-doing people in the audience, and their fates at the Last Judgment: 
For sekyrly ýer xall be a streyt examynacyon, 
The corn xall be sauyde, pe chaffe xall be brente. 
(1.42-3) 
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In this opposition, an individual is no longer comfortably on the side of virtue in all 
circumstances. Moreover, the image that Mercy uses also suggests that there is a 
wholeness formed by the parts of the opposition. Corn and chaff together are 
derived from a single plant; good and evil together make up a whole society, and 
the whole of the options open to man. Here, then, the fact of division is essential to 
the very existence of the system, while at the same time the division is a 
hierarchical one: to be 'brente' is the undesirable fate. In any binary opposition one 
term is inferior. 
Mischiefs startling interruptive speech is more than the mere nonsense it 
seems to be. It responds directly to the system Mercy has described in ways which 
sometimes support, sometimes subvert it. In the first place, the arrival of a second 
figure appears to support Mercy's binarist view of the world as involving self and 
enemy, by presenting a visual figure of opposition. Through the vastly different, 
vigorous verse form, Mischief raises a sense of confrontation with Mercy, and 
rivals him for control of the stage. Rivalry is exactly what Mercy has predicted, so 
Mischief's presence and manner support the orthodoxy. 41 
Mischief, however, also raises fundamental problems posed by any 
signifying system. The first is that its binarities are arbitrary, and as such are open 
to re-interpretation. Binarism itself may be accosted in the process. Mischief 
demonstrates an alternative reading of the grain-harvesting metaphor. He discovers 
that chaff and corn may both be useful in different ways, and that in 'straw' there is 
yet a third term needed to complete the picture. 
Ande )e sayde pe corn xulde be sauyde and Pe chaffe xulde be feryde, 
And he prouyth nay, as yt schewth be dis werse: 
'Corn seruit bredibus, chaffe horsibus, straw fyrybusque. ' 
Thys ys as moche to say, to yowr leude wndyrstondynge, 
As fe corn xall serue to brede at le nexte bakynge. 
'Chaff horsybus, et reliqua, ' 
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The chaff to horse xall be goode provente, 
(1.55-61) 
Again, he transforms the Hellish connotations of burning, set up by Mercy's 'the 
chaff shall be brent', into the practical need to keep out the cold with warm fires: 
When a man ys forcolde pe straw may be brent 
(1.62) 
Mercy, of course, has claimed, in God, a transcendental source validating the 
system he has put forward. God will divide all humanity into corn (the virtuous) 
and chaff (the wicked). Mischief opposes a 'realistic' correlative as a touchstone 
for meaning. All things are equal since all are useful, and are distinguishable from 
one another by virtue of the context in which they are used: corn makes bread; 
chaff is useful as fodder for animals; straw can keep people warm. Even though we 
know that in these plays ultimately God's metaphoric definitions must win in 
preference to literalism, Mischief's re-reading is persuasive. As a further 
confrontation of Mercy's theory of language, Mischief alludes to a variety of 
alternative sources of language. Mercy's discourse may be a product of folly: 'your 
wit is little; your head is mickle' (1.47). 42 Alternatively, language may be obscure, 
risking meaninglessness, as in the non-existent riddle he pretends to ask: 
But, ser, I pray is questyon to claryfye: 
Mysse- masche, dryff-draff, 
(1.48-9) 
Language as naming may come from authority, as Mercy has asserted, but now an 
alternative source of that authority is mentioned: the female line. Mischief knows 
that: 'my dame said my name was Raff (1.50). This formation with 'said' also 
raises the possibility of lying, and hence of language generally as deceitful. 
Finally, it seems that speech can be bought, if one accepts Wickham's reading of 
the stage business associated with 'Unshut your lock and take an halfpenny'. 43 
The last issue highlighted by Mischief is the place of language as an 
important prize in the battle for supremacy within the moral plays. It is more than 
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just a weapon with which that battle is conducted. Meaning, especially the meaning 
of 'good' and 'evil', must be fixed if 'virtue' is to win; but if meaning can be 
dislodged, or fixed differently, then within the scheme of the plays, 'evil' has a 
hold. 
Mankind, then, demonstrates that it is appropriate to consider the moral 
plays in terms of the binarisms of self versus other. One may consider them to 
express the psychology of an individual self, in the course of which the other 
appears both as an object of desire and as the controlling paternal rule-giver. One 
may also consider the plays to embody these self-versus-other divisions which 
rationalize the power-relationships between groups or classes in society. One may 
consider the plays' interest in binarism as a discussion of the nature of meaning, 
which carries forward in other terms their more overt discussion of moral meaning. 
The moral plays' discourse is founded in structures which purport to be 
binary, and which are imaged by their stock characters: the mankind figure, the 
vice, the good adviser, and so on. However, each of these linguistic 'terms' when 
analysed, will reveal interesting ramifications as one traces its complex movement 
of construction and signification along the chain of signifiers. That meanings 
should move is inevitable; how they move generates a philosophical investigation 
into the arbitrariness of ethical behaviour. A further consequence of viewing the 
plays as a signifying system is that, like any other semiotic structure, they 
participate in the deconstructive move. 
An analysis which sees the plays as uttering a varied code of oppositions 
between inside and outside can also see the plays as analogous to linguistic 
utterances, through their use of a group of conventional signs whose meaning is 
generated in relation to one another. The 'signs' themselves, which are the 
characters, are found to be multiple and flexible, and perpetually re-invented, 
always with new signifying effects. In addition to investigating the signs in this 
semiotic system, this study will observe how secure the system itself is. As with 
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psychoanalytic criticism, it is important to refrain from using deconstruction as a 
simple template to be laid over any text. Instead, I shall show how the moral play's 
self-deconstruction provides a plausible explanation for its historical transitions into 
a more worldly, individualized drama. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
1 Resnublica, in Schell and Schuchter, pp. 237-307,1.125. Also noted in 
Tilley, C853, and Whiting, C 574. 
2 Blacking the mankind figure's face occurs as a stage direction in Merbury's 
The Marriage of Wit and Wisdom, ed. Glynne Wickham, English Moral Interludes 
(London, 1976), pp. 167-194: 
'Here shall Wantonness sing this song to the tune of 'Attend thee, go 
play thee' --- then let her set a fool's bauble on his head, and 
coiling his face; and Idleness shall steal away his purse from him, 
and go his ways. ' S. D. 1.202. 
3 See my discussions of The Play of the Wether and Love and Fortune in 
Chapter Five. 
4 Allegory is such an ancient form that one can equally easily read externality 
as a result of staging allegory. 
5 Jon Whitman in Allegory: The Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval 
Technique (Oxford, 1987), p. 168, sees allegory as 'the philosophic and literary 
articulation of the search for causes' and argues that particular allegorical 
representations are constructed according to philosophical principles. 
6 Prominent examples are L. W. Cushman, The Devil and the Vice (London, 
1900), and Bernard Spivack, ShakesR= and the Allegory of Evil (New York and 
London, 1958). 
7 Donald R. Howard considers human concern with the comparable areas of 
economics and morals, with regard to major medieval texts, in The Three 
Temptations: Medieval Man in Search of the World (Princeton, 1966). He sees 
Piers Plowman, for example as analysing the human condition in economic terms: 
'How, he [the dreamer] asks, can men supply the primary needs of life if they will 
not submit to the toil of producing goods? How can they produce those goods 
without being lured by the lust of the eyes? How can the social order run smoothly 
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without becoming corrupt? "How shall the world be served? ". ' p. 166. 
8 Issues to do with free will in the moral play are discussed by Carolynn Van 
Dyke, The Fiction of Truth: Structures of Meaning in Narrative and Dramatic 
Allegory (Ithaca and London, 1985), p. 153; by Merle Fifield in The Rhetoric of 
Free Will (Ilkley, 1974), pp. 10-11 and by E. N. S. Thompson, in 'The English 
Moral Plays', in Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 14 
(1910), pp. 293-408 (p. 358). 
9 The kind of classificatory tangle that the romances can create is exemplified 
in the Introduction to a recent edition, by John Isaac Owen, of The Rare Triumphs 
of Love and Fortune (New York and London, 1979). Owen perceives that some 
relationship exists between Love and Fortune and the Moralities, but has difficulty 
pinning it down. He accepts that a moral contention is an important feature of the 
genre, and considers that the argument between Venus and Fortune might satisfy 
that requirement. He does not notice, however, that these two characters are 
structurally identical, since both function as external, controlling deities in relation 
to the human beings. The real moral contention of the play is between the self- 
determining individual and the arbitrariness of fate: in other words, a relationship 
identical to that between the mankind figure and the vice figure. Owen discards 
Love and Fortune from the moral play genre because 'it contains no moral, no 
conflict between the forces of good and evil, and teaches no significant lesson for 
the guidance of life', p. 205. On the contrary, the play offers a very traditional 
piece of advice: the need for the virtue of constancy. Within the play, the virtuous 
decision of the loving human beings is repeatedly challenged by the inconstant 
effects of the gods' trial. Although the tone is secular, the moral content is 
manifest. 
10 This leads me to put suggest an origin of the moral play other than the often- 
cited Psychomachia of Prudentius. For a discussion of The Choice of Hera . les in 
this context, see Appendix A. 
11 In this movement towards closure the moral plays do not usually fit into the 
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'open-ended debate' structure described by Joel Altman: 'an antithetical drama 
whose contrary elements reach a tentative equilibrium, but are always ready to settle 
out again. ' The Tudor Play of Mind (Berkeley and London, 1978), p. 129. 
12 Poetic allegory is discussed in C. S. Lewis, The Allegory, of Love (London, 
1936); Gay Clifford, The Transformations of Allegory (London, 1974); Jon 
Whitman, Allegory: The Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval Technique (Oxford, 
1987) and Angus Fletcher, Allegy: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca, 
1974). 
Studies of stage allegory can be found in Allegory and Representation, ed. 
Stephen Greenblatt (Baltimore, 1981), Maureen Quilligan, The Language of 
Allegory (Ithaca, 1979) and Carolynn Van Dyke, The Fiction of Truth (Ithaca and 
London, 1985). 
13 The most important source for this was de Guileville's poem, Le lerinage 
de la vie humaine and its influential translation by Lydgate as The Pilgrimage of the 
Lyfe of the Manhode, ed. Avril Henry, 2 vols, EETS, ES, 288 & 292 (London, 
1985-89). 
14 E. K. Chambers is wonderfully unequivocal: 'Far more important than this 
slight secular extension of miracle plays is another development in the direction of 
allegory, giving rise to the 'moral plays' or 'moralities' as they came indifferently 
to be called, in which the characters are no longer scriptural or legendary persons, 
but wholly or almost wholly, abstractions, and which, although still religious in 
intention, aim rather at ethical cultivation than the stablishing of faith'. Tg 
Medieval Stave, 2 vols (London, 1903), II, 151. 
Similarly combining allegory with the homiletic purposes of the plays in a 
way which almost suggests that allegory is inevitably connected with ethics, 
W. Roy Mackenzie is equally dogmatic. 'A Morality is a play, allegorical in 
structure, which has for its main object the teaching of some lesson for the guidance 
of life, and in which the principal characters are personified abstractions or highly 
universalized types. ' The dish Moralities from the Point of View of Allegory 
31 
(Boston, Mass., 1915), p. 15. 
Robert Potter sees allegory as incidental, but pervasive, rather than as 
structural. It is 'the best-known peculiarity of the medieval morality plays'. The 
English Morality Play (London and Boston, 1975), p. 37. 
Marion Jones continues the identification: 'The tradition is clearly marked, 
and involves a quite distinct principle of organisation: the allegorical. ' 'Early 
Moral Plays and the Earliest Secular Drama' in The 'Revels' History of Drama in 
English, Volume I, Medieval Drama, ed. A. C. Cawley and others (London, 1983), 
pp. 211-291 (p. 215). 
15 op. cit., p. 248. 
16 I have avoided using C. S. Lewis's distinction between the allegoric and the 
symbolic as both terms are useful to my argument here. The Allegory of Love 
(London, 1936), p. 48 
17 In this I agree with Marion Jones, 'once an abstract noun borrows flesh and 
blood from a player with full physical being, its actions appear to be those of a real 
person, and as such provoke associations and expectations which cannot be bounded 
by considerations of allegorical significance. ' cit. in note 15 above, p. 248. This 
differs from Bernard Spivack: 'His [the mankind figure's] life is a moral conflict 
and a moral choice among a multitude of contending impulses. But each of these 
impulses, as it is personified on the morality stage, expresses in its behaviour a very 
different dynamic. A personification, no matter how persuasive its human 
similitude and vital energy in play and story, is subject to none of the multiplicity 
which defines the moral condition of human life. It is an elemental force, 
constrained to its single activity by what C. S. Lewis called its esse. What it does is 
what it has to do by virtue of what it explicitly and indivisibly is ... its behaviour 
and motivation are inherent in its name. ' cit. in note 7 above, pp. 126-7. 
18 On the capacities of allegorical sins to be reformed, see Carolynn Van Dyke, 
cit. in note 12 above, p. 109; Robert Potter, cit. in note 14 above, p. 26. 
19 One may notice how Courage's lament for the death of Greediness, in 
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Wapull's The Tyde Tarrieth No Man, comes close to being naturalistically moving. 
20 Carolynn Van Dyke: 'Theater is not inherently realistic in any simple sense; 
actors are signs, as are the words of a text, and what they signify may be even less 
verisimilar or concrete than are parts of the Psychomachia. ' op. cit., p. 109. 
21 The distinction is described by Jon Whitman, cit. in note 12, pp. 1-13. 
22 Paula Neuss, Aspects of Early English Drama (Cambridge, 1983), p. 19. 
23 Robert Potter: 'In the ultimate sense it [the traditional morality play] 
provided the inherited mythic idea of a theatrical treatise on the human condition. ' 
cit. in note 14 above, p. 105. 
24 In this discussion of usage and definition, it is appropriate to enclose such 
terms as 'otherness', the 'other', and the 'self` n quotation marks. In general, 
however, I shall assume that the reader understands that a specialized usage is 
intended, and omit the punctuation. 
25 Women. History and Theory: The Essays of Joan Kelly (Chicago and 
London, 1984), p. 5. 
26 Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, The Politics and Poetics of Transgression 
(London, 1986). They illuminate this concept with their argument that opposed 
extremes ('the symbolic extremities of the exalted and the base') are fundamental to 
the ways in which cultures 'think themselves'. See especially the Introduction, p. 3. 
27 Examples are E. K. Chambers, The English Folk Play (New York, 1966); 
M. D. Bristol, Carnival and Theater (New York and London, 1985). 
28 Renaissance Self-Fashioning (Chicago, 1980), p. 9. 
29 Quotations are from The Macro Plays, ed. Mark Eccles, EETS, OS, 262 
(London, 1969), pp. 153-184. 
30 Mark Pilkinton expounds this terminology in the Introduction to his 'The 
Antagonists of English Drama, 1370-1576' (unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University 
of Bristol, 1974). 
31 'Active and Idle Language: Dramatic Images in Mankind', in Mgftyg 
D, ed. Neville Denny, Stratford-upon-Avon Studies, 16 (London, 1973), 
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pp. 41-67. 
32 Glynne Wickham follows her arguments: 'the author takes great care to 
involve his audience very directly in the play by making them participate in the very 
actions which are to undo Mankind'. English Moral Interludes (London, 1976), 
p. 3. 
33 I refer to the mankind figure as male throughout this discussion. Female 
mankind figures occur rarely, and are usually also atypical in other ways, too 
complex to discuss here. I consider images of women in Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven. 
34 E. N. S. Thompson takes this view: 'the motives and impulses of man's own 
heart were taken from him, and, clothed in flesh and blood, given him again for 
companions. ' cit. in note 8, above, p. 315. He derives this from the Psychomachia 
structure, in which 'the opening lines of the poem ... make it plain that the 
combatants are the impulses that dwell in man's soul, and that the story is a soul's 
history. ' p. 333n. This view disputes Ramsay's view of these plays as a contest and 
of the vice figures as merely fools, in Skelton's Magnyfycence, ed. R. L. Ramsay, 
EETS, OS, 98 (London, 1908; reprinted 1925), p. xiii and pp. civ-cv. 
35 This other as an internal/external object of desire shares points of similarity 
with Lacan's objet petit a, discussed throughout his work, but perhaps most clearly 
put forward in Ecrits: A Selection, tr. Alan Sheridan (London, 1980), pp. 192-195. 
The concept is also explained by Malcolm Bowie, in jam (London, 1991), 
pp. 165-168. 
36 J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, in The Language of Psychoanalysis, tr. 
Donald Nicholson Smith (London, 1973), give the following definition of 
projection: 'II. In the properly psycho-analytic sense: operation whereby qualities, 
feelings, wishes or even 'objects', which the subject refuses to recognize or rejects 
in himself, are expelled from the self and located in another person or thing. 
Projection so understood is a defence of very primitive origin which may be seen at 
work especially in paranoia, but also in 'normal' modes of thought such as 
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superstition. ' p. 349. 
37 Interestingly, the projection that I propose here is very like a converse of 
Greenblatt's sociological model: 'If both the authority and the alien are located 
outside the self, they are both at the same time experienced as inward necessities, so 
that both submission and destruction are always already internalized. ' cit. in note 28 
above, p. 9. 
38 cit. in note 28 above, pp. 6-7. 
39 This important term was coined by Julia Kristeva, and is the subject of her 
Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection, tr. Leon S. Roudiez (New York, 1982). 
Its effects are described most concisely by Victor Burgin, in 'Geometry and 
Abjection', in Abjection. Melancholia and Love: The Work of Julia Kristeva, eds. 
John Fletcher and Andrew Benjamin (London, 1990), pp. 104-123. 'The abject ... 
is the means by which the subject is first impelled towards the possibility of 
constituting itself as such - in an act of revulsion, of expulsion of that which can no 
longer be contained ... the first object of abjection 
is the pre-oedipal mother - 
prefiguring that positioning of the woman in society which Kristeva locates, in the 
patriarchal scheme, as perpetually at the boundary, the borderline, the edge, the 
'outer limit' - the place where order shades into chaos, light into darkness. ' 
pp. 115-6. Kristeva refers to individuals, rather than society, but the term has been 
adopted by social theorists such as Jonathan Dollimore, Peter Stallybrass and Allon 
White. 
40 See Ecrits: A Selection, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977; reprinted 
London, 1980), pp. 65-68. From the domain of the Other comes the Law of the 
Father, that interruption to the primitive self which introduces the Symbolic order. 
Lacan also uses the term Non/m du Pare, a typically multivalent mnemonic which 
simultaneously i) invokes the Freudian Father, who imposes social prohibitions, 
instituting the Oedipus complex, and thus the self; ii) indicates with 'non' that area 
that imposes prohibitions: the structuring conditions under which all must live; iii) 
implies that the father is not a reality but a name ('nom'), and so involves an 
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essentially linguistic order; iv) uses punning to imply the interlocking of psychic 
and linguistic structures. 
41 Paula Neuss makes a similar point: 'Mischief's appearance provides a 
concrete example of the point that Mercy had been at pains to make, that, given the 
opportunity, their 'gostly enmy' will do his best to interrupt and interfere with their 
good behaviour. ' cit. in note 31 above, p. 46. 
42 'Big Head' can be a reference to both a folk-play fool and to a hydrocephalic 
case. E. K. Chambers describes the folk-play Big Head in The English Folk Play 
(New York, 1966), p. 64. I disagree with his opinion that the parallel with Mankind 
is unconvincing (p. 163). 
43 Glynne Wickham, cit. in note 32 above, p. 8n. 
'Lock' for 'mouth' does not, however, appear amongst the proverbs listed 
by either Tilley or Whiting. More relevantly, Tilley gives 'H5 1. They will know 
by an halfpenny if a priest will take offering. ' Perhaps Mischief is suggesting that 
the priestly Mercy is either avaricious or open to bribes. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
MUNDUS & INFANS AND JACQUES LACAN. 
Lacan is thus a metaphor - or a symptom - of psychoanalysis itself, insofar as psychoanalysis is re-enacting a constant revolution in the 
most basic human questions: 
What does it mean to be human? 
What does it mean to think? and consegyently 
What does it mean to be contemporary? 
One may view the morality play in its simplest form as a dialogue between 
virtue and vice, with the self generally beginning as virtuous but falling to the 
temptation of an evil other, frequently referred to as the 'enemy' or the 'foe'. Such 
a view offers us a two-term conflict, as opposed to the three-term structure implicit 
in the view of mankind as a reasoning agent, possessed of free will, who chooses 
between good and evil actions. It is the latter model which is generally represented 
as typical of the earlier moral plays: the Moralities. 2 I wish to suggest that many of 
these plays begin in the first mode and only gradually move into the second, when 
they do so at all. 3 
The discussion that follows analyzes a group of three early plays, using 
terminology derived from the work of Jacques Lacan, in an attempt to demonstrate 
that the two-term structure exists, to reveal how this movement from 'two-term' to 
'three-term' structures operates, and then to consider what effect that structure has 
on the picture of the other that the plays develop. I set up an analogy between three 
complex processes. The first is the overt plot of the morality play: the familiar 
development of the mankind figure out of innocence and moral vulnerability into 
knowledge of right and wrong, and hence into an ability to choose a virtuous life. 
The second is the imaging of that process in linguistic terms as a development out of 
a literal mode of language use into an ability to use and understand language 
metaphorically. It is through metaphoric language that spiritual truths are conveyed 
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and understood. The third is the process, put forward by Lacan, by which the non- 
linguistic human being is inserted into the Symbolic order through an acceptance of 
the 'Law of the Father'. 4 Such an acceptance involves an appreciation of the 
complex intrications of desire, lack and language. The Symbolic order is 
principally concerned with language, but also with other language-like structures, 
including moral and social structures. Parallels between linguistic structures and 
social structures will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
I must stress that Lacanian terminology is intended as an elucidator here, not 
a strait jackets There are large areas where Lacan's vision does not fit neatly with 
the situation that the plays describe. Thus psychoanalytic theories are useful as a 
template against which one can compare what the plays have to say about otherness. 
In particular, the state of the pre-Mirror Stage 'hommelene' cannot be comfortably 
reconciled with the moralities' representation of the pre-linguistic, pre-moral 
individual. 6 It will become clear that pre-linguistic formlessness occurs in the plays 
as a chameleon-like, imperative adaptation to the environment by the mankind 
figure. That character is therefore in a condition which has much more in common 
with Freud's infantile primary narcissism.? However, as the mythical Narcissus is 
trapped by his own reflection, while Lacan's Mirror Stage also involves a 
'reflection', by the infant of a figure which is specifically not itself, there is a 
danger of confusion in trying to use both sets of terms at once. I have therefore 
striven to excise or qualify all references to mirrors and reflection as they relate to 
the pre-Mirror Stage. One has then to treat the pre-linguistic mankind figure on 
occasion as if it were a subject. Indeed, it is his bizarre behaviour as subject that 
indicates that this character can represent a condition of non-subjectivity. This 
explains the puzzle that has afflicted critics who find the early mankind figure 
mechanical and 'unmotivated' (in the narrative sense). He must be exactly that, for 
complex motivations stem from occupying a fully mature place in the linguistic 
order, and hence also in the social order. 
38 
The play Mundus & Infans, where there are apparently never more than two 
characters on stage at a time, may, through its simplicity of action, help to clarify 
the situation. Using the concepts of binarism and the Mirror Phase can also suggest 
interpretations leading beyond the usual critical assessment of the play, an 
assessment which amounts to the rather pragmatic discovery that it must have been 
written for a travelling troupe of two players. 8 The very fact that only two (or 
three) players are needed can make crucial theological points. 
When a plot is pared down, as this one is, its essential parts become more 
apparent. Lacan's theories may help towards explaining why this repetitious and, to 
the superficial glance, naive dramatic form held a fascination for audiences 
seemingly for well over a century, and even continued to be revived and referred to 
on the stage as late as the early Jacobean period. It may be because the audience is 
observing an enactment of the nature of infant psychological maturation, a process 
they have all been through and subsequently repressed. 9 Our fascination with our 
repressed history is at least as strong as our interest in future moral development 
and salvation. 
One needs to be aware that otherness for Lacan is an aspect of the self. 
This, indeed, fits with the observation discussed in Chapter One that the moral play 
as Psychomachia involves the human being both as protagonist and as the scene of 
the action. In the second part of this chapter, I shall apply to two other early plays 
the perceptions derived from the investigation of Mundus & Infans. It will then be 
possible to assess the further applicability of the approach, and to formulate some 
general remarks about the characteristics of otherness in these plays. 
SECTION A: MUNDUS & INFANS10 
Published by Wynkyn de Worde in 1522, this early moral play shares 
numerous features with its fourteenth and fifteenth century antecedents, in particular 
with The Castle of Perseverance, and may have been written considerably earlier 
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than that publication date. " The plot is a simple one, although it covers a lifetime 
and presents a version of the ages of man. 12 The main character represents 
humanity at several stages of his life: as an infant; as a child (called Wanton); as a 
young man (Lust-and-Liking); as an adult (Manhood); and as an old man (Age, 
subsequently renamed Repentance). This character remains on stage throughout the 
974-line play, with the possible exception of the scene at lines 716 to 761. His 
encounters are restricted to the following simple list: first, an opening passage with 
the World, who names him and introduces him to the Seven Deadly Sins; second, a 
passage with Conscience, who warns him against the Sins and against Folly; third, a 
passage in which Folly tempts him to lead an evil life and renames him Shame; 
fourth, a passage in which Conscience tries to reform Manhood/Shame, but fails; 
and finally, a passage in which Perseverance succeeds in reforming him, largely 
because time has passed and the main character, now called Age, possesses 
characteristics which enable him to heed the threat of death. Age reforms and is 
renamed Repentance. As a consequence Perseverance teaches him the articles of 
the Faith, and bids the audience farewell. The habit of renaming the main character 
is significant in ways which will be demonstrated below. 
Mundus & Infans offers a sparse version of the traditional morality plot 
sequence of innocence, then sinfulness and lastly redemption. It is also curiously 
static: one actually sees none of the much-discussed evil life, which is very 
sketchily represented by Folly's coarse language. In general, the speeches offer 
little obvious scope for action: even the semi-obligatory fight amongst the vices is 
reduced to a brief scuffle between Manhood and Folly. 13 
The moral transitions of the plot are represented not by behaviour and 
actions, but by self advertisement and changes of dress. Costume changes are 
designed to be quick and easy: Conscience need only throw off his friar's garment 
in order to enter as Folly, dressed in a breechcloth (1.640-41). Other changes take 
place on stage, as part of the action: the Infant is given the clothes of a child (1.67), 
and Manhood is also dressed and knighted on stage (1.195-6). The audience is 
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faced with a series of visually significant tableaux, suggestive of a production on a 
'stage' consisting of two or three static mansions and a minimal acting space. 14 
The overt project of the play is to bring Christ to the forefront, and relegate 
Mundus to his proper, inferior position. Similarly, when read with a Lacanian 
perspective, the play enacts the creation of the subject through its insertion in the 
Symbolic order. It would, however, be inappropriate to describe the relationship 
between the Imaginary and the Symbolic orders as inferior/superior. In Lacan's 
theory, the Imaginary is not so much subordinated as located in relation to the other 
orders. 15 That relativity is formed through loss in the subject, and hence generates 
pain. Morality plays, by contrast, put forward a theory that maturation, as the 
acquisition of a metaphoric or symbolic capacity, is a gain, and is necessary for 
perfect happiness. 
In its original condition, the unformed self gazes on what it takes to be its 
own representation, locked in a dyad of subject and mother. The Symbolic order 
contains language as a result of the entry of the third term: the structuring authority 
of the 'Law of the Father'. To see how this process is represented, let us look more 
closely at what takes place within the simple four-stage plot of Mundus & Infans. 
The opening speech is uttered by Mundus, the World, who thereby claims 
reality as his, and identifies himself with all that exists. He is king of the whole 
surroundings, of all peoples, and of all pleasure. 16 It is thus the world of the senses 
which he represents, and which he describes as the totality of all there is. ('I am a 
läng in every case' 1.19. ) One might tentatively, therefore, begin by locating 
Mundus as representative of the Real - the 'ineffable, stupid existence' of the 
Subject (S). 17 Already, however, two hints suggest that there is more to be 
considered than Mundus is aware of. He mentions 'free will' (1.24), which, as a 
theological concept, is out of place in his world. Again, 'methinketh I am a god of 
grace' (1.20) can only be ironic or ignorant. 'Methinketh' casts doubt on the 
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accuracy of his perception, while 'grace' reminds the audience of an attribute of the 
Christian God, which is exactly what Mundus is not. Infans enters. Literally his 
name means 'language-less', and we shall see shortly that in a special sense this is 
an accurate description, even though dramatic necessity means that he must express 
his condition in speech. He too reminds us of the category unspoken by Mundus, 
that of Christ, mentioning him twice in his opening three lines: 
Christ our King grant you clearly to know ye case, 
To move of this matter that is in my mind. 
Clearly to declare it Christ grant me grace 
(1.25-7) 
Infans describes his earlier state of total dependence on his mother: 'Forty weeks I 
was freely fed/ Within my mother's possession' (1.40-1); and his present deprived 
condition: 'Poor and naked as ye may see/ I am not worthily wrapt nor went, / But 
poorly pricked in poverty' (1.45-7). He has been sent 'into the world', but also uses 
that phrase for going to talk to the character Mundus: 'Now into the world will I 
wend, / Some comfort of him for to crave. ' (1.489). 
Mundus, still secure in his claims to totality, takes over the mother's place, 
granting the child's request for 'meat and clothes my life to save'. We shall see that 
Infans accepts his instructions unquestioningly, a response which has been 
appropriately called the 'sudden conversion', and which is typical of the moral play 
in general. '8 In addition Mundus renames the child Wanton. It seems at first that 
Mundus has here initiated the child into language, and so in Lacan's terms has 
introduced the Name of the Father into Infans' life. However this is not the case: it 
is a deceit structured into the apparently unbreakable dyad of self-contemplation, the 
condition of the pre-Mirror Stage. Infans, it may be noted, does not know his true 
name, but does know what his mother called him. Mundus' naming of the child 
repeats the mother's action, and is similarly temporizing as it will only last until he 
is fourteen. What appears to be a naming is in fact a labelling of those attributes of 
the human being which are linked to his age. It is appropriate that Mundus 
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perceives and labels the condition of the senses which is dominant for each age. 19 
Mundus had claimed to be everything. Now we see, through his repeated use of 'I 
can' and 'I will' (lines 76-120), that Wanton shares the delusion of omnipotence. 
Wanton's relationships all take place within a power structure in which might is the 
whole basis of control. He assaults family ties and authority, friendship, the 
property of his neighbours, and the hierarchy of knowledge. This last he sees, 
characteristically, solely in terms of physical punishment. The only uses of 
language he reports are verbal abuse (1.91) and lying (1.97-8). In other words, 
language is a tool with which Wanton furthers the aggressive power-play that is his 
life. The play offers us a single explanation of his behaviour: it is his nature. 'All 
recklessness is kind for thee' (1.75) and 'this cunning came me of kind' (1.99). 
We are therefore observing in Infans' aging process nothing more than an 
emphasis on the senses varied over time. There is no hint of progress or maturation 
in the changes from one age to the next. Lust-Liking even repeats Mundus' words. 
'Game and glee' recur (lines 127 and 140) as does 'love-longing' (lines 128 and 
136). Lust-and-Liking also demonstrates the imposition of the subject's desires on 
the environment. All that Lust finds in the world is his own desire, which is 
obsessive and therefore excludes alternative possibilities. 
At the age of nineteen, Lust returns to Mundus, who renames him Manhood 
Mighty. Once he is knighted, Manhood takes on Mundus' boastful tone: 
Mundus: As a lord in each land I am beloved 
(1217) 
Manhood: For I am a lord both stalworthy and stout 
(1.238) 
and: 
For I have might and main over countries far 
(1.242) 
Both assert a domination, based on physical power, over the noble hierarchy. 
43 
Mundus: Who that stirreth with any strife or 
weighteth me with wrong 
I shall mightily make him to stammer and 
stoop 
(1.229-30) 
And: 
Emperors and kings they kneel to my knee 
(1.220) 
Manhood: There is no emperor so keen 
That dare me lightly teen 
And many a king's crown have I cracked 
(1.249-50) 
Thus, Manhood Mighty presents an assimilation of Mundus' description of him 
through his naming. Two voices sing the same tune: Mundus announces the theme, 
and the mankind figure elaborates on it in each of his incarnations. Although there 
are two voices, there is no sense of exchange or dialogue. As Infans and his 
successors uncritically assume the labels offered by Mundus, and clothe themselves 
in the garments he brings, we find that the name is the means by which they are 
constituted as a series of transformations of the sensual, visible aspect of the self. 
The figure of humanity is thus still truly infans, for language is not available to 
him, only a structurally undifferentiable sensual experience. Even the older, re- 
named figure has not yet entered into a system of linguistic relationships. 20 
In summary then, the mankind figure has only two kinds of relationship: 
firstly, one of identification (with Mundus) and secondly one of sensual 
gratification, heedless of external controls (beating up his friends, 1.81; indulging 
in 'love-longing', 1.138; and spilling blood, 1.253. ). He significantly lacks any 
perception of metaphoric or metonymic connections, meeting the 'Kings' who are 
the Seven Deadly Sins as if they operate on the same plane of allegorical reality as 
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himself. In his ignorance, Manhood does not recognize that the 'Kings' represent 
abstract ideas, while he is a representative of all members of the human race. Their 
royalty is a metaphor for the power that wrong-doing can have over people, a 
power that is generated only by people's belief in it. It is significant that they do 
not appear 'in the flesh' on stage, and Manhood, therefore, is at least one degree 
closer to reality than they are. Ignorant of levels of linguistic abstraction, Manhood 
cannot perceive the Kings' true nature. Thus, for all his obedience to the senses, 
Manhood retains an innocence which makes his easy obedience to Mundus seem 
less than culpable. 
This is the stage that the play has reached when it pauses for breath at line 
287. Manhood has seated himself, self-satisfied and ignorant, yet somehow not 
blameworthy, and his static position suggests the hollowness of his achievement. 
Here in this seat sit I 
For no loves let I 
Here for to sit. 
(1.285-7) 
The mere occupation of physical space is the whole product of his efforts up to this 
point. In this position, he mutely invites the audience to see themselves represented 
in him - seated, passive, and waiting for the next event. Clearly the knowledge that 
he claims ('as a wight witty', 1.284) is without much spiritual meaning. It is based 
on a list of countries visited and limbs hacked off. As his boastful long lines 
dwindle into shorter and shorter ones, and then into silence, expectation builds up in 
the audience for the next move. 
With this preparation, Conscience now enters, and speaks of 'light' and of 
'spirituality'. Manhood is uncomprehending, taking 'light' literally: 'light fain 
would I see' (1.335). In addition he rejects Conscience's teaching because it 
conflicts with the physical hierarchy implied by 'To me men lout full low' (1.346). 
To Conscience's metaphoric 'Sir, there is no king but God above' (1.355) is 
opposed Manhood's literal, worldly reading of the word 'king' - for this is how he 
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sees Pride and the other Sins. 'Think, Manhood, on substance' (1.379) appeals 
Conscience, and substance here means what is real in Aristotelian terms, that is, the 
spiritual, and so that which has real importance. Manhood has been dwelling on the 
wrong kind of reality: that of tangible existence. He is as yet incapable of seeing 
the metaphoric truth that Conscience brings. Here the Christian project of the play 
intersects with the theoretical projects of Lacan and linguistics, for, in order to 
know about Christianity, Manhood has to comprehend the abstract, substituting the 
linguistic structure of metaphor for the primitive, sense-based structure of 
literalism. That substitution is also the process that initiates him into genuine 
linguistic competence. 
Conscience begins Manhood's education by suggesting that he retain his 
allegiance to Covetous, glossing this as 'Covetous in good doing' (1.413). 
Manhood happily swears to adhere to this programme, only to be informed of the 
contents of the Ten Commandments, which he finds very little to his liking. With 
his question 'What, Conscience, is this thy Covetous' (1.439), he identifies the 
possibility that a word may contain a second meaning. Conscience is demonstrating 
how language, of itself, can generate the Symbolic through its inherent duplicity. A 
person who can enter a relationship with the alternatives offered by language will 
have achieved a three-term pattern: self, literal meaning, metaphoric meaning. The 
succeeding exchange finds Manhood determined to pin down the meanings of 
words: he queries the ideas of 'measure', ' folly', 'mercy' and 'discretion'. 
Finally, though, he acknowledges Conscience's superior understanding: 
Ah, Conscience, now I know and see, 
Thy cunning is much more than mine 
(1.476-7) 
Because Manhood is still at a primitive phase of development, he believes himself to 
be accurately represented in any description that is made of him. Even so, perhaps 
because Conscience has begun to break through that primitive phase, we now find 
elements of resistance in Manhood's attitude towards him. Once Conscience has 
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departed, it appears that Manhood's acquiescence, reluctant even at the time, was 
insincere. He is still in the same state as Wanton, prepared to lie to secure his 
advantage. There follows a very curious passage of vacillating emotions. 21 Four 
lines abuse Conscience with comic vigour before the turning point: 
Ah ah now I have bethought me if I shall heaven win 
(1.493) 
This introduces a section of sixteen lines in which Manhood dedicates himself to 
virtue. But another volte face follows: 
But yet I will him not forsake 
For Mankind he doth merry make. 
(1.509-10) 
'Him' here is Mundus, and eleven lines bring Manhood back onto Mundus' side, in 
time for Folly's entrance. 
Even so, Manhood offers some resistance to Folly's approaches. Though 
unable to originate resistance, he can put forward Conscience's instructions, if only 
briefly. 
Manhood: Yea sir, but yet Conscience biddeth me 
nay 
Folly: No sir, thou darest not, in good fay, 
For truly thou failest now, false heart. 
Manhood: What, sayest thou I have a false heart? 
Folly: Yea sir, in good fay 
(1.549-53) 
Manhood predictably lacks the sophistication to argue for an honourable 
interpretation of his doubts, but falls to the demeaning position of fighting with 
Folly. 22 He is thus returned to the world of physicality through his reliance on the 
simple interpretation of language. 
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As his next move, Manhood rejects Folly and Mundus in order to retain 
knowledge ('cunning', 1.622). When Folly scorns Conscience, he once again 
opposes the world of action to that of language. 
A cuckoo for Conscience, he is but a daw 
He can not else but preach. 
(1.623-4) 
Conscience's knowledge of words is perceived as empty and useless, a shadow of 
reality rather than a reality in its own right. Manhood's brief understanding of the 
basis of language vanishes, for he is easily tricked into accepting Folly as his 
servant, through a confusion between the idea and the concrete. 
Sir, here in this clout I knit Shame 
And clep me but proper Folly. 
0.640-1) 
Folly claims that shame can be hidden in a breechcloth, and Manhood fails to 
comprehend that the avoidance of nakedness is not the same thing as avoiding moral 
disgrace. When Manhood, with Folly now as his servant, hears of the stews, he 
puts forward a series of objections to going there which reveal his moral 
immaturity. 23 He first objects not because he believes it to be wrong, but because 
he fears that Conscience would find him. 
For, by Christ, I would not that Conscience should me here find. 
(x"660) 
Folly reassures him that Conscience never comes that way. Next Manhood seems 
to feel that recognition is what matters: 
Peace Folly, there is no man that knoweth me 
(1.663) 
This line makes best sense as an objection to Folly that no-one will recognize him at 
the stews. He does not wish to go to a strange place where his status is unknown. 
Folly's reassuring answer accepts these terms, and explains that he need not worry 
about going unrecognized. 
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An thou wilt go with me 
For knowledge have thou no care. 
(1.665-6) 
He also suggests the irony that anyone can recognize a fool, which is what 
Manhood will be when he goes to the stews in Folly's company. 
Once again, the world that Manhood inhabits is manifestly one in which physical 
externals are of prime importance: the gaze of others defines his own condition. It 
seems that Manhood can only feel happy if he is continually noticed, so that his 
status is constantly re-created by recognition. His last objection to going to the 
stews is trivial: he fears that they may be too far away. Folly, of course, knows 
that evil is always near at hand, and goes on to promise him a warm welcome to 
dinner in East Cheap, and sweet wine at the Pope's Head. Manhood is still quite 
incapable of judgement, referring yet again to Folly's opinions. 
What sayest thou Folly is this the best? 
(1.674) 
The term 'best' suggests that he has some perception that he needs to make moral 
distinctions. Folly's response is very interesting: 
Sir, all this is manhood, well thou knowest 
(1.675) 
He thus implies that Manhood's level of knowledge is complete, or at least 
adequate. He also equates 'the best' with a realisation of Manhood's physical stage 
of life. Folly identifies the name Manhood as sufficient prescription of the 
behaviour appropriate to him, although both we and Manhood himself know this 
name to be merely a temporary description of the human being. Manhood is still 
afraid of Conscience's anger: 
For well I wot if Conscience meet me in this tide 
Right well I wot he would me chide. 
(1.678-9) 
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One may notice the repetition of 'well I wot', with which Manhood stresses his 
knowledge. However, that knowledge is a minimal awareness of Conscience's 
behaviour, not of his ideals. Folly names him Shame, so that Conscience will not 
look at him, and Manhood now accepts willingly the very name he once refused to 
employ as his servant. 
When Manhood eventually re-enters as Age, he is still focussed on his own 
physical state, in accordance with the conventional view of old age. 24 
I cough and rough, my body will bract, 
Age doth follow me so 
I stare and stagger as I stand 
I groan grisly upon the ground 
(1.795-8) 
He is in despair, and still lacks any but the most simple spiritual knowledge. He 
knows that he has sinned, but appears not to comprehend that suicide is a further 
sin. 
For I have done ill 
Now wend I will 
Myself to spill 
I care not whither or where 
(1.802-5) 
These short lines, with their sinewy, rhythmic movement have a powerful falling 
tone which enacts the despair that Age feels. They prepare the next entrance, in a 
repetition of the rhythm of silence and hope which coloured Manhood's encounter 
with Conscience. Perseverance now enters, cutting through the gloomy atmosphere 
with a cheerful greeting which is as welcome to the audience as it is to Age. 'well 
i-met, sir, well i-met'. With the bonhomous repetition and the 'sir' of social 
equality, he proffers a sense of communitas25 as supportive and pleasurable. 
Perseverance picks up Age's fruitless 'whither' to re-form it into a purposive idea. 
Age once again narrates his history so far, in a speech which becomes a summary of 
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the instability of his identity through time, and a detailed account of how his every 
act has been determined by his passivity in the face of Mundus. He has been 
indistinguishable from his worldly circumstances even to the extent of being named 
by them. Finally he has remained with the name Shame, which has been dinned 
into him by Folly and his own weakness, and which he believes to be irreversible. 
In contradiction to this position, Perseverance offers him optimism and yet another 
chance of grace, conditional on his repentance. Perseverance calls this 'shrift of 
mouth'. In naming Age Repentance, Perseverance causes him to take personal 
responsibility for all the previous ages he has lived through. At the same time, the 
name 'Repentance' defers to a use of language to take control of circumstances, 
thus appropriating language for Age's needs. This name is not temporizing as the 
earlier ones were, for it comprehends them, supersedes them, and so can cancel 
them. 
Age/Repentance must now come to understand this point, that language may 
be used to take the place of physical acts in confession. 'Repentance' is potentially 
a speaking subject, whereas Infans, Wanton, Lust, Manhood and Age/Shame had 
been merely bundles of pre-determined behaviours, constituted by their worldly 
status and condition. 
The list of Saints that follows is intended to show Age an example that he 
must contemplate. In them he is to see a figure for himself as a sinner, and also a 
figure for his own possible future. 
And yet these to Christ are darlings dear 
(1.874) 
In order that these examples can be credible, and even comprehensible to him, Age 
must begin to understand metaphor. Perseverance next argues to lead him away 
from his physical obsessions, moving by small steps from a list of the senses 
(calling them the 'five wits') to a list of mental and spiritual strengths. It is only 
this preliminary knowledge of the relation between the physical and the abstract that 
will enable Age to make sense of the Articles of the Faith, which Perseverance now 
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recites to him. Age accepts his teaching, and in so doing accepts a new 
interpretation of knowledge: 
That it is necessary to all mankind 
Truly for to know 
(1.959-60) 
Age, now Repentance, demonstrates his full understanding of linguistic relationships 
by offering himself to the audience as a metaphor for their own condition: 
Now sirs, take all example by me 
(1.961) 
At this point, where true knowledge begins, the play's action ceases, and the 
briefest of blessings by Perseverance concludes the piece. 
The play's representation of a dawning Christian consciousness is paralleled 
by its representation of the maturation of the individual subject out of its infantile 
belief in its own omnipotence, into a full capacity to use and understand language. 
Language use is accompanied by socialisation into a world governed by outside 
influences. The key to this position appears when Conscience and Manhood discuss 
the duplicity of language. Conscience calls worldliness 'folly' (1.460), to which 
Manhood offers the alternative: 'may I not go arrayed honestly? ' (1.466). 
Conscience demonstrates that the two apparent alternatives can co-exist, provided 
they are governed by 'discretion, which is a gift from God. 26 Thus a binary 
system of 'either a/or b' becomes a ternary 'either a, or b, or a and W, in the 
presence of an external legislation, similar to Lacan's Law of the Father. 
Lacan's 'Schema L' describes the relationships between the subject (S), the 
other (o), 27 the object of desire (or objet petit a) (o'), 
28 and that Other (0) which is 
external social necessity, and which contains the Law of the Father. 
29 It is striking 
how closely the structures of Mundus & Infans can be related to Schema L. This 
Schema is useful because it offers a graphic way of seeing what kinds of 'otherness' 
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occur in the plays, and how they interact. It stresses the importance of both the 
Other of the Nom/n du Pere and that of the object of desire. Both are manifested in 
the moral plays. 
S 
(Man) 
o (Mundus) 
(the sins) o' 
(the senses) 
O (the spirit) 
(the symbolic) 
(knowledge of 
spirituality) 
Conscience, on the line between o' and 0, separates the senses from the spirit, until 
'measure' can mediate between them. All the other lines are dynamic: that is, they 
are lines of connection rather than of separation. 
As the symbols imply, o and o' are subdivisions of one category. Thus as long 
as S, o and o' are all that is perceived to exist, the model is of a dyad. Conscience 
attempts to impose the Non du Pyre, by casting out the flesh, thus teaching the 
separation of S and 0. He imposes the Nom du Pere by teaching metaphor, and 
hence language. 
Perhaps one should not feel too surprised that the parallel can be so easily 
and closely worked out. Lacan is, for all his radicalism, the great expositor of 
Freud, whose theories in turn are profoundly embedded in the Judaic tradition and 
in its paternalistic authority structures. A resemblance between the orthodoxies of 
Christianity and Freudianism is therefore only reasonable, though Lacan himself 
would probably have rejected such a comparison. 30 
(Conscience) 
(measure) 
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In numerous places in the foregoing discussion, I have mentioned the 
introduction of a third term as constituting the breakthrough into language of 
Lacan's Mirror Stage. In addition, Manhood's theological education clearly 
includes a knowledge of God as that third term which divides man from 
worldliness, interpreting it as sin. Even a superficial examination shows that 
Mundus & Infans contains an advertisement for the important numbers one, three 
and zero. 
Upon one God and persons three 
That made all thing of nought 
(1.499-500) 
It is obvious that there is an unspoken prime in this series, the number two. Major 
heresies, such as those influenced by Manichaeism, involved transforming the focus 
on a trinity within God into one on a duality of God and the Devil. With this in 
mind, it is reasonable that 'two' should be implicitly excluded from the system of 
'all the mysteries of man/ That be as simple as they can' (1.307-8) (my italics). 31 
Two, however, is also the number of man in a state of temptation by the World, 
and the number which represents man rapt in narcissistic contemplation of his own 
image. As I have suggested in connection with the discussion of Age's initiation 
into language, two is the number involved in the concept of language as labelling 
reality - that is, of word in relation to thing. This is to be contrasted with a picture 
of meaning as dependant on linguistic relationships, thus on ambiguity, and thus on 
a system that is at least ternary, and possibly not to be numbered at all. 32 Two, 
however, involves the illusion of the unitary, for the infantile gaze on the object 
involves an identification with it, comparable to the way in which the labelling 
theory of language involves a perceived identification between the world and the 
thing referred to. 
If further evidence for this striking interest in numbers can be found within the 
play, it would act as evidence that the play works on fundamental human 
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psychological experience. Through this it rivets the audience's attention and makes 
the overt theological message both more fascinating and more convincing. 
One method through which Manhood escapes from the oppositions of the 
binary into the mediation of the ternary33 is the imagery generated within the 
staging of the play. It has frequently been noticed that Mundus & Infans requires 
only two players. 34 Throughout the time of his early ignorance, the mankind figure 
is on stage with nobody but Mundus. This image of the pair constructs man's total 
obsession with the world, for there is no visual sense that anywhere else exists. 
Conversation can only bounce to and fro between the two of them. Hence, as we 
have seen, an impression arises of total agreement. When Conscience arrives, a 
similar process continues, for these two can still only interact with each other. The 
dramatic effect is one of obsession, for there is nowhere else to which utterances 
can be directed. In its iconography the play images the binary system out of which 
Manhood must eventually break. A sense of 'somewhere else' begins in the passage 
with Folly, for Manhood is now able to hold the memory of Conscience in his mind 
and refer to it. Conscience is off stage somewhere, balancing that other locale that 
Folly has introduced - the stews. It is interesting that at first that area of corruption 
seems to be located on stage ('For, by Christ, I would not that Folly should me here 
find' 1.660) but it soon becomes a distant place to which Folly and Manhood must 
travel ('Pardee sir, we may be there on a day' 1.668) (my italics). In this way, 
Folly offers an evil place to balance the good place that Conscience inhabits, 
capturing it in another two-term opposition. 
For a moment now the forces of evil outnumber the forces of good, and this 
could be a reason why Conscience is next supported by Perseverance: again there is 
a numerical balance, with Conscience and Perseverance opposing Mundus and 
Folly. Of course these four cannot appear on stage at the same time. 
Commentators have felt that this was solely because the play was written to be 
performed by two people, and indeed such a scheme seems most natural, given that 
there are never more than two speaking parts on stage at a time. I wish to put 
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forward an alternative view: that the play would be more effectively performed with 
three players. 
A practical problem with using two players arises at line 739, when Conscience 
departs: 
Farewell lordings and have good day 
To seek Perseverance will I wend 
(1.738-9) 
Perseverance's entrance follows immediately. There seems little point in the change 
of name if the same actor is to play both r6les. Unusually, no covering speech has 
been inserted to allow for a change of costume. 35 Other name changes in the play 
have been rationally motivated, either by the 'ages of man' topos, or by the vast 
differences in character between Mundus and Folly, who presumably will be 
doubled. However, if Perseverance is played by the second actor, the role must be 
doubled with that of Manhood. This leaves the first actor changing from 
Conscience to re-enter as Manhood/Age - that is, the role of mankind figure is split 
between the two actors, which seems at least undesirable and at worst very 
confusing, though not, of course, unheard of. Circumstances rationalizing such a 
split here are either the use of masks, or performance by a company where there 
was a very noticeable age difference between the two actors. The older would then 
take the roles of World, Folly, Conscience and Age, while the younger took on 
Infans, Wanton, Lust-and-Liking, Manhood and Perseverance. Even so, there is 
something a little suspect about the grey-bearded Folly that this scheme 
postulates. 36 
A company of three actors would solve the difficulty of 
Conscience/Perseverance's lightning change, and could also add variety to the 
forces of worldliness: player A could take Mundus and Conscience; player B, Folly 
and Perseverance; and player C all the versions of the mankind figure. At the point 
where Perseverance enters, he could then be accompanied by Conscience. Age's 
repentance, involving a knowledge of the complexity of language and a knowledge 
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of the Trinity could then be symbolically echoed by the deployment of three people 
on stage, where previously there had been only two. 
So far, I have considered the difference between a view of the human as 
double (the self and its purely physical aspect) compared with a more complex view 
which includes the spiritual. This transition from a double view to a three-cornered 
one is detectable through much more of the play. 
In Lacanian theory, the third term's function is to locate the other two, so 
that they are no longer seen as a binary opposition, but as co-existing. In this 
sense, the Name of the Father resembles a catalyst, rather than being a term 
comparable in kind to the original two. What simplifications and dualities, then, 
does one find in Mundus & Infans? By his behaviour, the character Mundus insists 
that a human being cannot be complex, and will only allow Infans to be one kind of 
thing at a time. We see a total commitment at each age to the single, named 
characteristics of that age. Again, only one vision of time is permitted: linear 
time. This in turn imposes an impression that the present is of sole importance. 
One notices the many occurrences of 'now', and of its correlative, 'here', which 
also contains a strong impression of immediacy and of the moment. 37 Each 
segment of seven years leaves the human being exactly where he started, waiting to 
be directed by Mundus. There is no sense of maturation or of building on past 
experience, and no memory of past life, until we reach the lengthy summaries that 
Repentance produces in conversation with Perseverance. 
In addition, the human's view of relationships is also based on an 
opposition, usually a fight, in which one side triumphs and so has power over the 
other. In Wanton's behaviour we have seen this view of reality as structured by 
dominance. For Manhood, the Master/Servant opposition defines the world. His 
attempt to alter his position in that relationship involves appropriating the Master 
r81e from Mundus (signified by 'here in this seat sit I', when it is likely that he 
occupies Mundus' 'mansion'. ) The Servant role is then given to Mundus and to the 
Seven Kings (or Sins), whom Manhood now believes himself to control. ('They 
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will me maintain with main and all their might' 1.278, and 'All those send me their 
livery' 1.281. ) 
When Manhood makes an active choice to be informed by Conscience, he is 
moving towards a sense of self that can operate independently of Mundus. 
Light, yea but hark fellow, yet light fain would I see 
(1.335) 
A genuine interchange of opinions takes place between them, and it seems that 
Manhood will no longer automatically be a disciple. However, he is still committed 
to Pride, who embodies for him the attraction of the binary - of up/down; high/low; 
master/servant. 
For the World and Pride hath advanced me 
To me men lout full low 
(1.347-8) 
As the exchange continues, Manhood asks Conscience about the meanings of words. 
The rhythm of question and answer has grown beyond Manhood's rough challenge: 
'Say thou harlot, whither in haste', into a curiosity about the significance of 
'conscience', 'spirituality' and 'covetous'. Eventually an explanation of 'measure' 
leads Conscience to his definition of its opposite, Folly, as equivalent to the Seven 
Deadly Sins. Within the discussion, Manhood resists the idea of interpretation by 
habitually returning to the two-term structure of truth/falsehood. He regards 
Conscience's evaluation of the Seven Sins as a lie: 
Conscience: These Seven Sins I call Folly 
Manhood: What thou liest! To this Seven the 
World delivered me 
And said they were kings of great beauty 
And most of main and mights 
(1.459-62) 
If one term is false, Manhood can return to the security of a world based on 
binaries. It has already been remarked that Conscience can demonstrate how the 
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two apparent alternatives of pleasure and virtue can be made to co-exist, provided 
they are governed by 'measure'. 
All mirth in measure is good for thee 
But sir, measure is in all thing 
(1.449-50) 
Measure's alternative form, 'discretion', is described as a gift from God (1.473). 
When Conscience leaves the stage, there follows the intriguing passage of 
vacillation mentioned above. Manhood is alone, which is significant as he now has 
no external mould available to govern his actions, falsely defining who he is. The 
only other occasion when he has been alone on stage witnessed an intense, vaunting 
monologue of his soldierly exploits, followed by an appropriation of Mundus' 
'throne'. In this scene something very interesting occurs, for Manhood, of his own 
accord, is in two minds about what he should do. The scene just prior to this has 
imaged Manhood's introduction to the idea of the third term through the arrival of 
an alternative mentor. The same possibility has also been presented to him in the 
form of an inner, spiritual meaning to language, but he has proved incapable of 
assimilating that. Nevertheless, he has made some progress, for he is now able to 
consider the merits of both Mundus and Conscience, however inadequately, in their 
absence. On Conscience's departure, Manhood's first remark is a comic reversal of 
the agreement he has just struck. For a moment his hypocritical tone has the true 
ring of the Vice. 
yes, yes, ye come wind and rain 
God let him never come here again 
Now he is forward I am right fain 
(1.489-91) 
However, once Manhood has achieved the laugh that surprise tactics and barefaced 
iconoclasm can always raise from an audience, he remembers the reason behind his 
promise of virtue. It yields another abrupt reversal, contained simply in the startled 
exclamation: 
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Ah, ah now I have bethought me if I shall heaven win 
Conscience teaching I must begin 
(1.493-4) 
In spite of his minimal abstracting ability, Manhood is in such a primitive 
phase that he need only think of either one of the two in order to be wholly devoted 
to that one. We can see that a chink has been found in his egotism through which 
perception of a three-term structure can enter, for one line contains both 
alternatives: 
Though the World and Conscience be at debate 
(1.511) 
Another line contains a statement of the understanding he must attain: 
And believe, as he hath taught me 
Upon one God and Persons three 
(1.498-9) 
It seems for the space of twelve lines that Manhood will accept Conscience's 
instruction. He vows to forsake Mundus, and to follow Conscience's beliefs. He 
decides to call Conscience his king and to show his own loyalty through good 
deeds. Indeed, he now goes so far as to try to apply that teaching himself, by 
considering how it locates Mundus. He can manage to do this for only four lines 
before the danger of even thinking about Mundus overcomes him: 
But yet will I him not forsake 
For mankind he doth merry make 
(1.509-10) 
Manhood finally is not yet ready to abandon or to re-interpret worldly pleasures, 
and needs little persuasion to join the newly arrived Folly in his dissolute ways. It 
is even Manhood who first offers to fight, while it is characteristic that the qualms 
he then feels at wasting time in brawling are easily overcome by Folly's appeal to 
the binary system of true/false: 
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Manhood: Yea sir, but yet Conscience biddeth me 
nay 
Folly: No sir, thou darest not, in good fay 
For truly thou failest no false heart 
Manhood: What, sayest thou I have a false heart? 
Folly: Yea sir, in good fay 
(1.549-53) 
The story of Manhood's eventual initiation into virtue after suffering shame and 
despair has been told above. One may note in passing that these conditions involve 
a separation from the reflecting security that Manhood has always needed from the 
world around him. Shame implies a rejection by society at large; while despair, 
involving an assault on life itself in the moral play convention, is a peculiarly 
isolating, antisocial state. 
In conclusion, then, it seems that we can see a cluster of interlocking 
processes at work in Mundus & Infans. In the first, an individual's passage through 
the Mirror Stage into full participation in the Symbolic order is demonstrated by his 
initiation into the metaphoric use of language (co-incidentally with his education in 
basic theology). In the second, the passage from a 'dual' to a 'triple' way of 
thinking (necessary to the first process) is symbolized both by the play's language 
forms and by the stage images which it creates. The second process acts as a 
reinforcement of the first. 
Is there any practical point in putting forward a Lacanian reading of Mundus 
& Infans? In the first place, such a reading suggests an approach to production 
which mobilizes stage images of 'two' and 'three'. This is particularly relevant to 
the final scene, when the recitation of the Articles of Faith beats down Age. Out of 
the chrysalis of Age's despair emerges a concept of trinity, for a concept of zero, or 
nothingness, constructs a third term. Secondly, a Lacanian reading offers a more 
complex interpretation of a play which has previously been seen as interesting 
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because of its simplicity. Its primary interest for scholars in the past has been as a 
clever rendering of the Morality form for a minimal cast of two. The more 
complex reading creates the potential for a thought-provoking modern production. 
Finally, a Lacanian reading provides a tool with which to analyze the theory that an 
early moral play presents a primitive, undifferentiated self. The simplest 
'psychological' view of the moral plays in general is that they enact an internal 
conflict: the good and ill that we see are allegorizations of internal desires. In this 
view, the moral plays are direct descendants of the idea of the 'Microcosmos'. 38 A 
good case can be made for this view, but one strong objection to it is that it is 
peculiarly difficult to render recognizably in a production. In Mundus & Infans, as 
I have argued, humanity graduates beyond the binary situation into one that takes 
account of the externally located power of language. 
One may ask, finally, what advantages this kind of highly specialised 
theorizing might have for performance. The abstract differences between two and 
three could become iconographic and visually powerful. Differences between levels 
of reality could be rendered atmospherically. Lastly, the significance of the clash 
between slavish obedience and independence could appear on stage with interest and 
effectiveness. That these perceptions stem from a complex theoretical structure 
makes them all the more interesting for the reader of a play, who inevitably has 
more leisure to ponder such matters than an audience. 
SECTION B: YT AND THE CASTLE OF PERSEVERANCE 
Before' analysing the otherness established in Mundus & Infans, it will be 
useful to look at two comparable early moral plays. These are The Interlude of 
Youth39 (1530; 1514) and The Castle of Perseveraunce40 (c. 1400). Two features 
are crucial to the Mundus & Infans pattern: the 'sudden conversion' mode and 
'linguistic learning'. In the first of these, the protagonist must be instantly 
persuaded to change from a good way of life to an evil one, or vice versa, merely 
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by the announcement of the existence of that mode of being by its advocate. This is 
possible because the mankind figure does not have the ability (whether moral, 
linguistic or rational) to oppose the Vice's arguments, even though it is obvious, at 
least to the audience, that he is thereby falling into sin. 41 The alteration of his 
opinion about the nature of virtue takes place often with unrealistic or even farcical 
haste. 42 
In 'linguistic learning', the kind of learning process which the mankind 
figure undergoes can be interpreted as an insertion into language. This occurs in 
those plays where the mankind figure transcends his solipsistic identification with 
what is observed. 43 
The Interlude of Youth, though not a 'whole of life' play, resembles 
Mundus & Infans in the presence of both 'sudden conversion' and 'linguistic 
learning' features. The protagonist, Youth, begins without an ability to 
comprehend the spiritual significance of language, but acquires this in the course of 
the play. The play also contains the 'sudden conversion' feature, and its direct 
descendant, a tendency to subscribe to the opinion most recently uttered. 
In the opening argument with Charity, Youth, like Infans, takes his own 
name to be a full and adequate description of himself. Youth resists every mention 
of virtue, his literal-mindedness resulting in an inability to understand Charity's 
meaning. He copes with the idea of Hell by offering to beat Charity up, and with 
the idea of Heaven by finding literal objections to it. 
What sirs, above the sky? 
I had need of a ladder to climb so high. 
(1.96-97)' 
Charity's attempt to describe an intangible quality, God's mercy, is expressed in 
spiritual terms. As supporting evidence he offers a Latin Biblical quotation: 
The mercy of God passeth all works 
That witnesseth holy scripture, saying thus 
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Miserationes domini super omnia opera eius 
Therefore doubt not God's grace 
Thereof is plenty in every place. 
0.107-111) 
The metaphoric relationship between word and thing is too tenuous for Youth, who 
exclaims: 
What! methink ye be clerkish 
For ye speak good gibb'rish 
(1.112-113) 
To Youth it is gibberish firstly because he does not understand Latin, but in addition 
he does not understand the spiritual, or accept God's law. Turning the idea of the 
location of heaven into a joke based on a concrete interpretation of 'height', he 
believes that it will be physically dangerous to go there. Because Youth sees 
himself merely as a body, Charity's answer seems off the point, since it assumes 
physical death to be irrelevant to spiritual well-being. Youth offers Charity a 
meaningless riddle of his own, based on the very physical function of eating: 'Why 
do men eat mustard with salt fish? ' (1.119) The question contains a glancing 
reference to the rigours of fast days, which is all that religion can mean to Youth at 
this stage of his development. 
These two are not talldng to each other: as they continue to answer a 
mistaken sense in each other's words, they generate a strong sense of 
incomprehension and of failed communication. True dialogue involves hearing 
what the other party has said, and responding to it meaningfully. It often involves 
adjustment to accommodate the other speaker's approach, and a resulting sense of 
compromise. There is no dialogue here, as each party responds to the other with a 
kind of blankness: a reiteration of his own position. 
When Charity and Humility first attempt to reason with Youth it is to no 
avail. What they say is systematically buffered from Youth by interpolations from 
Riot and Pride. As we have seen, pre-linguistic competence involves lack of 'self', 
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and so the individual is inhabited by any discourse that passes by. In this condition, 
Youth follows the counsel of the last speaker, through a sequence of speakers 
beginning with Youth's entrance at 1.580 and extending to 1.684. In this scene 
Youth follows the opinion of the preceding speaker in five of his seven speeches. 
On the two occasions when there is no interpolation by Riot or Pride, Youth is 
handicapped from understanding the language of piety by his own immature 
commitment to interpreting all discourse in a material sense. For example, when 
Humility offers to reason with him and change his mind, Youth thinks a fight is in 
the offing. 
Humility: Ye be welcome to this place here 
We think ye labour all in vain 
Wherefore your brains we sill stir 
And kele you a little again. 
Youth: Sayest thou my brains thou wilt stir? 
I shall lay thee on the ear 
(1.588-93) 
On the single occasion when Youth answers a direct remark (from Humility), that 
remark contains a simple statement of his present condition, and offers nothing 
reformatory or inspiring. 
Humility: Sir, it is a pitiful case 
That ye would forsake grace 
And to vice apply. 
Youth: Why, knave, doth it grieve thee? 
Thou shalt not answer for me. 
(1.615-19) 
It begins to seem almost impossible that Youth's defenses can be breached. 
Finally, however, Charity approaches Youth in exactly those material terms 
that he understands best: the use of money and goods has been characteristic of 
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Youth from the beginning. Thus when Charity advises him to 'save that God hath 
bought', the word 'bought' catches his attention. 
Charity: And amend that thou hast miswrought 
That thou mayest save that God hath bought 
Youth: What say ye, Master Charity? 
What hath God bought? 
(1.686-89) 
Youth points out that he has never met God and therefore God cannot have bought 
anything for him. 
He came never at the stews 
Nor at any place that I do use 
I wis he bought not my cap 
Nor yet my jolly hat 
I wot not what he hath bought for me. 
(1.692-6) 
Charity embarks on an explanation of the scriptural significance of the term 
'bought'. Youth quite sincerely seeks further information, which Charity supplies 
with a simple historical narrative of the Fall and the Crucifixion. When Charity 
explains the term 'bond', Youth understands at last, and resolves to save his soul by 
following Charity's further advice. 
How should I save it? Tell me now 
And I will be ruled after you my soul to save 
(1.718-9) 
Nevertheless, Youth's understanding is really most secure when spiritual terms are 
reified. He is still very close to the literal world of concrete action. Charity's 
further teaching responds to this need to express meaning in significant action: 
Kneel down and ask God mercy 
For that you have offended 
(1.723-4) 
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When Riot and Pride address him, Youth is now deaf to them, apparently hearing 
only the virtues' speeches. He is provided with a new name, Good Contrition, as 
well as with new, sober clothes, and with a rosary. He is to conduct his relations 
with God and with his fellow man through the medium of language. 
Here is a new array 
For you to walk by the way 
your prayer for to say 
(1.757-9) 
He is to try to give others good counsel about their misdeeds, and is thus now not 
merely virtuous, but also an agent of virtue. Where Repentance in Mundus & 
Irrfans was to be an example to others, Youth is to become a counsellor, instructing 
them verbally in the spiritual life. 
When ye see misdoing men 
Good counsel give them 
And teach them to amend 
(1.763-5) 
The language that he uses for both these purposes will, of course, be the new 
metaphorical language of the spirit that he has just learned. 
For my sin I will mourn 
All creatures I will turn 
And when I see misdoing men 
Good counsel I shall give them 
And exhort them to amend. 
(1.766-770) 
Like Mundus & Infans and Youth, The Castle of Perseveraunce contains a 
protagonist who is capable of leaving the chaos of physicality and vice-play to enter 
the Symbolic order, though in this case that takes place only at the last moment. 
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The Castle of Perseverance is a long and interesting play, and an exhaustive 
consideration of it is out of place here. Instead, it is appropriate to glance at the 
ways in which its handling of the moral play situation differs from that of Mundus 
& Infans. The plays are comparable insofar as both narrate man's moral dilemma 
over the whole of his life, adopting the traditional view that the ages of man define 
which vice is specific to any individual. The two plays differ most obviously in 
terms of scale: The Castle of Perseveraunce is much longer and its generous cast list 
of thirty-five characters requires almost as many actors, as there is little opportunity 
for doubling. 45 Finally, it is apparently designed for a large-scale open-air 
production. Mundus & Infans is a miniature by comparison. However, as we shall 
see, The Castle of Perseverance treats man's moral development as an inherently 
simpler process than that which has been observed in Mundus & Infans. 
First the audience is introduced to two systems, one of good and one of evil, 
broadly characterized by feminine and masculine stereotypes, respectively. Once 
the self-introductions are over, wrongdoing is represented by male heartiness and 
good-fellowship. The group of vices is an adolescent gang of macho males: their 
idea of pleasure is to cause Humanum Genus46 to join them in their loose living, 
and to accept the consequence of going to hell with a swaggering bonhomie. This 
devil-may-care masculinity is imaged through the large space of the platen where 
they move vigorously and freely. In addition to the Bad Angel, the evil characters 
here include the World, the Flesh and the Devil, three all-purpose vices called 
Pleasure, Folly and Backbiter, and the full complement of seven Deadly Sins. Of 
these only Lechery is female, and unlike the others she is manifestly not suggested 
as a role model for Humanum Genus. They offer him the usual temptations: 
money, power and fashionable clothes are assumed to be the most interesting, with 
assorted fleshly indulgences also available. 
By contrast, the place of moral safety in which the virtuous life is conducted 
is a Castle containing the seven Moral Virtues, who are female: 'ladys in lond, 
louely & lyt, ' (1.1670). In holding a fortress against male attack they put forward a 
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powerful symbol of the female. The virtuous life is safe, enclosed and peaceful. 
One might expect Humanum Genus to move between these two areas one or more 
times, on each occasion learning more about the true nature of spirituality, and 
perhaps developing some independence of judgment or clarity of vision, 
contributory to freeing himself from the vices. This pattern, the pattern of Mundus 
I& nfans, of Mankind and of Everyman, is not realized. Instead, his education is 
postponed till the end of the play, as we shall see, and Humanum Genus spends the 
bulk of the play suffering from 'sudden conversion' symptoms of a peculiarly 
linguistic kind. 
To begin with, Humanum Genus embodies a curious split personality, 
containing a knowing self and an ignorant self. 47 The first appears to be aware of 
good and evil: 
To aungels bene asynyd to me: 
pe ton techyth me to goode; 
on my ryth syde 3e may hym se; 
He cam fro Criste Oat deyed on rode. 
Anopyr is ordeynyd her to be, 
pat is my foo, be fen and flode; 
(1.301-6) 
That knowing self, however, is also aware that it may be easily submerged, and 
prays that he will be able to continue virtuous: 
Lord Jhesu! to 'ou I bydde a bone 
pat I may foiwe, be strete and stalle, 
ýe aungyl Pat cam fro heuene trone. 
(1.315-17) 
When the two angels argue, Humanum Genus' confidence is immediately shaken. 
Even the 'knowing' self cannot hold itself independent of the alternative point of 
view, for the Bad Angel accosts the truth of the Good Angel's arguments. The two 
use similar verse forms, and even similar phrases: 
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Malus Angelus: Pes, aungel, pi wordys are not 
wyse. (1.340) 
Bonus Angelus: A, pes, aungel, jaou spekyst 
folye. (1.349) 
Humanum Genus is totally confused: 
Whom to folwe wetyn I ne may: 
I stonde and stodye and gynne to raue. 
(1.375-6) 
The confusion is not because he is torn between good and evil, but because he does 
not know how much of each he is permitted. He wants both, but is unable to make 
judgements about them. While he tries to hold both ideas in his mind, he fears 
madness (1.376, quoted above), and a return to primal chaos: 
As wynde in watyr I wave (1.379) 
This inability to operate as a separate agent is an unmistakable stage 
indication of the struggle of the unformed self, and Humanum Genus' solution, 
predictably, is to follow whoever spoke last. His decisions, therefore, are only 
superficially made on rational grounds. Arguments are offered to him, but he can 
only echo the opinion of the last speaker. Thus for anyone who wants to keep 
Humanum Genus' allegiance, the trick is to buffer him from other speakers in the 
same way that Youth was buffered. 48 This can be seen taking place as long as the 
Good Angel is on stage and outnumbered by the wicked characters (that is, as far as 
line 1298, when Confession enters). Whenever the Good Angel addresses 
Humanum Genus directly, the Bad Angel or one of the other evil characters 
interposes a speech which returns Humanum Genus to their side. 
In this way, without having made any moral progress, Humanum Genus has 
accepted the wicked alternative. However he has not opted for chaos or freedom as 
opposed to order. Instead, he has submitted to a system bound by rules and 
conventions, where disobedience brings punishment. The Bad Angel may control 
him: 'but ou muste be at myn acord' (1.431) and he has no option but obedience: 
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And bere pe manly euere among, 
Whanne ýou comyst out or inne. 
Humanum Genus. 3ys, and ellys haue Peu my necke, 
(1.436-38) 
Coueytyse instructs Humanum Genus in correct behaviour: 
Jou muste 3yfe P to symonye, 
Extorsion, and false asyse, 
Helpe no man but ýüu haue why; 
Pay not 1i serwauntys here serwyse 
pi neyborys loke ýou dystroye. 
(1.841-45) 
The passage continues for a further twenty lines with the same imperative verb 
forms. Clearly Coueytyse is not giving advice, but a series of commands in 'you 
muste' ; 'pay not' ; 'loke pou' (= be sure to), and so on. 
Thus when Shrift, Penance and the Good Angel attempt to win Humanum 
Genus away from evil, he uses both rules and reference to authority to defend his 
way of life. 
A, Schryfte you art wel be note 
Here to Slawthe at syttyth here-inne. 
He seyth you mytyst a com to mannys cote 
On Palme Sunday al betyme. 
you art com al to sone, 
perfore, Schryfte, be ý fay, 
Goo forthe tyl on Good Fryday! 
Tente to pe tanne wet I may; 
I haue now ellys to done. 
(1.1346-54) 
Humanum Genus' conversion back to good is not effected through words, 
but through the touch of Repentance's lance, instilling sorrow into his composition 
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as a human being. Thus he has not so much learned something, as had his nature 
altered to include an emotion. This, which he lacked previously, is something 
personal and individual on which he can base judgements. An external third term 
has reached Humanum Genus. Only now can he devote himself wholly to 
repentance, and describe his sinful life as a madness: 'I was tanne wood, and gan to 
raue: ' (1.1483). However a repentance which does not allow for a successful 
confrontation with the Bad Angel is not a particularly secure one. When the Bad 
Angel remonstrates with Humanum Genus, the Good Angel steps in to prevent 
Humanum Genus from answering him directly. And Humanum Genus' choice is 
still not an individual statement, but an echo: 'Goode Aungyl, I wyl do as jou 
wylt, ' (1.1598). What the Good Angel has to offer as an alternative to the rules of 
macho society is now revealed to be the Castle of Perseverance. The virtues are 
attractive, but the price that Humanum Genus must pay for their protection is a high 
one - he must lose not just sin, but all vestiges of the active life. 
We schul Pe fende fro 0 fon 
If lou keile ýe in Jis castel stylle. 
Cum sancto sanctus eris, etcetera. 
Tlunc intrabit 
Stonde hereinne as stylle as ston; 
panne schal no dedly synne Pe spylle: 
0.1695-1699) 
Thus virtue, imaged as female, is static to the point of moribundity, and Humanum 
Genus has exchanged one strait jacket for another. The alternative to the active life 
is usually the contemplative life, but Humanum Genus must go further, and become 
'as stylle as ston'. 
The forces of evil meanwhile are in disarray, cursing, scrapping, and 
accusing one another of letting Humanum Genus escape- 'A, Lechery, ýou skallyd 
mare! ' (1.1814) begins a nine line stanza of diatribe. 
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The villains launch an assault on the Castle, each Sin addressing the 
corresponding virtue, only to be defeated by reason. In this way, Humanum Genus 
continues to be protected from entering into verbal dispute -a combat which he 
would inevitably lose, as only someone who has entered the Symbolic order has the 
competence which allows him to hold his own in argument. 
All are aware of Humanum Genus' weakness in debate, and it seems that the 
Virtues have protectively denied the Sins an audience with him. When Coueytyse 
approaches the Castle, he is answered by Generosity, but refuses to accept her 
remarks, insisting on speaking directly to Humanum Genus. 
What eylyth ý-, Lady Largyte, 
Damysel dyngne upon des? 
And I spak ryth not to pe, 
ierfore I prey ý holde pes. 
How, Mankynde! cum speke wyth me, 
(1.2466-70) 
By questioning Coueytyse, Humanum Genus invites him to hold the floor 
further. Humanum Genus has apparently learned a little during his sojourn in the 
Castle, and is not immediately persuaded. In putting forward the idea of 'my best 
frendys' as a description of the ladies (1.2517) he makes use of a moral term. 
However, he cannot sustain this notion against Coueytyse's re-definition of the 
phrase to assert that his purse is his best friend because money can buy him comfort 
in his old age (1.2520-2526). Even at this late stage of the action, Humanum Genus 
is still in an infantile condition, both linguistically and in terms of moral 
knowledge. The Virtues' mourning must be buffered from him by the World, lest 
he be affected. 
Death now enters and promises to complete Humanum Genus' education: 'A 
newe lessun I wyl hym teche' (1.2832). Like Repentance in Youth, he does this 
extra-linguistically, by a blow on the heart. Again, the Real has intruded on 
Humanum Genus's Imaginary state. Though Humanum Genus recognizes what has 
73 
happened, he has not learned the lesson: like Everyman he turns to the World for 
assistance, basing his appeal on the friendship theme that has run through the play. 
'Werlde, for olde aqweyntawns, / Helpe me fro pis sory chawns! ' (1.2865-6). 
World, unable to help him, can now be recognized for what he is, as can the other 
false friend, Coueytyse: 
Ow, Werld, Werld, euere worthe wo! 
And pou, synful Coveytyse! 
(1.2882-83) 
and: pe wytte of is werld is sorwe and wo: (1.2886). Humanum Genus curses 
them and begins the virtuous process of teaching others what he now knows: 'Be 
ware, good men, of is gyse! ' (1.2887). Significantly, he achieves this point 
independently of any instruction by the Good Angel or the Virtues. Humanum 
Genus has one more lesson to learn: that he must abandon all connection with the 
world, even the emotional one of leaving his goods to his chosen heirs. The World, 
thinking to turn the screw on his anguish, unwittingly releases him to focus on God 
by assimilating the language of prayer and repentance. The World's name for his 
heir, 'I wot neuere who', stimulates in Humanum Genus' mind the memory of a 
verse from the Psalms: 'Tesaurijat, et ignorat cui congregabit ea. ' (l. 2986). 49 
For much of the play, Humanum Genus has failed to learn the nature of 
language. All he could do was to take on the form of whatever aspect of existence 
stood before him. Like the Manhood character in Mundus & Infans, Humanum 
Genus can now both understand the language of spirituality and hold himself up as 
an exemplary figure to educate others. Without further 
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instruction he comprehends fundamental tenets of the faith: 
God kepe me fro dyspayr! (1.2990) 
and: 
To helle I schal bothe fare and fie 
But God me graunte of hys grace. 
(1.3001-2) 
With his final breath he asks for mercy. 
For a time, however, it seems that this may not be enough: his eternal fate 
will rest on his behaviour through life rather than his spiritual condition at the end 
of it. Is his repentance genuine? Has Humanum Genus really learned anything, or 
is he playing for his own best advantage? The four daughters of God debate the 
ambivalent quality of his life and death. 50 Rytwysnes and Truthe hold to a hard 
line on punishment. 
Ouyrlate he callyd Confescion; 
Ouyrlyt was hys contricioun; 
(1.3427-8) 
God does not weigh their arguments. He resolves them with a simple unreasoned 
statement of his own nature: 51 
I menge wyth my most myth 
Alle pes, sum treuthe, and sum ryth, 
And most of my mercy. 
(1.3571-73) 
God's decision, therefore, validates the learning process that Humanum 
Genus has gone through, and the understanding that he has achieved. In The Castle 
of Perseverance we see the 'sudden conversion' in parallel with its prevention by 
buffering speeches. A hint of the 'linguistic learning' process can also be detected 
when Humanum Genus begins to comprehend the application of Biblical language to 
his own life. However, one must note in conclusion that the play's main interest is 
not in the progress that man's understanding makes, so much as in a rich, detailed 
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presentation of the moral options open to the vacillating self. To that extent, this 
kind of drama glorifies and thrives on the self in its undifferentiated, formless state, 
as a vehicle for spectacle. 
These early moral plays present us with a picture of the human being, almost 
invariably male, set about by enemies to whom he is most susceptible. This figure, 
from whom good and evil have been partly removed through the allegorizing 
process, tends to become a neutral ground whose principal attribute is to pass 
through an inevitable sequence of ages. He is peculiarly innocent. Thus any form 
of moral knowledge is alien to the human as he exists at the beginning of each of 
the plays discussed above. However, there is also a strong impression that such a 
person is not fully himself: that moral awareness is necessary in order to be 
properly human and to make meaningful choices between the available lifestyles. 
Both good and evil are externalized, but to use those terms 'good' and 'evil' is to 
subscribe to the value system of the plays. It is more revealing to consider how this 
external 'good' and 'evil' are constituted. 
Virtue in most forms is represented as external to the mankind figure. It is a 
goal to be achieved, and involves the acquisition of knowledge, in terms of an 
acquired skill with metaphoric language. Otherness here is associated with the 
passage of time. However, the mankind figure's acquisition of virtue also involves 
submission to a set of rules. Thus the virtuous Other is equated with social 
expectation, and the mankind figure's internalisation of it with a change in social 
status. It brings a sense of maturity and confidence to the mankind figure, but for 
the plays this involves the denial of the otherness that the World and the later vice 
figures represent. With the vices constructed as they are, the mankind figure can 
interpret his repudiation of them as involving no harmful loss at all. That Other 
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defined by the plays as virtuous, then, involves: a) a set of imposed rules which 
allow some behaviours but exclude others; b) a passport to immediate social 
respectability; c) an apparent gain in the prospect of prosperity; d) an acquired 
linguistic system. Frequently, but not inevitably, there are also: e) a change in 
clothing or other props; and t) the use of verse instead of prose; or of longer lines 
and a stately rhyme scheme instead of more abrupt forms. It will be readily seen 
how relevant a Lacanian perspective is to this picture. The virtuous other has much 
in common with the Other with a capital '0': the locus from which the Law of the 
Father imposes itself, and which is located in the Symbolic. 52 An ideological move 
to locate this 'rule-making Other' as the self, and to construct the subject as happily 
contained by that position is really what these early plays encode. Indeed, some of 
the tone of that position creeps into even the most disinterested plot-summary. 
Also implicated in the generation of the Symbolic order is the discovery of 
death - the radical other of life - which is used by the plays as the enabling factor 
from which metaphor is derived. It is here that one must locate Lacan's Real, as 
well as the zero that Age discovers in Mundus & Infans. 
The second important other is equivalent in some of its characteristics to 
Lacan's objet petit a, the object of desire which language transcends and 
incorporates. In the plays it occurs as the Manichean other, namely the Devil and 
his agents, but also as the senses, physicality, and literality in language. It must be 
stressed that these summary equivalences are intended as no more than preliminary 
to the investigation which is to follow in Chapters Three and Four. 
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One movement of the early plays is to obscure the desired quality of this 
other further, through a social move which defines its area as foolish and 
unattractive, not to mention imprudent in its carelessness of time. Notoriously, that 
attempt yields in many instances to the attractions of that which it wishes to 
denigrate. Defined within the plays as evil, this version of otherness actively 
attempts to obstruct the development of a fuller awareness in the mankind figure. 
He is to be prevented from making informed or mature choices, for self-realization 
always leads to piety within the scheme of the plays. Thus the forces of evil are so 
defined because they are 'enemies' of the human in a most profound way. It is in 
its derivation from this concept of opposition that the term 'other' makes sense for 
the moral plays, and the conclusions that follow are in many ways as much 
conclusions about the vice figures as about the other. 
The subject is blind to otherness. The first basic characteristic of the 
inimical other is that it goes undetected as such, at least by the main character. In 
all the plays examined in this chapter, the subject believes that the vicious life will 
not harm him, and further, he cannot even be properly aware that the dissipated 
lifestyle is vicious, because he does not understand the meaning of that term. We 
have seen that this blindness results from his own immature linguistic development 
and consequent inability to manipulate moral concepts. The mankind figure adopts 
habits of luxury and lavish dress with a kind of innocent vigour which is incapable 
of detecting the existence of moral dubiety beneath the glittering surface. In these 
early plays, the subject's innocence is such that the vices do not even need to 
conceal their true natures in order to go unrecognized as evil. There is an appealing 
frankness about their approaches to the mankind figure, and about his immediate 
identification with what they have to offer. This and the resulting fast pace are the 
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immediate dramatic benefits of constructing a protagonist who is subject to 'sudden 
conversions'. What is concealed from the subject is that the vice figures are 
actively opposed to his development as a complete human being. They obstruct his 
education in Christian morality, and are frequently active in plotting his damnation 
through an emphasis on the pleasures of the senses. On another level, their 
opposition to the mankind figure's progress means that the vices must oppose his 
insertion into language. Their preferred method for doing this is to exercise the 
comic, mocking effects of literalism to debase the spiritual remarks of the virtuous. 
It is the status of otherness as opposed to his best interests that the mankind figure is 
unaware of, even though the detailed description of evil is public. 53 
The concealment of the other is facilitated by its basic characteristic as an 
object of desire. The specific nature of the desire itself is seen as constructed by the 
age of the subject: it is inevitable that the child will be wilful, the youth lecherous, 
and so on, as detailed over and over again by the many versions of the Ages of Man 
topos. In these early plays, the existence of physical desires coupled with moral 
innocence lead to the protagonist's immediate submission to anyone who offers him 
the appropriate reflection of his physical state, by making the Imaginary and the 
Real seem undivided. The subject does not differentiate between a desiring self and 
an object of desire, and so cannot operate any mechanism of choice. Thus the focus 
on physicality by the human enables him to interpret desire and its satisfaction as 
the same thing. He does not yet contain the idea of 'desire as loss', an inherent 
attribute of language. 54 It is because of its generation in lack, contingent on the 
fragmented nature of the individual, that this other is complementary to the 
individual, and so it, or more accurately, the image of its absence, can be said to be 
part of the self. The allegorical figures of the plays render concrete the projection 
of desire and so support the illusion that desire is external, and the self unitary. 55 
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Its relation to desire makes it all the easier for the plays' other to sustain a 
further characteristic: deceitfulness. The human figure wants to believe what the 
other has to say, however incredible it may seem, for the self wants to believe that 
desire can be satisfied, and so that the sense of lack is temporary. The feature of 
the other's lying becomes much more important in later morality plays, reaching its 
height in Cambyses, with Ambidexter, 56 but even in the early plays the other can be 
deceitful about its true relationship with man. It represents itself as being his 'best 
friend' (Castle) and as loyal (Youth). Lying is essentially a manipulation, perhaps 
even a misuse, of language. Deceitfulness is interestingly implicated in the vice 
figures' own level of self-knowledge, and this is something to which each play has a 
unique approach. One may well ask how much the vices themselves know about 
time and the future. A key to this is in their fear of hanging, which they reduce to 
a joke in several plays. The vice figures sometimes show awareness that their 
function is against the mankind figure's 'best' interests. Such an awareness is 
problematic for discussions of subjectivity and otherness, for it gestures towards a 
construction of some kind of subjectivity in the vice figures. Each play copes with 
this situation in its own way. 
Stemming from its physical nature as an object of desire is the penultimate 
characteristic of the other in this discussion, its literality. We have seen how the 
vice habitually takes remarks literally. Such an inability to comprehend metaphoric 
relationships leads the vices to their characteristic mockery of the virtuous as 
babblers. It also means that they are on occasion genuinely incapable of perceiving 
spiritual truths. Related to the literal approach is the characteristic belief that a 
name is a full description of what a person is, and indeed, should be. From this, 
one may say that both the vices and the immature self use only the most simple 
model of language: as a labelling system of signifiers, validated by and indissolubly 
linked with an objectively existing system of referents. Paradoxically, then, a 
deceit particularly characteristic of the vices is their tendency to glamorize the world 
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with attractive verbal descriptions and tempting lists. Similarly they turn the risks 
of the gallows into stock jokes while overlaying the realities of their dissipated 
lifestyle with verbal wit and racy monologues. The final deceit, then, is that what 
is promised cannot be delivered, for the literal world cannot live up to the charm of 
the word. It is within a deep-seated ambivalence about language that vices are 
excluded from that model of language as a cross-referencing system of signifiers, 
whose relationships are multiple and shifting. This latter is, of course, the model in 
which the good characters' spiritual discourse can have meaning. 
It is only by recognizing the other that the protagonist can locate himself in 
that three-term relationship which constitutes both moral and linguistic maturity. 
Recognizing the other is not usually something that the subject can achieve on his 
own: he needs the assistance of the virtuous characters. 
This brings us to the final important feature of the other. Although it is 
concealed and deceitful, as we have seen, its function is to be found out. In the 
first place, its status as enemy is always public to the audience. Thus, from the 
audience's point of view it is not an occluded other, but a carefully defined one, 
situated and detailed by the pressures of the dominant order. How this meticulous 
constraint can break down will be seen in the course of the next two chapters. The 
other must, however, be gradually discovered by the protagonist if he is to achieve 
the complete selfhood of moral maturity. The overt message is that this will be 
achieved by a subject who can exercise free will to make the correct decisions. 
Fundamental to that is a vision of a subject who cannot make choices until he is 
inserted into language by a discovery of the separation of self, object/other, and a 
third term, namely the constraints under which the relations between the first two 
may operate. To achieve salvation, the subject represented on stage must move to a 
condition of knowledge more nearly approximating that of the audience. 
57 In some 
cases this results in his perception of his own condition: he is a dramatic character, 
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a hollow man, an 'example' to others, but this condition fills him with satisfaction. 
He is not merely fully competent in language, but occupies a new location in it, as a 
linguistic term himself. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 
1 Shoshana Felman, Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight (Cambridge 
Mass. and London, 1987), p. 9. 
2 F. P. Wilson expresses this most concisely: 'It is for man to choose salvation 
or damnation with "fre arbitracion". ' The English Drama 1485-1585, ed. G. K. 
Hunter (London, 1969), p. 5. 
See also E. K. Chambers, The Medieval Stage, 2 vols (London, 1903), II, 
p. 155: 'the representative of humanity ... 
is beset by the compulsion or swayed 
this way and that by the persuasion of allegorized good or bad qualities. ' 
3 Robert Potter recognizes the inadequacy of the Psychomachia model, in The 
English Morality Play (London and Boston, 1975), pp. 7-8. 
4 See note 40, Chapter One. 
5 Shoshana Felman's position on this seems admirable: 'Far from claiming 
that this frame of reference stands for the only valid or the most legitimate 
conception, my empathic stance - my intellectual adherence to this frame - is one of 
searching for the usefulness, the productivity, the creativity inherent in it: it seeks to 
derive and to explore the utmost inspiration that this frame of reference might be 
capable of yielding. ' cit in note 1, p. 8 
6 J. Laplanche and J. B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis (London, 
1973), pp. 250-251, define the Mirror Phase (or Stage): 'Though still in a state of 
powerlessness and motor incoordination, the infant anticipates on an imaginary 
plane the apprehension and mastery of its bodily unity. This imaginary unification 
comes about by means of identification with the image of the counterpart as total 
Gestalt; it is exemplified concretely by the experience in which the child perceives 
its own reflection in a mirror. ' 
Jacques Lacan introduces the concept in his short essay: 'The Mirror Phase', 
published in Ecrits: A Selection, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977), pp. 1-7. 
7 The pre-Mirror Stage condition is discussed by Julia Kristeva in 'Freud and 
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Love : Treatment and its Discontents', Powers of Horror (New York, 1982), 
pp. 240-248. 
8 Glynne Wickham, Early English Stages (London and New York, 1959-81), 
III, pp. 163-165. 
See also D. M. Bevington, From 'Mankind' to Marlowe (Cambridge, Mass., 
1962), pp. 116-117. 
9 Laura Mulvey puts this point with regard to cinema. One may 'use 
psychoanalysis to discover where and how the fascination of film is re-inforced by 
pre-existing patterns of fascination already at work within the individual subject and 
the social formations that have moulded him. ' 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative 
Cinema', in Visual and Other Pleasures (London, 1989), pp. 14-26, (p. 14). 
10 References are to the edition in Schell and Schuchter. 
11 Opinions about the date of composition of Mundus & Infans tend to fall into 
two camps: those who place it close to its date of publication by Wynkyn de Worde 
in 1522, and those who argue from stylistic evidence for an earlier date, around 
1500 or even earlier. The first group finds its rationale first in de Worde's own 
description of the play as 'a newe interlude', and second in the opinion of Alois 
Brandl that 'the use of the Narrenmotiv points to a date of composition not long 
before that of publication': Introduction to Quellen des Weltlichen Dramas in 
England vor Shakespeare, 80 (Strasburg, 1898), p. xlii. Quoted by E. K. Chambers, 
this opinion has had considerable influence. One finds it subscribed to by Glynne 
Wickham in Early English Stages, 3 vols (London and New York, 1959-81), III, 
p. 163, where he locates the play c. 15 10. 
Curiously, Glynne Wickham is also to be found in the alternative camp of 
scholars who believe the play to be earlier. In The Medieval Theatre, third edition 
(Cambridge, 1987), p. 118, he describes the play as 'of fifteenth century 
provenance', here following Chambers' own opinion that it is 'one of the half dozen 
English moralities that can with any plausibility be assigned to the fifteenth 
century', The Medieval Stage, 2 vols (London, 1903), II, p. 440. This was also the 
84 
view of J. Payne Collier, in The History of English Dramatic Poetry to the Time of 
Shakespeare and Annals of the Stage to the Restoration (London, 1831), If, p. 307, 
who gives the play more detailed consideration than most, and finally has 'little 
hesitation in assigning a date to the piece anterior to 1506. ' Doubtless it is this 
opinion that the editor of the Tudor Facsimile Texts has assimilated in his note: 
'Written (it is supposed) ... c. 1500-6. ' A. W. Pollard also feels that it 'cannot be 
assigned to a later reign than that of Henry VII', in the Introduction to English 
Miracle Plays and Moral Interludes (Oxford, 1923), p. li. One may notice that he 
leaves the earliest possible date open to question. For illumination one must turn to 
H. N. MacCracken's 'A Source of Mundus & Infans', PMLA, 23 (1908), pp. 486- 
496, a most persuasive article ignored by all except D. M. Bevington. MacCracken 
locates parallels between Mundus & Infans and a poem of c. 1430, the 'Mirror of 
the Periods of Man's Life; or, Bids of the Virtues and Vices for the Soul of Man'. 
He seriously, and correctly, questions Brandl's Narrenmotiv evidence, the only 
substantial point in favour of a date post-1500. MacCracken's linguistic evidence 
implicitly opens up the whole latter half of the fifteenth century for a possible 
composition date. For example, 'the continual rhyming of words in -y, -ye with 
words in -e goes to show that the play must have been written later than 1450. ' 
p. 486n. 
Not only is MacCracken's discussion persuasive, it provides objective 
substantiation of the feeling that one has when reading the play, that it has close 
affinities with the older plays. It would be a pity if the unthinking repetition of 
Brandl's opinion by modern writers on the drama left us with an over-rigid view 
which is at best only a good guess. 
12 Philippa Tristram offers a relevant detailed examination of the topos of Age 
as 'the spectacle of personified decrepitude. ' Figures of Life and Death in 
Medieval English Literature (London, 1976), p. 62- 
13 Peter Happd, in 'The Vice 1350-1605' (unpublished Ph. D Thesis, University 
of London, 1966), p. 285, includes fighting in a list of aspects typical of the Vice 
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convention. He also lists 'quarrels and brawls' among the characteristic activities of 
the Vice, p. 394. See also F. P. Wilson, cit. in note 2, p. 65. 
14 This staging convention involving 'mansions and platea' is discussed in 
Glynne Wickham, cit. in note 7, I, pp. 158-9, and p. 243. 
15 Juliet Flower McCannell, in Figuring Lacan: Criticism and the Cultural 
Unconscious (London, 1986), reads Lacan's theory as a critique of the destructive 
and compulsive power of the Symbolic. 
16 'over all fodes I am king' 1.4. Schell and Schuchter gloss 'fodes' here as 
dwellings. However, MED gives 'races' as a possible meaning, which seems to fit 
as a logical expansion of Mundus' claim to exercise comprehensive rule. If the 
'realms' are places and the 'fodes' are the peoples in them, this is more coherent 
than a claim to rule over all places and, redundantly, all dwellings. 
17 Jacques Lacan, cit in note 5, p. 194. 
18 The term is used by Lois Potter, in 'The Plays and the Playwrights, Du 
'Revels' HistoEy of Drama in English, vol 2,1500-1576, ed. Norman Sanders and 
others (London, 1980), pp. 141-257, (p. 153). 
19 Wanton, for example, is involved with movement and with physicality. He 
sees himself as aggressively controlling the physical world: this is apparent in his 
active vocabulary: 'drive', 'hit', 'make', 'bleer', 'scratch', 'bite', 'cry', and 'kick'. 
20 Because it occurs in a play, the condition of the unformed subject is, of 
necessity, rendered to the readers or audience analogically, through language. What 
that language describes is the pre-linguistic immersion in the senses. 
21 The vacillation in this passage provides interesting comparisons with the 
similarly divided speeches of Marlowe's Faustus, in Dr Faustus, ed. Roma Gill, 
New Mermaids (London, 1965), (V, ii, 140-154), as well as with Shakespeare's 
Richard III. The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. Harry Levin and others (Boston and 
London, 1974), pp. 712-764 (V, iii, 182-203). It is discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Four, with reference to Courage in Wapull's The Tyde Tarrieth No Man. 
22 Fighting is a reliable indication of the presence of the vices, who habitually 
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scuffle amongst themselves. Manhood is in danger of becoming one of them. 
23 Although both Manhood and Folly use the word 'here' as well as 'there' to 
refer to their destination, it seems to make more sense to read both as 'there' since 
they are clearly talking about going somewhere else. 
24 Philippa Tristram, cit. in note 12: Age is 'an outward spectacle, sometimes 
macabre, sometimes comic', p. 63. 
25 Victor Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play 
(New York, 1982) refers to 'this moment when compatible people ... obtain a 
flash of lucid mutual understanding on the existential level, when they feel that all 
problems, not just their problems, could be resolved', p. 48. The concept is also 
discussed in Turner's The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (London, 
1969), pp. 96-7. 
26 Interestingly, knowledge of the Symbolic at this point carries with it an 
understanding of a time-structure: 
Alway, ere ye begin, think on the ending 
For blame 
(1.484-5) 
27 Malcolm Bowie, in Lacan, Fontana Modern Masters (London, 1991), offers 
convenient definitions, which may help to point up the relevance of these terms to 
Mundus & Infans. He explains that this first other 'stood in for the world at large', 
p. 165. 
28 Bowie, 'it is anything and everything that desire touches, and cannot exist 
where desire is not', ibid., p. 166. 
29 Versions of this diagram appear in several places: 
in Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection, tr. Alan Sheridan (New York, 1977; 
reprinted London, 1980), p. 193; 
in John P. Muller and William J. Richardson, 'Lacan's Seminar on The 
Purloined Letter: Overview', The Purloined Poe, tr. Jeffrey Mehlman (Baltimore 
and London, 1988), pp. 55-76, (p. 71). 
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in The Language of The Self, tr. Anthony Wilden (Baltimore, 1975), p. 20n. 
30 Professor Malcolm Bowie suggested Lacan's probable rejection of such an 
idea, personal communication, October 1991. 
31 Bernard Spivack, Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil (New York and 
London, 1958): 'Among the early and medieval heresies that distracted Christianity 
none was more stubbornly rooted and recrudescent than the belief in a universe 
ultimately dualistic, with Evil a second, and competing godhead. Against the sects 
that held it, or seemed to hold it, the Church fought bitterly', p. 75. 
32 Anthony Wilden, System and Structure (London, 1972) is concerned with 
this difference in terms of 'analog' and 'digital' systems of communication, pp. 155- 
200. 
33 Or from the Imaginary order to the Symbolic. There is a problem with this 
terminology of 'escape' from the Imaginary to the Symbolic, in that it subscribes to 
the plays' own theory that literalism/worldliness is inferior. 
34 See, in particular, D. M. Bevington, From 'Mankind' to Marlowe, 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p. 116 ff. 
35 All other costume changes in the play are covered by monologues from the 
remaining actor, a practise which is to be found throughout these plays for small 
companies. 
36 Glynne Wickham has noted this difficulty, deciding that the role swap could 
be best effected 'given two actors of similar build and height': Early English Stages 
1300-1660,3 vols (London and New York, 1959-81), III, p. 164n. 
37 Now fair child I grant thee thine asking 
(1.64) 
For now I purpose me to play (1.73) 
Now Manhood I will array thee new (1.195) 
And here I dub thee a knight (1.198) 
Now I will wend to the world, that Worthy Emperor 
(1.119) 
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Now welcome Wanton my darling dear 
A new name will I give thee here (1.123-4) 
Aha, now Lust-and-liking is my name (1.131) 
This list is far from exhaustive, but it gives an idea of the pervasiveness of the form 
of speech. 
38 ? Lydgate's Assembly of the Gods is a fundamental example of the working 
through of the Microcosm image. The late morality Lingua is another, and is 
discussed at length in Chapter 5. 
39 I use the edition by Ian Lancashire, in Two Tudor Interludes (Manchester, 
1980), pp. 101-152. 
40 The Macro Plays, ed. Mark Eccles, EETS, OS, 262 (London, 1969), pp. 1- 
111. 
41 One finds an example of a mankind figure succumbing over-easily to a 
specious argument in Henry Medwall's Nature II, when pity for his old friend's 
sorrow returns Man to his friendship with Pryde. A variant example occurs in 
Mankind, when Mankind believes Tityvillus' appearance in his sleep to be a dream 
revelation of the truth. 
42 Lest it seem that this category must include all moral plays, one should 
notice the large group of plays, such as Rsi, in which the main figure is 
tricked into following evil disguised as good. The conversion there is not 'sudden', 
but has been effected instrumentally. 
43 In a small number of plays, for example the fragmentary Pride of Life, the 
mankind figure remains in a pre-linguistic state, as no real learning process takes 
place. In plays such as Respublic and Nature, that particular learning 
process cannot be observed because the play opens with the protagonist already fully 
aware of good and evil, and so inserted into the linguistic order. 
44 This is the first occurrence in the moral plays of a common joke, which 
could be read as a reference to Jacob's Ladder, and perhaps also to the 'ladder' on 
the gown of Philosophia, in Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, tr. H. R. 
89 
James (London, 1897). Of course, felons had to climb a ladder to be hanged, 
which may be one reason why Youth finds the idea of using a ladder unappealing. 
45 D. M. Bevington in From Mankind to Marlowe (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), 
p. 72, suggests that twenty-five actors would be required to supply all the parts. 
46 To avoid confusion with the better-known hero of Mankind, I shall refer to 
the protagonist in The Castle of Perseverance as Humanum Genus throughout, but 
retain the names of the other characters in English, as they appear in the speeches in 
the play. 
47 This structure is repeated at the end of the play when the soul appears, 
separated from the body. 
48 Youth, lines 580-684, discussed above. 
49 That this change is a matter of knowledge can be seen from Folly's much 
earlier description of Humanum Genus' sinful condition: 
Trewly Mankynde nowth nen can 
ynke on God ýt hathe hym bowth 
(1.714-15) 
50 See Michael E. Ralston, 'The Four Daughters of God in The Castle of 
Perseverance', mi tu , 15 (1984), pp. 35-44. 
51 See Thomas Rendall, 'The Times of Mercy and Judgment in Mankind, 
Evejyman, and The Castle of Perseverance', English Studies in Canada, 7 (1981), 
pp. 255-269. 
52 This point will be developed in Chapter Five in relation to hierarchical 
control, especially that of the patriarchal order. 
53 In later plays, with a more integrated subject, the vices must conceal the 
details of evil behind a cloud of lies and assumed names. Respublica, for example, 
in the play of the same name, is not morally undeveloped so much as rather dim and 
very gullible. 
54 It is noticeable that these plays frequently refer to the satisfaction of physical 
desires without representing the scenes necessary to that satisfaction. The taverns, 
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brothels, and banquets do not appear on stage. A fuller discussion of the 
implications of this is contained in my work on Hickscorner in 'Four Tudor 
Morality Plays in the Light of Recent Critical Theory', (unpublished M. A. 
dissertation, University of Warwick, 1987). 
55 It is interesting to see how closely Anthony Wilden's reading of Lacan fits 
this theory: 'the subject's profoundest desire to be 'One' again (to control the Other 
to whom he becomes subjected) is totally and absolutely irreducible. It is this desire 
for what is really annihilation (non-difference) that makes human beings human. 
And if we employ the insights of the mathematical metaphor as Lacan does in the 
later works, we realize that this primordial 'One' cannot be one at all, since one 
requires two. What it can be is zero ..... Zero makes a lack (but not a 
'nothing') visible, and thus it provides for the linear movement of integers in the 
same way as absence constitutes the subject of the Fort! Da!, who has previously 
known only the asubjectivity of total presence. The subject is the binary opposition 
of presence and absence, and the discovery of the One - the discovery of difference 
- is to be condemned to an eternal desire for the non-relationship of zero, where 
identity is meaningless. ' Anthony Wilden, 'Lacan and the Discourse of the Other', 
in Jacques Lacan, The Language of the Self, tr. Anthony Wilden (Baltimore, 
1975), pp. 159-311, (p. 191) . 
56 Some, however, would see its greatest exponent in Iago. 
57 The satisfaction of observing that process is akin to the satisfaction of seeing 
an initiation ceremony successfully undertaken. The failed initiate, of course, 
becomes a sacrifice, in a pattern highlighted by Rend Girard in Violence and the 
Sacred, tr. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore, 1977; first published in French 1972). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE VICE-FIGURE AND SEMIOTIC SYSTEMS 
Evil is nothing but the absence of God; matter is 
nothing but the absence of spirituality in the world 
John Scotus Eriugena 
SECTION A: CONSTRUCTION OF THE OTHER 
When the early moral plays establish the object of desire as other and then as 
adversarial and wicked, they balance that other against a conservative and restricted 
subject. Polarisation in turn feeds an impression of the self as unified, literally, as 
an 'individual'. From this the mankind figure becomes the humanist individual who 
can be represented as capable of self-determination. 
The previous chapter demonstrated how the primitive, undifferentiated 
subject is transformed by a complex process in which the assimilation of language 
interacts with the discovery of otherness to produce a subject which can perceive 
itself in relation to morals and metaphor. The subject participates in the established 
order both by using this knowledge and by submitting to it. 
A need not just to recognize the other but to reject it was presented by 
Mundus & Infans as inherent in these operations, for a view of the other as evil is 
implicit in the moral play's perception of the world as adversarial. I 
This chapter explores the nature of the transgressive other, who can 
conveniently be equated with the vice characters. For the moment, the Other of the 
Non/m du PEre can be aligned with the self, in its polarization as a censorious, law- 
abiding citizen. It is important to bear in mind that a vice figure is a jgtt pointing 
towards otherness. It does not in itself constitute the other, but is an umbrella term 
for much but not all of the ramified characterization of otherness that the moral 
plays present. The link is so close that social abjection can 
be achieved by attaching 
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to the victim of abjection some of the casual features of a vice figure. This is a 
point which will be developed in later chapters. 
The apparent success that comes to the mankind figure with the finding of 
metaphor is achieved at the cost of repressing the physical, the punning, and a 
particular kind of excess. When, in Mundus & Infans, Age is renamed Repentance 
and thus saved, his salvation is represented as part of a process which involves his 
dedication to a metaphoric language of the spiritual, and a related exclusion of the 
physical and literal. 
Gramercy Perseverance for your true teaching 
For in the spirit of my soul well I find 
That it is necessary to all mankind 
Truly for to know. 
(1.957-60) 
Because the metaphor that is discovered is presented as a total, exclusive truth, 
while literality is seen as a deception, the duplicity of language is recognized only 
as something to be conquered. 2 The act of confession masters the mankind figure's 
own naughty past by covering it with language, and so appropriating it to virtuous 
purposes, but the allegorical representatives of evil are treated differently. A few 
simply vanish from the plot, most are dismissed with contumely, often to Hell, but 
sometimes to be hanged. 3 Some are declared to roam the world, through a sinister 
eternity of corruption and temptation. In general, though, audiences who earlier 
in the performance relished the vice figures' subversive antics end by taking delight 
in their humiliation. This point suggests that one must not push too hard any notion 
of the audience's identification with the vice figure. He has more the character of a 
sacrificial victim, who is licensed to commit outrageous acts before being gleefully 
destroyed - in this case, in effigy. 
6 Humiliations, because they include both visual 
spectacle and intensity of emotion are particularly appropriate theatrical events.? 
However, the rejection of the vice figure serves a subtler end than that of inserting 
the subject into language, and one which is most significant for the points that this 
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chapter will take up. It can be seen as a move in the construction of the subject as 
unitary. 
So far it has seemed that the other must be repudiated for full selfhood to be 
achieved. We have seen that a vice figure, as an object of desire, is part of the self. 
In banishing that figure, the moral play offers the illusion that the individual's past 
experience can be rejected. In covering past wickedness with language it also offers 
a related illusion of successful repression. The ejection of the vice figures therefore 
represents the repression of disreputable urges in the subject. Actually, then, a 
mutilation is involved in repression, for the other must effectively be cut out of the 
self in order to create an acceptable 'good self . Such a mutilation is intolerable to 
the subject, so its existence must be obscured, together with its occasion. The plays 
cope with this unbearable psychic dilemma by externalizing these unacceptable 
urges, characterizing the other as the vice figure, and then as grotesque and 
extreme. Further incidental characteristics may then be developed within these 
figures. It is impossible in this chicken-and-egg cycle to say whether vice figures 
are defined as alienated and so act as a convenient vehicle for additional features of 
otherness, or whether a mild form of otherness is unconsciously repudiated in 
abstract and then characterized in an exaggerated or repulsive way in the vice 
figures, thus rationalizing its rejection. The process as it is conducted within the 
plays is more than one of simple projection, it involves the creation of a character, 
followed by projection onto it of undesired additional features. The search for the 
self that the mankind figure pursues is therefore a search for an undivided self. The 
self is newly differentiated from the 'outside' - the World - in the process we have 
observed exemplarily in Mundus & Infans. Next it naively craves to establish itself 
as unitary. One might object that the moral plays assume the self to be complex, 
through their grounding in the allegorical tradition, for allegory represents 
numerous discrete aspects of the self as separate named individuals. From this it 
seems that allegory as a dramatic form begins by articulating a complex 
representation of a multiple self. However, as soon as one of the allegorical figures 
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represents humanity, allegory also conduces to a picture of the self as unitary, and 
of psychic conflict as external. The position in this case becomes one of simple 
paranoiac projection. The 'true' self that can cope with the spiritual through the 
language of metaphor suffers from the delusion that evil can be abolished. This it 
effects by projecting all evil onto the vice figures. 
In exploring the content of that category of the repressed manifested in the 
vice figure, one can also assess the price which the mankind figure pays in order to 
sustain a sense of personal indivisibility. To do this it is essential to rehearse here 
some familiar material. 
Peter Happd establishes a comprehensive list of the Vice's characteristic 
behaviours. 8 Happe's list is extremely lengthy and detailed, and simply bursting 
with exemplifications. That in itself poses problems of emphasis and direction. His 
solutions are, either to direct his discussion towards a search for the homiletic point 
of each of the Vice's typical activities, or else to see them as designed to entertain a 
relatively inattentive audience. In the context of the present analysis, his list is a 
useful foundation from which certain of the more important attributes which he 
mentions, as well as some that he does not, can be discussed in terms of their 
significance for the self as areas of repression. For the sake of clarity and 
coherence, it seems preferable to begin by listing these features in fairly general 
terms, before moving on, in Section B, to examine how a large number of them are 
exemplified in operation in a single play, Mankind. Those characteristics which 
involve ways of using language are particularly interesting, as it is in the realm of 
language that the individual crucially attempts to find itself. As we have seen, the 
self which it is the play's project to define is designated partly by labelling certain 
linguistic practices as belonging to the other, and hence as unacceptable. Most 
critics agree that the plays offer a rich enjoyment of those aspects of language they 
wish eventually to decry. 9 The dominating tendency of vice figures is towards 
excess in all things, related to that branch of their ancestry which goes back to the 
Deadly Sin of Pride. It is marked by an express opposition to moderation or the 
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mean, whereas the mean is often advocated by the virtuous characters. There are 
various reasons, foreshadowed above, why physicality and language use are difficult 
to separate completely. One example is when abrupt verse forms image the vice 
figures' vigour as well as asserting it. However, for the sake of comprehensibility I 
shall consider these traits in several categories, namely i) Physicality, ii) Verbal 
features, iii) Controlling moves, iv) Lying and double-dealing, v) Relations 
with Women, and vi) Music, Singing and Noise. I shall label separate 
characteristics P1, P2 etc., Vi, V2 etc., to enable ease of reference in the 
discussions of individual plays. 10 There is considerable cross-referencing among 
these categories, and the closing sections in which I discuss Transgression, and 
The Vice Figure as Supplement in many ways act as a summary of the others. I 
hope that the cross-referencing to Peter Happe's thesis, though it extends the 
discussion somewhat, may also be of use in helping readers to find their way around 
that important reference work. These cross-references appear as: (H, page 
number). 
i) Physicality of the vice figure. A concentration on the physical life is the most 
immediately obvious attribute of vice figures. Vice figures operate in crews, 
typically of one chief and either two or three subordinates (P1) (H, 398). Happe 
sees a greater distinction between the Vice and his associates. However, in many 
cases the vice-crew's behaviour and diction is very much of a piece with that of the 
principal Vice. One is led astray if one considers rustics and lower-class victims to 
be members of the vice-crew. The Vice and his crew are inordinately vigorous 
(P2), bursting into activities such as dancing, wrestling and brawling (H, 385) at the 
least provocation. They eat and drink to excess and offer the mankind figure 
journeys to the stews and to taverns full of meat and drink (P3). 11 Gluttonous 
excess is their response to the often moderate wishes of the virtuously tired or 
hungry mankind figure. 12 Such excess is represented by lists of wines (as in The 
Four Elements) and by proto-Rabelaisian bragging. Their frankness about bodily 
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matters may appear as a lack of inhibition about defecation, and what Bakhtin calls 
the 'lower parts' generally (P4). 
The vice figures' easy access to sex (P5) (H, 378) is often connected with 
that to food and drink through their common location in the tavern. Vice figures 
are typically on familiar terms with a selection of whores all endowed with 
'smattering' faces. They occasionally offer the mankind figure introductions to 
these women, just as they offer food and drink. 13 
Another offshoot of the physical life is the fighting and brawling that vice 
figures typically go in for (P6) (H, 375; 391-4). Connected with their fighting is the 
famous vice's dagger, with which they may fight with others or alone (P7). This 
latter curious habit occurs as a stage direction, 14 which I take to indicate flailing 
around, opponent-less, in a manner which could appear to be either comic or 
sinisterly deranged. Some fights appear as a mock tourney, involving the use of 
kitchen utensils as armour (P8). 
Vices show clear indications of ubiquity, which one might reasonably regard 
as the ultimate physical excess (P9). This is suggested by their tendency to appear 
whenever the pious figures leave the stage, and to be called up readily by the merest 
mention of their names. In this they resemble the Devil, from whom they in part 
derive. 15 Dramatically it is convenient and somewhat sinister that they can arrive 
very much pat on cue. 16 Further evidence of their omnipresence can be seen in the 
'marvellous voyage' through many lands, of which numerous principal Vices boast, 
usually to the point of incredibility. '7 Parallel to the vice figures' ubiquity in space 
is an imperviousness to time (P10) (H, 384, refers to their 'prophetic power and 
knowledge of events'). Again resembling the Devil, vice figures may leave the 
stage, but they are not killed. Even when they are ultimately punished by 
banishment, often to Hell (P11), one has a sense that they can easily return, for the 
quality of an abstraction such as Greed or Mischief is to be resurrected in every 
human being. They can thus continue as long as the human race does. This 
perennial quality sorts awkwardly with the anxieties about hanging, to which these 
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same figures habitually return in their conversations and their abuse. 18 
The next attribute of vice figures that must be mentioned here is their class, 
since that is constitutive of and constituted by their material condition (P13) (H, 
356, 'Vice taken on as servant' ; H, 377, 'Vice and associates as thieves'). They 
are most commonly 'masterless men' : tinkers or horse thieves, or in later plays, 
cony catchers. In the sixteenth century a 'masterless man' was seen as outside the 
proper social structure, in which one either owned property or was employed by 
(and so tied to) someone who did. Other modes of existence were seen as 
dangerous, and probably criminal. 19 In addition, vice figures sometimes claim to 
be ex-sailors or ex-soldiers. Genuine ex-sailors and ex-soldiers were licensed to beg 
by Henry VIII, as a means of controlling those sturdy beggars who operated 
illicitly. By purporting to have returned from the wars, vice figures claim a 
position within the social order, albeit a lowly one, to which they are not entitled. 
Occasionally leaving their extra-social position, vice figures may become servants 
for a time, but there is no feeling of permanence or sincerity about such 
arrangements. 20 Although they are generally poor, these low characters evince a 
love of fine clothing and a strong wish to sport the latest fashions, particularly if 
these are extreme and hence ridiculous or impractical in some way (P12) (H, 429, 
'bizarre appearance'). 21 This, needless to say, is another characteristic they share 
with Pride. It seems to be a natural extension of their relation to the Deadly Sin of 
Avarice, as well as coherent generally with their close relationship with material 
goods, that vice figures are often usurers (P14) (H, 377). It is probably a perceived 
link between that and a traditional stage characteristic of Devils that also gives them 
large or 'bottle' noses, and sometimes large heads, as more specific versions of 
their generalized physical grotesquerie (P15). fl I have mentioned several times that 
vice figures are connected with the Devil. This feature is occasionally foregrounded 
as lineal descent (P16). 23 Thus, though the principal Vice is generally represented 
as external to human systems of organisation, it is possible to locate him, and in 
part to contain him, in that very social structure, the family. 
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ii) Verbal features of the vice figure. Parallel to and often linked with these 
physical features are the vice figures' verbal characteristics. Quite simply, they are 
inordinately garrulous (Vi), which is of course another area of excess. This 
linguistic excess is inextricably bound up with physical excess as I suggested above. 
Indeed, excessive behaviour is often presented purely in linguistic terms: the 
'lemans', the food and the wine are described, not shown, and so exist in the moral 
play primarily as language. 24 The things referred to collapse into the 'idle 
language' in which they are represented. 25 Another verbal feature is the vice 
figures' interest in one another's exploits (V2). They question one another about 
their lives in the elsewhere of off-stage and before-now. The atmosphere thus 
generated creates a warm feeling of a loose informal society, and is connected with 
the physical intimacy of brawling. (Vice figures always forgive one another their 
brawls. ) They typically converse on these matters in a way which is sometimes, but 
not always, dramatically useful in furthering the plot. Their questions and the often 
digressive responses feed an impression of camaraderie, and even of a very human 
concern for one another. 26 The vice figures tease one another about the possible 
consequences of their lifestyle: it is they, far more than the virtuous characters, who 
habitually refer to the dangers of hanging and going to Hell (V3). It is natural in 
connection with their thieving habits that vice figures are very conscious of hanging 
(H, 372, 'Either he is punished, usually by hanging, or he is threatened with such a 
punishment and escapes. The number of escapes is small. The effect of an escape 
is to show that the Vice is irrepressible and will live to fight another day'. ) In fact, 
Happe is mistaken here, for the commonest fate of the vice figure is banishment. 
Vices are braggarts (V4), a characteristic they share, once again, with the 
Deadly Sin of Pride (H, 374, also draws the connection with the Miles Gloriosus. 
H, 375 and 376 refers to their cowardice. ) Their more protracted flights of 
narrative are extremely self-centred. 
27 Individual vice figures may command a 
wide variety of styles from repartee to argument to narrative monologue. This 
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versatility (V5) (H, 404) is noticeable in their love of parody. Principal Vices are 
particularly skilled at persuasive argument (V6) (H, 357), and in this lies their 
threat to a mankind figure accustomed to debate. 
The vice figures abuse conventional language forms by blaspheming and 
using foul language (V7) (H, 400, 'oaths and obscenities'; H, 402, 'a sort of know- 
all naughtiness'), a habit which seems contradictory in the light of their linguistic 
and casuistic skills. The habit results from the fact that vice figures, even principal 
Vices, are generally responsive rather than initiatory in conversation with the 
virtuous characters. Only after a pious character has made some remark can the 
vice figures exercise their disruptive skill upon it. The characteristic diction of the 
pious characters is one of logical argument. Their reasonable tone is mocked 
through parodic nonsense phrases (V8), while aureation and Latinity are mimicked 
in abusive dog-Latin (H, 403 mentions the Vice's similar, but not identical, 'logic- 
chopping and ... use of Latin tags'). We have seen 
in the previous chapter that 
the over-arching structure of holy metaphor is attacked by the vice figures' 
ludicrous literalisms, with which they manipulate opportunities for double-meaning 
(V9). The insistence on literalism seems like stupidity, but it also works 
transgressively. In that way it is like 'Carnivalesque discourse' which 'breaks 
through the laws of a language censored by grammar and semantics' . 
28 The vice 
figures' moronic misunderstandings carry shock value on several levels. The first 
comes from the cheek with which they confront authority. The second comes from 
their stunning stupidity: the audience can easily see that the vice figures' readings 
involve a lesser understanding rather than a greater. Yet there is a sense in which 
these literal readings put themselves forward as having considered and rejected the 
elaborate form, in favour of 'common sense'. What they offer is a refusal to be 
involved in the spiralling play of meaning of metaphoric language. In this context, 
then, the small-scale coarseness and knowing sniggers of V7 have the overt function 
of distracting language from more serious purposes. 
The vice figures' jokes take the form of puns or wilful mishearings (V 10). 
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On other occasions vice figures expose the gullibility of the mankind figure to 
ridicule by accidentally-on-purpose uttering a true opinion, then quickly retracting it 
and offering a similar-sounding honourable remark instead (Vii) (H, 405). 29 A 
variant on this trait occurs in a very few plays where a vice figure says 'well, 'tis 
well', when in fact dissatisfied. 30 
Principal Vices are addicted to discursive and often digressive monologues 
(V 12) (H, 369 - 'passages of self-explanation which may be in the form of a 
soliloquy'). Many opportunities for these occur, but the autobiographical 
monologues already mentioned in connection with ubiquity about impossibly 
protracted journeyings through many countries, and adventures in many towns, 
usually within England and France are especially popular (H, 395-97). 31 Happ6 
treats these narratives as if they described real occurrences, but sees that 'there is 
something other-worldly about such journeys which suggests that the Vice 
represents a perennial evil. '32 Another aspect of their responsiveness to the spoken 
word has been mentioned in connection with ubiquity: they can hear and be 
conjured up, like any devil (V13). 33 
The vice figures are particularly addicted to proverbs and sententiae (V 14) 
(H, 411): though other characters use these from time to time, they are most 
consistently used by vice figures. Contrary to first impressions, proverbs are a 
mode of ambiguity and of language play, as will be made clear in the analysis of 
The Tyde Tarrieth No Man. Happe draws attention to a further quality of otherness 
occasionally present in the vice figure's speech, namely a tendency to be 
distinguished from the speakers around him by the use of contrasting verse forms 
(V15) (H, 412). 
iii) controlling moves. Before proceeding to list the principal Vice's methods of 
control and the areas which he attempts to dominate, it is important to establish why 
control is important to this character. 
The principal Vice wishes to control the mankind figure in order to engineer 
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his spiritual destruction. This seems a simple and obvious enough aim at first 
blush, and is clearly linked with the principal Vice's own close relationship with the 
Devil. However, it often appears that it is the Devil as Pride who is the principal 
Vice's nearest relative (H, 40). 34 Understanding this point is crucial to an 
understanding of the underlying coherence which structures the principal Vice's 
apparently wild and random disruptions. It is as Pride that this character is ego- 
centric and boastful; as Pride that he wishes to fill the stage with his own voice and 
presence, and as Pride that he is addicted to the first person, and to repetitions of 
his own name. His self-assertiveness can be detected to extend even so far as other 
people's identities, on those occasions when he insists on re-naming his followers. 
From this point of view, it seems equally true to recast my initial proposition that 
the vice figures take the forms they do in order to destroy the mankind figure, by 
saying that the vice figure wishes to engineer the mankind figure's spiritual 
destruction in order to assert his own existence and power. Because the moral high 
ground is already occupied, those intent on asserting themselves in opposition have 
little choice but to occupy a position of viciousness, and make that seem as 
attractive as they can. Seen in this way, some of the oddly obscure motivations of 
famous vice figures become more explicable. It is this desire for self-assertion that 
leads vices and vice-like figures such as Ambidexter and Iago to operate at times in 
defiance of their own best interest as credible human beings, (H, 160, 'recklessness 
and self-seeking' . 
35 
Joining a battle for control is the principal Vice's fundamental response to 
any situation. Further, he can be seen to make controlling moves in several clearly 
definable areas. He wishes to control the other characters: firstly his unruly crew 
(Cl) (H, 285), through beatings and orders; and secondly the mankind figure (C2), 
through argument and appeals to his physical needs. He adopts a tutelary 
relationship towards both the vice-crew and the mankind figure (C3). He also 
attempts to control the audience. A vice figure's virtuosity with language allows 
him to overstep the bounds of the stage and enter into colloquy with the audience 
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(C4) (H, 120 and 282ff. ), both through his use of knowing asides and of 
monologue. Each of these techniques can generate a collusive atmosphere quite 
different from the response invited by other characters. 36 (H, 368-370, notices the 
use of asides, but sees the practice either as a device for communicating the intrigue 
to the audience or as a means of uttering moral truths. ) Vice figures attempt to 
control the overt plot by re-defining the good characters as mockable, impractical, 
boring, and incomprehensible (C5). At a deeper level the principal Vice's frequent 
formation of schemes, and their working through, locate him as an alternative 
author (C6), 37 and this creative streak is recognized by that freedom to improvise 
(C7) which stage directions on occasion specifically give to the Vice and other low 
characters. He is thus to a large extent in control of the audience's enjoyment of 
the play. 
The vice figure's wish to control occurs in opposition to the control already 
exercised by the pious figures through their sermonizing claims to possess 
understanding of total truth. The pious speeches carry considerable authority and 
the respectability of being the received opinions of the class of government. It is 
against this extra-textual background that a vice figure's attempts at control appear 
rebellious, rather than simply part of the ordinary machinery of the plot. The text 
thus subscribes to a high/low opposition in which the virtuous sermon is proper, 
even authorial, and the vice figures come from elsewhere, from 'another stage', to 
pull down established authority. 38 The urge to control, taken in conjunction with 
the later Vice's notorious unreliability, leads to a significant development in those 
later plays where vice figures enter a Romance plot: the so-called 'hybrid plays', of 
which the principal examples are Common Conditions, Clyomon and Clamydes, 
and Cambyses. 39 Here, the principal Vice's opposition to human good is subtly 
altered into the quality of ambidextrousness - the ability or even the compulsion to 
'play on both sides' "40 In other words, this 
kind of vice figure may alternately 
serve the hero's needs and operate against him, with equal sincerity. Serving the 
hero in this case is no longer always a mask. At this point, the vice figure has 
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ceased to function as an agent of the Devil, and is regarded as a representative of 
that randomness, or ill luck, which the Romance plot requires to initiate the 
wanderings of its courtly subjects. In this way the character of allegorized evil 
survived the move into 'realistic' secular plots, when the 'Vice comes to represent 
the uncanny destructive forces in the human environment' (H, 305). 
iv) Lying and Double-Dealing. The vice figure's penchant for lying and double- 
dealing arises in part from his function as alternate author, for it is in order to re- 
direct the plot, or to disrupt a stable situation that a vice figure deliberately perverts 
the truth. His lying takes various forms, most of which are essentially verbal 
traits. 41 In addition to the simple utterance of falsehood (L1) (H, 261), he may re- 
interpret the virtuous character's counsel in order to lure the mankind figure into 
dissolute ways (L2). He may appeal to literality disguised as common sense in 
order to re-direct the mankind figure's good intentions (L3). Both of these modes 
involve alternative interpretations of an accepted remark. Deceitfulness came to be 
so widely recognised as central to the character that it is often specifically referred 
to, and is combined with the concept of infidelity in some cases. Originally an 
allegorical figure from religious polemic, infidelity could also be used to refer to 
social or personal betrayal. 'Ambidexter' is the name of the vice figure in 
Cambyses (1569/70), and the idea of helping or hindering both parties in the play 
recurs in several later vice-plays (L4). In addition to betraying their masters, vice 
figures also betray one another (H, 302). 42 Lying is often intensified when the lie 
involves the conveying of a false message, or a false letter (L5). 43 Deceit of this 
kind is not the alternative meaning embodied in cynical or worldly remarks, for 
these act to question the idea of unitary truth by suggesting that the world might be 
subject to alternative interpretations. Instead, this variety of the vice figures' 
deceit, like Li, is manifest falsification of verifiable fact. 44 As such, it shores up 
the concept of 'truth' by opposing falsehood to it. Hence it is a conservative move, 
in the sense that it preserves the framework of belief in a real world, in which 
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concepts of truth and falsehood are valid. To this extent, the vice figures' practice 
of lying suscribes to the established structure, rather than subverting it. 
One only partly incidental function of the lies is to promote plot, for they 
create an area of misunderstanding or muddle. From those misconceptions come 
further actions, frequently those in which the mankind figure goes wrong in some 
way. Thus, Common Condition's connivings in Common Conditions (1576) are 
a direct cause of the troubles that follow for Sedmond and Clarisia. In this way, the 
vice figures' lying puts the moral play in a position to go beyond the old-style Ages- 
of-Man plot which we have seen functioning with a rather deterministic effect in 
Mundus & Infans and Youth. That plot form can be amplified, through the vice 
figures' lies, with detailed remarks and events, sometimes of an almost random 
nature, and with the naturalistic responses to those situations which the mankind 
figure and the virtuous figures must then make. Lies which have affected the plot 
in this way mean that the conclusion can - even must - involve some unravelling of 
events, in addition to the conventional exposure of the vice figure for what he is. 
This development of techniques of intrigue and denouement in moral plays feeds 
directly into the plot techniques of the Romance tradition, as the example from 
Common Conditions implies. Such a perception suggests that the so-called 'hybrid' 
plays - the moral play/Romances - have a more logical genealogy than is commonly 
supposed. 45 
The name-changing which is so significant to many vice plays (L6) (H, 364; 
366; 368) 46 also falls into the category of alternative interpretation mentioned 
above. Although the intention of name-changing is to deceive the virtuous character 
into accepting the company of the evil ones, the false names are themselves always 
alternative interpretations of the original name. 47 In Resnulica, for example, 
Adulation is renamed Honesty, and in that way the kind of flattery that turns a 
prince's head claims that it is merely a frank statement of the truth. It is exactly 
that question of where the line lies between honest description and invented, 
excessive praise that is morally problematic. Oppression in the same play is re- 
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named Reformation, and certainly there is a grey area where the same political acts 
may be interpreted as tending towards the former or as a necessary, stringent 
version of the latter. For this reason, the name Reformation is the perfect disguise 
when Oppression sets out to mulct the populace under Respublica's very eyes. 
Interestingly, Avarice, the chief vice in that play, takes for himself the still 
profoundly ambiguous name of Policy. Although 'Policy' may be read as 'good 
political counsel', it also has familiar overtones of the deceitful, the 
Machiavellian. 48 At this point, Avarice is perhaps indulging in a condensed version 
of V11, above (saying the truth aloud and then retracting it by offering an 
innocuous, similar-sounding phrase). 
It seems, then, that the name-changing convention involves satiric 
tendencies. This capacity also enables the character of the vice figure to generate a 
serious discussion of established orders, and how they operate to establish 
themselves through language. He can act as an Orwellian de-bunker of the practice 
of re-writing language for political purposes. At the same time, the convention of 
name-changing points up the malleability of language: the susceptibility of meaning, 
particularly of moral terms, to slide. Thus name-changing creates an area where 
meaning is overtly 'solicited'. (This subject is investigated further in Chapter 
Four. ) 
Anne Ferry discusses the use of names, and specifically the form adjective- 
noun as a single name. 49 This is a form used by many vice-characters. Given that 
a name is seen as ontologically linked with the thing it belongs to, then in changing 
their names the vice figures could, in the sixteenth century, be perceived as stealing 
the possession of another. They are, in that case, operating as thieves on a 
linguistic level, as well as in the material world. 
v) Relations with Women. Among the vice figures' identifying features are details 
which connect them with women. Such connections can take the form of simple 
association, but they can on occasion be relationships of similarity. Similarity can 
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construct structural identity in some plays. 50 
We have seen that vice figures have access to illicit sex as part of their 
location in and near taverns (Wi) (H, 378). In connection with this, they are given 
to knowing remarks about women, and their coarse language frequently tends 
towards sexual innuendo (W2) (H, 401). That relationship looks like one in which 
women are dominated, offered as commodities like food and drink. However, in 
relation to women a vice figure can himself take on the aspect of a victim (W3). 
Within marriage, vice figures are often battered husbands, reversing their usual 
physical ebullience. They report or take part in comic rows, denigrating their wives 
as shrews (W4) and claiming to live in fear of both their sexual demands and their 
physical violence. It might be objected that this attitude is not particularly 
remarkable, being a conventionally cynical view of marriage. However, it is a 
consistent trend that marriage is associated with the vice figures. By contrast the 
pious 'happy endings' of the moral plays rarely allow the hero any emotional or 
sexual life outside his dedication to holiness. The 'Wit' plays stand alone in 
permitting him even so much as a highly formal version of matrimony, until the 
hybrid Romance/Moral plays become popular in the 1570's. To take the contrast 
further, the newly pious mankind figure generally concludes the play by ceasing to 
be associated with social or physical life at all. He becomes an object lesson to the 
rest of society, and thus alienated from his peers. 
It is appropriate at this point to describe how the vice figures' linguistic 
habits usurp categories conventionally, and pejoratively, applied to women. 51 
Women, too, were and are reckoned to be excessive talkers (W5). In addition, 
their discourse is deemed to be empty (W6) or illogical (W7), the first because 
concerned with detail and personality ('gossip') rather than abstractions; the second 
because of an assumption of female mental incapacity. All of these attributes are 
assumed by vice figures time after time. The female and the principal Vice are 
again conflated when both are seen as dangerously persuasive, often to an almost 
mystical extent (W8). Psychoanalytic theory has shown how the process of infantile 
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identification makes the mankind figure amazingly easily persuaded into accepting 
the principal Vice's propositions. The picture of the female as temptress substitutes 
very naturally in that relationship. Uncontrolled sexuality is attributed to both 
women and vice figures. Politicke Perswasion, the Vice in Patient Grissil claims: 'I 
am kyn to a woman in all poynts ile haue my will. ' (1.1230), while Ill Report in 
Susanna actually declares that he is a woman, in the course of the conventional 
refusal to reveal his name (1.504-5). Finally, one can refer the vice figures' interest 
in the vanities of fashion to a conventional view of women, in addition to its more 
usual moral play application to young men and to nobles. The two come together in 
the entrance of Mary Magdalene in the Digby play, trifling with her garments, and 
in the dandy Nichol Newfangle's comments in his first monologue in Like Will to 
Lilo, expecting a special relationship with women: 
How say you woman? You that stand in the angle 
Were you never acquainted with Nichol Newfangle 
(1.47-8). 
vi) Music, Singing and Noise. A potentially intriguing side of vice-activity is a 
predilection for music-making in general and singing in particular (Ml) (H, 
386; 397). It may be perceived immediately that singing involves a combination of 
the physical, the verbal and the artistic. It also necessitates discipline and a co- 
operative attitude in order to create an object of art. Fools who 'sing the foot of 
many songs' in a silly, disjointed kind of way do occur, but are rarer. Morns in 
The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art is the clearest instance. Even in 
that case considerable skill was needed to make such a performance effective. The 
moment when the vice figures sing is a moment when the skill of these apparently 
clownish actors becomes very obvious to the spectator. At that moment, in fact, 
they must step out of role as idiots and thugs. One ground for denigrating actors 
was that they were only playing, that is, they were doing for profit that which 
ordinary people did for recreation. The unaccompanied rounds and partsongs which 
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form the musical diet of the moralities require both talent and training. In its 
demand for ensemble playing, partsong may be regarded as an image of playmaking 
itself, and so as a public assertion of the professionalism of the players. 
Song acts as another of the vice figure's controlling devices. It occupies the 
auditory space, precluding other dialogue (M2). It is like monologue in that it can 
slow the plot down: improvised action may go on during a song, but the plot is 
unlikely to be furthered until the song is over. In this, singing is a controlling 
move, which, like the garrulity of V1, takes control of the audience's attention by 
occupying the stage, often with quite mindless nonsense. Secondly, a song often 
signals the arrival or (more frequently) the departure of characters, adding to a 
sense of climax or completion. In this way, controlling the pace and articulating 
scenes, the vice figures' songs structure a play (M3). It is also relevant to notice 
here that the sixteenth century still perceived a relation between ca»nina (songs) 
and the charm that kept away the Devil. 52 The possibility that a song might be 
incantatory links singing with the vice figures' habits of conjuring up the Devil, and 
with their capacity to be unnaturally persuasive. 
Other areas where the vice figures' noise-making capacities are significant 
are their habit of loud, insincere weeping (M4) (H, 387-8); and their equally loud, 
demonic laughter (M5) (H, 389-90). 53 Both of these activities share the feature of 
seeming to be wildly or even hysterically out of control, and hence contain the 
possibility of being frightening. Whether fighting, laughing, weeping or singing, 
vice figures fill the auditory space. Their noise functions as a controlling move, 
preventing virtuous characters from speaking, but it also acts as a coded indication 
that a particular character should be read as a vice figure. 
It can be seen from this material that much vice activity can be subsumed 
under the concept of excess. Their out-of-bounds behaviour is an apparent 
challenge to the constituted order of society - most obviously in the vice figures' 
thieving and lying, but also in their self-assertive grasping for a socially 
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unacceptable proportion of license. In their manifest wish to usurp authority over 
the direction of the plot they overstep the bounds of a representational drama, an 
overstepping which was so popular and so widely used as to re-define the 
fundamental qualities of the moral play genre itself. 
There is a real issue here about the nature of transgression. The low 
characters are clear manifestations of carnival in their grotesqueness, their physical 
excesses and their coarse language. In the moral plays transgression can be either 
radical or conservative on different occasions. 54 The more outrageous the 
transgression, the more conservative the final effect, for then the audience is invited 
to locate otherness and transgression as alien with respect to itself. In that case, the 
audience is aligned in the course of the play with the existing forces of 
censoriousness. 55 
The magnitude of this feat of audience alignment can only be appreciated 
when one considers the positions which individual members of theatre audiences 
occupied in society. 56 Attacks on the theatre suggest that playhouses were filled 
with thieves, whores and drunkards. In addition, it seems that they were frequented 
by variously idle and violent apprentices, and simple gulls. 57 Even after making 
allowances for the highly partisan qualities of these tracts, and for their relatively 
late date, we must accept that many members of the audiences for public 
performances were likely to be on the low side of a high/low opposition. 58 The 
carnival aspect of vice-play offered them the chance to participate in ritualized 
attacks on the social structure, while simultaneously offering the comforting thought 
that there were many people nastier, more vicious, and more stupid than themselves 
in the world. The latter locates the audience on the high side of that same high/low 
opposition. 
In his role as alternative author, and also in his relationship to the audience, 
a vice figure may be seen as a Derridean supplement to the line which the moral 
play must take. 59 In plays where he operates as an extra author, he creates an 
excess of authors, and so is supplementary to the requirements 
for constructing a 
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play. Through that function, a tension between the authentic author and the rival is 
generated outside the narrative at the level of abstract plot, which is additional to 
the intramural tension between good and evil. As a performer who relates to the 
audience directly, a vice figure adds a supplementary activity to the simple plot in 
which he tempts mankind from virtue. Once again, it would be sufficient to the 
moral play's didactic purposes to present the action of the narrative. The virtuous 
characters address the audience directly, in the formal relationship of a preacher to a 
congregation. To this the principal Vices add that special kind of collusive, 
subversive relationship, imitating the rapport of more personal social interactions 
amongst friends. They specifically appeal to a sense that they are enacting the 
audience's true feelings, and hence that the audience can readily identify with their 
attitudes and motives. 
In addition, the vice figures are supplementary in the moral play in the sense 
that they are a necessary part of it, without which it would not be complete. They 
are the other which is needed if man is to exercise free will. Nevertheless, they are 
the other which needs to be obliterated, in order to realize happiness. The mankind 
figure who concludes a moral play is doomed to be one thing or another - the plays 
permit no synthetic, inclusive resolution. One might say that the Aufhebung offered 
by 'know thyself is denied by the totalizing negative that can be read in 'nothing in 
excess'. Constructing decisions as simplistically binary allows the plays to 
constitute man as a self-determining individual in the humanist mode. 
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SECTION B: THE VICE FIGURES IN MANKIND 
We can see many of these typical vice-features operating together in 
Mankind, though one might turn to any of the moral plays at random and find 
numerous vice characteristics exemplified. As Peter Happd points out, any one vice 
figure need only manifest a few features from the total available in order to identify 
himself to an audience. 60 In this again we observe how different each moral play is 
from its fellows, and how far contrary to the evidence it is to see these plays as 
repetitious and therefore inevitably boring. One must view the theoretical analysis 
given above as a kind of supermarket from which the ingredients to make up 
individual vice figures are selected. Of course, there is no 'typical' vice figure or 
'typical' moral play. The types are always realised in different ways, but the 
realisation depends on the type. 61 For this reason, it is a simple process for vice- 
characteristics to proliferate in number and ramify in detail over time. Like other 
early moralities, Mankind contains a large number of 'evil' figures, and they 
occupy a relatively large portion of the play. It offers, therefore, many 
opportunities for observing vice behaviour. In addition, the play's popularity in 
modem times can be seen from the several editions and performances it has 
stimulated. 62 Insofar as any moral play verges on the canonical, Mankind does. 
For that reason, too, it seems a worthwhile area in which to test the benefits of a 
new approach. It will help to reveal what kinds of otherness the hero, Mankind, is 
called on to reject, the terms of that rejection, and the kind of self that is finally 
constructed. 
In contrast with the 'whole life' plays analysed in the previous chapter, 
M&nkind dramatises a small number of crisis points, concentrated around one 
episode in the life of the main character. Unlike Youth, The Castle of 
Perseveraunce, and other 'whole life' plays, it does not set out to discuss the full 
course of the life of a human being. After an opening speech of pious prayer by 
Mercy, the vice-characters of the piece are immediately introduced: the chief Vice, 
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Mischief, and his followers, New Guise, Nought and Nowadays. Their interest at 
this point is in mocking Mercy, and they leave before Mankind enters. Mankind's 
opening speech locates him as an adult, with a good grasp on his faith's 
fundamental beliefs about the relationship between the body and the soul. Mercy 
counsels him, and warns him against his enemies, New Guise, Nought and 
Nowadays. Mankind, in response, writes down a reminder of his own mortality, 
and turns to dig his land. When the three sub-vices attempt to waylay the audience 
with a crude song (and, incidentally, to tempt Mankind away from virtuous prayer 
and agricultural tasks) he lays about him with his spade and drives them off. 
Mankind, now overconfident from this success, departs to fetch seed-corn. 
Mischief comforts his beaten henchmen, and these three call up the devil, Titivillus, 
by playing the flute and taking a collection from the audience. Titivillus takes on 
Mischief's function, instructing New Guise, Nought and Nowadays in an anti- 
mission to corrupt the neighbourhood. Now invisible, Titivillus gradually 
discourages the newly returned Mankind from his labour by making the earth 
unworkable and stealing his tools. Mankind falls asleep, weary from fruitless toil 
and a lengthy church service. Titivillus then whispers a lie in his ear, to the effect 
that Mercy has been caught stealing a horse and so has been hanged. It is this that 
finally decides Mankind to repair to the ale-house, and to the company of New 
Guise, Nowadays and Nought. Clearly there is something irrational in this 
decision, for New Guise, Nowadays and Nought, soon joined by Mischief, narrate 
crimes very similar to that of which Mercy was accused. Mankind, however, 
remains with them. Mischief sets up a mock court, in which Mankind is deprived 
of his coat, and instructed in the arts of villainy by means of a catechistic ritual. 
Next, Mercy mourns Mankind's defection, and searches for him. Mischief and the 
rest of the vice-crew are afraid that Mercy will find Mankind and save him, so they 
hurry off to frighten Mankind into killing himself, with the threat that Mercy is 
searching for him. This plan almost works, but Mercy drives the villains off with a 
whip. Mankind, after some discussion, asks for forgiveness, and is told to 'go and 
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syn no more'. With Mercy's help, Mankind reviews his past behaviour and its 
interpretation. He then exits, blessed by Mercy, and leaving Mercy to farewell the 
audience with another blessing. 
The enormous ebullience of the evil characters is demonstrated from 
Mischiefs first, abrupt entrance, when his chopped-up lines accost Mercy's more 
ponderous formulations (V5). 63 There is an impression that Mischief can 'dance 
like a butterfly, sting like a bee' in his darting attack: 
leue yowr chaffe, leue yowr corn, leue yowr dalyacyon. 
Yowr wytt ys lytyll yowr hede ys mekyll, 3e are full of predycacyon. 
(1.46-7) 
The feeling of vigorous physicality is continued when the three sub-vices soon take 
over the stage with a dance (P2 & M2). They have arrived in haste, impelled, it 
seems (there is a leaf missing in the MS) by hearing Mercy utter the words that 
form their names (V13). Apparently they are duty-bound to be always and 
everywhere available when called on (P9). 
Nought: But, ser, I trow of ws thre I herde yow 
ý- 
New Guise: Crystys curse bade aerfor, for I 
was in slepe. 
Nowadays: And I hade le cuppe in my 
honde, rely to goo to met. 
(1.98-100) 
Titivillus is similarly omnipresendy, available at a command (P9), in this case a 
musical interlude (M2) which also covers the collection of money. 
Mischief: Blow apase & tou xall brynge hym in 
wyth a flewte. 
(1.453) 
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They have established a social world alternative to that which Mercy inhabits 
(P1). Mercy has included himself with '3e souerens ýRt sytt and 3e brothern at 
stonde ryght wppe' (1.29). The audience is the group with which he wishes to be 
involved. The others live in a shared world of Bakhtinian excess, where musicians 
can 'Ley on wyth h ballys tyll hys bely breste! ' (1.73) (P2, P6), and Nought 
believes or affects to believe that his neck can be broken in a dance (V3). The 
concern for one's neck re-appears when Nought decides to avoid tempting two local 
notables for fear of hanging (V3), which he demonstrates with comic realism: 'For 
drede of in manus tuas --- qweke ' (1.516). New Guise suggests that they all learn 
their 'neck verse', which will save them from being hanged. Again, Titivillus 
chooses to discredit Mercy by claiming that he has been hanged for stealing a horse 
(V3). Finally, New Guise, in obscure circumstances, evaded death when the 
hangman's rope broke: 
I was twychyde by ae neke; k game was be-gunne 
A grace was, Pe halter brast asonder: ecce signum! 
(1.615-16) 
Their social class is carefully outlined at the earliest possible moment (P11). 
Mischief, as a winter corn thresher, is an itinerant labourer. The phrase 'I haue 
hyryde' (1.54) makes the point that he takes his own decisions regarding whom he 
works for and for how long, an assumption of power which defies the accepted 
social order (P11). In spite of their low social position, New Guise, Nought and 
Nowadays are committed to following the most modem fashions (P11). In this they 
are descendants both of the allegorical figures of Pride as a dandy, and of those 
satires on the times which bewail the loss of traditional values. Their concern with 
clothes is typical of vice figures (P12), and in b"Wand is a functional stage 
symbol. The depth of Mankind's fall is represented by his willing adoption of an 
impractically short jacket in place of his useful coat. He is persuaded into this 
folly on the pretext that it is high fashion. M 
A major strand in the construction of the vice figures' class is that they are 
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all petty thieves. New Guise casually refers to having stolen a leg of mutton as if it 
were the most natural behaviour in the world. Titivillus advertises himself as a 
horse thief: 'y fat haue goode hors, to yow I sey, caueatis! ' (1.476). At another 
point they plan to rob a church to pay for food. Robbery is thus seen as a way in 
which the possession-less can make a living: it is directed towards gaining the 
physical necessities of life. Eating and drinking recur, together with sleep, as a 
steady theme of potentially immoral excess (P3). The three sub-vices were 
variously sleeping and eating just before their entrance. Nought brags of his 
drinking prowess: 'I haue be sethen wyth Je comyn tapster of Bury/ And pleyde so 
longe ýe foll at I am ewyn wery. / 3yt xall I be ter ageyn to-mom. ' (1.274-276). 
Another aspect of their concern with the physical occurs in the greeting 'The wether 
ys colde, Gode sende ws goode ferys! '(1.323%It is doubtless a little ironic that these 
damned characters should pray thus artlessly for good fires. When Mankind finally 
falls from his devotion to virtue, it is initially through the physical inevitability of 
sleep. Once awake, he knows by instinct that New Guise, Nought and Nowadays 
are to be found at the ale-house, together with a 'lemman wyth a smattrynge face' 
(1.611). In general, their sins in this area seem relatively mild, though they do rob a 
church in order to pay for 'ale, brede, and wyn' (1.633), a modest-sounding feast. 
The cross-referencing of churches and ale-houses occurs again when dining at the 
ale-house on Sunday instead of going to church becomes one of the dictates imposed 
on Mankind by Nowadays (1.710-712). 65 
The vice figures' idiosyncratic use of language is highlighted in this play not 
just as a sign of their presence, but as a possible threat in itself. Mercy, indeed, 
warns Mankind that he is to be particularly wary of these people's linguistic 
behaviour. It seems from 'Nyse in per a-ray, in language lei be large ' (1.288) that 
they use language excessively (Vi), leading to exaggerations and probably lies 
(L1). 66 Their easy lying is demonstrated in Titivillus' whisper to the sleeping 
Mankind that Mercy is corrupted and dead. 67 
Mischief shows both skill and confidence in speech (V5). He can play with 
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Mercy's scriptural metaphors by applying a witty literalism to them (V9). At his 
first appearance he controls Mercy's discourse with a nonsense interruption, 
distracting him and the audience from pious thoughts (V8). Where Mercy has used 
aureate English, Mischief lays competitive claim to linguistic authority by using 
Latin grammatical forms, but still mocks such knowledge through macaronic 
constructions (V5). 
Corn seruit bredibus, chaffe horsibus, straw fyrybusque 
0.57) 
While contradicting Mercy's remark that 'The corn xall be sauyde, e chaffe xall be 
brente' (1.43), Mischief appears to be more aware of practicalities (related to V9), 
and to support them with the authoritative status of Latin, mockingly pre-empting a 
style that one might normally attribute to Mercy (V5). 
We have noticed the vice figures' love of high fashion in clothes (P12). 
Mercy has seen the resemblance between this and their use of language (1.288, 
quoted above). Adherence to fashion is also destructive of Mischief's ideas about 
language. Mercy advocates 'Few wordys, few and well sett! ' - the suggestion is 
that pious truth can be best expressed pithily. New Guise recommends linguistic 
excess: 'many wordys and schortely sett. ' (V 1). 
It is as an aspect of both abusiveness (V7) and physicality (P4) that the 
group of vice figures mobilizes its ideas about women. Immediately following 
Now-a-Days' thoughts about excretion come his thoughts about his wife, Rachel, 
(W3). The link is a close one, formed by 'Also'. Rachel is constituted as an 
opponent (W3): 
Betuyx her and me was a gret batell; (1.136) 
The image of matrimony as a battleground is a common one. It recurs with New 
Guise's 'I haue fede my wyff so well tyll sche ys my master. ' (1.246). By stressing 
this conflict, the villains advertise themselves as victims, and so as images of the 
reversal of the patriarchal order. Presented as ludicrous weaklings, they are also 
examples of the dangers of failing to dominate women. The latter are described as 
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unpredictable, threatening and wild creatures, not unlike horses ('Ande my wyf 
were yowr hors, sche wolde yow all to-banne', 1.249). There is a danger of actual 
violence, for New Guise's wife has wounded him on the head, as well as '; er I 
pysse my peson. ' (1.248). How she has achieved the latter remains subject to 
speculation, but the possibility exists that she has trumped his excesses with 
excessive sexual demands. Clearly, associating with women is seen as an 
unsavoury experience, in addition to creating the opportunity for forcing further 
obscenities on Mercy (V7). The female is used as a specific affront to religion: the 
interesting obscenity 'Pope Pokett' (1.144) stems, it would seem, from a desire to 
abuse the Pope added to a feeling that the most denigratory possible appellation is a 
salacious metonymy for female genitals (W2). Marriage is presented by New Guise 
as both an unlikely and obscene combination when he offers: 'I xall tell yow of a 
maryage: / I wolde yowr mowth and hys ars Pat is made/ Wer maryede junctly 
together' (1.345-347). 'This' in the speech just quoted refers to the low characters' 
preceding coarse song, and constitutes just one instance of the obsession with 
excreta in Manidnd (P4; V7). It also suggests an identification between excreta and 
words, an issue which is taken up at greater length below. 
The vice figures' desire to take control by forging a special relationship with 
the audience can be observed in the quantities of pantomimic playing to the gallery 
which ManIdnd contains (C4). Vice figures use both language and sound 
manipulatively, and the most important audience involvements are engineered when 
the vice figures are in sole control of the stage. The scene which introduces 
Titivillus opens with vociferous wailing (M2; M4): Mischiefs traditional 
hypocritical self-pity is combined with tenderness towards his equally noisy crew. 
Mischief acts as a Master of Ceremonies, summarizing the plot for the audience's 
sake (C5) at lines 415 to 423, and asking them to listen to the noise that the beaten 
New Guise, Nought and Nowadays are making off stage (M2; M4). 
Wyll 3e lyst? I here ýem crye. Clamant 
(1.424) 
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After comforting them, however, he offers to salve the injured parts by chopping 
them off, which silences the three sufferers. Their cries are scarcely finished when 
the 'Walsyngham wystyll' is struck up (M2), to accompany the collection of money 
from the audience. The action of the play must now be held up for as long as the 
vice figures wish, while they clamorously collect money and conjure up Titivillus, 
the great-headed devil. On various occasions, loud weeping, Titivillus' roars, and 
the music of the whistle all fill the auditory space, supplanting any possibility of 
that reasoned, syntactically complex discourse to which one can give analytic 
attention. From these events it can be seen that control of the audience and control 
of the play operate especially through noise. Sound in the moral plays, then, can 
put itself forward as the self-presence of speech: as the sheer existence of the thing 
itself. As such, it is opposed to language as writing: the Ecriture of the written and 
of crafted speech (the writing that one can contemplate). In thus excluding 
contemplatable speech from the stage, the vice figures are very overtly asserting a 
primacy of things over language: money, magical cures, music and spectacle are 
more desirable to them than discourse. This is, of course, their theme throughout, 
in one form or another. 
An earlier moment exists which shows a subtle level of collusion with the 
audience. New Guise picks up Mercy's remarks about controlling excess, and 
applies them to his own lewd concerns (lines 245-246. ). One must assume him to 
be 'on stage' from the audience's point of view, but concealed from Mercy and 
Mankind. The audience is thus in possession of knowledge which exceeds that of 
the good characters, and parallels that of the wicked. New Guise's remarks are 
superficially directed towards Mercy and Mankind: 
3e say trew, ser, 3e are no faytour (1.244) 
It is clear that he is primarily speaking for the audience's benefit, since he is not 
visible to the other two, nor even perfectly audible to them. 
mod, then, exemplifies numerous, though not all, features of vice 
behaviour. Most noticeably, it makes use of the conventions that vice figures are 
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physically vigorous and noisy; that they are obscene in word and deed; and that they 
are obsessed with power structures. To a lesser degree, Mankind's vice figures 
manipulate the audience through their special relationship of collusion. The kind of 
adversary that Mankind faces and must reject is thus a very particular one. The 
'wrongdoing' takes place in the area of language, and of writing. Clamour is 
opposed to silence, and fun is opposed to work. Property is important, for the 
mankind figure owns land, however little, while the adversary can only steal. What 
land he owns is his patrimony in Hell. The vice figures as manipulators, whether of 
Mankind or of the audience, are socially interactive, and are opposed by the play to 
a quietist, prayerful ideal, which is individualist, even self-interested. Otherness, 
therefore, directly confronts the individual as such, accosting barriers to do with the 
ownership of property, and secondly by offering a public, social life as a substitute 
for prayer and solitary labour. Mankind becomes a self that can distinguish 
between two kinds of language: spiritual truth and 'fables delusory'. He can also 
use language himself to ask for mercy. Thus, the individual is created as freely 
judging, exclusive, and willingly functioning within the laws laid down by the the 
spiritual orthodoxy. 
Those features that the play finds most interesting are also those which repay 
closer study. Areas where individual vice-characteristics are cross-referenced are 
especially productive: for example language and excreta; song and audience 
involvement; writing and obscenity; 'authority' and improvisation. I now consider 
in turn the effects that result from this play's interest in language, in coarseness, and 
in ownership. The individual has been constructed as one side of a binary 
opposition. As a credible and coherent statement, the play thus supports a binarist 
interpretation of the world and of the nature of meaning. 
Crudity of language (V7) is used with a persistence that invites closer 
attention. Physical concerns and linguistic aggression come together in coarse 
language, which occurs particularly often and with particular crudity in Mankind. 
The low-life characters are fascinated by excreta (P4). What is noteworthy is 
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something amounting to an interchangeability of speech and excretion. Titivillus, 
for example, causes Mankind to leave his prayers by provoking in him a need to 
move his bowels. The flow of pious language from the mouth has been restructured 
in 'low' terms. Again, the ordinary rural custom of fertilizing fields with human 
excreta is described as 'blessing' by the three sub-vices. The most familiar example 
of an identification of words with excreta takes place in the song which New Guise, 
Nought and Nowadays lead the audience into singing. This is normally seen as an 
exercise in involving the audience in the process of Mankind's corruption. 
68 Their 
ultimate shock of revulsion against the vice figures will then be the greater because 
they have actually taken part in and enjoyed their degraded games. I find such a 
reading dubious because it involves several unproven assumptions about the nature 
of audiences. What is clear is that the song refers to two systems of signs. The 
first is writing, for it tells us that something has been 'written with a coal'. Because 
something written in charcoal or coal is easily erased, the song takes on the quality 
of crudely-chalked graffiti. Coal has a devilish connection in the moral plays, 
perhaps because it is black, perhaps from an association with the fires of hell. 
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Thus the crude song is one which has been handed down in writing, but a devilish 
writing, the obverse of scripture. It confronts as other the writing which is still on 
the stage at that moment: Mankind's 'paper' which asserts 'Memento homo quod 
cinis es, et in cinerem reuerteris. ' (1.321). At the same time, however, the contrast 
between virtue and vice is threatened by that repetition of 'coal'. On both sides of 
the opposition 'coal' is crucial to memory: to the past, to language, to the nature of 
what it is to be human. The 'individual' is thus accosted, not by an adversary, but 
by the very substance out of which he is constituted. 
The second sign system establishes excrement as an alternative discourse, for 
the fouling of the breeches is a publicly visible sign. As an indication of unhygienic 
behaviour it implies shame as a consequence. 
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But he wype his ers Glen 
On hys breche yt xall be sen 
(1.341-2) 
It is also the public statement of the presence of that which is normally kept hidden. 
In this way the song canvasses the inscription of the other. The fouled breeches are 
also a sign of man's physical self and so the option exists to read them as a 
reminder of dust, death and the need for piety - in other words, as Mankind's holy 
inscription. The play cannot of course pursue that option without deconstructing the 
analogy that vice : virtue :: material : spiritual. Instead, the breeches are used as a 
re-interpretation of the theme of physicality in terms of coarse merry-making. Thus 
to the vice figures writing is crudity and excrement is writing. 
On another occasion, evacuation is seen as speech by Titivillus, when he 
transfers the idea of lying, which really belongs to himself, onto Mankind's 
activity: 
I haue sent hym forth to schyte lesynges 
(1.561) 
[I have sent him forth to shit lies. ] 
This connection makes the point of various other alarming remarks clearer. In an 
early conversation with Mercy, Nowadays challenges him to translate a couplet into 
Latin: 
I haue etun a dysch full of curdis 
Ande I haue schetun yowur mowth full of turdis 
(1.126-7) 
It is a trick on the same lines as the song trick, an attempt to make a virtuous 
character sully his mouth with coarse language. In this play, the vice figures' 
coarseness is insistently scatological, in preference to any other form. One ever- 
popular abusive phrase brings high and low together: 'osculare fundamentum' 
(1.140), says Nowadays to Nought. 7° The intensity of vice-play and in particular 
the grossness of vice discourse function to sustain the opposition of vice to virtue, 
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and obscure their interrelationship, while playing riskily with the very terms that 
could reveal it. 
To a large extent this intriguing connection between language and various 
kinds of soil degrades speech. Certainly there is a carnival quality in the low 
characters' joyous assaults on received ideas of the utterable. However there is 
another effect which stems from the association of speech and excreta. 
Developmental psychology reveals the deeply personal, intimate status of bowel 
movements. They are the only real possession of the poor and powerless, to be 
offered or withheld as gestures of giving or of defensiveness. It is impossible in a 
short space to do justice to the ramifications of this concept, but for the purposes of 
discussing Mankind it is important to notice this ambivalent quality. It is captured 
most effectively in Nought's use of the word 'ouer-blysse' in his remark about 
Mankind's land: 
Ande yf he wyll haue compass[t]e he may ouer-blysse yt 
A lytyll with hys ers lyke (1.374-5) 
To manure the land is to bless it and to foul it at the same time. What implications 
does this have for language? By asserting its identity with the most personal of 
possessions, the vice figures are claiming language for themselves. Language can 
thus appear as an important aspect of otherness. It can also be a gift to the group, 
as a joke, an act of social largesse. As such it acts as a communal force, through 
which groups can share laughter. 7' If excreta are the possession of the individual in 
his opposition to regulative society, by extension coarse words appropriate language 
to the joking, subversive social group as opposed to the authoritative. It is thus that 
language can be used as a weapon against authority's pressures to conform to norms 
and regulations. In Mankind, the vice figures have profoundly problematized the 
link between language and authority in exactly this way. The kind of connection 
made in Mundus & Infans, and plays like it, between spiritual knowledge and 
linguistic competence can be sustained in Mankind by constructing and stressing 
otherness as distasteful. 
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The ownership of language and of excreta are contested by the vice figures. 
Other, more conventional possessions are also fought over for their structural 
significance. It is scarcely surprising that Mischief, uncommitted to social 
structures, has neither horse nor saddle: the freedom to construct one's life implies 
poverty, and a hand-to-mouth existence. It is almost like a monastic decision that 
freedom from worldly constraints is also freedom from the domination of 
possessions. By contrast Mankind owns his own land, and is tied to what is 
apparently a very small area. Enslavement to the soil as a possession goes hand in 
hand with social respectability. Clothes, however, are also possessions with an 
identical capacity to construct identity. Mercy is teased by Nought at an early stage 
of the play: 'Anon of wyth yowr clothes, yf3e wyll play' (1.88). As we have seen, 
Mankind's initiation into the company of vice figures involves the well-known 
episode in which his coat is gradually cut down into a brief garment like a fencing 
jacket. One might say that mischief stands outside ordinary life as the author stands 
outside his play. That state is only one of several possible positions: at other points 
we find a slavish devotion to the norms of high fashion, and the vice figures' love 
of clothes. In later plays, such as Enough is as Good as a Feast, where the mankind 
figure is less clearly distinguished from the vice figure, avarice attracts particular 
attention as the principal deadly sin. A reading which resolves this contradiction 
between worldly negligence and pleasure in possessions develops when one relates 
the fashion for display in dress to the fashion for display in language. Linguistic 
excess offers an opportunity for confusion: the more words are used, the more 
opportunities for interpretation proliferate. Thus, excess of language generates 
multiple meanings and in so doing puts forward an alternative to the univocal 
message insisted on by the virtuous characters. Mercy warns Mankind against the 
low characters' 'large' language because it will lead Mankind away from the path of 
religious doctrine, now seen as single. In a limited way, fashion - the new guise - 
operates similarly, for it offers a subversive alternative to sober practicality of 
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dress, an alternative which threatens one of the signifying codes of class. Fashion, 
changing rapidly with time, sets up a diachronic signifying structure in opposition to 
the traditional synchronic structure in which people dress according to their station 
in life. 72 Fashion involves the adoption of a code - an alternative code, but one 
equally as strictly regulated as the original. 
Nevertheless the play itself has an over-riding attitude to its own 
problematization of the link between language and authority, for by the penultimate 
scene the vice figures are shown to have reached a state of gibbering confusion. 
Their speech is no longer under their control, but threatens to become sheer sound. 
Nought loses control of himself, accidentally fouling his own foot (1.784-786). The 
repetitions habitual to the vice figure begin to dominate their speech: line 775 
consists of 'hic' repeated seven times, and repetitions also occur at lines 776,777, 
779,784,787,789 and 802. Their attempt to persuade Mankind to hang himself is 
prevented when Mercy drives them off with a whip. In the course of the chase New 
Gyse comes close to hanging himself by accident. 
Qweke, qweke, qweke! Alass, my thrott! I beschrew yow, mary! 
(1.808-810) 
His imitation of a death rattle has the same quality of repetition. Vice play and vice 
language, then, peter out in meaninglessness and choking. 
The play ends, as always, with the re-possession of language as public 
property, and as the medium of control. Mercy asserts a division between a 
linguistic world of the spirit and a separate, physical arena in which ''our body ys 
)our enmy; let hym not haue hys wyll. ' (1.897) In this view language is not 
problematic: quite simply, excessive language, like the bodily functions, is to be 
scourged from the scene so that Mankind's controlled confession and repentance can 
take place. In this way he is re-created as an individual with an individual's free 
will: 'libere welle, libere nolle God may not deny iwys. ' (1.894) 
In general, for all their power, skill and appeal, there is no question that the 
vice figures are set up to be mocked and reviled. New Guise, Nowadays and 
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Nought are very stupid, and are also weaklings. In choosing to associate with 
these, Mischief can only be lowered in our eyes. 
In the course of appropriating the physical pleasures, the low characters have 
made them despicable by contagion. They have also made physicality repulsive to 
us through sheer exaggeration and an obsessive tendency to see it only in its most 
sordid aspects. In order to merit salvation Mankind must achieve a selfhood which, 
repudiating the vice figures, is defined as genuine and complete. To attain this 
'fortress-self' e must control his physicality by repressing the joyous aspects of 
song and dance, of sex, of defecation and of extravagant language. 
Mankind concludes with admonitions by Mercy that reveal the status of the 
self. Mankind is to be sent back into his former life, and will attempt to do better. 
At one moment it seems that the self even without the evil ones is still permitted to 
be complex, for he can: 
Aske mercy and hawe, whyll ?e body wyth fr Bowle hath hys 
annexion; 
(1.863) 
However, it soon becomes clear that the person being addressed is indivisible, and 
does not include the body or its temptations. 
lour body ys jour enmy; let hym not haue hys wyll. 
0.897) 
Not only is the body as enemy of the spirit separate from the self, being spoken of 
in the third person, it has a will of its own. The 'will' of the body is balanced in 
the next line by the 'will' which Mercy allows the self. This is the capacity to 
exercise judgment, by moving away from Mercy when the self sees fit. 
Take )Dur lewe whan, e wyll. God send Sow good perseuerans! 
(1.898) 
The ability to judge when to move away is necessary if Mankind is also to be able 
to judge when he needs to return, that is, to ask for mercy again. 
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The subject constructed by Mankind is therefore solely a spiritual subject, 
who is single and whose every act is interpreted in one dimension. That dimension 
is one of movement towards or away from grace. 
This view of the hero-subject as sanitized by the voluntary repudiation of 
external evil forces is clearly a very different picture from that examined in the 
previous chapter, where through much of the play the primitive pre-Mirror Stage 
figure locates himself in relation to figures of otherness through identification, and 
can assimilate his past through confession. In this Mankind exemplifies the process 
in a large number of the moral plays, namely a decisive move towards the alienation 
of otherness. 
Members of the audience for an early moral play resemble carnival 
participants by virtue of their intense involvement, especially with the vice 
characters. Peter Happe recognizes that 'the Vice must to some extent embody 
impulses present in the minds of his audience', (H, 83). Following Bakhtin, too, 
we must observe that the grotesque and foul, necessary aspects of the carnival 
participants' feelings about life and about themselves, are ambivalently also joyous 
and assertive. The danger for the homilist is that the vice figures will seem too 
attractive, too interesting, and the play's function be lost. There are pressures, 
then, to play with both aspects of the vice character: to make it increasingly both 
more exciting and more disgusting. In the long term this is a losing battle as a vice 
figure is always and only an area onto which unconscious urges are projected. The 
pressure is first to focus on a particular structural character and revile him, then to 
develop the vice figure thus achieved in such a way that it merits further reviling. 
This is of course a pressure to disavow those aspects in oneself by externalizing 
them and mocking them. It seems, then, that the creation of the vice figure is a 
foolproof method for establishing the 'self' s unified. Not only can the 
problematic areas of the 'self' be projected onto him, and so repudiated, but the 
condition of division itself can be located as external to the individual, and 
repudiated in exactly the same manner. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 
1A good example of the distinction between recognition and rejection occurs 
in Skelton's Magnyfý, ed. Robert Lee Ramsay, EETS, ES, 98 (London, 
1908). Even when Magnyfycence has discovered the truth about Cloked Collusyon 
and Crafty Conveyance, they remain powerful (1.2238-2276). Indeed, it is at the 
very point of discovery that Magnyfycence begins to give way to despair. Only 
when the first two have fled in terror is the stage freed for the presence of Good 
Hope. The way of salvation is assured when Magnyfycence can assert his rejection 
of evil, and a resulting wholeness. 
2 In this the plays subscribe to the idea of a higher truth, a fundamental theme 
of transcendental religions, and an area of considerable interest to post-modem 
criticism. Derrida sees binary structures as misleading, even pernicious. See, for 
example, 'The End of the Book and the Beginning of Writing', in Jacques Derrida, 
Of Grammatology, tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London, 1976; 
first published in French, 1967), pp. 6-26, where Derrida discusses the conventional 
relationship between signification and 'meaning', (pp. 10-11) . 
3 Banished from the plot are Titivillus and Hickscorner, who are 'suppressed', 
to use Bevington's term, because of doubling requirements. The Bad Angel in ThC 
Castle of Perseveraunce retires to Hell. In Ane Satyre of the Thre Estaitis, Flattery 
is banished to France. Avarice in Respublica and Courage in Tyde Tarrieth No 
Ma are humbled and delivered over to the law to be punished with torture and 
death, respectively. In Enough is as Good as a Feast, a play with numerous evil 
characters, Satan himself carries Worldly Man off to Hell. 
4 In The 
. 
Ty-de Tarrieth No Man, Courage greets the report of the sub-vice 
Greediness' death by asserting that Greediness cannot die, for he always lives in the 
hearts of men. 
5 Distinguishing between 'mortal' vices and personifications in the period 
1495-1535, Mark Pilkinton in The Antagonists of English Drama. 1370-1576 
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(unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Bristol, 1974) sees 'no attempt on the part 
of the playwrights to bring the personified vices to justice', p. 313. It seems to me, 
however, that the kind of 'life' that vice figures possess is represented as degraded 
to such an extent that this counts as a punishment in itself. 
6 Rene Girard's discussion of sacrificial victims in Violence and the Sacred, 
tr. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore and London, 1977; first published in French, 1972) 
offers a structural parallel in social terms for the effects that I locate here in the 
individual. Referring to human sacrifice among the Tupinamba, Girard observes: 
'the prisoner was "permitted during this period to lay about him with his fists, to 
steal fowl and geese and other things, and to do his utmost to avenge his coming 
death. " In short, the future victim was encouraged to violate the laws. Most 
modern observers agree that the purpose of these indulgences was to transform the 
prisoner into a 'scapegoat'. ' p. 275. Girard recognizes that this explanation is 
alternative to a surface rationale - which is also the overt cause and effect sequence 
offered by the plays: 'It is true that the more misdeeds the prisoner commits, the 
more legitimate the sanctions imposed on him might appear. ' Also relevant is 
Girard's The Scapegoat, tr. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore and London, 1986; first 
published in French, 1982). See especially Chapter Two, 'Stereotypes of 
Persecution'. 
7 One example of humiliation is the representation of Dalilah in Nice Wanton 
as revoltingly pox-ridden and aged: a savage stage revenge for her earlier joyous 
sexuality. Again, in John Heywood's A Play of Love the Vice, No-lover-nor-loved 
'cometh in, ronnyng sodenly aboute the place among the audyens with a hye copyn 
tank on his hed full of squybs fyred, cryeng water! water! fyre! fyre! fyre! water! 
water! fyre! tyll the fyre in the squybs be spent. ' S. D., 1.1309. More startling still 
is the stage direction on the famous sketch for The Castle of Perseveraunce 'He that 
shall play Belial, look that he have gunpowder burning in his hands and in his ears 
and in his arse when he goeth to battle. ' One scarcely knows whether to focus on 
the actor's showmanship, or his willingness to undergo public degradation. 
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8 Since Happe refers to the Vice (capitalized), it is clearer to adopt his style 
for the moment, though this style overstates the distinction between major and 
minor vices. Happd explains his position in the Introduction to Tudor Interludes 
(London, 1972): 'In discussing this character it is necessary to speak of 'the Vice' 
to distinguish him from other characters who represent moral evils. He appears to 
have originated from among this number and he almost always retains a homiletic 
function as the character who focusses the evil impulse in the plot and schemes for 
the downfall of the hero. The röle develops gradually during the first half of the 
sixteenth century, and is not certainly identified by name until Avarice in 
ReVublica (1553). ' p. 14. 
9 The wit and punning of the moral play vice figures proved so popular that it 
endured as a byword long after the play form itself was passe. 
10 A summary list of this information is attached at Appendix B. 
11 This temptation derives from their connection with the Flesh element of the 
triad of threats to salvation, the World, the Flesh and the Devil. 
12 This pattern occurs in The Four Elements, Natu , and Wit and Science, for 
example. 
13 Margery at the tavern is mentioned in Nature. 
Vice figures in Magnvýnce suggestively offer 'fresh meat' and 'raw 
mutton' (1.2264-5). 
Youth: 
Yet thou shalt have a wench to kiss 
Whensoever thou wilt 
(1.285-6) 
Four Elements" 
Than we wyll have lytell Nell, 
A proper wenche, she daunsith well, 
And Jane with the blacke lace; 
We wyll have bounsynge Besse also, 
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And two or thre proper wenchis mo, 
Ryght feyr and smotter of face 
(1.637-642) 
14 Nichol Newfangle in Like Will to Like and Moros in The Longer Thou 
Livest the More Fool Thou Art. 
15 L. W. Cushman, in The Devil and the Vice in the Dramatic Literature Before 
Shakespeare (L)ndon, 1900), pp. 61-2, lists plays in which the Vice is described as 
the son of the Devil. It is this hereditary strain that I wish to notice here. 
Cushman's conclusion is less relevant, 'The devil and Vice are, indeed, related in 
so far as all evil in society originates with the devil, but, as dramatic figures, they 
are distinct. ' He contrasts the Devil as a 'theological-mythological being' with the 
Vice as 'an allegorical representation of human weaknesses and vices', p. 63. This 
is debated by Happb. 
16 Ben Jonson, describing the stage practices of the 1550's in The Devil is an 
AM (1616) attributed ubiquity to the vice figure: 
Iniquity: Ere his words be half spoken I am with him in a trice; 
Here, there and everywhere, as the Cat is with the Mice. 
(1.45-46) 
17 In Lindsay's Ane Satyre of the Thre Estaitis, the vice has arrived from a 
voyage: 
And am cum heir now at the last 
Tostit on the sea ay sen 3uill day 
(1.608-9) 
Other instances include Experience in The Four Elements; Inclination in The Trial 
of Treasure; Haphazard in Appius and Virginia; Politicke Perswasion in Phillip's 
Patient Grissell; Evil Counsel in Bale's St John the Evangelist; and the merchant in 
Englishmen for MyMoncy (1601) (a late play, only loosely related to the moral 
play). Hickscorner has been to many countries, including 'the land of Rumbelow/ 
Three mile out of hell; ' (1.317-8). The practice is to be found as early as h 
131 
Castle of Perseveraunce, while the opening speech of Machiavel, in Marlowe's TTh 
Jew of Malta provides a concentrated late example of the same boast. 
The satirical poem, Cocke Lorell's Bote which involves a similar impossible 
voyage through England by a crew of villains, is also noteworthy here. The poem 
is in Tudor Verse Sati re, ed. K. W. Gransden (London, 1970), pp. 31-35. 
18 References to hanging are listed as a verbal quality, below. 
19 The most informative clarifications of these attitudes are to be found in the 
cony-catching pamphlets, whose ostensible function was to warn citizens against the 
tricks of rogues, but which simultaneously offer readers excitement and a vision of 
a fascinatingly disreputable sub-culture: John Awdeley's Fra rni e of Vacabondes 
(1560-1); Harman's Caveat (c. 1567); and Parson Haben's Sermon in Praise of 
Thieves and Thievery. All three pieces are published in Frat rni e of Vacabondes, 
ed. Edward Viles and F. J. Furnivall, EETS, ES, 9 (London, 1889). 
Anti-rogue legislation also takes place at intervals through the century, 
increasingly stringent Acts being passed in 1531,1536,1547, and 1555. See 
English Historical Documents, vol 5,1485-1558, ed. C. H. Williams 
(London, 1971), pp. 1023-1039. In 1563 the Statute of Artificers addressed the 
problem of vagabonds, and the issue was again before the House of Lords in 1572, 
Journals of the House of Lords, vol 1 (London, undated). 
20 Fulgens and Lucres, Magnvý and Respublica contain prominent 
examples. 
21 The impracticality of the traditional fool's costume is stressed in 
Magnyfy-m where the dangling parts of the fool's hat obscure Foly's vision: 
Tansy: Tusshe! thy lyppes hange in thyne eye; ' (1.1050). Similarly, in The Longer 
Thou Livest The More Fool Thou Art, Moros stumbles because he is distracted by 
the fine feather in his hat. 
Elsewhere, voluminous garments recall the verse satires of the Fifteenth 
Century, in which the nobility is perceived as wasteful for using too much cloth. In 
Medwall's Nature Pryde boasts: 
132 
Than have I suche a short gown 
Wyth wyde sleues that hang adown- 
They wold make some lad in thys town 
A doublet and a cote 
(1.767-770) 
In Fulgens and Lucres, the serving man describes excess cloth in the nobles' coats 
as 'like a lie', 1.742, while in nvýnce such comments are numerous. Fansy 
(ironically) refers to the excessive amount of cloth in Cloked Collusyon's priestly 
disguise 'Here was to little cloth' (1.607), to which Cloked Collusyon answers 'A, 
Fansy, Fansy, God send the brayne' (1.608). Later, Cloked Collusyon criticizes 
Courtly Abusyon's clothes: 'By God, Syr, What nede all this waste? ' (1.754). 
22 The obvious case is of Titivillus in Mankind '- a man wyth a hede at ys of 
grett omnipotens' (1.461). The Conflict of Conscience gives us: 'Tyranny: With a 
head of brass I will not be outfaced' (1.759); and 'Hypocrisy: And you are one of 
his [the Devil's] sons, methink, by your head. ' (1.785) 
23 The most extreme case of this lineality occurs in Thomas Lupton's All For 
Money, which I discuss below, in Chapter Four. 
24 The assumption of self-presence in language is analysed in relation to wig 
Play of the Four Elements in my unpublished M. A. dissertation (University of 
Warwick, 1987). Happd recuperates this absence, seeing it as justified by the 
familiarity that convention creates. 
25 Paula Neuss discusses this concern in relation to Mankind, in 'Active and 
Idle Language: Dramatic Images in Mankind', Medieval Drama, ed. Neville 
Denny, Stratford-Upon-Avon Studies, 16 (London, 1973), pp. 40-67. 
26 One must, however, allow for the shallowness in which their natures are 
constructed to supersede that state on occasion, as well as for occurrences of 
insincerity. 
27 Both Pride and the principal Vices often speak in a manner which recalls the 
vaunting Herod of the Mystery Cycles, as do early mankind figures when in a state 
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of sinful ignorance. Youth contains an excellent example, in the person of the hero, 
Youth. 
28 Julia Kristeva, "Word, Dialogue and Novel", in Desire in Language: A 
Semiotic Approach to Literature and Arc (New York, 1980), pp. 64-89 (p. 65). 
29 One may choose to interpret this aspect of vice behaviour as covering an 
error or as taunting the mankind figure. Again one may see the mankind figure as 
easily conned or as deaf, in such a scene. 
30 The texts in question, the endightement of mother messe and Lingua, are 
discussed in detail in Chapter Five. Perhaps this also casts a new light on Shylock's 
'I am content', (IV, i, 394), which is followed almost immediately by his parting, 
'I am not well', (IV, i, 396). The Merchant of Venice, in The Riverside 
Shakespeare, pp. 254-283. 
31 One might feel that such a monologue echoes in large the experiences of a 
travelling group of players. There is considerable self-ironizing effect in 
traditionally giving such a discourse to the evil character. 
32 In The Conflict of Conscience, Hypocrisy refers to this aspect of his own 
abilities: 
Sooner named, sooner come, as common proverbs say. 
(1.752) 
33 This is not only true in the obvious case of Titivillus in Mankind, but also in 
those of New Guise, Nought and Nowadays, and of the Taverner in The Four 
Elements, to name just two other instances. 
34 Pride is of course the single, fundamental flaw in the character of Lucifer, 
and so the main cause of the existence of the Devil. 
35 The problem of lago's excessive self-justification is discussed in connection 
with the Vice by Bernard Spivack, in Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil 
(London, 1958). He finds a broad source for Iago's behaviour in his Vice ancestry. 
This is too general, as the proliferation of vice-characteristics observed so far bears 
witness. Returning to lago's guiding dynamic, one finds in his behaviour the urge 
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to control - to re-write a heroic narrative - in parallel with an urge to assert himself 
in opposition to Othello's virtues. Where other aspects of Iago are contradictory, 
this force remains constant. 
In Cambyses, Ambidexter's betrayal of people for whom he apparently has 
some affection is particularly baffling. Once again, however, the tendency of his 
action is to force the plot to follow one line rather than another. In the closing 
scenes he insists on asserting his involvement, to his own detriment. The price he 
pays for thus drawing attention to himself is high, so high that one must accept that 
ego is more important to him than life itself. 
Both versions of Patient Grissil also contain a vice figure, whose destructive 
advice to Duke Gwalter is quite unmotivated. 
36 Anne Righter (Barton), in Shakespeare and the Idea of the Play (New York, 
1977), pp. 54-57, sees this as a method of keeping contact with the audience. 
37 One clear instance of this occurs with A and B in Medwall's Fulgens and 
Lucres, for in that play one plot is related, and then A and B, at different times, 
explicitly set out to alter its progress. Though not strictly speaking vice characters, 
A and B share many features with that later development. To list the most obvious 
features: A wishes Lucres to make the wrong choice; they both interfere in the 
action; they are 'low' characters, who make lewd jokes, including 
misunderstandings and double entendres; they function as explicators of the plot; 
and their entrance implies a familiar relationship with the audience. 
38 An interesting example occurs of a play which uses a vice-like figure, but 
establishes her in a framework which authorizes anarchy. The Rare Triumphs of 
Love and Fortune bases its plot on a contest of strength between Venus and 
Fortuna. This develops as a struggle between the consistency of true love and the 
unmotivated random attacks of chance to establish which is the stronger structuring 
principle in human life. This play will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five. 
39 The term 'hybrid plays' is used by Anne Righter, describing 'those 
experimental plays of the second half of the sixteenth century, both courtly and 
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popular, in which comedy and tragedy, classical, Italian, morality and folk elements 
appear wildly jumbled together. ' op. cit., p. 53. She sees that style beginning with 
Cambyses (1569-1570) and Horestes (1567-68). 
40 In Ralph Roister Doister, Merrygreeke works on both sides, as does Subtle 
Shift in Clyomon and Clamydes (c. 1576? ) In Common Conditions (1576), the 
eponymous Vice presents himself as both good and evil circumstances, and serves 
both sides apparently without conscious decision. 
41 Disguising, and loud, false weeping are exceptions. 
42 In Respublica, the lesser vice figures blame Avarice for their wrongdoing 
(1.1832-1836). 
In Ane Sat= of the Thre Estaitis, Flattery tries to escape by helping to have 
his friends hanged (1.3679-80). 
In wealth and Health, Ill-Will tries to abandon Shrewd wit. ('Lost' Tudor 
Plays 1460-1566, ed. J. S. Farmer, EEDS (London, 1907; reprinted Guildford, 
1966), pp. 273-309, (p. 305). 
43 The vice figures send a forged letter in both Respublica and in Skelton's 
MMmXfyycence. 
44 An instance is Titivillus' fabrication that Mercy was hanged as a horse thief, 
in Marikind. 
45 Lois Potter, for example, has argued for a separation between the moral play 
and the Romance-play, in 'The PLays and the Playwrights', The 'Revels' History of 
Drama in English, vol 2,1500-1576, ed. Norman Sanders and others (London, 
1980), pp. 141-257, (pp. 209-210). Her grounds are, firstly, that the heroes of 
Romances give way to despair, occasionally becoming suicidal. This objection 
appears to be based on a misunderstanding of the emotional variety available to the 
mankind figure. Secondly, the secularization of the vice figure into a figure of 
chance seems to her to involve a loss of free will. However, the oppositional figure 
in the earlier moral play, though creative, was never free to do anything but oppose. 
The points where the vice figure, as Chance, betrays his master, are points where 
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the compulsion placed on all vice figures is revealed particularly nakedly before us. 
46 (H, 366, 'The use of the alias is closely associated with the whole question 
of establishing the Vice's name and identity. The homiletic tradition attached 
considerable importance to the identification of the Vice, and this leads to the 
frequency of episodes in which the Vice gives his name or is reluctant to give it, or 
arranges an alias in such a way that the audience is aware of his true and false 
names. ' 
H, 368, 'considerable emphasis is given to this frequent device by means of 
the length of the episode in which the alias is assumed. ' 
47 This is clearly a different activity from the process of name-changes that 
takes place in Mundus et Infans. In that play, the sequence of changes from Infans 
to Age represents genuine physical alterations in the person named. The changes 
are a part of the staging of allegory as a formal device. They are misleading only in 
a very restricted sense, for they do focus attention on only one aspect of what it is 
to be human. 
48 MED lists both negative and positive connotations available for 'policy' 
from 1455. OED gives both readings lasting into the eighteenth century. 
49 Anne Ferry, The Art of Naming (Chicago and London, 1988). In 
particular, 'two grammatical forms were thought of as fundamentally bound 
together in the same way as accidents cleave to substances: the adjective unable to 
stand alone, the substance unknowable without it. ' p. 60. 
50 Plays in which a female role is structurally identical with that of the vice 
figure include Heywood's Ply of The Wether; Redford's Wit and Science (the 
character of Luxury); and Lingua. This matter is discussed at length in Chapter 
Five. 
51 Linda Woodbridge analyses the literary debate about the nature of woman in 
Women and the English Renaissance: Literature and the Nature-of Womankind 
(Brighton, 1984) 
52 Anne Ferry examines the magical function of language, cit. in note 49, 
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chapter Four. 
53 The conventionality of the principal Vice's laughter is pointed up in the 
description of Vice in the masque scene in Dekker's Old Fortunat us: 
Enter Vice with a gilded face, and horned on her head. --- her 
gannents painted behind with fooles faces and divels heads. and 
underneath it in the midst this written, Ha, Ha, He. 
54 Allon White, in 'Pigs and Pierrots: The Politics of Transgression in Modem 
Fiction', Raritan Review, 2, (1982), pp. 35-51, finds the question unresolved 
whether transgression generally is radical or conservative. 
55 cf. Jacques Derrida, Positions, tr. Alan Bass (Chicago, 1981), p. 11: 'even in 
aggressions or transgressions we are consorting with a code to which metaphysics is 
tied irreducibly, such that every transgressive gesture re-encloses us. ' 
56 E. K. Chambers, The Elizabethan Stage, 4 vols. (Oxford, 1923; reprinted, 
1961), II, pp. 396-7, suggests that audiences were socially mixed. His evidence is 
followed by Andrew Gurr, Playgoing in Shakespeare's London (Cambridge, 1987). 
57 The evidence about composition of audiences is immensely flexible, and 
scholars have arrived at widely differing views on the basis of the same material. 
They include contemporary attacks on the theatre, such as those by Stephen Gosson, 
to Michael Hattaway, Elizabethan Popular Theatre (London, 1982), p. 45, and Ann 
J. Cook, The Privileged Playgoers of Shakespeare's London 1576-1642 (Princeton, 
N. J., 1981). 
58 The Castle of Perseveraunce was publicly cried abroad, while internal 
evidence suggests a socially mixed audience for most of the moral plays. R. Willis, 
writing in 1639 about a performance of The Cradle of Security in Gloucester some 
fifty or more years earlier, describes what appears to be standard practice. When 
players arrived in the city the mayor financed a free performance of one play, 
attended by all who cared to attend. Subsequently, further performances, probably 
including novel material, would be put on for a broad public, restricted only by 
preparedness to pay. (This information is based on an extract from Willis's 
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memoirs, Mount Tabor, which is quoted at length in D. M. Bevington, From 
'Mankind' to Marlowe (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), p. 13. ) 
59 For a discussion of the supplement as excess, see Jacques Derrida, Qf 
Grammatology, tr. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London, 1976), 
p. 144. With regard to Rousseau and writing, Derrida explains: 'It is the addition of 
a technique, a sort of artificial and artful ruse to make speech present when it is 
actually absent. It is a violence done to the natural destiny of the language. ' 
However, 'It adds only to replace.... if it fills, it is as if one fills a void. ' p. 145. 
60 H, 393, 'the convention embraced such a large selection of devices and 
characteristics that it would be necessary for an author to include only a moderate 
number in order to set in motion the audience's normal responses to a vice. ' 
61 Rosemond Tuve puts the point with regard to Christian imagery that the 
representing character contains the condition of the character represented, without 
any necessity for us to transform the former into the latter. Allegorical Images 
Some Medieval Books and their Posterity (Princeton, 1966), p. 37. The allegorical 
quality of the moral play works in the same way. 
62 Oueilen des Weltlichen Dramas in England vor Shake ire, ed. Alois 
Brandt (Strasburg, 1898). 
Specimens of the Pre-Shak Drama, ed J. M. Manly, 2 vols, (Boston 
and London, 1904), I. 
The Macro Plays, ed. F. J. Furnivall and Alfred W. Pollard, EETS, ES, 91 
(London, 1904). 
"Lost" Tudor Plays, ed. J. S. Farmer, EEDS (first published, London, 1907; 
eighth edition 1966). 
Chief Pre-Sh Dramas, ed. John Quincy Adams (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1924). 
The Macro Plays, ed. Mark Eccles, EETS, OS, 262 (London, 1969). 
Mankind, ed. D. M. Bevington, Folger Facsimile Text (New York, 1972). 
Tudor Interludes, ed. Peter Happe (London, 1972). 
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Four Tudor Interludes, ed. J. A. B. Somerset (London, 1974). 
English Moral Interludes, ed. Glynne Wickham (London and Melbourne, 
1976). 
Three Late Medieval Morality Plays, ed. G. A. Lester (London, 1981). 
63 A detailed consideration of the play is assisted by reference to the vice- 
characteristics described in the first section of this chapter. A summary list of these 
and their codes is attached at Appendix B, for ease of reference. 
64 In Skelton's Magnv, too, the prince is persuaded to wear the height 
of ridiculous fashion as a sign of his moral deterioration. 
65 The persistent cross-referencing suggests an original production based on 
'mansions': one for the tavern and the devil's exits and entrances on the left; a 
second for the church and Mercy's appearances on the right. Mankind must use 
both at different stages of the plot. 
66 'large' here is related to 'largesse', a morally problematic quality as both 
Ma nyfy and Liberality and Prodigality show. 
67 This links with an ancient anxiety about the truth or falsehood of 
premonitions seen in dreams. The doubt is always about the source of the message, 
as here. 
68 William Tydeman in English Medieval Theatre. 1400-1500 (London and 
Boston, 1986) shows that this reading has now passed into general acceptance: 'the 
author's tactic appears to be to lure the audience into a false position, trading on 
their preference for 'mery chere' and high spirits to involve them in the process of 
sneering at goodness, and becoming parties to scurrility, riot and evil', p. 44. 
69 In Merbury's The Marriage Between Wit and Wisdom (c. 1570), the lady 
Idleness 'coals' (i. e. blackens') Wit's face while he is asleep, as a sign of his fall 
from virtue. 
The Devil in Like Will to Like is matched with a collier - one assumption is that 
they look alike, both having black faces. 
In the late Devil-play, Grim the Collier of Croydon, the collier has an important 
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role. 
Mammon, EQ, II, 7, iii, has a face tanned with smoke, head and beard covered 
with soot, and 'cole-black' hands. 
This coaly convention may go some way towards explaining sundry 
mysterious references in other plays. Courage in nw-Tyde Tarrieth No Man calls 
Profite 'Cole profite'; Covetous in Enough is as Good as a Feast also mentions 
'cole'; 'Cole hazard' appears as a gamester in Impatient Poverty. Finally, I. P. 
Collier, Annals of The Stage, 3 vols (London, 1831), I, pp. 130-132, quotes a letter 
from the Lord Mayor of London to Thomas Cromwell about a play by Thomas 
Wylley, Vicar of Yoxford which included the character 'Colle Clogger of 
Conseyens'. (Cited by Glynne Wickham, Early English Stages, vol I, 1300-1576, 
(London, 1959; 1980), p. 239. ) 
The connection between 'tole' and the French 'col' _ 'neck' does not so 
much contradict this reading as add to it, for the vice figure, in his sinful blackness, 
finds his neck in constant danger. 
70 Mark Pilkinton associates this suggestion, when it occurs in Ane Satyre of 
the Thre Estaitis, with the vice figures' 'demonic' connections ('The Antagonists of 
English Drama, 1370-1576', unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Bristol, 
1974). See also Robert Hughes, Heaven and Hell in Western Art (London, 1968), 
p. 257, who refers to 'the witch's practice of the anal 'devil's kiss' '. 
71 Freud describes the social nature of jokes, as opposed to the individual 
nature of dreams, in Jokes and the Unconscious, tr. James Strachey, S. E., 8, 
(London, 1960; first published in German, 1905), pp. 179-80. 
72 See Lisa Jardine, '"Make thy doublet of changeable taffeta" : Dress Codes, 
Sumptuary Law and 'Natural' Order', in Still Harping on Daughters (London, 
1983), pp. 141-168. 
141 
CHAPTER FOUR 
STRUCTURES AND MEANING IN THE PROVERB PLAYS 
'nothing ... in excess' 
SECTION A: SUBVERSION OF THE UNITARY SUBJECT 
This chapter contains first an examination of the ways in which the 
polarization of subject and other, discussed in Chapter Three, is subverted by the 
nature of language, from which it has necessarily been constructed. The e 
Tarrieth No Man (1576)1 is an extended example of the moral play's attempt to 
establish truth as single and absolute. From the subversion of the idea of truth as 
single, the diversity, the indeterminacy of the language-constituted subject reveals 
itself. Secondly, it becomes clear that there is a plurality both of mankind figures 
and of vice figures in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man, and that this is related to 
multiplicity of meaning. The proliferation of the mankind figures in The TW g 
Tarrieth No Man appears to be symptomatic of a development in the moral plays of 
the 1560's and 70's, which critics have usually discussed as a secularization of the 
moral theories under discussion by the moral play. 2 Certainly the candidates for the 
now diversified role of mankind figure are often representative of various social 
orders. 3 In comparison with earlier moral plays, it is as if the concept of allegory 
has wavered: mankind/the subject is no longer perceived as universal and therefore 
as being properly represented by a single figure. When people are perceived as 
deeply different in this world, that means that worldly differences are so apparent 
and profound that it becomes dramatically worthwhile, even witty, to observe those 
areas where people share a common fate. The pleasure developed in the plays is the 
ironic enjoyment of playing off similarities against differences. 4 The project of the 
proverb plays, of which The de Tarrieth No Man is one, is to demonstrate the 
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universality of application of the proverb, that is, to expound the idea that 
individuals share common truths of experience. This universality, however, had 
been taken for granted in the very construction of the earlier allegorical figure of 
mankind in Mankind, in Mundus & Infans and even in Magnyfvý. Thus the 
appearance of several mankind figures in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man is 
symptomatic of an altered theory about the nature of the world, but also stems from 
the multifarious nature of language. I will link it with the play's attempt to sustain 
a single interpretation of the proverb by attributing falsehood to otherness, as 
multiplicity. The escalating process of multiple characterization generates a 
fundamental attack on the unity of the subject. 
The repressive self is constituted as excluding some language skills in order 
to privilege others. So far the former have been represented in the plays as 
literalism, and therefore primitive. The latter have been represented as adding a 
single spiritual truth to literal meaning, and so as operating on a more abstract 
plane. The unitary self is therefore held together by its ability to insist on the 
'correct' linguistic interpretation of a given phrase. In this picture, 'true' meaning, 
whether good or bad, is single, whereas language is double. The metaphoric 
meaning is seen as the 'right' reading, that is, as having a single, true 
interpretation. (This is a novel way of seeing metaphoric language, since we are 
accustomed to reading metaphor as containing both of its available meanings 
simultaneously. ) In the plays, the successful self must control language by choosing 
to privilege metaphoric and spiritual readings. Any suggestion that language might 
be multiple is therefore a threat to the newly-achieved self. When the vice figures' 
linguistic practices are scrutinized more closely, we find the fissive effects of 
language laid out. We shall see later that it is language that undermines the attempt 
to achieve a unitary self, for while the individual is constituted in language, it is 
also the case that, language being polysemic and shifting, the 'individual' so 
constituted cannot be unitary. 
This analysis therefore perceives the plays to contain an area of conflict 
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beyond the simple battle between good and evil. That is to say, the plays reveal a 
fundamental tension between the unifying tendency to fixed meaning and the fissive 
tendency to multiple meaning. Both are inherent effects of language use; both are, 
to put it another way, objects of language's desire, since neither goal is ultimately 
achievable, but always worked towards. The existence of the idea of these goals is 
what makes language possible. To call this relationship a 'tension' is perhaps to 
succumb to the polarizing concerns of the Imaginary, for the two are not necessarily 
in opposition. 5 The two processes are necessary to each other as symbiotes, for 
multiple meaning is not indeterminacy: in fact, multiple meaning consists of 
meaning, together with both that meaning's subversion and the penumbra of 
meaning-effects generated by metaphoric and metonymic connections. (By 
metonymic connections in this case I mean relationships based on linguistic 
derivation, ambiguities, homonymies, and the like. ) 
It is only when meaning is seen as fixed that the subject can be put forward 
as an indivisible unit. It follows that recognition of the tendency of language 
towards multiple meaning implies an undermining of that notion of the fortress- 
subject, a notion which the polarizing mode of the moral play feeds, as we have 
seen. 6 
The following analysis considers a group of mid-century plays in which the 
fissive properties of language are foregrounded, an effect of the necessary 
repetitions of the proverb on which they are based. The proverb play is, however, 
a variety of the moral play, and we find that these plays must make judgments about 
the proverbial truths they assert. Where a psychomachia-morality focusses on the 
battle between good and evil figures, a proverb-morality conducts the same battle by 
locating it around a particular statement. Its brief is to show that the statement has 
moral implications. Thus, Like Will to Like asserts at one point that the 
congregation of the wicked is a good thing, because they can be more readily 
punished. Again, The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art condemns the 
wickedness involved in persevering in the follies of a simpleton. Moros, a kind of 
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village idiot, is whisked off to the devil at the end of the play. 
Assessing the moral quality of the originating proverb is not the only 
approach that the proverb play takes. Some reconstruct the assertion 'x is true, and 
that is good (or bad)' to read 'If x is true, In that is good (or bad)'. In other 
words, they allow for the possibility that the proverb on which the play is based 
may not be a statement of a universal truth. In the late romance The Weakest Goeth 
to the Wall (1600), much of the action shows the virtuous weak suffering many 
tribulations, to the accompaniment of a moral overtone of hand-wringing. The play 
concludes, however, with a happy ending and a reversal of fortunes, suggesting that 
proverbial truth may be modified by circumstances. 
The fissive process mentioned above occurs in spite of the overt project of 
the plays: to establish a single truth based on a proverb. They attempt this primary 
project by one of two methods. In the first method, it is assumed that the proverb 
offers a true comment on the world, and the play then follows a rondo form: a) a 
statement of the proverb; b) an enacted demonstration of a circumstance in which 
the proverb can be seen to apply; c) a restatement of the proverb with enhanced 
credibility. Steps b) and c) are then repeated with variations for as long as the 
author wishes the play to proceed. The second method, recognizing that a proverb 
may be interpreted in conflicting ways, opposes a virtuous interpretation to a 
vicious one and presents scenes which show the two possibilities in operation. The 
climax then demonstrates that only the virtuous interpretation is 'worthwhile'. 
(That word is appropriate, as in some plays the soul's ultimate fate is the standard 
by which worthwhile-ness is judged, but in others the standard appears to be 
material well-being. ) 
It can readily be seen that the polarisation of the interpretations of a 
statement into a simple opposition of virtuous versus vicious is structurally identical 
with that very familiar opposition of good/evil, out of which the successful mankind 
figure has been constructed as good in opposition to the projected evil 'otherness' of 
the vice figures. Closer reading of The Tyde Tarrieth No Man will show that 
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neither of the opposed terms remains stable. Thus language subverts its own claims 
to be able to speak unambiguously and hence to offer 'the truth. In so doing, I 
argue, language also subverts the character of the subject as a fortress-like 
individual. Crucially, then, the characterisation of the other as a linguistic other, 
equated to a verbally competent vice figure, acts in the end to subvert the notion of 
the self. Such a subverted self can no longer claim autonomy, self-determination or 
extra-linguistic transcendental existence. This proposition becomes more readily 
demonstrable in those situations where the 'truth' of language has been 
institutionalized in the form of a proverb. Before discussing The Tyde Tarrieth No 
Man, therefore, it is necessary to consider the kinds of truth that proverbs put 
forward. 
It is because proverbs, and so proverb plays, claim a special relationship 
with the truth that The Tarrieth No Man is appropriate for analysis. A 
tendency to use proverbs can be found not just in the mid- to late-sixteenth century 
group of plays called proverb plays, but throughout the moral play tradition. As a 
traditional weapon of argument, the proverb is an obvious mode for a vice figure to 
appropriate, given his renowned persuasive skills. The use of proverbs is also very 
much in keeping with the fashion of the times, evidence for which may be found in 
John Heywood's collections of proverbs, and epigrams on proverbs.? In general, 
Heywood's punning wit is aimed at overturning the statement that the proverb 
makes, or the advice that it gives. In moral plays, however, one finds a rather 
more straightforward approach to proverbs: they are used to justify arguments, or to 
emphasize conclusions in an authoritative way. 
The proverb appears to embody wisdom based on reliable observations of 
the way of the world. Its overtone of trustworthiness is derived in part from 
frequent repetition, in part from its witty, concise form. In the sense that proverbs 
appeared to be true, they were and are used seriously by 'dramatists and 
pamphleteers, politicians, orators and preachers'. 8 
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A proverb, then, is not necessarily always true. John Heywood knew this, 
and presumably so did his many readers. Not only can circumstances alter cases, 
but proverbs themselves are by nature ambiguous. Because of the pithy form - 
often gnomic and usually metaphoric - the proverb's meaning is matter for 
interpretation and hence also for debate. The inherent ambiguities of semantics and 
syntax make it possible to reverse a proverb's meaning completely. 9 
It seems that a proverb is an attempt to enunciate a truth about the world. 
The disruptive forces at work in language, however, shake the reliability of this 
putative relationship between words and experience. There is a remarkable 
similarity between this condition and the belief held by Derridean criticism that any 
attempt to construct truth is subverted by refusals within language itself to be held 
to a unitary meaning. The slipperiness of language is a function of the 'play of 
signification' . 
10 Because a proverb can be perceived as applying in a wide variety 
of cases, even quite contradictory ones, the possibility of a 'play of signification' 
can be detected from the proverb's wide applicability. Proverbs, therefore, mark a 
craving for interpretation, and hence a node of hesitancy within apparent certitude. 
Highly conscious of the moral dangers of ambiguity, the proverb plays constitute 
attempts to locate the 'meaning' of the proverb in question - in other words, to fix 
its interpretation. These points will become clearer in the course of my discussion 
of The Tyde Tarrieth No Man. 
The action is very largely taken up with a series of short plots, in which 
Courage, the principal Vice, uses the proverb 'the tyde tarrieth no man' (the tide 
waits for nobody) to stampede various victims into taking panicky immoral 
decisions. Wapull's skill avoids the danger of a fragmented effect by involving the 
concluding scenes of one episode in the opening ones of the next. The insertion of 
one plot in another adds a kaleidoscopic quality, for the audience can never be quite 
sure which plot will take place next. Part of the enjoyment of watching such a play 
lies in observing the technical skill of the actors in doubling parts, for of course 
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there are simply the same four people on and off the stage all the time, but in a 
dazzling variety of sequences, combinations and costumed roles. 
The play begins with a speech by the Prologue, who suggests that there is a 
virtuous interpretation of the proverb, and that problems arise for the many people 
who misinterpret it. 
How greedinesse at Such times, doth get what he can, 
and therefore Still cryeth, Tyde tarieth no man. 
Which prouerbe right well might be applyed, 
To a better fence then it is ufed: 
There is a time to altre grace, this may not be denyed, 
Of thy linfull life jo greatly abused. 
Let not that time then be refu fed, 
For that tyde most certayne will tarry no man, 
Thus taking the prouerbe we rightly do scan 
(A ii v) 
He implies a dual system of interpretation: either his truth, or worldly falsehood is 
all that is available. He leaves the stage, and the opposition immediately arrives in 
the form of the vice figure. Courage begins by listing all the categories of sinful 
human beings he intends to load onto his barge, which sounds like a cross between 
the Ship of Fools and Charon's ferry to Hell. Courage is joined by the minor vice 
figures, Hurting Help, Painted Profit and Fained Furtherance. They boast of their 
opportunism in the materialistic world: Help is a broker; Profit is the servant of a 
gentleman; and Furtherance serves the merchant. They discuss their names, then 
the four of them indulge in traditional vice-play activities of fighting and singing. 
Next, Courage persuades the merchant, Greediness, to put financial gain 
ahead of religious scruples. No Good Neighbourhood enlists the assistance of Help 
and Courage to have an elderly tenant put out of his lodgings so that he 
(Neighbourhood) can inherit the lease. Coincidentally the house is owned by 
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Greediness, who can be swayed by a quick bribe. Furtherance, who makes a living 
as Greediness' servant, provides the information that Greediness is particularly in 
need of money at that time, to buy some land. They leave, and the next to appear 
is an impoverished Courtier, named Willing-to-Win-Worship, who is planning to 
return to his property in the country. Courage persuades him to change his mind, 
offering to help him to borrow money in order to afford clothes for the imminent 
royal triumph. Furtherance and Help take him to find Greediness, from whom he 
will borrow at an extortionate rate of interest. Greediness now appears on stage, 
reporting that an old tenant is to be evicted, and rejoicing that he has successfully 
applied the proverb 'the tyde tarrieth for no man'. Greediness is packed off in a 
hurry to meet the Courtier. 
The haste and plotting abate for a time, for the Tenant arrives, to deliver a 
monologue of complaint about his misfortunes, and about the grasping nature of the 
world. 
Courage next uses his guiding motto to encourage a fourteen-year-old girl, 
Wilful Wantonness, to marry against her parents' wishes. The tone of the play 
continues to become more sombre, with Help regretting the Courtier's losses. The 
prevailing mood lifts briefly when all the vice figures gloat over their profits and 
their knavishness, and sing together. The Courtier now takes his turn at a 
monologue of regret and sorrow, adding to the sense of sadness which the Tenant's 
monologue has begun. He attributes worldly viciousness to the popular 
misapplication of the play's governing proverb: 
But what is their aunjwere, when they are blamed 
Say they, we haue here but a little Jpace, 
Therefore we haue neede to be getting a pace, 
Wherefore Should we gayning lay away, 
The Tyde taryeth no Man, this is all they can Say 
(E i v) 
For a time the scene becomes light-hearted, with the advent of Wantonness 
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and her new husband, Wastefulness. They entertain with a married couple's version 
of vice-play: railing, making up again, and singing. Wastefulness is encouraged to 
spend ruinously, on a carpe diem interpretation of the proverb. The final plot that 
belongs with this section of the play is scarcely substantial enough to merit the term: 
it is a short scene in which a Debtor is arrested while listening to a sermon. With 
this, the mood darkens once more. Three-quarters of the play has passed thus in 
vice-play, songs, fights, and the deterioration of moral standards. Only now do 
Christianity and Faithful Few enter. 
Christianity has been much weakened by the evil in the world. Faithful 
attempts to revive his spirits, and succeeds in countering Greediness's arguments for 
money-making, re-defining riches by citing the durability of Christ's word. " He 
also saves the now indigent Wastefulness from suicide, driving away the inarticulate 
monster, Dispayre. Meanwhile, however, Courage reports that Greediness has 
killed himself off-stage. Correction and Authority are then mobilized to see 
Courage chastised: he struggles ignominiously with the gaoler, Correction, before 
being taken away to be hanged. Christianity can now be restored to the people, 
properly armed with the sword of 'god's word' and the shield of 'faith'. 
Written for a small troupe of four, The Tyde Tarrieth No Man involves 
numerous monologues and considerable doubling of parts. 12 Performing an 
elaborate plot including numerous roles with a small troupe in this way necessitates 
a large number of exits and entrances. 13 
Typically of vice-play, the tone is one of rumbustious fun of a rather savage 
kind. The scrambling, scuttling crew of minor vice figures is both various and 
numerous, creating an effect of dynamism and of excitement. The alternation of 
virtuous victims and vicious exploiters points up the moral tone, and does so the 
more movingly because the victims speak for themselves. This, and the debate 
between Faithful and Courage add an intellectual dimension to what might 
otherwise be seen as a simple psychomachia-morality. 
Closer analysis of the play demonstrates how it explicitly confronts that 
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intriguing conflict within proverbs, that they purport to state truths about the world 
on which one might reasonably base decisions, while at the same time being so open 
to interpretation that they are treacherous as an unthought basis for morality. The 
play also exploits the result that a proverb is the ideal dramatic resource for that 
master of deceit, word-play and misinterpretation, the principal Vice. Courage, 
through this facility, releases that incompletely repressed ambiguity which lies 
behind language and makes itself apparent whenever language is permitted to 
play. 14 Thus it is over-determined that otherness must manifest itself through the 
vice figures' playful and excessive speech. 
To put that point another way, once the totalizing system of the virtuous is 
specifically confronted by worldly behaviour and worldly words, two possibilities 
arise. The first is that an alternative totalizing system attempts to establish itself: 
one version of 'truth' confronts another. This is the overt scheme of the plays. The 
second, and more complex, possibility arises because that 'alternative truth' which 
forms the confrontation has rather special origins. Mobilizing the physical to 
confront the spiritual, and the linguistically free to confront the rigid, this 
alternative system taps the energies of the Kristevan chora. 
15 The second 
possibility, then, is that a deconstructive play of meaning can arise within each 
system, due to the dialogue between them. I have argued above, in Chapter Three, 
that the vice figures exist as pure opposition. This is the reason why a vice figure 
doesn't care what weapons he uses in order to oppose. It is this flexibility that can 
eventually be used to call his alternative totalization into question, and from that all 
pretensions to totality. 16 
When we consider the conventional 'emptiness' of the vice figure's prattle 
we can perhaps begin to see the relevance of Derrida's formulation: 'to risk 
meaning nothing is to start to play, and first to enter into the play of di, fferance 
which prevents any word, any concept, any enunciation from coming to summarize 
and to govern from the theological presence of a center the movement and textual 
spacing of diffenences. ' 17 
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It seems, then, that the proverb play readily offers itself as a specific 
instance of flexibility operating to place systems as such in question. It is, of 
course, fundamental to the very existence of the moral play that the vice figures 
should offer alternative interpretations of any moral message. The favoured 
technique for doing this has already been noticed at length: wilfully 
misapprehending the meaning of the virtuous figures' remarks and advice, often by 
taking metaphoric utterances literally. 
The opening monologue sets out the play's project, which is to explicate 
both the moral and the opportunistic applications of the proverb's advice to seize the 
moment because 'the Tyde Tarrieth No Man'. Naturally its aim is to demonstrate 
that the former is better. 
The Prologue begins by explaining that a few wicked people can destroy the 
good name of a whole city, using the analogies of the woodworm in timber and 
moth in fabric. He then advertises the content of the play to follow as further 
explanation of what he has said. 
To what ende thefe wordes we have lpoken 
In our matter shalbe more playnely exprejt, 
Which the Tide tarieth no man, to name hath token 
(A ii) 
The avaricious use the proverb of the title as their excuse for this behaviour. 
How greedinef je at Juch times, doth get what he can 
And therefore Still cryeth, Tyde tarieth no man 
(A ii v) 
The Prologue goes on to explain that the proverb could be better used for a godly 
purpose, in the lines quoted above. A concluding humble stanza follows, ushering 
in the players. Thus the play lays claim to an ability to interpret the proverb 
lucidly. It promises a close reading of the title, presented in dramatic form. Its 
first move in this business of practical criticism, asserting that two possible readings 
exist, is to locate these as occupying the polarized categories of virtuous and 
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vicious, and indeed of right and wrong. 
In analysing the play we find that this attempt to take a firm grip on 
language and meaning is subject to various forms of slippage. The proverb that 
Wapull has chosen to exemplify is itself a statement of the slippery, mutable nature 
of the world, so one must be careful to distinguish between the various kinds of 
indeterminacy in the play. 
The play attempts to control slippage by setting up an opposition between the 
'good interpretation' and the 'bad interpretation' of the proverb. However, such a 
simple sub-division of morality is undermined by the very examples which purport 
to establish it. It would be wrong to see this as intellectual failure on Wapull's part. 
In fact, it is a demonstration by language in its fluidity of the impossibility of an 
accurate linguistic statement of truth. 
The interpretative opposition is stated by the play's opening form: a pair of 
monologues sets up the two possibilities. The first monologue asserts the 'right' 
reading of the proverb, a reading which, we will see, is divided within itself. The 
second monologue balances that with a statement of Courage's intent, as vice 
figure, to see as many people as possible damned through a false reading. In 
asserting that the proverb has a virtuous and a vicious interpretation, the Prologue 
assumes an authoritative position, in control of the possible interpretations. It 
locates those interpretations as a pair of opposed, definable moral attitudes, but 
shies away from defining them neatly, inviting us to take the content of the play for 
explanation. However, throughout the play even the most overt attempts to grasp 
meaning firmly through language result in slippages away from the oppositional 
model. This problem is exemplified particularly in Courage's attempted control of 
labels; in the insecurity of the opposition between the virtuous and the vicious 
'tyde'; and in the hesitations in which the play establishes its basis for defining 
morality and the nature of evil. 
This fundamental slippage of meaning begins with a gesture of control, when 
153 
Courage and his crew take charge of the deceitful capacities of language. Courage 
claims a firm grasp on names, revealed in his ability to manipulate his own in the 
manner traditional to vice figures. Courage's self-definition is stated in his first 
monologue. He is both 'Corage contagious' and ' Corage contrarious' : he will 
incite others to do evil, and he will also occasionally pretend to be virtuous. In this 
way he claims all forms of courage as aspects of himself. 
The evil characters go through the standard moves of changing their names 
from accurate statements of their functions to misleading euphemisms. 18 In this 
they signify the deceitfulness of worldly things. However, initially Courage himself 
was unaware that his minions had abbreviated their names, and is corrected for 
making the mistake of addressing them in full. This is an unusual state of affairs in 
the moral play, for it is more common for the principal Vice to determine the names 
of the others. 
Hurtful Help renames himself Help, so that people will trust him. 19 
Similarly, Painted Profit calls himself simply Profit, and Fained Furtherance is 
Furtherance, the better to plunder the ordinary folk. The deceits are to prove 
effective. When No Good Neighbourhood enters, he demonstrates total confidence 
in his control of the effects of language. The analysis he offers of the various 
possible versions of his name is clearly more accurate and subtle than Courage's: 
For if no good neighbourhood I be named, 
Then of all men I jhal1 be blamed 
And if that good to neighbourhood I haue 
Men will fay I doe it prayse to craue 
(B iii v) 
For these reasons, Neighbourhood opts for the most ambiguous available version of 
his name. 
Thus a system of meaning based on the binary opposition of virtue versus 
vice already sees division within the second group. Courage, who is theoretically in 
control of the group of evil doers, and so of one of the polarities out of which the 
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moral world as an interpretative structure is constructed, is revealed as himself 
subject to ambiguity. This takes place at the most fundamental possible level, that 
of naming. 
The action of the play also contradicts Courage's assertion of control. Once 
ambiguity has been permitted, definitions can proliferate, and it transpires that this 
flexibility of language can be used by any and all the characters. This includes the 
virtuous, for all that they have a vested interest in sustaining clear definitions. A 
key word for this text is 'courage', and it is instructive to observe how even the 
virtuous characters depend on the flexibility of the term. Christianity first enters, 
skulking and mournful, shamefully carrying his perverted 'titles'. At this point, 
although it goes unstated, the feature that Christianity manifestly lacks is courage to 
act virtuously. Christianity's sword, properly labelled as 'God's word' has been 
turned around to display the title 'policy', a direct result of the general move 
towards self-interest by the population at large. Faithful Few sets out to cope with 
this: 
By the power of God I wil not delay, 
He turneth the titles 
To turne this tytle most untrue and fayned, 
And I will indue thee, and that Straight way 
With juch weapons, as Saynt Paule hatte ordayned. 
(F iii) 
When Faithful Few restores Christianity with support and encouraging words, 
another version of courage is now on stage, and out of Courage's control. Faithful 
then confronts Courage's creature Greediness in debate, and matches his arguments: 
G. Why I lende my money like a friend for good will, 
And thereby doe helpe men at their neede. 
F. A friend thou arte in deede, though a friend but ill, 
Pithagoras thy friendship, hath playnely decreede, 
There be many jayth he, who no friendes do lacke, 
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And yet of friendship they have but skant, 
So thou arte a friend for their moneys fake 
And yet thy friend f hip they alwayes j hall want 
(F iiii v) 
Having thus answered Greediness's arguments by re-interpreting the word 'friend', 
they now clash over the word 'riches': 
G. I put cafe pouerty should me ajiayle, 
Can Gods word and fayth me anything ayde: 
Pouerty agayn$t riches can neuer avayle, 
I am jure jyr this may not be denayde. 
F. We deny not, but in this world, riches beare the way 
Yet, it not riches to be called lure: 
For in Gods power it is to make riches decay, 
Whereas Gods word and fayth shall euer endure. 
(F iiii v) 
From this point it still seems as if Greediness's arguments may carry the day. 
Significantly, however, just as Faithful is proposing to refer the debate to God 
himself for judgment, the discussion is cut short by Courage's departure. This is 
one of the rare occasions when Courage is off stage, and it is a weak move on his 
part as it leaves Faithful Few in possession of the stage, as if it were a field of 
battle. Faithful Few retains undisputed control from here to the end of the play, for 
by the time Courage returns he has been much diminished by the death of 
Greediness. There is a structural reason why Courage can now be physically absent 
from the stage, quite apart from the requirements of doubling: courage as a quality 
is still present in the person of Faithful Few, who shows a virtuous courage in the 
face of Christianity's adversity. 
In the verbal confrontation between Greediness and Faithful we see selfish 
and selfless forms of courage in combat. But we also see another conflict. 
Courage's claim to establish the meaning of 'the tyde tarrieth no man' absolutely 
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has been constructed throughout the play by his behaviour as a kind of showman 
who has set up each relevant plot situation. Each time he has drawn the same 
moral, that one must rush in quickly, exploiting others in order to make money. 
We have heard Greediness stating his wish for independent control of meaning: 
Why would you not haue me, how to inuent, 
Which way were best to bring in my gayne? 
(F iiii) 
His use of 'best' suggests a moral dimension to his decision making. This claim on 
behalf of the individual is subverted by an external phenomenon: the virtue of a 
Christian life as exemplified by Faithful Few. He counters Courage's and 
Greediness' bid for independent interpretation with an argument elevating the 
interests of the majority: 
But not in Juch fort, to jet thine intent 
That all the world of thee Should complayne. 
(F iiii) 
In the example cited earlier, we found Greediness and Faithful disputing the usage 
of the term 'friend', with just the same opposition of the selfish and the social. 
Faithful introduces Pythagoras' authority - an appeal to communal standards. When 
Christianity is ready to give in to Greediness' arguments, Faithful makes the scene 
untenable to the vice figures by introducing another social form: that of a trial 
before a judge, in this case God. 
To God let us the cause betake: 
Whome I trust, when as time he doth fee, 
He will for us, a deliueraunce make. 
(Ui) 
These two areas, of the public good and of God's judgment, are both outside 
Courage's linguistic control. 
By demolishing Courage's linguistic control over the play, Faithful Few has 
succeeded in sanitizing the concept of courage. The principal vice figure's position 
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as controller of labels has been shown to be a delusion. Nevertheless, Courage's 
requiem for Greediness utters a description of immortality which we all know 
applies equally to himself. Contained in that prediction of immortality is the 
inevitability of a continuing 'play' between the attempted control of meaning and its 
subversion. 
While accepting that the proverb enunciates some kind of truth, the Prologue 
asserts opposed readings of the word 'tide'. There is a good 'tide', when man takes 
advantage of God's forgiveness: 
There is time to aSke grace, this may not be denyed 
Of thy Sinfull life fo greatly abujed 
Let not that time then be refufed 
(A ii v) 
People use the evil 'tide' as an excuse to exploit their fellow citizens. 
For they nothing way, any needy man's cafe 
But with greedy grype, their gayne they imbrace 
No kind of degree that they will forbeare, 
Neyther any time will they let Pip or jpare. 
(A ii -A ii v) 
The exact nature of these readings is left unclear, as the Prologue expects the play 
to clarify them. 
To what ende theje wordes we haue fpoken, 
In our matter f halbe more playnely exprejt. 
(A ii) 
Because the Prologue has a position in the play comparable with that of the 
messengers from God or the author in earlier moral plays, we expect him to take 
the side of virtue. He provides a small hint of what this would imply, apart from 
merely opposing greed: 
There is time to aßce grace, (A ii v) 
Two possible interpretations occur. The first, backed by his earlier references to 
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' worme' , 
'moth' and 'the grave', is that death is a person's last chance to ask 
forgiveness for a 'sinfull life'. The second is that the opportunity to reform one's 
life and to live well will not always be available: people must therefore seize that 
moment when it arrives. The nature of the virtuous tide is not clearly established: it 
may be living well, or dying well. Either way, where exactly the play claims the 
danger of missing the tide to lie remains to be seen. The Prologue is much more at 
ease talking about virtue in terms of the negation of its opposite. He categorizes the 
vicious tide as opportunism, particularly that greed for money which damages one's 
neighbours or fellow countrymen. This is the interpretation that Courage is to 
explicate further. 
Courage, however, demonstrates an even wider variety of possible meanings 
for the 'tide' that one must hurry to catch. He begins by talking as a boatman, 
about a sea-tide and a barge which is to be loaded with a variety of villains: cut- 
purses, usurers, whores, and others. By representing himself as the ferryman, 
Courage seems to be speaking of death, and of himself as an agent of the devil. 
Like Charon, he is to transport the wicked to hell. He answers the Prologue's 
careful stanzas with a coarse, lurching metre, characteristics which his verse shares 
with the conventional description of the Dance of Death. 
We meane to preuayle 
And therefore we fayle 
To the Diuell of hell 
(A iii) 
The rowdy catalogue generates for a moment a picture of the crowds who are ready 
to dance with him towards their doom. His role as the Devil's boatman is 
punningly referred to later, with 'what news in the coste? ', (C iii v). 
Like the Prologue, however, Courage shows by his behaviour that he is 
unsure what kind of opportunistic 'tide' he is talking about. His ostensible function 
is to use a wicked misinterpretation of the proverb to cause people to fall from 
grace. But where he reckons his self-interest to lie shifts between the corruption of 
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others and his own financial gain, because he uses the 'tyde tarrieth' proverb to 
refer to both. 20 
His first concern seems to be for the making of money, as the Prologue 
predicted. He uses the love of money to ensure that Greediness, the merchant, does 
not give way to the conscience that was stirred in him by his conversation with the 
preacher. Courage quickly interprets the preacher's morality as a wish to prevent 
the merchant from making money. What Courage doesn't notice as the play works 
through his catalogue of 'tides' is that they are not all of the same dimensions. The 
earlier versions of avarice constitute damage done by the individual to his own soul. 
Greediness harms himself by not listening to the preacher, and by taking no care for 
the welfare of others. When he again shows his disregard for religion by causing a 
debtor to be arrested at St. Paul's Cross, he seems like a first-class convert to 
Courage's hell-bent cargo. Other cases of villainy are more problematic. When 
Help pities the courtier: 
Alas good Gentleman, he is jerued but ill, 
(D iii) 
Courage is pleased: 
--------- is he fo pincht I 
fay? 
By my troth that is a (port for to heare. 
(D iii v) 
It seems as if Courage himself has forgotten what the point of the exercise is, in his 
own eagerness for cash and mischief. The song 'We are winners all three' (D iiii - 
D iiii v) makes this point even more clearly. The audience can hardly be expected 
to believe that the Courtier's soul is lost because he borrowed unwisely. His 
motivation for borrowing is not all bad: a desire to wear fine clothes may be vain, 
but this is due to his wish to be part of a royal triumph. Even Courage has 
recognized this: 
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The one is good, no man will denay, 
I meane corage to win worship and fame: 
(C iii v) 
In their final interview, the Courtier has recognized Courage's villainy, but Courage 
remains pleased to have fleeced him. 
In fayth this jporte is trimly alone 
That I can thus a gentleman fray: 
(Eiv - Eii) 
['alone' is probably a misprint for 'done'] 
The Tenant takes this pattern a stage further, as he is entirely a virtuous victim 
whose monologue of complaint is both moving and relatively lacking in self-pity. 
Bringing the Tenant on stage makes his case more poignant and stresses the depth of 
No Good Neighbourhood's villainy. 
This play contains a movement away from the earlier moral play structure in 
which groups of the vices and virtues strove for the allegiance of a figure 
representative of humanity. Instead the humanity role here shows signs of splitting 
into the separate characters of exploiter and victim. In a moral world composed 
entirely of inhuman vice figures and innocent victims, it becomes difficult to locate 
a neutral battleground where man's soul is interestingly in question. This is the role 
played by Mankind, by Youth in The Interlude of Youth, and by Humanity in f 
Four Elements, among others. In the early fifteenth century poem The Assembly of 
, the human soul 
is represented as a battleground: the field of Macrocosmos. 21 
If that battleground has now, in the mid-sixteenth century, become the whole of 
society, secularization of morality is the result. Thus it seems that Courage's usage 
of the word 'tide' has slipped, away from one in which greed was merely the tool 
he used to lure people to hell, towards one in which financial gain or financial ruin 
are the ultimate stakes. 
With the arrival of the maid Wilful Wantonness, Courage slips into yet 
another interpretation of the 'tide'. Wantonness is suffering from intense sexual 
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frustration, and wishes to soothe this state by rushing into marriage with anyone 
who will have her. Clearly, encouraging her to persevere with this intention 
involves two areas of spiritual danger: rebellion against parental authority and a 
misuse of the sacrament of marriage. In this case the tide which Courage asserts 
will not wait is youth. Wilful Wanton finds her match in Wastefulness, whose soul 
is endangered by a morality which only considers pleasure, and who sees anxiety 
about old age in purely financial terms. 
Courage approaches this situation first by exploiting the young people's fear 
of aging, in order to incite them to a rash marriage. 
Now arte thou youthful!, thy felfe to prefere, 
And thy youthful! bewty, mens heartes may Itere, 
But youthful! bewty will not alwayes last 
The Tyde taryeth no man, but soone it is past. 
Therefore to wedding, yee thou make hafte, 
For now much time thou doejt loose in waste. 
(D ii v) 
However, he seems to have less than total confidence that this will be sufficiently 
destructive of their already shaky morality, for he soon slips back into his old stress 
on money, persuading Wastefulness to spend his fortune, on the grounds that he 
will enjoy it more while he is young. 
Take time while time is, for time will away: 
The niggard is neuer counted a man. 
(E iii) 
Like the Courtier, Wastefulness is not so much vicious as foolish, and Courage has 
merely encompassed his financial ruin. 
Neither the Prologue nor Courage is clear what kind of tide they refer to, 
then. Both are inclined to begin with an interpretation based on the traditional 
Christian death-centred morality of an earlier day, and both slip towards social 
interpretations. This terminological slippage around 'tide' points to a conceptual 
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slippage central to the play. 
The play purports to assert a Christian, or other worldly basis for morality. 
It is explicit about this in establishing Christianity and Faithful Few as the virtuous 
side of the conflict. 22 Already in the Prologue, however, this is questioned by a 
more secular interpretation. It seems that what is wrong with excessive self-interest 
is that it gets a town a bad name: 
Yet the fact of this one, the others good name doth Spill, 
And thus a reproch to his own towne ingendreth 
And the good name of the whole town he hindereth 
(A ii) 
The Prologue, then, is opposing the individual's worldly advancement to the town's 
equally worldly reputation. The complaint appears to be not that they do harm to 
themselves, but that they harm 'their own countrey'. This theme is pursued and 
repeated through fourteen lines of verse, whose overall tone is one of conventional 
complaint on the ills of society: 
The S, ymple ones commonly, by f uch are oppreSt 
For they nothing way, any needy mans cafe 
(A ii) 
Only after seven stanzas is there any hint that this is not to be a wholly secular play. 
There is time to aske grace, this may not be denyed 
Of thy Jinfull life Jo greatly abused 
(A ii v) 
The virtuous characters in the play are constructed in the same identification of 
secular and spiritual status. The Courtier is accepted as a good person. No doubt 
there are tactical issues involved here: the playwright seems afraid the character 
may give offence. However, the Courtier's virtue is once again a very secular one - 
his other name is Willing to Win Worship, and this is the source of his downfall as 
well as of his repectability. Even Faithful Few subscribes to the social definition of 
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evil, discernible in the terms with which he upbraids Greediness: 
Thou arte a ChriStyan with a canckered heart 
And the cause of reproch to a whole citty 
(F iiii) 
The rhythm of the verse form here reinforces a shocked emphasis on the second, 
secular line, at the expense of the Christian condemnation. 
The Prologue is, perhaps, entitled to assume that his audience is alert to a 
connection accepted in sixteenth century theological teachings between the private 
virtue of individuals and public opinion of them. 
23 Because the Prologue takes that 
for granted, we are left puzzling over the validity of social opinion as a moral 
sanction in a system where the World is usually identical with evil. 24 
The play's inbuilt confusion between a religious and a social definition of 
good is matched by a similar confusion about evil. At some points it is suggested 
that evil involves a neglect of one's individual soul. This is particularly clear when 
Greediness hesitates over his conversation with the preacher, and again in the tone 
of outrage the play attaches to his having the debtor arrested at St. Paul's Cross. 
Evil is also seen as victimisation. The maltreatment of the Tenant, and his 
moving lament are reminiscent of the maltreatment of such virtuous figures in 
earlier moral plays as Pity in Hickscorn er and Mercy in Mankind. The Tenant, by 
taking on the dramatic function of these allegorical virtues, further exemplifies the 
secularization taking place in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man. To a lesser extent, the 
Courtier, Wastefulness and the Debtor are also victims in this mode. There is even 
a mournful, defeated quality about Christianity, which aligns him with that group. 
However, the effect of this is not to allegorize the victims. Instead, sharing their 
tone stresses Christianity's dependance on society for success, as does his weakness 
as long as the faithful are few in number. 
The play's predominant view of un-Christian behaviour is a very materialist 
one, and in this the apparent opposition between the spiritual and the material is 
conflated into one between a variety of materialisms. 
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In considering the play's interpretations of the proverb, one must notice the 
image which Courage's first monologue plays on. His list of the people who are to 
board the ship for Hell raises the great image of the Ship of Fools. Barclay's free 
translation into English (1509)25 of the immensely popular Narrenschiff by Brant 
(1494) describes at great length each of the huge variety of fools who are to be 
loaded onto the ship. This substantial work is further enlarged by the inclusion of a 
category of additional follies at the end, and one of its principal effects is an 
impression of eternity. The Ship is always about to set sail; it is always very nearly 
full. Urgency to get on board is really merely another aspect of folly, as it is never 
too late to damn oneself. The omnipresence of damnation is also part of The Tyde 
Tarrieth No Man. Although Courage traffics in the need for haste expressed in the 
title, and even seems to believe in it himself, it is a wholly spurious need. The 
people he manipulates can turn to evil at any time in the course of the multitude of 
opportunities that the play offers. 
The same is true of good. Christianity, though varying in strength, is a 
presence in the play from the point when the Tenant appeals for him. When 
Wastefulness despairs, Faithful Few is instantly at hand to lead him away from his 
suicidal ideas. However, the play concludes with two suicides: that of Greediness is 
achieved but that attempted by Wastefulness is prevented by Faithful Few. In this 
scene, Faithful Few suggests the presence of eternity. He holds mutability in check 
by establishing a litany of repetitions, in which Wastefulness willingly joins. This 
is the price of his freedom from Courage's urgency. When Faithful Few adopts the 
term 'tide', it is not a re-interpretation, but a metaphysical irony. 
So Shalt thou enioy the Tide of his grace 
(G ii v) 
The tide evoked here is clearly not Courage's varying, panicky ebb and flow, but a 
state of perpetual flood, impossible in nature. 
The superhuman quality of evil has been noticed in Courage's speech of 
mourning for Greediness. The closing lines of the play explicitly raise the image of 
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Heaven as a continuous state: 
So Shall they be jure of a resting place, 
In Heaven where reigneth all ioy and blisse 
(G iiii v) 
That statement of certainty is possible because Courage has been banished, and in 
its bland confidence gives the impression that the Prologue's intention to establish a 
virtuous interpretation of the title has been carried through. However, the existence 
of an eternal Heaven and an equally eternal temptation to Hell means that neither an 
evil nor a good reading of the proverb can be established in the context of on-going 
human life. A person leading a wicked life may repent at any moment, while good 
may as easily fall. Two incompatible kinds of time interact here: eternity and the 
human life-span. Thus, to read virtue, for example, as equivalent to a lived 
moment of the life-span and so as irretrievable once past, is to confuse the two 
varieties of time. It is only at the moment of death that interpretation can be fixed 
either way, and then only for a given individual. For the individual, chance often 
determines which state he or she is in at the moment of death, and one might 
imagine that this would stimulate a prudent person to be as consistently virtuous as 
possible. Such a cynical approach might itself be seen as morally dangerous, 
particularly in that reverse form in which self-seeking was used throughout life, 
with the intention of death-bed repentance, to take care of the future. For the 
person in the midst of life, only a sincere, moment-by-moment approach was 
acceptable. 
From this perception one can next move to see that the play's project of 
seeking to establish a single, final truth is subverted by its recognition of the eternal 
nature of both evil and good. Even in the transcendent, extra-temporal world which 
supplies the touchstone for the 'meanings' of the proverb, truth is not single but 
double. 
An observer, then, rather than a mankind figure, finds two terms existing in 
a perpetual opposition, and where there are two terms and an external observer, 
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there is a three-term structure. The circumstance of the moral play constructs such 
an opposition from its form as theatre, in which good and evil is displayed before 
the audience: an observer who inhabits the 'space between', and whose existence 
can deny the implied polarity. 
The same triadic structure has been invoked at an earlier point in the play, 
when Faithful Few has defeated the vice figures by referring their dispute to 
external arbitration. That external phenomenon is itself linguistic, for it is 
constituted by Faithful's ability to talk Christianity round; to argue with Greediness 
on his own terms; and finally to take control of the dramatic arena with his own 
voice. When Courage and Greediness leave the stage, they leave Faithful still 
talking, still explaining his position. His control of the moral arena is manifested in 
his ability to cope with despair, when he saves Wastefulness from suicide. He 
achieves this by imposing his language on Wastefulness, who is a character very 
close to the traditional moral play's figure of humanity. 
They both kneele, and Wajtfull fayeth after Faythfull, 
F. Well follow mee and I will conduct thee. 
Oh heavenly Father, pardon my offence 
W. Oh heavenly father, pardon my offence 
F. And graunt that thy mercy may to me 
repayre. 
(G ii) 
In this manner, Wastefulness repeats Faithful's words line by line through four 
sentences, which drive away the 'ougly shape' (G i v) of the monster Dispayre. 
Thus the 'outside' of language and meaning is still also language, and there is no 
'transcendental referent'. Though the Prologue attempts to establish a single supra- 
linguistic transcendental 'truth', the play cannot help showing that even that must be 
contained within a structure, and is part of a sign-system. 
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SECTION B: OTHERNESS IN PLAYS OF THE 1560's-70's 
In this section I analyse a complex further process taking place in The Tyde 
Tarrieth No Man, to act as a convenient foundation on which to base discussions of 
the changes which took place in the moral play in the 1560's and 1570's. 
Approaching these changes through a discussion of subject and other identifies a 
previously unnoticed transition and casts new light on a rather well-known one. 
The process in question, involving the proliferation of mankind figures, is 
sometimes seen as the bifurcation of the mankind figure. 26 It appears that, 
wherever the mankind figure is multiplied into more than one character, at least one 
of those is assimilated to the vice-crew. 27 Here it seems that the opposition of 
subject/other has been almost completely abolished. 
28 This operation may leave the 
play entirely without any representation whatsoever of generalized humanity. This 
will prove to be the case in Like Will To Like (1568)29 where the representative of 
virtuous life, like Heavenly Man in Sough is as Good as a Feast (c. 1565-70)30 
behaves as one of the virtues rather than as a mankind figure. 
31 When the stage is 
dominated by the full-blown vice-play and the mankind figure has become cynical 
and evil, the original mankind figure is overwhelmed, together with his story. Only 
forms of otherness are represented, and a different kind of dramatic structure has 
been initiated. 32 Thus the development of vice play is significant for theatre 
history, but it develops in this way because of the nature of language. As a term in 
a semiotic structure, vice play is bound to take on a wider and more varied load of 
implications: it has a tendency to ramify because it participates in the play of 
signifiers. Psychoanalysis, too, gives clarification here, for, as the representatives 
of the repressed, the vices are ebulliently inclined to 'return', like the physical 
symptoms of neurosis, in an endless collection of mutations. Linguistic theory can 
explain the changes in the moral play, but what do these changes imply for the 
theories that the plays put forward? The relatively simple other of the earlier moral 
play develops in such a way as to become complex and then all-engrossing. In one 
sense, then, the plays offer a theory of meaning as multiply ambiguous: as both 
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playful and to be played with. The 'satire on the times' mode, however, also 
describes nothing more than another totalizing system: one in which unrelieved 
greed rules. 
When the changes in the moral play in the 1560's and 70's are analysed in 
terms of the growing emphasis on vice-play, loss of that polarity in which the 
meaning of the moral play had been constituted is found to result. 33 That clear 
meaning generated in the early moral plays by the persuasively binarist view of the 
world succumbs to multiplicity of interpretation. Both Enough is as Good as .A 
and Like Will To Like display significant changes in the mankind figure, and 
related changes in the status of the vice-play. 
It will be clear that these readings are based on a view of the plots of the 
plays as examples of discourse, and so as subject to the kinds of descriptions that 
are applicable to language. From this, the relation between vice play and narrative 
structure can be read as parallel to the relation between playful and logocentric 
forces within discourse. 34 
In the case of The Tyde Tarrieth No Man, we have seen meaning asserting 
itself to be multiple, through the wide variety of interpretations of the proverb. I 
have suggested that the pattern of the moral play acts as a signifying code in its own 
right, in which the vice-figures are signifiers pointing at otherness, while the 
mankind figure is a signifier pointing at the idea of the unitary self. In this 
circumstance of subverted meaning, what becomes of that conventional division 
between the mankind figure and the vice-figure/other which we have observed the 
moral play striving so hard to establish? The answer is interesting, for it supplies a 
key to interpreting several contemporary plays, in addition to The Tyde Tarrieth No 
M1. 
With signification now an issue, we find that the original oppositions of the 
code itself are no longer stable. The signifier 'mankind figure' slides radically 
35 under the transforming effects of vice-characteristics. In The Tyde Tarrieth No 
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Man there are several candidates for the position of mankind figure and this in itself 
is an important circumstance to which I shall return. 
The case of the merchant, Greediness is particularly interesting, for there is 
a slippage of labels in which the normal structure of the moral play is questioned by 
the growing tendency of otherness to apppropriate the stage. We first meet 
Greediness when he is in a precarious state, largely given over to evil, but still 
capable of a twinge of conscience. At this point he most resembles such mankind 
figures as Youth, the King in Pride of Life, and Humanum Genus in The Castle of 
Perseveraunce, whose nature it is to appear in a condition of redeemable error. 
Like many mankind figures, Greediness has a vice figure, Fayned Furtherance, as 
his servant. 
It was my chaunce with a preacher to meete 
Whole company to haue I did not deny, 
(B ii - Biiv) 
At this point he is an ordinary human in the social world. When lectured by the 
preacher he experiences a sense of guilt and even uses the pious idea of confession 
in referring to his feelings. 
His talke I confe f ce my conscience did nip, 
(B ii v) 
However, Greediness' reaction is to avoid discomfort by crossing the road and 
leaving the preacher. 
But fodenly I gaue him the flip 
And crojsed the way to the other Jyde 
(B ii v) 
Though Greediness has made a moral mistake here, he still does not seek bad 
company, but happens on it. 
So alone I let may$ter Preacher walke, 
And here by chaunce I ftombled in. 
(B ii v) 
170 
In the polarized view of the moral play, the 'waye' has only two sides, and when 
Greediness crosses to the side away from the preacher, he inevitably approaches 
evil. His perception that he has met Courage by chance is false, for we have seen 
that a vice figure's ubiquity makes him immediately available to those who, like 
Greediness, take a false step. 
So far, Greediness has behaved like any other mankind figure. Indeed, he 
continues to consider repentance and a moral life twenty-two lines later: 
Yea but truely his wordes did my confcience prick, 
Of me he did fo vnhappely gejje 
I promife thee he touched me vnto the quick, 
For that in gayning I vied exce$ e. 
My conscience doth tell me, I haue done ami j je, 
And of long time I haue gone ajtray 
And a thousand witnejjes the con jcience is, 
As Salust in mojte playne wordes doth jay 
(B iii) 
He thus demonstrates an educated background and an ability to argue from 
authority. But using a classical author leads him into evil, for he can also cite 
counter-arguments (by 'Hyemes'36) which support Courage's viewpoint (V6). 37 
This is a potential danger, for it is an aspect of the vice figures' skill in argument 
that they can cite supportive authorities from classical texts, and even from the 
Bible. However, it is no more than a straw in the wind at this point, for such 
quotations may be used freely by virtuous characters as well. In Greediness' 
situation, neither argument has ultimate moral authority. Courage manipulates the 
polarized picture of the world to persuade Greediness, for he claims the opposite of 
greed to be poverty, designating the taking of excessive profits as prudent 
behaviour. Even the simplest of audiences could see that he has elided various 
versions of the middle way. 
In the course of the play Greediness moves further and further towards evil. 
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When next he speaks with Courage, we find that his charity towards the Tenant has 
been eroded by money (C2). However, he still tries to see himself as guiltless in 
the matter, for he has not exactly evicted the Tenant himself, but has passed over 
responsibility to the new landlord, No Good Neighbourhood. 
But I with that matter haue naught to doe, 
Let them two now for that agree: 
(C iiii r) 
By the time he has ruined the Courtier, Greediness can no longer understand a 
preacher's words. 
For that goeth out whereas it comes in, 
(E ii v) 
Instead, as we have seen, he uses a pious occasion to have his debtor arrested. 
In this sense, Greediness is Courage's greatest success: a human being 
whose soul has been lost through greed. 
However, this movement is obscured by his assimilation into the crew of 
minor vice figures, who are scarcely responsible for their behaviour in any human 
way, evil being the foundation of their dramatic existence. In moving away from 
grace, Greediness becomes something other than an erring human being, and begins 
to function on a structural level as a vice figure. It is noteworthy that, in addition 
to being ubiquitous and grasping, Greediness has gone over entirely to money- 
lending in the course of the action (P, 1Y). Where originally he was a merchant with 
'wares' that might deteriorate (B ii v), his various deals have left him as one who 
lives 'by the fruits of other men's toiling', as Faithful Few puts it. When he finally 
dies, he is accorded the same status as a major vice figure: his immortal, allegorical 
function has now fully superseded any earlier humanity: 38 
Why foole, Greedine ffe will neuer dye 
So long as couetous people do liue: 
(G iii) 
Courage reasons with himself over the true interpretation of Greediness's life and 
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death. The passage in which this occurs is extraordinary for its sense of a divided 
self in Courage. At first it appears that some sort of printer's error has omitted 
stage directions for a second character, to whom Courage might be talking. In fact, 
there is unmistakably no-one else on stage, since all other characters have departed, 
and Courage has entered alone. Courage's struggle to establish the proper meaning 
of Greediness's death is therefore a struggle to fix interpretation. However, the 
options are between an emotional interpretation (Greediness is a friend) and an 
allegorical one (Greediness is an attribute of the human race) and so cannot be 
resolved. Interrupted by the entry of Authority and Faithful Few, Courage reaches 
no conclusion, and Greediness's ultimate status is left in perpetual doubt. Courage 
ultimately hovers, undecided whether to interpret his play as a humanist document 
or as a moral play. 
In Greediness, then, the polarisation of subject/other is subverted, but only 
up to a point. Insofar as 'Greedine%e will neuer die', the polarisation is sustained, 
for Greediness has merely moved to the other side of the opposition. But insofar as 
judgment is suspended, the opposition of mankind figure/vice figure no longer 
exists in its old form. 
Indeed, the play has no single, obvious mankind figure of the traditional 
style. Although Greediness initially reveals some human characteristics, he is not 
the only possible mankind figure in the play, nor even the most obvious. All the 
following, as ordinary mortals, have some right to be considered for the position: 
the Courtier, the Tenant, the Debtor, Wilful Wantonness, and Wastefulness. 
Structurally, though, the Tenant gravitates towards the virtues, through his 
resemblance to Mercy, Pity, and similar figures who lament the times. The Debtor, 
too, is pure victim, only existing to demonstrate the depth of evil to which 
Greediness has fallen. 39 Wastefulness and his wife, Wilful Wanton, show several 
traditional mankind figure traits. They fall into evil through sins of the flesh 
committed in youth. It is significant that Wastefulness is reformed by his ability to 
identify himself with the paternal linguistic code. In my opinion, one may assume 
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that Wilful Wantonness will follow his example. 
However, the overwhelming impression left by the play is of an abounding 
multiplicity of allegorical representatives of humanity in one form or another. 
Typicality is lost in the statement of social variety, of the differing fates of 
individuals, and of the differing sins which must be on offer if everyone is to be 
tempted. 
Several results of this splitting of the mankind figure can be seen more 
clearly in two further plays, also from the period of The Tyde Tarrieth No Man. 
These are Enough is as Good as a Feast and Like Will To Like. It is critical 
orthodoxy that Enough is Good as a Feast contains a divided mankind figure, and 
certainly there are two figures who at first glance seem to be part of the remains of 
the mankind figure: Worldly Man and Heavenly Man. Not only is this 
interpretation an inaccurate reading of the relationship between Worldly Man and 
Heavenly Man, it leads one to misread the significance of Worldly Man's fall at the 
conclusion of the play. Heavenly Man is never the object of the vice figures' 
attacks by temptation, and his spiritual fate is never in doubt. He functions instead 
as a member of the team of virtuous advisers who are wrestling with evil for the 
soul of Worldly Man. For these reasons, one cannot see Heavenly Man as related 
to the mankind figure in anything but name. Worldly Man, on the other hand, is 
much more like any earlier mankind figure, beginning conventionally enough in a 
worldly state of wealth. He is soon reformed by the combined arguments of 
Heavenly Man and Contentation, who re-channel his concern to provide for his old 
age into a concern for his future after death. He is then tricked and persuaded into 
accepting the company of Covetous and his crew. However, once this has 
happened, Worldly Man's condition rapidly descends into extreme evil: 
------------he 
taketh on like the devil of hell 
There was never one so hasty cruel and fell 
(1.1008-9) (V 13). 
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He acquires the specific characteristics of a principal Vice, laughing uncontrollably 
at his own power (M5): 
Ha, ha, ha! I must laugh, so God me save, 
To see what a lot of suitors nowadays we have 
(1.1157-8) 
9 
Covetous, the chief vice figure, promises him a kind of universality (P, ): 
You shall have all the world to sue you shortly 
(1.1160) 
Worldly Man's speech of gloating over his possessions recalls Mundus' self- 
introduction in Mundus & Infans: 
---------how glorious my buildings do shine! 
No gentleman's in this country like unto mine! 
(1.1165-6) 
There is even a suggestion that he has developed that curious physical feature 
common to vice figures, devils and usurers on the Renaissance stage, a prominent 
nose (P 
--it is not meet that such a beggar as he 
Should dwell so near under the nose of me 
(1.1178) 
The hint is amplified after Worldly Man is dead, when Satan informs us that he has 
r 
been a usurer in secret (PH). In this way Worldly Man gradually becomes more 
'worldly' than 'man'. World, of course, is one member of that sinister trio World, 
Flesh and Devil, all of whom are intimately related to the vice figures (V 13). 
It seems, then, that this is a play from which the mankind figure has 
vanished, and which deals solely in a binary opposition between good and evil. In 
this case, though, there is no permanent assimilation of the mankind figure to the 
vice figures. Covetous must work hard at interposing his own voice (V6) to prevent 
Worldly Man from registering that there is hope in the Physician's message of 
imminent death-40 Worldly Man's deathbed scene has rightly been described as 
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moving, because one feels that he misses a genuine chance of salvation by a hair's 
breadth. 41 His capacity to elicit a sympathetic response from the audience indicates 
that he cannot, finally, be seen as a vice figure. One must class Enough is as Good 
as a Feast with the earlier form of the moral play. 
By contrast, Like Will To Like multiplies mankind figures on a rather 
different principle. In order to demonstrate the truth of its title, it creates duplicates 
of its sinning individuals rather than a variety of characters. Following that 
principle means that there is no reason why the mankind figure should not be 
multiplied indefinitely. This potential for infinite division locates Like Will To 
jig as the limiting case of the division of mankind figures. 
Curiously, the feature of Like Will To Like that most immediately strikes 
the reader is that it threatens to be an astoundingly boring play. The first problem 
lies in choosing to apply the proverb-play mode to this particular old saw. The 
proverb asserts that people of a similar moral status will seek one another out and 
become friends. By the same token, they will reject the company of those who are 
either more wicked or more virtuous than themselves. The principal Vice, Nichol 
Newfangle, explains this on several occasions: 
For the virtuous will always virtuous company seek out 
A gentleman never seeketh the company of a lout, 
And roisters and ruffians do sober company eschew: 
For like will ever to like, this is most true 
(1.305-8) 
The complete title of the play is Like Will To Like Ouod the Devil to the Collier. 
Coal in general, and hence the collier, were reckoned to have a special relationship 
with the devil, so the two are supposed to be an example of the proverb. The 
proverb is even uttered by one of the figures it refers to. That is, the devil is 
claiming the collier as one of this own, and his remark is self-referentially ironic. 
Combining the need imposed by the title to show the duplication of similar kinds of 
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sinner, with the cyclic form of the proverb-play risks excessive repetition of 
characters and circumstances. This indeed takes place. 
A second element which threatens tedium is that there are only two jokes in 
Like Will To Like, both amply signalled in advance and both mildly sadistic. The 
first is the 'drunken grotesque' joke: that it is funny to see people falling over and 
stumbling in their speech due to drunkenness. The second is 'the sting': the idea 
that it is funny to see people's expectations fraudulently raised and then destroyed. 
In this case the expectation is one of coming into an inheritance of land, while the 
audience shares with the principal vice figure, Nichol Newfangle, the knowledge 
that the land in question must be the gallows, or possibly penury. 
Finally, a certain inexpert flatness in the writing signals a deeper problem. 
Language is impoverished in this play, and little debate takes place between the 
virtuous and vicious characters. It seems unlikely that either side could handle such 
sophistication. No-one fights to redeem the souls of the sinners, nor are there the 
related efforts to work with metaphoric usages, such as those remarked in Mankind 
and other plays. 
Briefly, the action of the play (one cannot call such a loose construction a 
plot) is as follows: - After an opening Prologue and some warming-up teasing of the 
audience by the principal vice figure, Lucifer appears and sets him the task of 
bringing similar people together. Tom Collier, a dishonest coal-dealer, enters. He 
dances and sings with the Devil and Nichol Newfangle, accompanied on a gittern. 
Tom and the Devil are deemed to be an appropriate pair, further evidence for which 
is derived from a pun on their singing skills, since to 'agree' is to produce pleasing 
harmonies: 
A ha, marry, this is trim singing; 
I had not thought the Devil to be so cunning, 
And by the mass Tom Collier as good as he: 
I see that like with like will ever agree. 
(1.189-92) 
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Next the drunkards Tom Tosspot and Rafe Roister are brought together. Both of 
these are knaves and vain young-men-about-town, who lead others into evil 
company. Nichol Newfangle then sets up a mock court, in the course of which he 
beats Rafe Roister and Tom Tosspot, raging immoderately. He then promises a 
patrimony to 'the falsest thief of you both by my father's will' (1.383). 42 They are 
delighted. 
Hance enters, drinking; his oath-filled speech is slurred into a stammer: 
Be go go Gog's nowns ch ch cha drunk zo zo much today 
That be be mass ch cham a most drunk ich da da dare zay 
(1.451-2) 
It seems he was a student, but has been corrupted by Tom Tosspot, whom he now 
calls 'captain' (1.454). He is incapable of finding his way home: 
Bi bi bid Philip Fleming cu cu come hither to me 
Vo vo vor he must lead me home now ich do zee 
(1.465-6) 
Rafe Roister now departs, leaving the others making fun of Hance until Philip 
Fleming, another drunkard, arrives. Both Philip and Hance have enormous bellies 
from drinking beer. It seems from their names that they are intended to be Dutch, 
though Hance's 'foreign' accent has strong rural overtones. As they leave, Nichol 
Newfangle identifies the three of them as 'mates now matched together' (1.564). 
Nichol, now alone on stage, explains the joke about the inheritance to the audience, 
thus also filling in time while costumes are changed so that Cutbert Cutpurse and 
Pierce Pickpurse can enter. These two, unsurprisingly, are thieves and they 
proceed to boast of their skill. Nichol describes them as 'sworn brothers in every 
booty' and offers them the 'Land of the Two-legged Mare' (1.645). This is a 
common euphemism for the gallows which it is rather surprising that they do not 
comprehend. (Their failure to be able to 'read' his meaning images the moral 
incomprehension that wrongdoers in the moral plays habitually harbour. They 
appear not to understand that sanctions may really apply to them. ) They, too, are 
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planning to go drinking, when Virtuous Living enters, praising virtue at length. He 
rejects Nichol Newfangle's claims of friendship, and all agree that this is reasonable 
because it accords with the keynote of the play, the proverb 'like will to like', the 
idea that morally unequal people will not tolerate one another's company. Nichol 
Newfangle, Hance and Philip Fleming sing together and then leave, having repeated 
their intention of getting drunk. 
Virtuous Living, now alone, muses on the relation of man to God, 
concluding that honour in the world is an important aspect of this. Appositely, 
Good Fame now enters, sent by God's Promise to be a permanent companion to 
Virtuous Life: he is thus in a sense another example of 'like will to like'. However 
in this case Good Fame is scarcely human - he is a condition naturally associated 
with Virtuous Life, and he has no dramatic function other than mere existence. The 
same is true of God's Promise and Honour, who join them and enthrone Virtuous 
Life in the seat of honour, with a symbolic sword and crown. Once this tableau is 
achieved, Good Fame leaves and the other three sing a holy song before leaving 
also. 43 
Nichol Newfangle comes in, crying his wares in the style of a pedlar. He is 
pretending to sell the equipment for a beggar, and two hangman's nooses. He 
explains that these constitute the inheritance he has promised. Tom Tosspot and 
Rafe Roister explain that they have gambled away their possessions, and when they 
turn to Nichol Newfangle for help he gives them the implements of beggary. They 
respond by beating him, but have to accept their fate. Aided by the Judge 
(Severity), Nichol next despatches Cutbert Cutpurse and Pierce Pickpurse, in the 
care of Hankin Hangman, to their execution. Nichol Newfangle gloats over this 
conclusion, before riding off to Hell on the Devil's back. Finally, Virtuous Living 
and Honour return to extol virtue. In the context, virtue apparently consists of the 
rather easy task of avoiding the company of thieves and drunkards. Furthermore, 
virtue and vice are pre-ordained conditions, not subject to alteration through 
persuasion or reformation. Good Fame joins the virtuous figures in a prayer and 
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there is a closing song on the 'like to like' theme. 
What, we may wonder, has become of the role of the mankind figure 
amongst this collection of characters? Several are likely candidates, based on the 
model of the mankind figure as someone who lives in the world and is subject to 
temptation by an external figure to behave well or ill. The choice that he makes 
will determine the future of his soul after death. 44 In the terms established earlier, 
the mankind figure must learn to use language, in the sense that he must learn to 
interpret the signs of wickedness. We have seen that in other plays, the mankind 
figure ends by locating himself within the sign system as an indicator of virtue. 
The characters indicated by these criteria are Tom Collier, Tom Tosspot, 
Rafe Roister, Hance, Philip Fleming and Virtuous Living. 45 In a conventionally- 
structured moral play, these are the characters who would show indications of 
repentance, and whose fall would at some stage be shown to be the result of 
temptation. The mankind figure appears to have been divided into a virtuous and a 
vicious part, and the latter, it seems, is diversified into five separate roles. In the 
dramatic context which the discussion of the vice-convention has made clear, these 
apparent mankind figures can now be seen to have adopted so many vice- 
characteristics that their stage image can no longer be interpreted as representing the 
ordinary human being. To a later dramatist, the presence of this kind of a range of 
characters could lead into a comedy of humours, or even to a realistic representation 
of city life. To the writer of a moral play, it is an opportunity for reiteration. 
It has been suggested that Virtuous Living is a mankind figure. 46 However, 
there are reasons why Virtuous Living cannot be seen in this role. Firstly, he is 
never tempted to do wrong. Although Nichol Newfangle accosts Virtuous Living at 
one point, 47 his attempts at concealing his true nature as a vice figure fail from the 
start, and Virtuous Living recognizes that he is an unsuitable companion. Virtuous 
Living has thus always known how to read the moral sign system. Because he is 
never tempted, he can never be in danger of falling, and that is an essential to the 
condition of humanity. Here, the need to keep to the founding proverb means that 
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Virtuous Living can only be an emblem, not an allegory. He is enthroned as a 
stage symbol of virtue at lines 847-851. Preaching to the audience, he speaks in the 
tones of Christ addressing a humanity from which he is excluded: 
Oh man, what meanest thou with thy Saviour to fight? 
Come unto him for he is full of mercy 
(1.815-16) 
The passage continues in this vein for a further thirteen lines. 
Virtuous Living's arguments are strange. He asserts that evil need not even 
try to tempt the virtuous, for they are protected by God. He appears to ignore the 
impact that vice has had on the numerous characters that have dominated the stage 
before his entry. His argument also seeks to explain this play's lack of any of the 
tension that had traditionally surrounded the mankind figure of the moral plays and 
his decisions about conduct. Instead, Virtuous Living will 'tempt' the evil ones to 
reform via threats and blandishments, but with no success. Virtuous Living is not 
just boring, he is also rather stupid. The argument that one need not praise virtue 
as it will automatically be praised (1.791 ff) is especially hollow. Renown depends 
on people like himself, so the act of praising must occur if this good thing, renown, 
is to arise. On the other hand, he has in fact been praising virtue himself, but we 
must deem him incapable of realising why he was doing so. 
With regard to the other pretenders to the role of mankind figure, the 
problem is clearly that too many of the characters behave similarly. The idea that 
we are offered a vision of society at large cannot be sustained because the possible 
mankind figures are all petty miscreants and drunks of very similar social origin. 
48 
They are very slightly distinguished from one another by the fact that two are 
outright thieves, one is a fraudulent dealer, and two are incompetent gamblers and 
corrupters of youth. The dramatic effect of multiplying a single aspect of the old 
mankind figure's behaviour over several characters is to repeat the scene in which 
he roisters in bad company over and over again, instead of showing a single 
individual undergoing changes. The resulting repetitiousness of plot is a problem 
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for this play. 
These figures, although they appear to derive from the mankind figure, in 
fact all gravitate toward the condition of vice figure. They take on several of the 
prominent characteristics of the vice figures. Visually, they are grotesques. Tom 
Collier's face is almost certainly 'blacked up' to match the Devil's (P14). Tom 
Tosspot and Rafe Roister begin by wearing ridiculously modish finery (P12), 
reminiscent of New Guise, Nought and Nowadays from Mankind, only to appear in 
extreme need in their last scene. When Tom Tosspot is presented as a captain who 
recruits people to his service, there is a tinge of the vice-feature of universality to 
his boast that his followers would fill Salisbury Plain. If everyone who is a 
drunkard is his servant, he stands as an allegorical figure of drunkenness in all but 
name (P3). His status here is comparable with that given to Greediness in the 
speech already referred to in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man: 'fool, Greedine e will 
neuer die - -'. Hance and Philip Fleming wear huge false bellies (P14), which 
Nichol Newfangle refers to on numerous occasions as denoting their chronic 
drunkenness (P3). Hance indulges in a reduced version of the principal vice 
figure's traditional monologue when he tells a nonsense story of an impossible 
voyage (V12). In this case, though, it is presented as a dream. 
Methought ich was drowned in a barrel of beer, 
And by and by the barrel was turned to a ship 
Which, methought, the wind made lively to skip; 
And ich did sail therein from Flanders to France. 
0.553-6). 
The tendency of all of these five to collect in groups (P1), to fight (P2), to drink 
and to sing and dance (M1) all key into that non-verbal sign system which identifies 
them with the vice-crews we have observed in other plays. To some extent they are 
shown as separate from the principal Vice, for he is pleased to punish them and 
trick them (C 1). The nature of that trick hints at another aspect of the vice figures 
noticed already: that they are set up as sacrificial victims. Presenting them as other 
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rationalises the glee that the audience can then take in their eventual punishment and 
humiliation. This, however, can be seen as a version of the conventional 
relationship in which the principal Vice dominates his crew of sub-vices by beatings 
and through his superior intelligence (Cl). Tom and Rafe, that unruly crew, 
eventually turn on Nichol Newfangle and beat him (S. D., 1.1031; S. D., 1.1038). 
On a verbal level, they are signalled as outsiders by foreign or otherwise strange 
accents (a version of the grotesqueness of P14, but also frequent in stock 'country 
bumpkin' characters who are not vice figures). Tom Collier speaks in a rural 
dialect, Hance in stereotypical 'Dutch'. Nichol Newfangle also claims foreign 
origins (1.253; 256) (V 12). Their swearing (V7) and discussions of hanging (V3) 
also locate this group as vice-crew. Tom and Rafe are finally turned out to wander 
the world as beggars, thus acquiring the vice-features of masterlessness (P 11) and of 
travelling (V 12). Cuthert and Pierce approach a more human condition when it 
seems they are actually about to be hanged. Hanging and the fear of hanging is of 
course a stock theme of the vice figures (V3). Pierce's closing remarks could be 
taken as repentance, but it seems more probable that they should be read not as a 
literal act of contrition, but as a plan (C6) to escape being damned for one's evil life 
by uttering a last-minute repentance at a well-chosen moment. Such an intention 
was itself, of course, a considerable sin. 
And though our lives have licentiously been spent, 
Yet at the last to God let us call, 
For he heareth such as are ready to repent, 
And desireth not that sinners should fall. 
Now are we ready to suffer, come when it shall 
(1.1151-5) 
These five characters are not so much a group as a single entity. In the 
terms of the old moral play plot they share a single function. In order to match like 
with like, the plot creates a double for each of its vice figures. In the case of Tom 
Tosspot and Rafe Roister, the double is an exact copy. Both are old friends of 
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Nichol Newfangle, both swear intensively, both are described as 'knave' and their 
speeches are indistinguishable. Properly for a copy, Rafe is the weaker partner, for 
he is characterized in a less detailed way and speaks less often. When Tom analyses 
the situation of being caught in one's own trap by drawing an analogy with the bull 
of Phalaris, Rafe offers an equally authoritative comparison with Haman. Rafe may 
even have been called into being by the wish for a double that Tom has expressed: 
Similis similem sibi quaerit; such a one do I seek 
As unto myself in every condition is like 
(1.241-2) 
The incantatory Latin, uttered in Nichol's presence, begins a conjuring relationship. 
Initially neither of them has recognised the other. Once Nichol Newfangle has 
given his name, Tom Tosspot knows him as an old acquaintance. It is, of course, 
the signification of the allegory that he recognizes, rather than the individual who 
bears the name. Nichol has to 'know' Tom in a special sense. He describes 
remembering Tom as taking him into his mind: 
Tom Tosspot? Sancti amen, how you were out of my mind 
(1.255) 
By knowing his name and recognizing him, he also knows his moral condition. 
And seeing that thou wouldst a mate so fain have 
I will join thee with one that shall be as very a knave 
As thou art thyself, thou may'st believe me 
(1.265-267) 
This relationship results in the entrance of Rafe Roister, five lines later. Rafe 
arrives 'in pudding time', that is, with perfect timing, on the reiteration of the 'like 
will to like' proverb. Such an entrance, pat on cue, again resembles the calling up 
of a supernatural figure. In this case, Rafe's pallidity as a character yields a slightly 
anti-climactic quality. The dramatic effect lies not in his interest as a character, but 
in his extraordinary resemblance to Tom Tosspot. 
Beyond the resemblance between Tom and Rafe it seems that both are 
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avatars of Nichol Newfangle. When Tom Tosspot sets out to prove himself a 
knave, he doesn't offer evidence, but appeals to Nichol's knowledge of him, in an 
intimately stichomythic exchange suggestive of identity, in which Nichol interrupts 
to complete both Tom's sentences and his couplets (lines 370-374). When Nichol 
requires that they should 'dance hand in hand like knaves all three' (1.297), he 
creates a stage image of three identical figures. 
There is a sense that the existence of a double is inevitable and necessary. 
Historically, the project of the moral play had frequently involved a balancing of 
vice figures against their opposing virtues, often on highly logical grounds. 49 
Another 'doubling by opposition' commonly occurred when vice figures took new 
names, to masquerade as virtuous-seeming versions of their old iniquitous selves. 
Like Will To Like, by coining the same figure, causes three villains to become six. 
Since there are never more than four players on stage at any one time, and for much 
of the play two of these are identical twins, a certain stagnation sets in. This is in 
contrast to both of the earlier kinds of 'doubling' involving diversification: the 
setting up of an analysis of an interesting relationship between unlike entities. 
One result of the difference which these later plays have introduced seems to 
be that mankind figures can be damned. In its original form, the moral play was 
always a comedy: one remembers that even the unrepentant King of Life, from 
Pride of Life, arrived at salvation. In the 1560's and 70's the moral play became 
willing to consign to damnation characters who were apparently mankind figures. 
However, it is the AU in which they are damned that is revealing. If one compares 
these characters with Marlowe's Faustus, an important difference is revealed. 
Faustus dies without repenting and so goes to hell. But in his damnation scene he is 
a human being, and the emotional value of the scene rests in his human sorrow and 
longing for Christ. Despair, though seen as the ultimate sin, is presented here as 
most human. However, when the figure that is to be damned has previously been 
systematically established as a vice figure, the poignancy of his death vanishes. The 
death scene may even be played as a huge joke, as in The Longer Thou Livest the 
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More Fool Thou Art. 50 In The Tyde Tarrieth No Man we have seen how the death 
of Greediness is ambivalently received because he has progressively metamorphosed 
into a vice figure. In that play, it is the presence of Wastefulness and his 
reformation that provide a traditional mankind figure. 
It seems, then, that Like Will To Like contains no traditional mankind 
figure. Furthermore, the loss of the mankind figure has been effected in a way 
which destroys any sense of dramatic tension. What remains to give the piece its 
liveliness is the virtuoso display of an amazing variety of different forms of vice- 
play. Here is another version of the order of events in the play: - a bantering 
monologue by the principal Vice, involving direct address to members of the 
audience; the appearance of the devil; a dance; a 'three men's song'; a mock court; 
a fight; a comic drinking song; a moronic Dutch drunkard; a dance in anti-masque 
style ('as evil-formed as may be devised'); a second solo drinking song; 'special 
effects', in the form of false bellies for Hance and Philip Fleming; hysterical 
laughter and a nonsense spiel by the principal Vice; another 'three men's song', 
possibly in the form of a round; an imitation of a street cry; a return fight, in which 
the principal Vice is beaten; a second appearance of the devil; and finally a comic 
exit of the Vice to Hell. In addition to the vice-play, the virtuous characters further 
diversify the entertainment with the following: a metrical sermon; a tableau 
representing honour; and a serious song for four voices, possibly a four-part song. 
The piece concludes with a song for all four voices. 
There is a second feature which an audience seeing this play in performance 
must admire, and that is the slickness with which doubling is handled. The title 
page of the original edition suggests that 'Five may easely play this enterlude'. It is 
not unusual for the titles of plays 'offered for acting' to get the number of players 
wrong, though more often they err on the optimistic side. On the contrary here, it 
is clear that this play has been most carefully crafted to allow fr to play it. I 
attach the doubling plan for the play as Appendix D, to demonstrate this point. It 
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will be seen that the play has been constructed with the twin elegances of always 
allowing time for players to change roles while keeping that time to a minimum, 
thereby maintaining as many characters as possible on stage at any one time. These 
ends are achieved without ever splitting a part between players, and with little 
suppression of rdles. 
The point here is that theatricality has replaced a discursive plot: in so 
doing, it substitutes display for narrative tension as the principal source of the 
audience's pleasure. At the same time it substitutes 'presence' of an observable 
performance for the 'absence' inherent in linguistic forms. The play thus evades the 
problematic of language by offering the dominance of meaninglessness, of structural 
incoherence. 
There is no combat over meaning whatsoever. Instead, the stage is occupied 
by the vice-play as action, rather than as an element in an argument. It is possible 
for action to function as argument, but in this case it operates as pure display. This, 
then, is the point towards which the development of the vice figure as other has 
been leading: a domination of the binary meaning-structure of interactive dialogue 
by the excessive display of the vice figures. This has a paradoxical effect, as, like 
the Elizabethans, we are inclined to think of vice play as 'the entertainment' and the 
moralizing portions of the plays as tedious. When the moralizing is squeezed out, 
however, the whole play loses momentum and tension, in spite of its songs, its 
comic grotesques and its horseplay. 
With meaning itself challenged, the moral play responds by formulating a 
means of containing vice play. All for Money (1578)51 offers a solution to the 
problem of a moral play form which has ceased to signify, by controlling vice play 
with narrative structure. In the course of doing so, it discovers the narrative sub- 
plot, and the resulting possibility of metaphoric relationships between apparently 
dislocated structures of meaning. Re-possessing the moral play for meaningful 
discourse, the new complexity is a crucial move towards the sophistications of the 
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1580's and 90's. 
It is the proverb-play's universalising tendency that allows the de-structuring 
of the moral play plot, so it is apt that a play of the universalising proverb-type 
should offer an original solution, functioning to reclaim vice-play within a structure 
which allows for a more abstract order of interpretation. All For Money focusses 
on form as a solution to the problems raised by the universal message. It finds a 
structural solution to the loss of plot by resurrecting the debate form of John 
Heywood's A Play ofi ve, but using it to regenerate complex significance in the 
vice-dominated display epitomized in Like Will To Like. 
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The title All for Money has the appearance of a proverb, and certainly it has 
a proverb's qualities of being both pithy and generalizing. It is more gnomic and 
elliptical than is usual, even for a proverb play. Indeed, it is not clear that this title 
is a proverb at all. 53 The Prologue behaves as if it were an old saying, and explains 
that the play is designed to show that 'All thing is for money' (1.94). There are 
various possible readings of this phrase, though the main opposition is between 
saying 'Everything that people do is for money' and 'All evil is done for money'. 
There is a suggestion that this leads to the conclusion that all actions are thereby 
morally tainted. The title therefore has the proverb's qualities of a) a pretense to 
universality, and b) ambiguity. It implicitly invites a play which is dedicated to 
displaying wild behaviour by the vice figures, similar to Like Will To Like. 
Instead, the following five-part structure develops: 
I. An opening set-piece of monologues by rather worthy and sententious 
allegorical figures, named Theology, Science and Art. One might choose to 
see the Prologue's very similar speech as part of this scene. 
2. A long scene of vice-play, beginning with Money and Adulation, and 
including the parthenogenesis of Pleasure, vomited up by Money, of Sin by 
Pleasure, and of Damnation by Sin. Sin is the principal Vice. Vice-play 
here consists almost entirely of grotesque display, as in Like Will To Like. 
This takes the form of horrifying costumes ('Satan the great devil as 
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deformedly dressed as may be'), and of the spectacular theatrical trick of 
engineering the onstage 'births' from a trapdoor in the stage. The plot of 
this section is to enact the sequence of generations, thereby showing a causal 
relationship between Money, Pleasure, Sin and Damnation. Each time a 
more discursive plot seems about to begin, such as that suggested by Prest- 
for-Pleasure, another 'birth' supervenes. When that sequence is finished, 
Sin argues with Satan over their relative status as agents of evil. Again, the 
solution to this is not in the form of plot, but as display, for Satan calls up 
Gluttony and Pride as a spectacle to impress Sin. It seems, then, that vice- 
play dominates, to the exclusion of plot. The play does not, however, allow 
this to continue. 
3. The third scene abolishes all the preceding characters in favour of a formal 
debate in the style of John Heywood. By harking back to a most stringent 
form, the play counters the structural licence involved in vice-play. 54 The 
characters involved are: Learning with Money; Learning without Money; 
Money without Learning; and Neither Money nor Learning. The last figure 
does, however, possess a good dollop of simple faith. None of these 
characters is in any sense vicious, though Money without Learning has 
various inbuilt problems. The form is one in which language controls the 
action to such an extent that a static presentational mode is invited. The 
content of the speeches is all-important. Where the vice-play of ilk Will 
To Like tended away from meaningful speech, and towards action as its 
raison d'etre, All for Money rejects action at this point and fills the stage 
with four static allegorical figures who talk at length, and whose speeches 
interact. These figures respond to one another in a rational way, contrary to 
those in Like Will To Like, where vice-play reserved interaction to physical 
contact and to speech-as-action. 
4. In the fourth section the character All for Money appears. It seems that he 
has been human once, like Greediness in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man and 
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Worldly Man in Enough is as Good as a Feast. Now, however, his 
perceived whole aim is to make money, while his theatrical point is to 
demonstrate the existence of widespread cupidity and related injustice. He is 
a biased bribed judge. Sundry corrupt and self-seeking characters approach 
him, and fmd that he will fix things in exchange for cash. The variety of 
types gestures towards both a demonstration of the universality of the 
proverb and towards the fashionable mode of social satire. 
5. The final scene involves the further display of vice figures, in a pageant of 
damned souls, but here speech is also an important part of the action. Dives 
and Judas appear, spectacularly dressed to demonstrate the terrible torments 
they suffer. They lament their fate, and wish for an opportunity to repent or 
to live their lives differently. 
At this point, then, the display of vice-play is contained by the language in 
which that display is given meaning. Dives and Judas combine the spectacular 
qualities of conventional vice play with the rational speeches of formal debate, and 
of virtuous characters. The emblem and its label have been re-instated as a unified 
object to be observed. Money and his crew have vanished from the play, together 
with their action-packed but anti-significant mode of theatricality. Vice, the vice 
figures and vice play can therefore be re-instated within the sign system which they 
have threatened to overwhelm with chaotic acts. Rampant vice-play can be 
contained only by imposing a new dramatic form. It seeks to contain fission within 
a new structure, which uses multiple form to generate complex meaning, rather than 
meaninglessness. Where the earliest plays found wholeness in the concluding form 
of the mankind figure as a sign of mature understanding, this form finds wholeness 
in the play itself. By containing vice play it asserts an over-arching meaning made 
out of physicality as vice play, and intellectuality as debate. Placing the two side by 
side in separate scenes draws attention to their differences and to their similarities g 
. From this comes their potential to 
be fused into a mode which one might 
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call symbolic theatricality. 
Clearly the proverb play as a development of the moral play can cast light on 
the signifying systems with which that form works. It seems that the concept of 
'meaning' can be approached through the plays on three levels. The first, relatively 
negligible level, uses meaning in the commonplace sense of the meaning of a given 
phrase. This is what the virtuous and vicious figures argue over when they dispute 
the true meaning of, for example, 'the tide tarrieth no man', or the best answer to 
Mankind's question in The Castle of Perseverance 'whither should I wend? ', or to 
Youth's question 'what hath God bought? ' 
The second sense is a discussion about the nature of language that takes 
place on the metaphoric level. Images of chaos confront images of order within the 
linguistic practices of the characters. It seems for example, that transgression is 
represented in the vice-characters' speech not just by a vocabulary of the material 
and the obscene but also by a free-wheeling use of verse forms and a refusal to 
participate in accepted 'truthful' relationships between language and reality. By 
contrast, the virtuous characters' diction images order through stately verse forms, 
and an insistence on 'truth', especially on the metaphoric/spiritual plane. 
The confrontation is generally resolved in favour of virtue. For example, 
the disorder brought to Wastefulness by Despair in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man is 
defeated by a ritualized, pious repetition of prayers. Each play, however, finds its 
resolution of this confrontation in a different form, and hence suggests a different 
analysis of the construction of meaning. 
The third sense is structural. That is the 'meaning' of the moral play seen as 
an entity or a genre. It includes what the form of the play has to say about the 
nature of language. The form of the play at this level is variously constructed 
depending on the ways in which the balance of the characters alters: the original 
relationships among the mankind figure, the good characters and the evil characters 
are adjusted over time. Who dominates, and in what ways, have developed as areas 
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of considerable interest. In speaking about language, the play also speaks about the 
possibility of truth. Its structure represents a theory about the way in which 
meaning is constituted. 55 It is at this level that an ongoing debate over the nature of 
linguistic meaning takes place, based in that discussion of the separation between 
self and other which informs all moral plays from their earliest occurrence to the 
final dilution of the genre in later forms. 
A brief summary of parallels may be useful at this point, though one must 
bear in mind that these 'parallels' usually need modification in their practical 
application to individual plays. 
i) Mankind Figure = self 
ii) Vice figure = other 
iii) sustaining their separation = 
(a) belief in meaning as single; 
(b) belief in the possibility of truth 
(c) belief in the subject as undivided 
iv) multiplying vice figures and/or mankind figures = 
(a) the fissive tendency of language, as 
in the 'play of signifiers'; 
(b) the tendency towards loss of 
meaning through excess 
v) merging of mankind figure and vice figure = 
the loss of meaning through the collapse 
of the originating difference. (This 
leads to a need within the play to locate 
meaning outside either plot or linguistic 
behaviour. ) 
Broadly, two arguments inhabit the discussions so far. The first establishes 
that three important processes take place during the twenty years after W. Wager's 
"ri, ger Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art (1559). These processes are the 
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multiplying of mankind figures; the merging of mankind figures with vice figures; 
and the growing dominance of vice-play. The second argument begins from these 
processes and analyses the effects they have on a reading of the plays which 
focusses on level three (above). Such a reading looks at the plays as signifying 
structures, referring to the nature of language, and to the relation of language and 
reality. The moves which the plays make correspond closely to a theory of 
language which sees it as conducting an autonomous struggle between its claims to 
embody truth, and its innate, di,, f erance-based, tendency to become meaningless. 
One might abbreviate this concept to a struggle between unity and fissivity. Each 
alteration in the form of the moral play can now be seen as a move in that debate, 
answering the position implicitly taken up by the preceding form. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 
1 By George Wapull. The edition used here is the Students' Facsimile Edition 
(London, 1910). 
2 Bernard Spivack, Shakespeare and the The Allegory of Evil (N. Y. and 
London, 1958): 'The process of change in the plays themselves, although rich in 
details, obeys a single law: like the epoch they mirror, they gradually submit to the 
secular revolution that separates the Renaissance from the late Middle Ages', p. 206. 
Robert Potter, in The English Morality Play (London and Boston, 1975), 
observes that moral interludes of the 1560's and 1570's 'document the emergence of 
a didactic and ethical drama, concerned with problems of everyday human 
behaviour and earthly justice rather than ultimate questions of salvation', p. 107. 
3 Lois Potter, in The 'Revels' History of Drama in English, vol 2,1500-1576, 
ed. Norman Sanders and others (London, 1975): 'the interest of morality writers 
had moved, as in Impatient Poverty, from the study of an Everyman hero to the 
depiction of a variety of social types', p. 198. 
4 This kind of social analysis is not new with the moral plays in question. It 
is, for example, the foundation for that bitter gloating over the downfall of the 
mighty that permeates the medieval Dance of Death motif. 
5 This is also the error committed by those who see deconstruction as a threat 
to established modes of analysis. It is not an either/or choice. 
6 Mark Pilkinton in 'The Antagonists of English Drama, 1370-1576' 
(unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Bristol, 1974), sees moral hesitation much 
earlier in the century, in the struggle over definition in Skelton's Magnyf . 
'Skelton views sin quantitatively and not qualitatively as do his medieval 
predecessors. The black/white, night/day imagery of the cyclic drama gives way to 
an early Tudor Renaissance shade of grey wherein even a sin hitherto deemed 
deadly can become a virtue', p. 300. This wilful redefinition, however, is a typical 
vice-ploy, as we have seen, and not a genuine hesitation on the part of the play. 
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7 John Heywood, The Proverbs. Epigrams and Miscellanies, ed. John S. 
Farmer, EEDS (London, 1966; first published, 1906). His work was still the 
subject of admiration c. 1612, when John Davies of Hereford described his own 
epigrams as imitations of Heywood's. 
8 F. P. Wilson, 'The Proverbial Wisdom of Shakespeare', in Shakespearean 
and Other Studies, ed. Helen Gardner (Oxford, 1969), pp. 143-175 (p. 144). 
9 The entertainment of Heywood's proverbs and epigrams comes from 
observing the paradoxes that are generated by assuming all interpretations of 
proverbs to be equally valuable. Heywood provides many neat examples of 
paradoxical interpretation, for example: 
A merry man by his master at meat set: 
'Methinketh' quoth the master, 'thou canst no drink get 
'Here is enough, though there be none, ' said he. 
'Then art not dry? ' 'Yes, so mote I thee, 
And fain would drink. ' 'How be thy words true then? ' 
'Thus: This word enough two ways we may scan; 
Th'one much enough, th'other little enough; 
And here is little enough. ' His master lough. 
However, the servant suffers for his wit in the end, for: 
More than enough were waste: he getteth no more. ' 
(Number 52 of The First Hundred of Epigrammes, 1562). 
10 See, for example, Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, tr. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore and London, 1976; first published in French, 1967): 
'There is not a single signified that escapes, even if recaptured, the play of 
signifying references that constitute language. The advent of writing is the advent 
of this play; today such a play is coming into its own, effacing the limit starting 
from which one had thought to regulate the circulation of signs, drawing along with 
it all the reassuring signifieds, reducing all the strongholds, all the out-of-bounds 
shelters that watched over the field of language. This, strictly speaking, amounts to 
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destroying the concept of 'sign' and its entire logic', p. 7. 
11 
We deny not, but in this world, riches Beare the sway 
Yet, it not riches to be called sure: 
For in Gods power it is to make riches decay, 
Whereas Gods word and fayth shall euer endure 
(F iiii v) 
12 It is a model example of sophisticated doubling, and is described from that 
point of view in D. M. Bevington, From 'Mankind' to Marlowe (Cambridge, Mass., 
1962), pp. 149-151. 
13 Wapull works with this need, and motivates it by establishing a dramatic 
'other place' off stage, where Greediness, the merchant, is waiting. There is thus a 
reason why players need to rush off and return in order to transact business. In 
addition to suggesting a sinister location of evil somewhere out of sight, this 'other 
place' thus also generates a cumulative stage effect of Plautine farcical 
breathlessness. 
14 It should be noted that we are moving between theoretical systems here. 
Lacanian psychoanalysis, for all its emphasis on a three-part system, usually 
functions with, and reasons through, dualities. (This is a contentious remark, as 
there are Lacanians, such as Professor Malcolm Bowie, who feel that his three-part 
structure holds up. ) Derrida's analyses, towards which this discussion is now 
moving, delight in polarities because they lay themselves open to deconstruction. 
15 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, tr Margaret Waller (New 
York, 1984; first published in French, 1974), pp. 25-28. 
16 Robert Hughes, Heaven and Hell in Western Art (London, 1968) sees a 
related philosophical difficulty for the artist who seeks for images with which to 
depict the 'chaos' of Hell. 'To paint Chaos in a chaotic manner would merely 
produce an illegible picture. And so the problem was to discover a form for the Pit 
without depriving Hell of its terrible and negative formlessness', p. 156. 'They 
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evolved a set of images which were, to a surprising degree, stable. They were the 
negative images to Heaven's reality, doubling it, parodying it, like hallucinatory 
reflections in black water', p. 157. 
17 Jacques Derrida, 'Implications', in Positions, tr. Alan Bass (London, 1976), 
pp. 1-14 (p. 14). 
18 This move is wholly within the project that the Prologue has mapped out, 
and also manifestly not intended to deceive the audience. The vice portion of the 
play is in collusion with the Prologue in demonstrating one version of the Proverb's 
meaning. 
19 
For I am a broker the truth is fo 
Wherefore if men in me hurtfulneffe should know 
There are few or none that with me would deale 
Therefore this word hurtful! I never reueale 
(A iii v) 
20 The hesitation between devilish and human motives in the late moral play 
(c. 1576 onwards) may be understood historically, as part of the gradual 
humanisation of the vice role documented by Bernard Spivack in Shakespeare and 
the Allegory of Evil (New York and London, 1958). See especially Chapter Seven, 
'Change and Decline in the Morality Convention', pp. 206-250. 
21 The Assembly of Gods* or. The Accord of Reason and Sensuality in the 
Fear of Death (c. 1463), ed. Oscar Lovell Triggs, EETS, ES, 69 (London, 1896; 
reprinted, 1957). The attribution of this poem to Lydgate is uncertain, according to 
the title-page addendum to the 1957 edition. 
22 These names are both very general ones, and also very much open to 
interpretation, compared with the specificity embodied in such earlier stage virtues 
as Mercy, Pity or God's Promises, to name but a few. 
23 That relationship, which the Prologue to The Tyde Tarrieth No Man glides 
over, can be found put with clarity in Like Will To Like: 
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Saint Augustine saith in his fifth book De Civitate Dei, 
Conjunctae suns edes Virtutis et Honoris, saith he; 
The houses of Virtue and Honour joined together be, 
And so the way to Honour's house is disposed 
That through Virtue's house he needs must pass 
(Like Will To Like, 1.757-61) 
In Like Will To Like, then, public opinion is necessarily linked with spiritual 
virtue. Furthermore, one's secular standing in the world is directly associated with 
salvation: 
But if through virtue honour be attained 
The path to salvation may soon be gained 
(1.764-5) 
24 Consciousness of this difficulty is not a modern construction: it can also be 
found in other plays. Sensualitas, the vice figure in Virtuous and Godly Susanna 
(1578, c. 1568) sees worldly opinion opposed to spiritual credit: 
For God, or his threatninges, I passe it not a straw, 
But for myne honour in this world, is it I stand in aw. 
(1.433-434) 
A vice figure's opinion is a dubious one to rely on, but one also finds the 
sympathetic figure of Philologus reflecting on a comparable dilemma in wig 
Conflict of Conscience (1581; c. 1570): 
My case indeed I see most miserable 
As was Susanna betwixt two evils placed 
Either to consent to sin most abhominable 
Or else in the world's sight to be utterly disgraced 
(1.1201-1204) 
25 Alexander Barclay, The Ship of Fools, ed. T. H. Jamieson, 2 vols 
(Edinburgh and London, 1874). 
26 Plays in which proliferation of the mankind figure occurs are Wapull's jg 
198 
Tyde Tarrieth No Man (1576), Ulpian Fuiwell's Like Will to Like (1568), and 
Thomas Lupton's All for Money (1577). One might include Nice Wanton (1560; 
c. 1550) in this category and also those plays which, while retaining moral-play 
elements, move away from allegory towards romance: Clyomon and Clamydes 
(1599; c. 1576), Common Conditions (1576), and Thomas Preston's Cambyses 
(1569-70). The mankind figure is bifurcated in W. Wager's Enough is as Good as 
aFeast (1560's). 
27 This combination is a different effect from that discussed in Chapter Two, 
where evil and the main character are one and the same. This feature, often 
manifested as a youthful, almost innocent boastfulness about personal appearance 
can be observed in such earlier plays as Pride of Life, Youth and Mundus & Infans. 
The youthful boasting can be reminiscent of folk festivals celebrating fertility: 
Youth describes himself in terms which suggest a Green Man: 
I flourish as the vine tree. 
Who may be likened unto me 
In my youth and jollity? 
My hair is royal and bushed thick, 
My body pliant as a hazel stick 
(Youth, 1.45-49) 
28 That process can be observed in incomplete form in The Tyde Tarrieth No 
M&a and Enough is as Good as a Feast, and in a complete form in Like Will to 
Ljl&, in W. Wager's The Longer Thou Livest the More Fool Thou Art and in All 
For Money. 
29 Ulpian Fulwell, Like Will to Like guod the Devil to the Collier, in EM 
Tudor Interludes, ed. J. A. B. Somerset (London, 1974), pp. 128-164. 
30 W. Wager, Enough is as Good as east, in The Longer Thou Livest and 
Enough is as good as a Feast, ed. R. Mark Benbow, Regents Renaissance Drama 
Series (London, 1968), pp. 79-146. 
31 The same absence can be detected in The Longer Thou Livest The More 
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Fool Thou Art (c. 1569), ibid., pp. 1-78. Here the putative mankind figure is a 
single character, Moros, but he too is assimilated to the vice-crew, almost by 
definition. 
32 At this point Victor Turner's theories of the 'liminal' and the 'liminoid' 
become relevant. From Ritual to Theatre: the Human Seriousness of Play, 
(New York, 1982), see especially Chapter 1, pp. 20-59. Turner sees the liminoid as 
forming a parodic version of a previously serious rite of passage. In addition, 
'liminoid phenomena --- are often parts of social critiques or even revolutionary 
manifestoes' (ibid., pp. 54-5). Turner discusses both theatre and Carnival. It is 
frequently observed that the popular theatre in some of its versions, was 'outside' 
the socially acceptable. In other words it is inherently 'on the edge' in its own 
right: both culturally central and suspect at one and the same time. Its position 
depended on whether it was perceived as offering liminal descriptions, or liminoid 
ones. The transition from innocent immorality to a knowledge of the language of 
God, put forward by the early moral plays described in Chapter Two, would seem 
to be in the former category, while that of the vice-play-laden later moral plays 
would fall into the latter, suspect class. 
33 At Appendix CI analyse the relative proportions of vice play, virtuous 
speeches, and interchanges between the two, in a selection of moral plays. 
Although more subjective than they appear, these figures give a reasonably reliable 
picture of the changes detectable over time. 
34 This theory that language contains a tension between Derridean fission and a 
more conventional drive towards meaning is similar to one proposed by Stephen 
Greenblatt, 'Towards a Poetics of Culture', in The New Historicism, ed. H. Aram 
Veeser (London, 1989), pp. 1-14. Greenblatt is not overtly talking about linguistic 
structures, but about political power: 'capitalism has characteristically generated .. 
. r6gimes 
in which the drive towards differentiation and the drive towards 
monological organization operate simultaneously, or at least oscillate so rapidly, as 
to create the impression of simultaneity', p. 6. Later, he sees this oscillation as 'a 
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complex dialectic of differentiation and identity', p. 7. 
35 It is, however, important to distinguish between the slippage of a mankind 
figure towards vice behaviour in plays after 1559, and the 'innocent' sinfulness 
displayed by protagonists in earlier plays. Pride of Life, Youth, Mundus & Infans, 
The Castle of Perseveraunce and The Four Elements are all instances of plays in 
which an ignorant mankind figure embodies a kind of original sin. His problem can 
be solved by acquiring the understanding of maturity. 
36 In its context as a reference to decay, it seems most likely that Greediness is 
referring to Winter. The argument is thus one between an authority and the 
physical experience of being human. 
37 In the ensuing discussion of Greediness as a vice figure, I use the code 
developed in Chapter Three, and summarized at Appendix B. 
38 One is reminded of Gryll, E(, 2, XII, 86-7, who ceases to desire ordinary 
human existence. 
39 The moral interpretation of debt is another flexible area in this play. The 
Courtier's wish to borrow money is merely foolish, while Wastefulness's behaviour 
is more reprehensible. 
40 This is the same 'linguistic mirroring' device that was observed in Mundus 
and The Castle of Perseveraunce, where the mankind figure reflects the 
last opinion uttered. 
41 Schell and Schuchter see Wager as 'a very skillful dramatist in the mode of 
moral tragedy', and this scene as 'one of the best scenes in mid-century drama', 
English Morality Plays and Moral Interludes (N. Y., 1969), p. 367. 
42 He is referring to Lucifer, whom he has already described as his godfather. 
43 This is the first occasion I have mentioned so far when virtuous characters 
sing. It is not a unique instance, for virtues sing in the plays for schools and for 
boys' companies. It is, however, true that the practice is considerably more 
common among vice characters. 
44 Few authorities actually attempt to define what is meant by the mankind 
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figure, assuming that there is general agreement on this. It is clear from the present 
study of otherness that the concept is a much more fluid and ambiguous one than 
that approach would suggest. 
Sylvia D. Feldman, in The Morality-Patterned Comedy of the Renaissance 
(The Hague, 1970), puts forward a set of criteria which is symptomatic of the usual 
attitude. She sees the mankind figure as a character who goes through a strictly 
delineated series of actions: 1) an optional virtuous beginning; 2) temptation and 
fall; 3) life in sin; 4) temptation to despair; 5) repentance; 6) forgiveness and 
promise of salvation. These over-rigid criteria would exclude from consideration 
those mankind figures who die in sin and are damned. 
45 Hankin Hangman is a stage function, almost a prop, rather than a character. 
46 J. A. B. Somerset, in his Introduction to Four Tudor Interludes (London, 
1974), p. 21, sees Virtuous Living as a human being to be rewarded. 
47 'Yea, marry, I am an old friend of yours, perchance' (1.688). One may 
contrast his effectiveness with that of a similar move in The Castle of 
Perseveraunce. There, the claim of old acquaintance is the point where the 
mankind figure is persuaded to leave the castle and return to his old worldly 
companions. 
48 It is also the case that none is a woman. This is not the trivial objection that 
it may seem, for one may consider that women characters appear as mankind 
figures in The Tarrieth No Man, Lusty Juventus, R li , Nice Wanton, 
and the 'Wit' plays, to name the most prominent examples. 
49 In The Castle of Perseveraunce, Bad Angel is balanced with Good Angel; 
Pride with Meekness; Wrath with Patience; Envy with Charity; Gluttony with 
Abstinence; Lechery with Chastity; Sloth with Industry; and Covetous with 
Generosity. See William O. Harris, Skelton's 'Magnyfycence' and the Cardinal 
Virtue Tradition (Chapel Hill, 1965). 
In the tradition of the three living and the three dead men, parallel figures 
representing different ages or different social types may be confronted by their dead 
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equivalents. The convention is described by Philippa Tristram, Figures of Life and 
Death in Medieval English Literature (London, 1976), pp. 162-7. 
50 Charlotte Spivack, The Comedy of Evil on Shakespeare's Stagg (Cranbury, 
New Jersey, 1978), documents the transition from the humour of humiliation to 
Gothic suffering in Jacobean plays, pp. 128-135. 
51 Thomas Lupton, All For Money, in English Morality Plays and Moral 
Interludes, ed. J. D. Schell and J. Schuchter (New York, 1969), pp. 419-473. 
52 This structural experiment, however, cannot be called innovative as it was 
not imitated by later playwrights. If it has successors, they appear much later in the 
use of thematic sub-plot, and in plays with a masque element such as The Rare 
Triumphs of Love and Fortune and The White Devil, to name two at random. It 
may be that some of the plays with titles like Three Plays in One are also related 
forms. The 'plot' survives of The Seven Deadly Sins (c. 1590), which is thought to 
be a revival of ? Tarlton's Three Plays in One (1585), ed. W. W. Greg, Dramatic 
Documents From the Elizabethan Playhouses (London, 1931). A Yorkshire 
Tragedy (1606) is described on the title page as 'All's One; or, One of the foure 
plaies in one, called a York-shire Tragedy'. At 794 lines, it is scarcely a full-length 
play, and the character of the senselessly destructive father has much in common 
with the wastrels of the moral plays, perhaps combined with the Deadly Sin of 
Anger. A Yorkshire Tragedy (1606), ed. Sylvia D. Feldman and G. R. Proudfoot, 
from the edition of 1608, Malone Society Reprints (Oxford, 1973 for 1969). 
53 In fact the phrase 'all for money' is only loosely related to proverbs in either 
Tilley or Whiting. It seems nearest to the following: Whiting: - M631 'Money 
reigns'; M633 'To money all things obey'. Tilley: - M1052 'Money answers all 
things' ;M 1084 'Money will do anything' ;M 1102 'What will not money do? '; and 
T163 'All things are obedient to money'. 
54 Heywood, of course, devised an early vice figure, Neither Lover nor Loved, 
in The Play of Love, but that character's use of vice-play is very restricted. In fact, 
he is more involved in the debate, and the trick of running in shouting 'fire, fire' is 
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directly related to the subject under discussion. 
55 As Terry Eagleton puts it: 'A text may 'show' us something about the nature 
of meaning and signification which it is not able to formulate as a proposition. ' 
ite Theory (Oxford, 1983), p. 134. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE FEMALE VICE 
whom hell it selfe complaines to keep within her race. 1 
Joan Kelly observes the change in women's opportunities in the Renaissance 
in these terms: 'the startling fact is that women as a group, especially among the 
classes that dominated Italian urban life, experienced a contraction of social and 
personal options that men of their classes either did not, as was the case with the 
bourgeoisie, or [did] not experience as markedly, as was the case with the 
nobility. '2 She is here using the Italian experience as exemplary of that of other 
European countries. 
Kelly goes on to argue that the status of women steadily declined through the 
late Middle-Ages and the Renaissance, and that the decline resulted in a perception 
of women's economic role less as co-operative among equals, and more as 
subservient to male interests. Effecting this transition meant that women's 
behaviour generally had to be perceived as less important than men's. From that, 
women themselves could be seen as inferior, and then as other. One might expect 
some signs of this process to be visible on the popular stage. Kelly specifically lists 
as one of the 'criteria for gauging the relative contraction (or expansion) of the 
powers of Renaissance women and for determining the quality of their historical 
experience .... 4) Ideology about women, 
in particular the sex-role system displayed 
or advocated in the symbolic products of the society, its art, literature and 
philosophy. ' (p. 177). One cannot move simply or directly from observing stage 
representations of women to making remarks about the realities of social and 
cultural life. Indeed, such a move would involve a far more protracted and 
interdisciplinary discussion than the scope of the present analysis allows. Here, I 
put forward some basic and previously unexplored data on the subject, provided by 
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the Tudor moral plays. 
Following Kelly's thesis, one would expect not only to observe female 
characters being denigrated, but also to see this taking place to a greater extent with 
the passage of time. The belittling of women's activities can be seen as significant 
to narrative in the drama as early as the often-cited Noah Play in the Chester Cycle. 
Woman's need to spend time in the company of other women is contrasted with a 
male need to obey orders, to hierarchize and to organize, whether by tallying 
animals, or commanding the world. Male association here takes place in a lineal 
family group of father and sons, and is contrasted with female association with 
peers (the gossips). In the Towneley Noah, both groups are engaged in productive 
and potentially complementary labour. However, the plot validates a male view of 
women's work as peripheral, and not to the point, by inserting it in a story where 
persisting in female activities will lead to death. 
A second approach to the scrutiny of female characterization comes from 
linguistic theory. It assumes that women will necessarily be represented as other, 
because of the fundamental construction of language in desire, and its 
phallogocentric properties. Following this, one may analyse what traits are 
particularly attributed to the character of woman, and thereby rejected or repressed 
from the definition of the 'self'. 
It is a commonplace that female speaking parts in the moral plays are in 
general relatively few and short. However, there is ample evidence available across 
the forty or so moralities and morality-related plays for a considerable variety of 
female characters and functions to be displayed. I put forward here the theory that 
there is a relationship between those conventional images of otherness which the 
mainstream moral play establishes, and its images of women. These plays 
characterize women in several quite distinct ways, however, which suggests that the 
relationship is a complex one, and not one of simple identification. In this chapter I 
scrutinize that relationship, firstly in order to document its qualities, and secondly to 
consider its implications for the subject matter of the plays. In addition I suggest 
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that the way in which a link between otherness and woman is put forward in the 
moral play has significance for the status of women in the sixteenth century. 
In Chapter Four I have shown how, in the later moral play, the otherness of 
vice play came to be the dominant 'subject' of the text. When femaleness (as 
alternative other) can be represented as a vice figure, a channel is created whereby 
the marginalized can return to be the central focus of attention. 
This chapter observes ways in which roles depicting women acquired the 
taint of those vice-characteristics discusse 
involved are John Heywood's The Play 
'dialogue', The endightement of Mother ] 
(1607,1590's). The relevant case of 1 
(1589,1582) is also discussed in passing. 
the 'female vice' can be demonstrated. 
d in Chapter Three. The principal plays 
of the Wether (c. 1527), William Punt's 
Messe (1548), and the anonymous Lingu 
'he Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune 
Through these plays the development of 
I should mention at this point those aspects of the representation of woman 
which this chapter does not attempt to deal with. In Chapter Six I show how 
woman is seen as representative of forces of chaos, in a social context where both 
'self' and 'other' have been re-defined as social structures, rather than as 
individuals. The 'good woman' is discussed in Chapter Seven. The omission of 
other types is not a statement that they are unproblematic, so much as that they are 
extraneous to the arguments based on the overt oppositions which Chapters Three 
and Four have set up. In particular, there is a small number of plays where women 
appear among the 'low' group of knockabout rustics, for example Fund Jonet in 
Ane Satyre of the Thre Estaitis, and, in Misogonus, the uproarious Alison, Isbell 
Bushy and Madge Mumblecrust. These are figures whose prime affinity is with the 
likes of Skelton's Elinor Rumming: figures of joyous carnivalesque excess. 
Secondly, I do not explore that area of the moralities where woman is other in the 
sense of an object of desire. In several moral plays of the early part of the sixteenth 
century, women appear, or are mentioned, simply as whores to tempt the mankind 
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figure from virtue by offering gratification of the senses, thus functioning passively 
as objects of desire, not even as temptresses. Frequently these figures did not 
appear on stage, but were mentioned by the vice figure in his catalogue of 
seductions, and located at the tavern where they were classed, along with food and 
drink, as commodities to satisfy the needs of the senses. The danger that they posed 
for the mankind figure was that he might fall from virtue as a consequence of 
distraction from his prime purpose. Only Redford's Wit and Science (1539) offers 
a whore with more lively characteristics, in the figure of Idleness, who conducts a 
ridiculous dialogue with Ignorancy. Idleness's major scene involves the significant 
vice-characteristics of word-play, control of the stage and a dominating, teacher- 
pupil relationship. In those plays where women are equated with food, they have 
no status as agents within the moral order, which is located around the vice figures 
and the mankind figure. In other words, their otherness is ontological, not 
social/moral, and though of interest, it can be seen that these figures are not very 
closely connected with the argument in hand. 
This study, then, does not claim to be a complete discussion of the position 
of woman on the moral play stage. Instead, it is specifically related to those areas 
of otherness established by the good-versus-evil world view set up by the moral play 
form. Some slippage of terminology between 'otherness' and 'vice figure' is 
therefore likely to take place, since they are homologous in the bulk of the plays. 
It seems probable that, through the sixteenth century, plays became 
increasingly capable of characterizing women as possessing many of those qualities 
of otherness already described in connection with the vice figure. The relationship, 
once again, is not one-way, for vice-characteristics also developed and ramified 
through the period, as we have seen, and some of those ramifications are founded 
on stereotypically female characteristics: association in peer rather than lineal 
groups; inconstancy; love of finery; 'empty' speech; excessive speech; lack of self- 
control; and the use of artifice in deceit. 
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The idea of the stereotype is itself a problematic description here, as I am 
talking about a process which involves the evolution of a stereotype. In terms of 
stage image, the plays evince a double circularity. The idea of evil contributes to 
the image of the vice figure; the image of the vice figure contributes to the 
characterization of women; resulting stage conventions of the female contribute to 
social notions of what is bad. It is also possible to move around the same circle in 
the reverse direction. Thus, stereotypes of the female are added to the picture of 
the vice figure; the image of the vice figure adds to the concept of what is bad; that, 
in turn, supplements the presentation of woman on the stage. Thus stereotyping in 
part creates the process of change, in the course of which the stereotypes themselves 
alter. This change is a historical process insofar as the development of the vice-role 
is itself a historical process, subject to such dynamics of social need as the abjection 
of the lowest castes and changing power-structures. The change is also a response 
to theatrical demands that plays must entertain. In fact the three terms, 'evil', vice, 
and woman, are locked into an interplay between the feminization of the vice figure 
and the abjection of the female right from the start. The third term, the concept of 
evil, is not comparable with the other two, being an idea rather than a stage image. 
It is that which enables abjection to be enforced. The key point for this discussion, 
therefore, is to demonstrate the nature of the connection between certain female 
characters and the vice figure. I shall show that by the end of the century, the 
figure of the 'female vice' was readily identifiable on the Elizabethan stage. 
Before proceeding to individual examples of moral plays, however, one 
stage emblem which cuts across many plays and much of the sixteenth century's 
discourse about women needs to be considered. This is the image of the bridled 
horse. Through this image the vice figure is implicated with that of the female in a 
way which highlights the interrelationship between the fictional image and the re- 
emergence of its conceptual structures in the real world. Thus the traditional 
iconography of female behaviour is amplified or rendered ambiguous when a stage 
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figure uses comparable conduct. 
Plato in the Phaedrus famously describes the soul as a tripartite entity: a 
charioteer driving one good horse and one bad one (246a&b; 253c-254e). From 
this, Plutarch refers to ' "the horse of the mind" as Plato termeth it, that is so hard 
of reign (I mean the unreigned lust of concupiscence)'. It is as if Plutarch's horse 
imagery has elided the good horse and left only the image of uncontrolled lust as the 
important referent. It is instructive to consider the significance of the horse as an 
image on the sixteenth century stage. 3 As with the vice figure, the emblematic 
attributes of physicality and lust are paramount. From these comes its quality as a 
paradigm for things which require controlling, and its consequent illogical power to 
relocate as carnal something which is perceived as in need of control. In the 
Phaedrus the evil steed is eventually tamed. An unspoken knowledge of the tamed 
horse's potential for practical service to its controller underlies discussions of its 
animal nature. It is thus an ambiguous image, intrinsically involved with the 
concept that repression is virtuous, and containing a quite specific statement that it 
is carnality that must be repressed. This equation derives very naturally from the 
mundane experience that the horse operated in close physical conjunction with its 
(usually male) rider or user. 
A resemblance has been noticed between the vice figure and tamed animals 
in general. For example, the entrance of New Guise, Nought and Nowadays in 
Mankind has been read as imaging the entrance of a bear-ward and his animals. 4 In 
Like Will To Like (1568), Hankin Hangman leads out Cuthbert Cutpurse and Pierce 
Pickpurse in a similar way. 5 The stage direction at 1.1667 instructs: 
Hankin goeth out and leadeth the one in his right hand and the other 
in his left, having halters about their necks. 
Nichol Newfangle comments: 
Ha, ha, ha, there is a brace of hounds, well worth a dozen crowns, 
Behold the huntsman leadeth away; 
I think in twenty towns, on hills and eke on downs 
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They have taken their prey. 
So well-liked was their hunting, on hill and eke on mountain, 
That now they be up in leace: 
(1.1168-73) 
There are several moral plays in which the vice figure is treated as a horse. In The 
Trial of Treasure (1567), the virtues must bridle the beast Inclination. 6 This figure 
is characterized with a neighing laugh and horse imagery throughout: 
Inclin.: We-he-he, it is good for you to hold fast 
For I will kick and winch, while the life doth last 
(p. 233) 
Next, Just draws the moral: 
Thus should every man, that will be called Just 
Bridle & subdue his beastly inclination 
(p. 233) 
This theme is particularly common in those plays such as Enough is as Good as a 
Feast where, at the moment of exit, the vice figure rides out or is ridden out by the 
devil. 
As one might expect, women as representative of sensual temptation, and of 
forces in need of control, are also associated with horses. The connection between 
woman and horse is most explicitly made in the anonymous Marriage of Wit and 
, 
Science (1569): 7 
And when you once perceyue her stomacke to aryse 
Then cut her short at the first and you shall see 
A meruaylouse vertue in that medisen to bee, 
Giue her not the bridle for a yeare or twayne 
And you shat see her bridle it without a reine 
Breake her betymes and bring her under by force 
Or elles the graye Mere, wil be the better horse 
(1.347-53) 
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This is advice on the management of a new wife, being given by Will, the figure of 
foolishness. Will himself is, as one might expect, lustful and lacking in self- 
control, and part of the comedy might be reckoned to lie in his projection of his 
own qualities onto women. Although the source of the remarks undermines any 
authority they might have, the use of the image is of interest. 
It has been widely observed that an excessive use of language - particularly 
as speech - is attributed both to vice figures and to women. Again, it seems, an 
abstract characteristic is interpreted in physical terms: language becomes speech 
when it is female. To control such excess, then, is to control the organs of speech, 
and from this move into 'brute existence', combined with the horse-taming theme, 
come the images of both the bridled vice and the bridled woman. The scold's bridle 
is popularly believed to be a mediaeval instrument: in fact it appears not to have 
been referred to in literature before the sixteenth century. 
8 Here the theatre is once 
again involved as part of a sequence of over-determining symbolic structures which 
interlock with the real world. 
Heywood's Play of the Wether was printed in 1533, when the stage 
convention of the vice figure was as yet undeveloped. Certainly it was unusual to 
describe either the clown or the representation of temptation as a vice. 9 More 
commonly the tendency to wrongdoing was presented as inherent in the human 
being, and more or less inevitably elicited by the normal processes of daily living 
and growing up. Mundus & Infans, Youth and The Four Elements are the best 
examples of this structure. The active involvement of a devil who tricks an 
otherwise virtuous young man into error, as in Mankind, is relatively uncommon. 
It is not surprising that The Wether contains in Merry Report only a proto-vice 
figure. He manifests many vice-features, with the crucial exception of the desire to 
do evil. However, the comic and linguistic vice-features he does reveal are 
matched in the second part of the play by a female character, the Launder 
(laundress). On one level, the Launder is a good woman, who delivers a homily to 
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the Gentlewoman on the virtues of honest toil. It is surprising then (within the non- 
naturalistic structure of the moral play) that she also behaves like a shrew, sharing 
the vice figure's linguistic skill, his abusive ability, and his low comic presence. 
Most persuasively, she rivals his charismatic capacity to focus attention on himself. 
The play gives every appearance of being a conventional debate play of a 
peculiarly static form. The action is built into a series of legal petitions. One 
petitioner after another puts his or her case to an eminent arbitrator, and all receive 
an answer in the end. The scene is introduced by Jupiter, who reminds the audience 
of a previous debate amongst the gods who control the weather. Jupiter now 
intends to call on public opinion, to establish which variety of weather is required. 
To this end he appoints a fast-talking volunteer, Merry Report, to act as his 
messenger, proclaiming the debate throughout the land, and so stimulating those 
people with an interest in the matter to come forward and put their cases. Merry 
Report is also to act as a master of ceremonies, deciding who may or may not speak 
directly to Jupiter, on the basis of their social standing. 
The play proper follows, consisting of representations made to Jupiter firstly 
by a Gentleman and then by a Merchant. After these two have been heard the 
representations become more and more confrontational, and are interspersed with 
increasing interference by Merry Report. His dismissive tone towards the Ranger 
makes it clear that the Vice's claims to impartiality are false. A Wind Miller and a 
Water Miller argue over their conflicting needs, as do a Gentlewoman and the 
Launder. The Vice's determined enforcement of social hierarchy temporarily 
overwhelms his function of facilitating petitions, and he and the Launder abuse each 
other roundly. A scene of reconciliation follows when a little boy is the next 
petitioner, asking with gently comic innocence for snow and hard frosts. The whole 
piece is concluded as a joke, or a little myth of the origin of the weather, in which 
Jupiter has the last word. 
The vice-like characteristics embodied in the Launder can be most 
conveniently listed in the order in which they occur. Some of these, paralleling 
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prominent traits of Merry Report's behaviour, are foregrounded as vice-play by the 
formal patterning set up by the play. Others are recognizable to us with hindsight 
derived from the overview of vice-characteristics presented in Chapter Three. 
The Launder appears as if conjured from the other world (V 13) when the 
light-minded Gentlewoman is about to be led into error by Merry Report. She is 
from a low social caste (P8), though her possession of a trade gives her some social 
position. The least ambiguous evidence is that her bawdy jokes (V7 and V10) 
match Merry Report's special brand of punning innuendo. With 'why haue ye 
alway kyst her behynde' (1.890), she confronts Merry Report on his own terms, for 
it is a version of his pun on 'backe syde' and 'fore syde' (1.889). The logic of the 
joke is founded on the same manipulation of double meaning (V9) as his earlier 
capping of the Gentlewoman's remark: 'I knowe not how to passe in to the god 
now', with: 'No but ye know how he may passe into you' (1.785-6). The effect of 
the Launder's wit is also identical with that of Merry Report: to seize control of the 
stage (C4) by seeming to be more knowing, more in control of the possibilities of 
language. The Launder uses oaths ('byr lady') and coarse language, including the 
conventional 'kiss my arse' joke (V7). 
Merry Report attempts to control her through a highly rhythmic, repetitive 
series of remarks which stress her incompetence with language. Indeed, he 
describes her speech as meaningless (W6): 
The more ye babyll the more ye fabyll 
The more ye fabyll the more unstabyll 
The more unstabyll the more unabyll 
0.984-86) 
Her response matches both his rhythms and his linguistic skill. 
The les your sylence the lesse your credence 
The les your credens the les your honeste 
(1.988-89) 
Opposing the Launder to Merry Report in a flyting states their balanced, opposed 
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positions in the play's structure, both economically and with excitement. Merry 
Report inaccurately remarks that he has never heard anyone like her. 
Such a raylynge hore by the holy mas 
I neuer herde in all my lyfe tyll now 
(1.959-60) 
Again: 
What monster is this I neuer harde none suche 
(1.994) 
At this point we are forced to recognize how closely her language skills parallel his 
own. 
To be fair to the Launder, it should be noted that her presence stands 
ultimately for virtue, not vice. Her verbal tactics and to some extent her stage 
presence are all that is vice-like. What is of interest now is the stage symbol 
constructed by opposing two figures who are not opposites, but twins. I shall return 
to this play in Chapter Six, with reference to the relationship between order and 
chaos. 
The next development in the matter of the female vice is to be found in a 
little dialogue by William Punt: a Protestant polemic titled the endightement of 
Mother Messe (1548). 10 It is closely related to a dialogue by William Turner which 
covered rather similar ground, though in a significantly different manner. 
11 
Although called a 'dialogue', Punt's work is in dramatic form, containing 
several characters, speech headings and stage directions. It offers further evidence 
that it was coming to be possible for female characters to be accorded vice- 
characteristics. In this case, the author wishes to present a character as pernicious, 
godless, and threatening to the souls of Christians. The dialogue takes the form of a 
trial scene, in which the Catholic mass, characterized as a woman, 'Mother Messe', 
is cross-questioned by a group of male characters with names such as 'Verity' and 
'Knowledge'. Mother Messe is a relatively developed characterization. When she 
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expounds her interpretation of her function she comes across as well-intentioned and 
rather innocent, even simple-minded, such that initially the play conveys some 
sympathy for this character. 12 
In the course of the trial, however, Mother Messe displays or has ascribed to 
her various traits which are strongly reminiscent of the vice figure. There are so 
many of these that I merely list them here. 
1. She is involved in a lineage of evil, being described as the daughter of the 
Pope. 13 She is also described as the 'mother of al myschefe' (A iiii). (Bale 
represents the Pope both as the Devil and as the father of vice. ) (P 16). 
2. The Mass deceives by lying (L1). 
3. On a theological level, the Mass mistakes the spiritual for the literal (V9), in the 
doctrine of trans-substantiation. This confusion of the literal and the 
metaphoric meanings of a word is a typical vice technique for generating 
puns and for mocking spiritual advisers. 
4. She has a detrimental influence on mankind (C2). 'She murders the souls of men 
by leading them to damnation. ' 
5. She assists the devil (P16): 'a woman that hath brought the people in to a 
deuelyshe trade. ' (A iiii). 
6. The formulations in 4 and 5 suggest a further vice-trait, that of adopting a 
teacher-pupil relationship with mankind (C3). This is in addition to the more 
obvious tempter-fallen relationship. 
7. She is reported to be boastful (V4), though we do not observe this in action: 'she 
vaunce her seife to be a god of gods. '(A iiii v). 
8. She propagates heresy. 
9. She associates with morally dubious individuals (P1): we hear that those who will 
stand surety for her live in corners and have such names as 'Stiffneck' and 
'Couetous'. 
10. She attempts to reverse the 'natural' hierarchy of command. (C 1; C2) 'She hath 
set her seife in the seace wher the lyuing god heave should sit' (A iiii v). 
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The accusation is repeated at C iii r, in the judge's sentence. 
11. Her fate is to be banished from the kingdom (P11). 
12. Although banished, she is still seen as a perennially recurrent danger (P7). 
13. Linguistically, the terms in which her behaviour is described belong with the 
vice conventions. She uses 'filthy doctrine' and 'subtil conueyaunce'. The 
latter phrase simultaneously anticipates Subtle Shift, from Clyomon and 
Clamydes (c. 1576)14 and reminds one of Crafty Conveyance from Skelton's 
Magnyfycence (c. 1515-1526), while a character called False Doctrine 
appears in Bale's Three Laws (1538). People also 'heare & se her play in 
her iuglyng garmetes' - thus linking a priest's ceremony with a player's 
performance, and his robes with a tumbler's or fool's costume. Juggling is 
also that 'playing with both hands' that is often referred to in the 1560's and 
70's, in connection with the vice's treachery. 
The characteristics listed above all emerge as reported behaviour. There is, 
however, a moment of on-stage vice-play which verifies the identification. When 
Mother Messe is about to be taken away to Newgate for the night, she mutters a 
remark for the audience's ears alone. Wisdom then asks her to repeat it, at which 
point she reverses its content to create an acceptable lie. 
Wisd. come on youre wais you shall go with me, 
Messe. I am not very wel content 
Wisd. what sayste thou. 
Messe. marye I say I am very wel content. 
(A viii v) 
This striking feature of uttering the truth and then changing it to a similar sounding 
acceptable falsehood is one of the vice figure's most pervasive and characteristic 
verbal habits (Vii). No other character does it. 15 
One can see most clearly what takes place in this dialogue by comparing it 
with its near relative and probable source, the Turner Examination of the Masse. 
The Turner dialogue is considerably longer, but more static. Its primary, even sole, 
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interest is in a theological debate about the nature and hence status of the mass. 
There is some slight characterization, but in general the speeches are lengthy, 
technical and detailed. These speeches are fascinating as examples of a thorough 
forensic examination, based on a pattern in which Catholic advocates identify 
Biblical evidence which appears to sanction the practise of the Mass. Protestants 
then counter each citation with an alternative explication of the text, and in each 
case conclude with an analysis of their reading's implications for contemporary 
practice. The difference in the titles of the two works distinguishes accurately 
between them: Turner's Examination is minutely logical, while Punt's endightement 
is entertainingly confrontational, though intellectually relatively superficial. Both 
belong to the late 1540's, and many expressions are common to both. In the 
Examination, Maistres Messe speaks only at the beginning and the end, framing the 
dialogue rather than taking part in it. The argument is wholly based on Biblical 
exegesis, and not at all on character. Although Punt makes many of the same 
points, he uses very little technical argument and so creates the impression that it is 
Mother Messe's character that is at fault. For example, Turner's Maistres Messe is 
shown to claim to make fair weather and rain, on the basis of a precise linguistic 
analysis. Her discourse is contained at all points by specifically relating it to 
Church ceremonial. Maistres Messe, demonstrating the difference between the 
Mass and the Protestant 'Lord's Supper', explains herself as follows: 
I wyll at this tyme (compelled by necessytye) compare myselfe with 
theyr supper, and proue my seife more worthy of place in Christes 
Churche, then it is. 
the Supper that these fellowes sprake of euen after theyr owne 
confessyon, is but a memoryall of Christes death, of a gyuing of 
thanker, for the benefyt of mans saluation, wherby mans fayth is 
strengthened, and theyr loue is increased..... But harke nowe what I 
dothe do, and can do. I delyuer the sely soules that haue bene longe 
pytously punyshed in purgatory, from theyr paynes &*tormentes. 
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Where fynde you in all the hole Scripture, that the supper of oure 
Lorde, can doo so moche? I can make fayre wether, and rayne: I can 
heale all Sycknesses, and brynge dampned Boules oute of Hell: I can 
purchasse remyssion of synnes, by the offerynge up agayne of 
Christes body and bloude. I can with fyue wordes, make both God 
and man. Which thynge, seynge that God cannot do: can not I do 
more, tht God can do? 
(Avv - Avi) 
(* = next page in original) 
Knowledge points out that it is blasphemy to make herself equal with, or 
superior to God. 
When the relationship between the Mass's claims and the Church is elided, 
the equivalent passage appears in the Punt dialogue as a claim to possess occult 
powers. In brief, Turner's Maistres Messe shares only some of Mother Messe's 
characteristics, namely those I have numbered 1,7,11 and 12 in my discussion. 
Even those are presented in a theoretical and impersonal way which never forgets 
that the object of discussion is a piece of Church ceremony. 
One must ask, then, what effects are generated by a theatrical text which 
makes the Mass simultaneously a vice figure and a woman. There are several 
possible answers. The tradition which represents the Church of Rome as the Whore 
of Babylon allows a fear of woman as insatiable to be brought into play: 'not onely 
this could satisfye hyr wycked desier. ' (C iii v). Alternatively, or additionally, the 
text adds to the vice figure's traditional deceptiveness the tradition of women as 
untrustworthy, and so as deceivers. Such a move hardly seems necessary. Given 
the nature of the vice figure, it seems more likely that contamination would move 
the other way, and identification with the vice figure serve to lower the female. 
Thirdly, the view of women as irrational makes the arguments put forward by 
Mother Messe in the debate structure of the trial seem less plausible: her femaleness 
undermines her attempt to use logic in debate. Finally there is one aspect of Mother 
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Messe which relates to her as female rather than as a vice figure. She is accused of 
acting as a white witch, or wise woman. This is linked with an apparently heretical 
usurpation of divine prerogative: 'she saith she can make fayre wether & raine & 
heale all sicknes, and bring däpned soles out of hel' (A iiii v-A v). At this point, 
if it were not for the Turner source, one might be tempted to wonder whether some 
real woman was the model for Mother Messe, for in the absence of Turner's 
detailed substantiation, the remark creates a sense of personal power in the character 
of Mother Messe. 
The play contains an ambivalence towards its central character. Her defence 
has been sincere, but she is to be severely punished. As long as she seems virtuous 
but uninformed, her well-intentioned error is treated with a degree of warmth and 
sympathy. The gndightement, however, turns savagely against this mood when 
Mother Messe refuses to be reconstructed. This sequence again follows the 
narrative turn typical of those moral plays in which the vice figure is first seen as 
entertaining, but is reviled in the conclusion. 
It seems most probable that woman is the primary characterization of the 
mass within this dialogue. A group of vice-traits is then assimilated to the figure of 
Mother Messe. These then function to reinforce the presumption of deceit, self- 
aggrandizement and mistaken reasoning that are already present in the female 
stereotype. However, they add to that stereotype an impression of a league with the 
devil, founded in the wilful mischief-making which is more than just an Eve-like 
susceptibility to temptation. From that, in turn, comes the sense of a pervasive 
threat that must be guarded against. The play concludes by incorporating the vice- 
characteristics firmly into the female ones. 
The result of all this is to reinforce the process by which vice-traits could be 
seen as part of the female stereotype. The number of parallels and the exactness of 
the match betwen vice-traits and stereotypically 'female' characteristics are what is 
new and striking here. That single sotto voce remark of Mother Messe's is the 
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identifiable beginning of that process. It is not a simple one-way relationship, for 
the stage representation of both figures is in transition. Their interaction generates 
more elaborate forms. It seems more than probable, according to other work done 
on the vice figure, that even without that interaction each figure would have become 
elaborated under pressure from social forces and from developments in theatrical 
fashions. 16 The feminization of the vice figure, and the corresponding assimilation 
of vice-characteristics by the images of the female add a further major force to those 
already generating change in the morality play. When a type begins to include an 
increased and flexible repertoire of determining features, the capacity for variations 
in characterization of the individual representatives of the type correspondingly 
becomes free to increase. Thus it seems that the transition to 'naturalistic' 
characterisation through the 1580's, often represented as diametrically different 
from the earlier mode, has its roots in a dynamic of character development already 
present in the earliest moral plays. 
The terms of Mother Messe's dismissal are extremely suggestive for this 
argument about the incorporation of vice-features in the female. It is significant 
that Punt expanded this section of Turner's dialogue considerably, exploiting its 
potential for rhetorical display and for theatricality. He introduced extra characters 
- vendicta dei and a constable - who escort Mother 
Messe out to Newgate. This is 
consonant with the importance that the arrest and exit of the vice figure already had 
in the moral play. It is, of course, a motif that later became even more clearly 
stressed. Here is the passage in which her fate is announced: 
judge Then vendicta dei and fynall dessperacion shall haue the ouerseing of 
hyr to se hir conuied to hir father the pope againe, and *for thy part 
vendicta dei, se thou that she trauelith with moch paine and 
persecucion & let not my wrath neuer depart from hir but hang thou 
still ouer hir heade for euer & let hir neuer haue no prosperyte but all 
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ways in sorowe & care, and se that she crepith not in to no mans 
house in eany wise as I knowe she will, if thou take not good heade 
therefore wayte narowlye uppon hyr and specially a bowghte Powlles 
amonge hyr fryndes there, and Ludgate and sayncte pulckers, and se 
that she carieth with hyr, hir two brother supersticyon and Idolatry, 
and for thy pane fynall desperacyon, so [sic] that she be broughte hyr 
Jorneys end wyth owght Soker or comfort and that she neuer returne 
agayne wiles the world indureth but alwayes to abide In 
un*comfortable paine as a thing desperate of all comfort neuer to 
obtayne mercy. 
final. My lord vendicta dei and I shal se this youre commaundement 
fulfylled unto the uttermoste. 
Iuge. I pray yow hartely do so & take hir with you. 
(C ii -C iii) 
Two familiar notes are struck by the detail of this banishment. The first is a 
reminiscence of Eve's banishment from the Garden of Eden. The choice of 
'traueleth' is interesting, for it is appropriate to the journey to Rome that Mother 
Messe has been sent on, while also containing 'travaileth' - the doom of childbirth 
placed on Eve. 17 The same image is picked up with 'sorowe and care'. A sense of 
eternity is present in the vow of 'eternal wrath' and 'neuer let her neuer haue no 
prosperyte but all ways in sorowe & care'. Once again, a comparison with Turner's 
dialogue shows that much has been added. 'Crepith', in the next phrase, 
contaminates ideas of womanhood with the fate laid on the serpent, and so aligns 
Mother Messe with the devil as well as with women. It is significant that at this 
point the judgment passes into its second familiar mode, that of domesticity. This 
contrasts with Turner's association of the Mass with the priesthood. 18 
The 'crepith' phrase continues: 'and se that she crepith not i to no mans 
house in any wise as I knowe she will, if thou take not good heade. ' The 
instructions seem now to be directed not so much at vendicta dei, as at each 
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individual, possibly even each man in the audience. Mother Messe herself has been 
sent to Italy, so the allegorized individual figure is now generalized to mean many 
people involved in the practice of conducting the Catholic Mass. However, it has 
not lost its feminine aspect. The significance of this generalized, creeping figure is 
thus enabled to slide from Catholics to women, while the sense that we are no 
longer considering Mother Messe as an individual is reinforced when we are told 
that, though exiled to Rome, she may be found at St. Paul's 'a monge hyr fryndes' 
(like Mrs. Noah) or with 'hir two brother'. 19 Turner does not mention this social 
aspect. 
Neither of these areas of resonance is necessitated by the direction of the 
play, nor by the logic of the prosecution's arguments. Both, however, are founded 
in the characterization of the Mass as female. Between them they focus the 
femaleness of Mother Messe in such a way as to license the rage that fills the 
pronouncement of her exile. 20 By harnessing Biblical authority and the rationale of 
analogy, the apparent justice of that dismissal is enhanced. Finally, the connection 
between the mass and woman mobilizes what can only be seen as a sinister 
overtone, associating the evil Mother Messe with a threat to domestic peace. 
Suddenly it is important to ensure that she 'crepith into no mans house'. 
Apparently the first area of assault that she is likely to choose is not the individual 
or the soul, but the dwelling place. This is sinister because the rhetoric has moved 
away from theological debate into the fabric of everyday life. On a pragmatic level 
the 'house' in question is simply the physical location needed for a Mass to be 
celebrated, given its exclusion from churches. Nevertheless, it is also the location 
of the family, and so of negotiations between husband and wife. Finally, it is an 
image of the self: that place where one is most private, most vulnerable, most 
relaxed. In this play, then, woman is imaged as that which is threatening to the 
domain of the self, that which triggers fragmentation. At this point the vice- 
convention of ubiquity interlocks with the lived realities of domestic life to create an 
atmosphere which suggests that it may be women in general who need perpetual 
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surveillance. 
In its attempt to draw a general moral from the allegorical trial of a person 
called Mother Messe, the dialogue moves its discussion away from the immediately 
present situation of the dramatic trial to more wide-ranging advice to the audience 
about the use of the Mass in the world at large. At this point it appears that 'thou' 
no longer addresses the character vendicta dei, but is extended to describe the 
sixteenth century masculine householders: the position of selfhood to which the text 
appeals when it refers to 'no mans house'. Attributing ubiquity to the allegorical 
figure coheres, on the level of the referent, with a fear of the continued celebration 
of the Mass in many parts of the country, and on the figurative level with the 
dramatic presence of Mother Messe as a female vice figure. It is the translation of 
allegory into real terms that triggers this extra meaning. 
These two aspects of Mother Messe are so interwoven in the judgement 
scene that the play's move to warn against evil cannot be dissociated from a 
partially-concealed warning against women. Indeed, that last offers a modified 
escape from the illogicality of combining the total banishment of evil with a belief 
in its continued presence. A sense of the omnipresence of the threat results in a 
feeling that some unidentified person must be eternally watched over. Again, the 
surface illogicality of combining banishment and presence masks a mode of 
reasoning which classically is accepted as valid only by the unconscious mind: the 
Mass is a woman; the Mass is dangerous; therefore all women are dangerous. Such 
an attitude feeds the fear that even 'good' women are a potential threat, for at any 
time their 'womanness' might overwhelm their virtue. 
A state of eternal tension between (unsuccessful) banishment and (denied but 
feared) presence is, of course, the locus of the repressed other. 
The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune (1582)21 is a moral play because it 
represents human life as subject to a metaphysical opposition. Where Mankind uses 
a farmer for whom success is the harvest, Lave and Fortune makes its mankind 
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figure a lover, for whom success is marriage. 22 Mankind is opposed by Titivillus' 
plank, Hermione by Fortune's placing of Armenio. In both cases the agent of 
opposition is defeated by a higher authority who re-institutes the original life script. 
This sketch will suffice for now, but it will require modification later, when I come 
to consider the social structures involved in the action. In this play the vice-features 
missing from Mother Messe and the Launder can be detected, though with a 
secularizing twist which is significant. I shall discuss the construction of this 
elaborate play at greater length in Chapter Six. Here, however, it is the ambience 
attached to the female characters of the framing plot which is of interest. Very 
briefly, then, the situation set out in Act One establishes a mechanism of control 
over what follows, such that the relationship is much more complex than that of a 
simple play-within-a-play. 
In a contention over precedence, put before the court of Jupiter, Fortune 
claims that Venus has been denigrating her, to the extent that her status as a god has 
been attacked. 23 There follows a dumb-show, presenting a series of historical 
figures whose falls were due to either Fortune or Love: Troilus and Cressida; 
Alexander; Dido; Pompey and Caesar; and Hero and Leander. The show is 
inconclusive, so as a further trial of strength Jupiter decides on a competition, 
influencing the lives of certain human beings. Whoever has the greater effect will 
be deemed the greater goddess. The project has clearly shifted from the original 
desire to restore Fortune's rights as an equal amongst the gods, and has become a 
simple contest for supremacy, in structure strongly reminiscent of a tilt. Success in 
that contest is now expressed as 'soueraintie'. Jupiter, in setting up the contest, 
rewrites its purpose: 
there is a Prince beloued of his loue? 
On whom I meane your souerainties to proue. 
Venus, for that thy loue thy sweet delight, 
thou shalt endure to encrease their ioy: 
and Fortune thou to manifest thy might, 
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their pleasures and their pastimes thou shalt destroye 
Ouerthwarting them with newes of freshe anoye 
And she that most can please them or dispight, 
I will confirm to be of greatest might. 
(1.258-66) 
Thus the contention among the gods becomes the frame of a complicated Romance- 
plot, which occupies the ensuing three Acts, and is resolved, together with the 
resolution of the trial-of-strength plot, in Act Five. It should be said here that vice- 
traits in this play are dispersed through various characters in addition to the 
Goddesses: Vulcan is vulgar and confiding; Penulo plots; Armenio enjoys a high 
level of manic viciousness; Bomelio is a wizard of sorts; 24 and even Fidelia has 
magical properties. Both goddesses, however, harbour the vice figure's desire to 
interfere in the normal course of human events: to set themselves up as alternative 
authors (C6). Of the two, Fortune appears the likelier candidate for the title of vice 
figure, 25 insofar as such a term is appropriate to this play, since she comes from 
Hell, where her father is Pluto, the King of Hades (P16). 26 Their messenger is the 
fury, Tysiphone, represented as terrifying and devilish. 27 Her function of spreading 
discord amongst the Gods resembles the r6le of Cacurgus in Misogonus. 28 Fortune 
begins her petition to the Gods: 
I cannot but confesse dread Gods I am not she, 
that seekes with Venus to compare in her supremacie. 
I am not of that power, yet am I of some might, 
which she usurping chalengeth to keep me from my right 
(1.151-4) 
How far the audience can believe Fortune here is a question which each particular 
production has to decide. Some doubt is cast on her sincerity by the preamble to 
her plea, where she suggests that what she will say is a construction with an ulterior 
purpose. 
------- how should I now begin, 
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Or which way should I couch my words your fauors for to win. 
(1.146-7) 
Fortune is not fickle, but deeply and consistently negative to human happiness. She 
interprets her own place in the scheme of things as entirely evil. Although she is 
'High mastris of the rowling wheele of chaunce' (1.558), which is theoretically able 
to raise people's fortunes as well as destroying them, all her activities in this play 
are designed to damage human happiness by thwarting the plans by which people 
seek to control their futures. 
Heerin consisteth Fortunes soueraintie, 
that Fortune can on earth doo what she will. 
when men haue builded on the surest grounds, 
their strong deuises Fortunes power confoundes. 
(1.560-63). 
Fortune appears from a human point of view, therefore, as unpredictable and 
external. Her motivations, in particular, can only be mysterious to humans, who 
are necessarily unaware of the debate between the gods. The vice figure too was 
external, manipulative, and an alternative author. For these reasons the 
identification of Fortune as vice figure is believable, especially given that the vice 
figure came, by the middle of the century, to be represented as a manifestation of 
randomness, rather than as an agent of the Devil. Fortune's motivations, like those 
of the vice figure, are concealed from those human beings she manipulates. Love 
and Fortune can be seen as expressing a sense of personal helplessness and a 
paranoid sense of the other as an unexplained force. Here, causality is explored in 
a secular way. The earlier moral plays had seen the vicissitudes and the triumphs of 
life as attributable to two clear varieties of cause. The first lay in the inherent 
frailty of human moral structures, where moral weakness was peculiar to each stage 
of life. Thus childhood was wilful, youth sexual, old age filled with a love of 
money, and so on. At any age, simple tiredness, hunger or boredom standardly 
invited moral danger. Moral decline was therefore stereotyped, predictable in 
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nature, and avoidable by the exercise of the will. In the second model, morally 
damaging events were also initiated by the active engagement of antagonistic forces 
in human affairs. In other words, the Devil and his agents offered temptations to 
evil tailor-made to the frailties of the individual. Agents of virtue were seen as 
available at significant moments to describe the nature of virtue, to clarify the 
consequences of particular actions, and to remind the mankind figure of the 
existence of moral choice. Life events therefore were shown as centred on the 
individual, and indeed designed to affect the individual's behaviour. 
In the Romances one expects to observe the chaotic operations of chance and 
coincidence: improbable events and hardships, voyages into the unknown and a 
happy outcome are standard fare. However, once in the theatre, these narratives 
became subject to the need to explain, and they take over the vice figure as a force 
of deliberate but random malevolence. 
29 In The Rare Triumphs of Love and 
Fortun events are represented as controlled by external forces. Because of the way 
in which they are personified, these forces have aims wholly separate from concerns 
about the future, or the spiritual well-being of the individual. The effect on the 
human beings is to locate them in a world where random, unanticipated events take 
place. Such events cannot be contained in the essentially anthropocentric view of 
the traditional moral play. Within the play this stance can be a source of quasi- 
comic irony. 
Bomelio: And now somewhat it is but what I 
cannot tell, 
prouokes me forward more then wont to 
leaue my darksome sell 
(1.608-9) 
Furthermore, that sense of the incon 
jhensible, 
of uncontrolled yet controlling 
forces, is insistently imaged as female. 
Although the sense of randomness is present in the play, it also retains a 
certain theological flavour in its assertion that such randomness has an explanation, 
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if one could only see into the minds of the Gods. It is a view of cause which has 
much in common with the empirical sciences. 
The female vice can be found in its elaborated form in the anonymous play 
Lingua (sometimes attributed to Thomas Tomkis). 30 The play is extremely 
interesting since it seems courtly, though it is usually described as an 'academic 
morality'. 31 The language is often beautiful, often witty, and always attractive. It 
delights in aphorism, and moves smoothly between verse and prose. The plot is 
entertaining and the action hilarious. First printed in 1607, though clearly dating 
from the last decade of the reign of Elizabeth, it uses a series of wholly allegorical 
characters. 32 The play narrates a moral conflict for control of the Microcosmos - 
the human body, or possibly the body politic of the nation - which harks back 
directly to The Assembly of Gods. In brief, it is a very late moral play. The 
Prologue is at pains to ensure that the audience does not expect any of the stock 
behaviour or characters derived from continental farce. 
Our Muse describes no lover's passion 
No wretched father, no unthrifty son! 
No craving subtle whore or shameless bawd, 
No stubborn clown or daring parasite 
No lying servant or bold sycophant. 
(Prologue, p. 335)33 
Although it is a comedy, it is neither a Romance nor a farce. The players' aim to 
teach 'severe Philosophy to smile' is achieved by moving into a contemporary 
realisation of an old-fashioned form: the struggle for supremacy between good and 
evil. It will be seen, though, that the terms 'good' and 'evil' are very qualified 
ones in this case. 
The scene opens with Lingua expressing her complaints to Auditus. It soon 
becomes clear that Lingua feels politically isolated. She is cut off from direct 
communication with Psyche, Queen of the Commonwealth of Microcosm, because 
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everything perceived by the Queen is mediated through her five Senses: Auditus, 
Tactus, Gustus, Visus and Olfactus. The Queen has a minister, Communis Sensus, 
whose function as judge Lingua also believes to be perverted by the Senses. 34 
Lingua therefore plots to 'set them all at variance, / And so obtain to speak. ' With 
the help of her servant, Mendacio, she tricks the Senses into believing that a robe 
and crown, left temptingly by the wayside, are really a present from Jupiter for the 
one of the five who 'proves himself the best' (Act 1, scene 2; p. 359) This is rather 
easily achieved, given the childish self-seeking that governs each Sense's mental 
framework. That is coupled with a shallowness of thought, which is itself related to 
the allegorical status of each Sense as perceiving only one facet of experience. For 
the purposes of this discussion, I omit the series of comic scenes involving various 
serving lads. 
The expected dissent ensues, and battle lines are drawn up, with Auditus' 
and Visus' armies opposing those of Tactus and Gustus. Lingua takes the 
opportunity to have Communis Sensus convene a court. With hierarchy already on 
the agenda, the hearing becomes an opportunity for Lingua to put her own case for 
a different status. The Senses put forward a list of Articles against her claim. 
Communis Sensus chooses to postpone judgment of this matter until he has 
finished with the contention of the Senses for superiority. Their representations take 
the form of a series of five pageants with commentary, each advertising the worth 
of a particular Sense. The reactions of the on-stage audience - Communis Sensus, 
Phantastes, Memory, Anamnestes, 35 and Heuresis36 - add to the expositions and the 
wit. Visus and Auditus display their attributes first. Act Four begins with comic 
byplay among the three servants. Next Auditus continues his display with the 
characters of Comedy and Tragedy speaking for him. The shows of Olfactus and 
Gustus each occupy relatively brief scenes, while that of Tactus is reduced to a 
simple speech, for his sensual show of Venus and Cupid has foundered on the . 
problems posed by women's dress. Communis Sensus forms a rational judgement 
which rewards and compliments all the Senses, and so is acceptable to all. He also 
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judges Lingua not to be a Sense, but allocates her specifically to women as a sixth 
sense, the sense of speaking. 
Lingua, left alone and furious, plots a further attack on the Senses. 37 We 
learn that she has contacts with the dark powers, in the form of a witch called 
Acrasia who, in accordance with her classical identification with chaos, supplies a 
potion and a charm to enrage the Senses, causing each to lose his identifying 
quality. 38 Somnus, mobilized to control them one by one, also comes across 
Lingua as she gloats over their state, and puts her to sleep as well. Because they all 
talk in their sleep, Lingua can be interrogated, and her role in the plot is 
discovered. Communis Sensus condemns her to imprisonment, representing the 
teeth and lips as guards and strong doors. The play closes with a witty little 
epilogue, which requires the audience's applause so that the servant Appetitus will 
wake up, and return to normal life. 
The evidence that Lingua is a vice figure is overwhelming. I will consider 
in turn the evidence offered by her linguistic habits; by her associates; by her 
behaviour and the behaviour attributed to her; and by her place in the structure of 
the play. As we have found in previous discussions of vice-characteristics, these 
aspects frequently intersect. I separate them here for the sake of clarity of 
exposition: 
It is Lingua's metier to be extremely competent linguistically (V5). She can 
use gorgeous language, dark curses and humour. She tells lies readily (L1) and can 
mobilize classical paradoxes to provide a smoke screen for this habit. When 
accused of habitual lying, she responds 'I say so too, therefore I do not lie' (Act 1, 
scene 1; p. 339). There comes a point, however, where her witty control leads into 
meaninglessness. 39 When attempting a neat paradox, using the 'inexpressibility' 
topos to praise speech, she falls into the trap of simultaneously describing speech as 
both wonderful and inadequate. 40 Here the paradox works against her needs, and 
her linguistic emptiness is revealed. 
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'What should I say more? I can never speak enough of the 
unspeakable praise of speech, wherein I can find no other 
imperfection at all, but that the most exquisite power and excellency 
of speech cannot sufficiently express the exquisite power and 
excellency of speaking. ' (Act 3, scene 5; p. 395). 
She uses repetition (fie, fie, fie, fie) and gloating laughter (M5). At one 
point her laughter is uncontrolled, an outburst which cuts across the sentence she is 
uttering. She thinks aloud, sometimes apparently musing to herself (Act 1, scene 1; 
p. 342), or elsewhere taking the audience into her confidence (C4) (Act 1, scene 3; 
p. 344). In the trial scene, Lingua jumbles several languages together, apparently 
believing this macaronic construction to be appropriate to legal debate (Act 3, scene 
5; p. 392). Within English she embeds Latin, Greek, Italian and French. Her 
linguistic skill in changing styles to suit her audience is represented, in the terms of 
the play, as deceitfulness rather than flexibility. For example, she uses 'sugar'd 
words to delude Gustus' taste'; 'civet-speech t'entrap Olfactus' nose', and so on 
(Act 1, scene 1; p. 341). When the Senses put forward a list of charges against her, 
they include a charge that she creates bad translations: 'she hath most vilely 
prostituted the hard mysteries of unknown languages to the profane ears of the 
vulgar' (Act 3, scene 5; p. 396). Both 'mysteries' and 'profane' hint at a destructive 
meddling in theological matters (V9). 
Like Courage in The Tyde Tarrieth No Man, she utters a speech which 
suggests a 'divided self' Act 4, scene 8; pp. 431-2). 
41 In this case, the speech 
could be recuperated as a piece of sarcasm followed by an honest description of her 
feelings, but it reads more credibly as a change of heart: 
Well, now I see my cause is desperate, 
The judgment's pass'd, sentence irrevocable, 
Therefore I'll be content and clap my hands, 
And give a plaudite to their proceedings. 
What, shall I leave my hate begun unperfect? 
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So foully vanquish'd by the spiteful Senses? 
(Act 4, scene 8, pp. 431-2) 
Here, when she plans revenge, Lingua is vaunting and hubristic, another major 
vice-trait. 
It is a challenge to determine the extent to which Lingua associates with a 
vice-crew. On one hand we have the Senses' allegations that she associates with 'a 
train of prating pettifoggers, prowling sumners, smooth tongued bawds, artless 
empirics, hungry parasites, newscarriers, janglers and such like idle companions', 
(Act 3, scene 5; p. 397). Within the action of the play itself, however, the dramatic 
function contained by the concept 'vice-crew' is much more applicable to the group 
of the Five Senses in many of their rompings and rivalries. Although Lingua is in 
conflict with them throughout the play, they cannot quite be seen as emblems of 
goodness. Indeed, conflict in the form of abuse and beatings often characterizes the 
relationship between chief vices and their followers. Though verbally clever, the 
Senses are not very bright. They turn against one another on the slightest 
provocation, and are equally easily made violent. They laugh at one another's 
misfortunes, and plot rather risibly for their own self-interest. This tendency to the 
ridiculous connects them with the vice-crew as a low comic group. Our impression 
that Tactus has a criminal mind is reinforced when he sings a tinkers' song. There 
is even a scene in which he speaks the truth and then changes it to a plausible 
falsehood. Again, the vice-trait of mishearing can be found in the very funny 
slapstick scene in which Auditus has been deafened, (Act 5, scene 9; p. 442-4). 
When the Lingua/Senses plot is in the background, the stage is taken over by 
a succession of 'comic servant' scenes. The balance of this play is thus weighted 
towards that dispersal of the vice-function into numerous characters, already 
observed in connection with The Ty-de Tarrieth No Man and other proverb plays in 
Chapter Four. Lingua also resembles The yde Tarrieth No Man, in that the 
largest proportion of the play is devoted to the intrigue and knockabout comedy of 
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the vice and crew, with a corresponding reduction in stress on the role of virtue and 
of the mankind figure. 
Since vice figures generally represent the physical/literal aspect of 
experience, as opposed to the spiritual, it is inevitable that the Senses, as allegory, 
cannot help resembling the bibulous and lascivious aspects of the vice-crew. For 
the purposes of the play, however, they are represented in a more courtly mode. 
The 'comic servant' scenes relocate the Senses in a higher social caste. Ultimately, 
their aggression manifests itself as a formal battle, described but not seen. The 
terms of the description suggest the coded refinement of the Accession-Day Tilts, or 
poetic descriptions of battle array, rather than the horseplay traditionally favoured 
on the moral play stage. The 'kitchen' theme of that part of the battle which 
involves Gustus associates it with folk tale and folk-song bragging, but also with 
courtly banquets and civic receptions for the monarch, the narration of which takes 
delight in dwelling on the size and number of the comestibles provided. When 
presenting their shows, the Senses are permitted vivid and elegant verse. 42 
Through those lengthy passages they also assist in the constitution of the play as a 
delicately witty intellectual conceit. There is thus an ambivalence created by their 
characterisation as vice-crew, and their plot-function as courtiers. Again, in terms 
of subject/other, the femaleness of Lingua herself intensifies the opposition between 
the principal vice and her crew. 
A clearer representative of vice-crew occurs in Mendacio, her page, who is 
at one and the same time a conniving servant from Latin comedy and, like 
Greediness, both ubiquitous (Act 2, scene 1; p. 364) and ageless (Act 2, scene 1; 
p. 365). As evidence of ubiquity, one notices his answer when Appetitus asks him 
where he has been: 
Mendacio: Everywhere. In the court you 
gentlewomen hang me at their apron strings, and that 
makes them answer so readily. In the city I am 
honoured like a god; none so well 
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acquainted with your tradesmen 
.... (and so on, at length) 
(Act 2, scene 1; p. 364) 
He also offers evidence of his agelessness: 'I tell thee, three thousand years ago 
was Mendacio born in Greece, nursed in Crete, and ever since honoured 
everywhere. ' He claims an influence in the composition of all the major works of 
historians, as well as of poems and legends. Although Appetitus responds by 
drawing attention to his capacities as a liar, there is more satiric mileage to be 
gained by reading these claims as honest. 
Those characters who discuss Lingua attribute various significant 
behavioural qualities to her, in particular, lying and the deformation of language. I 
have already mentioned that they associate her with a troop of sinister figures. Her 
own language offers a loose connection with the devil: 'And do, in faith I will, the 
devil knows what' (Act 1, scene 1; p. 342). The juxtaposition of 'faith' and 'devil' 
hints at an unhallowed allegiance. Her translations are described as making 'a new 
hell in the upper world' (Act 3, scene 5; p. 396). As the only female character in 
the play, Lingua herself is an obvious particular referent when women in general 
are discussed. They are put forward as unlike men in 'peevishness and folly', in 
'pride, deceit, prating, lying, cogging, coyness, spite, hate'. Of these, only 
peevishness and coyness are not standard descriptions of the vice figure. The 
passage continues: 'and in many more such vices' (Act 3, scene 6; p. 403). In this 
exchange, then, the crucial differences betwen men and women are compressed into 
the term 'vices'. 
Among the elaborate pieces of stage business, Lingua sends a false message 
(L5), in the writing that accompanies the cloak and crown, and also struggles (P6) 
when taken prisoner (Act 5, scene 12; p. 447). 
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Lingua is perhaps most vice-like in her structural position in the play. She 
wishes to re-organize the order of society, subversively putting herself forward as a 
sense (C5). To this end she is the author of two separate plots (C6), rivalling the 
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'authority' of Communis Sensus' judgments. She is involved in creating symbolic 
'uncrownings', causing the Senses to take leave of their senses. She twice creates 
anarchy amongst the Senses, first by stimulating war and then by maddening them 
with a drug. Lingua is also associated with social disorder, in that she is seen as 
facilitating discord between husband and wife and between close friends (C6) (Act 
3, scene 5; p. 397). In addition, her satire is supposed to upset the social hierarchy 
by 'railing on men in authority, depraving their honours with bitter jests and taunts' 
(V7) (Act 3, scene 5; p. 397). Another of her actions is feared as a threat to 
established precedence: 'now by these translations every cobbler is as familiar with 
Alexander as he that wrote his life' (Act 3, scene 5; p. 396). 
On stage indeed, the dispersal of authority is represented by the ownerless 
crown and robe, which are fought over, concealed, and finally distributed. The 
crown and robe are fakes, and even Lingua has possession of them by default, for 
she was awarded them in a competition in which she was not even an entrant. 
Disputed authority is the foundation of the moral play form. Authority is only 
apparently symbolized here by the crown and robe, for these are in fact a red 
herring designed for the Senses. Lingua hopes that the real authority issue (an 
invisible matter to do with status) can be settled while they are arrayed for battle 
over the meretricious 'gauds'. The Senses, as always, have mistaken a literal, 
outward seeming for true value (V9). Even that abstract idea of 'superiority' that 
the crown and robe are purported to represent, is not of true value in a world where 
the Senses must co-operate if Queen Psyche is to achieve fidelity of perception. 
The existence of Communis Sensus as arbitrator among them is evidence of this. 
The solution to their rage appears when Somnus puts the Senses to sleep. This, 
however, allows a further reversal of authority, for the parasite Appetitus now 
changes his name (L6), ceases to be a servant, and puts forward great plans in 
pretentious language. 
The arraignment of Lingua in a scene resembling a trial reminds us of 
Mother Messe, but also of the many vice figures who are formally judged and 
236 
condemned to social exclusion, either by imprisonment or banishment (P11). Like 
other vice figures, Lingua is spared from death, but condemned to a lifetime of 
43 imprisonment. 
There are further aspects of Lingua which have little to do with vice- 
conventions, but much to do with femaleness. She is connected with magic. She 
has access to the hag, Acrasia, and seems to have witch-like powers in her own 
right to utter magic charms. Her blood-chilling curses have a peculiarly credible, 
forceful quality. 
May the loud cannoning of thunderbolts, 
Screeking of wolves, howling of tortur'd ghosts, 
Pursue thee still, and fill thy amaz'd ears 
With cold astonishment and horrid fears! 
(Act 1, scene 1; p. 341) 
This, spoken to Auditus, has an incantatory formality and elevation quite different 
from the human seeming frustration she expresses six lines earlier. 
0, could I use the breath mine anger spends, 
I'd maketheeknow ------- 
(Act 1, scene 1; p. 340) 
The Senses accuse her of witchcraft, among other things. Their description 
of her as a common whore is based in a pun on her linguistic properties, which 
identifies the detachment of meaning from truth with the loosening of sexual 
morality: she 'lets everyone lie with her'. She is also a scold, and, rather strangely, 
inclined to talk in her sleep. This last feature is seen as more common in women 
than in men: a case of stereotyping governing perception. The accusations are 
summed up by Article 10: 'Item (which is the last and worst), that she's a woman in 
every respect. ' (Act 3, scene 5; p. 397). 
There is of course the problem with this attribution of generalized sinfulness 
to Lingua, that it is presented by a group whose reliability as witnesses is seriously 
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in doubt. Their evidence is unlikely to be taken seriously even before the 
presentation of the ten articles. However, the articles themselves display a 
circularity of reasoning which it is hard to credit. Lingua's 'crimes' are based on 
her femaleness and on her allegorical aspect. The allegorical construction of a 
character called Speech, or Tongue, must involve a considerable amount of talking, 
and probably considerable versatility with speech. Yet these are the very details 
which are also culturally established both as proper to women and also as 
constitutive of vice figures. The characteristics of the allegorical figure of Lingua 
are thus also identical with a selection of the commonplaces about women. From 
this it becomes clear that the construction of Lingua as female is based precisely in 
an identification between the vice figure as a threat and language as a threat. 
Lingua's motivations seem to be her most fundamentally vice-like feature. 
On a simple level she is motivated by malice: to Lingua a joke is much richer if it is 
at somebody else's expense. Ultimately, though, her motivation is that which, in 
one form or another, summarizes all vice-behaviour from the earliest plays 
onwards: the sin of Pride. Lingua wishes to aggrandize herself beyond the place 
designated for her in the order of things. 
By creating a female vice figure the play of Lingua thus puts forward a view 
of women's speech as worse than merely excessive or undesirable, which is the 
situation presumed by the opposition of the good silent woman and the talking 
woman who needs to be controlled. Here, female speech is actively threatening to 
the well-being of the organism of Microcosmos. Because of the flexibility of 
allegory, one is free to read Microcosmos in several ways: as (male-dominated) 
society; as the human being (again presumably male, but significantly indivisible 
from the female/vice-like other that inhabits his capacity for language); as the union 
of husband and wife. How far is it possible to read Microcosmos as universal to all 
human beings, that is, as either female or male? The handicaps are in the presumed 
otherness of the essence of femininity. Microcosmos shares the alienating feature of 
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much (possibly all) language and literature, that the female is other. There is 
another woman in the play, who never appears: Psyche, the Queen to whom all the 
participants in the drama owe allegiance. This perfect female is not just silent, but 
absent, in a sense in which Microcosmos is not, for one can see Microcosmos as the 
physical surroundings: the stage itself. It seems probable that Psyche refers to 
Elizabeth I, offering the figure of the idealized woman for whom all courtly shows 
are intended. 45 If, as I believe, the play was performed for Elizabeth, the character 
of Psyche was effectively on stage throughout, silently presiding over the action. 
The soul, interestingly, cannot be touched by the machinations of Lingua, whose 
magic in this play extends only over the physical world of the Senses. 46 In terms of 
the stage image, the final arbiter, and so the most powerful individual, is Communis 
Sensus. 
The play then reveals itself as an advice play to the monarch, like John 
Heywood's Play of the Wether, in this case recommending adherence to standard 
committee procedure, and advising against paying attention to the lobbying of 
advisers or talkative upstarts. 47 
In the end, though, the presence of a silent 'Psyche' increases the pressure 
which isolates Lingua and her desperate schemes, for it turns the confrontation 
against her from a male/female one into one between 'virtuous people' on the one 
hand, and 'vicious woman' on the other. In this scenario, males can only be 
virtuous and sensible, virtuous and gullible, or comic servants. 
In both The Play of the Wether and mother messe, we have seen female 
figures with some vice-like aspects. However, both lack certain crucial features 
needed to qualify them unequivocally as vice figures. The Launder is profoundly 
virtuous and, though her verbal style is gutsy, the only person to accuse her of 
shrewish behaviour is the biased and compromised Merry Report. Mother Messe, 
though defined as evil, makes no attempt at wit. Her position as defendant in a trial 
gives her no opportunity for vice-play, and strict adherence to the debate form 
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means that there is no plot for her to manipulate. Given that the essence of vice 
figures is performance and virtuoso display, the static terms of the dialogue-form 
incapacitate its participants from behaving as developed vice figures. It is clear that 
Mother Messe constitutes a reference to the vice-convention, and even an image of 
it, rather than an example. 
In The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune female figures appear as 
controlling creators of narrative, and also as disruptions to the peace of both the 
realms Jupiter governs. The dignity and noble status of the goddesses, however, 
defend them from a vice-like identification with the 'low other'. 
By the time Lingua occurs at the end of the period I have been examining, it 
seems that there is ample evidence for the existence of the 'female vice' on the 
stage. This is a figure which is separate from that of the ordinary chattering or 
railing woman of low comedy. 47 Instead it is a vice figure in a moral play structure 
which involves a conflict between good and evil, whether for the well-being of the 
mankind figure, or for control of the play. For the audience, recognition of the 
terms of the good/evil division is constructed by the use of a set of key aspects of 
behaviour which I have called vice-features. It is in these features, welded to stock 
notions of the female that the character of Lingua is founded. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE 
1 The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune, Malone Society Reprints (Oxford, 
1930), (A ii). 
2 'Did Women Have a Renaissance? ', in Becoming Visible: Women in 
European History, ed. Renate Bridenthal, Claudia Koonz and Susan Stuard (Boston, 
1987), pp. 175-202 (p. 176) . 
3 On this theme, see George Ferguson, Signs and Symbols in Christian Art 
(New York, 1959), p. 7. 
4 Glynne Wickham, English Moral Interludes (London, 1976), p. 5. 
5 Ulpian Fulwell, Like Will to Like, in Four Tudor Interludes, ed. J. A. B. 
Somerset (London, 1974), pp. 128-164. 
6 The Trial of Treasure, in Anonymous Plays Third Series, ed. J. S. Farmer 
(London, 1906; reprinted Guildford, 1966), pp. 203-246. As Farmer does not give 
line numbers, it is clearest to give page references for the quotations from this play. 
7 The Marriage of Wit and Science, ed. Arthur Brown, Malone Society 
Reprints (Oxford, 1960). 
8 Outside the realm of the moral play, the theatrical imagery of women in 
need of reigning or curbing is extensive, including pervasive occurrences in 
Shakespeare's The Taming of the Shrew, Riverside Shakes re, ed. Harry Levin 
and others (Boston, 1974), pp. 110-139. In Antony and Cleopatra, Antony uses 
'snaffle' and 'uncurbable' in his remarks about Fulvia. Riverside Shakespea e, 
pp. 1347-86, (2, ii, 67-71). 
9 In John Heywood's A Play of Love, Neither Lover nor Loved, though 
designated the 'Vice', is merely the most cynical of the debaters. 
10 The endightement against mother messe, in Three Tudor Dialogues, ed. 
Dickie Spurgeon, Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 319 (New York, 1978), 
(unnumbered pages). 
11 Turner's Examination of the Mass, BM C. 21. Q. 53; STC 24364Q, is 
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discussed by C. H. Herford, Studies in the Literary Relations of England and 
Germany in the Renaissance (Cambridge, 1886), pp. 63-65. The first edition of the 
Examination provides no convenient date. It seems probable that the Examination 
precedes the endightement because of the latter's summarized versions of the 
elaborate arguments of the former. I note Herford's opinion: 'I regard the 
Endightment as a somewhat felicitous adaptation of Turner's plan, produced not 
many months after it', p. 66. The following discussion assumes the English 
Examination, rather than the German original, to be the direct source for Punt's 
work. 
12 This characteristic of Protestant attitudes to Catholicism recurs in 
Misogonus. 
13 Connecting the Pope with the Devil was a commonplace, related to the 
dictum of both Wyclif and Luther that the Pope was the Antichrist whose reign must 
precede the second coming. Herford, op. cit., pp. 120-138, discusses this connection 
in the drama. Kirchmayer's Pammachius, in which the Pope is shown making a 
contract with 'the Fiend', was performed at Christ's College Cambridge in 1545, 
and translated by John Bale (now lost). Bale's Kyng Johan also shows similarities. 
14 Though 1599 is the earliest printed edition, W. W. Greg's judgment has not 
been superseded: 'Clyomon and Clamydes is very likely by the same hand as, and 
almost certainly contemporary with, Common Conditions, to which it is, if 
anything, probably anterior. ' [The latter play was entered in the Stationer's 
Register in 1576. ] Sir Clyomon and Sir Clamydes, Malone Society Reprints 
(1913), p. vi. 
15 Bernard Spivack memorably describes this habit as 'a unique piece of oral 
legerdemain ... which appears scores of times 
in the moralities, and is, in fact, a 
prominent signature of [the Vice's] role after 1550.... he flashes a gleam of truth 
in the face of his dupe, but quickly withdraws it, pretending a slip of the tongue or 
other words to another effect. ' Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil (New York 
and London, 1958), p. 168. 
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16 Bernard Spivack sees the intellectual/social dimension: 'like the epoch they 
[the plays] mirror, they gradually submit to the secular revolution that separates the 
Renaissance from the Middle Ages. ' (op. cit., p. 206). Again, 'the single 
transcendental subject is replaced by a world of particulars ... topics equally 
specialized and secular', p. 227. 
17 While the confusion between the two words was a commonplace, it should 
be noticed that 'traue! ' is generally used when the difficulties and effort of 
movement from place to place are stressed. Otherwise 'journey' is one of several 
options. The use of 'travail' as the spelling of both forms is thus not merely 
unsurprising, but reasonable. 
18 Turner gives us: 
Knowledge: Syr yf it please you, yf there be no man appynted to se 
this woman shypped, and conueyed out of the lande, the priestes wyll 
kepe her styli in theyr chambres, and wyll abuse her, as they haue 
done before. (xami_, G iii). 
19 'Brother' was commonly used to mean 'knave', and is also frequently used 
as greeting and identification among members of the vice-crew. 
20 On a more conscious level, the effect of this argument by metaphor is to 
foster the transformation of Catholicism from 'self' nto 'other' in the moral play by 
personifying it as female. Where the earlier Morality had traditionally opposed the 
Christian 'self' to the devilish or heretical 'other', Protestantism needed to establish 
a Catholic other simply because Protestantism itself could so easily be located in the 
space of the heretical other. One needs only to add that 'self' had traditionally also 
been identified with conservatism, and with a fortress mentality (as in The Castle of 
Perseveraunce) and other had been linked with novelty, to see that the appropriation 
of reform for the 'self was an urgent task. In this play we see how the pre-existing 
otherness of women is mobilized to re-locate the two opposed terms of the 
theological debate. 
21 The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune, Malone Society Reprints (Oxford, 
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1930). 
22 In this I differ from Bernard Spivack, who sees the mankind figure post- 
1500 as no longer universal: 'in neither case [Four Elements and Three Estates] 
does he stand any longer for the universalized concept of mankind. Rather he is 
limited in the former to that side of man which engages in intellectual pursuits, and 
in the latter he is man as king', (cit. in note 15, p. 207ff). It seems here that 
Spivack's use of the word 'universal' to mean 'relating to every aspect of the human 
being' is not particularly helpful. My own approach sees, for example, 
ratiocination as universal, and accepts a Freudian view that a fantasy which refers to 
a king refers to a general concept of the self. 
23 'Breaking her anckers downe' 1.44, has provoked editorial puzzlement. In 
his edition of the play, W. W . Greg glosses 
'anckers' as (? auters= altars), reading it 
as a misprint. Far more likely is an identification between 'anckers' and 
anchoresses. (OED anchor, sb. Obs. 2 An anchoress. ) Included in the list of 
variant forms are ancre, ankre, anker. There is a problem that, from a literal point 
of view, it would have been their cells, not the anchoresses themselves that were 
broken. 
24 The manner in which he carries out this function shows him to be a near 
relation to Prospero. 
25 Vulcan, however, has a function like that of Merry Report in The Play of 
the blether as a low comic and commentator, and forms an effective if short-lived 
special relationship with the audience. 
26 It is possible that the Rare Triumphs is a source for Spenser's Mutabilitie 
Cantos, for Fortune as Chance has both characteristics and ambitions in common 
with Mutabilitie herself. 
27 A reference both to Troilus and Criseyde and to Tysiphone in the Aeneid, 
this name sets a courtly, erudite tone for the play. 
28 The episode also bears a strong resemblance to the arrival of Discorde at the 
Gods' feast in ? Lydgate's Assembly 
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In came Dyscord to haue made varyaunce. 
But there was no rome to set hyr in that hous 
The goddys remembryd the scisme odyous 
Among the three goddesses that she had wrought 
At the feast of Peleus, wherfor they thought 
They wold nat with her dele in auenture 
Lest she theym brought to som inconuenyent. 
She, seying thys, was wrothe out of mesure 
And in that gret wrethe out of the paleyce went, 
Seying to hersylf that chere shuld they repent. 
(1.409-420) 
29 For example, Hoccieve's 'Tale of Jereslaus' Wife', in Hoccleve's Works, 
vol 1, The Minor Poems, ed. F. J. Furnivall, EETS, ES, 61 (London, 1892), 
pp. 140-178, narrates the trials of a woman cast out by her husband. Phillips cannot 
follow the same track in his comparable Patient Grissill without introducing the 
operations of Politic Perswasion as a motiveless, vice-like adviser to Duke Gwalter. 
30 Lingua (1606; 1590's), in Dodsley, vol 8/9, pp. 331-463. 
31 Alfred Harbage, Annals of English Drama, third edition, revised by Sylvia 
Stoler Wagonheim (London and New York, 1989). 
32 Ling has received virtually no critical attention. Many references in the 
text have the air of 'in-jokes': remarks about prior occasions, possibly 
entertainments or plays, in the reign of Elizabeth. The references to a 'Queen 
Psyche', superior over the microcosm in which the dispute takes place suggests a 
deferential inclusion of Elizabeth in the festivities, and allows for the possibility that 
the play was intended for presentation at Court, or in the course of a Royal 
progress. Unfortunately for this theory, I have been unable to find any specific 
reference to the play's appearance in such circumstances. In the course of my 
discussion of the text, I footnote those allusions for which some suggestion can be 
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offered, though it seems probable that further research would reveal many more. 
33 Although Lingua is printed in Acts and scenes, it is far easier to locate 
quotations in Dodsley by page numbers. I therefore give both forms in the 
following discussion. 
34 'In Aristotelian (and Scholastic) philosophy, Communis Sensus is a capacity 
with two main functions: to grasp certain kinds of attribute which are not the 
province of any one of the five senses (e. g. number, movement); and to compare 
the data of the five senses, assessing their relations to one another. The detection of 
identity/similarity/difference through the superficial play of perceived qualities is its 
crucial function. ' (A. Barker, University of Warwick, personal communication, 
March, 1991. ) Communis Sensus is thus qualified by definition to act as a judge in 
this dispute. 
35 Anamnestes here is a comic old man, who is inclined to recall long-gone 
events in great detail at the slightest provocation, often incorrectly. He is a satirical 
image of that Platonic feature of the mind which penetrates to higher truths through 
a kind of 'remembering' based on an immediate perception. 
36 Anamnestes' page, Heuresis (or Discovery), combines the features of a 
Plautine cheeky slave with the mental verve that his name suggests. 
37 This double cycle of attack and repulse by the forces of evil is discussed by 
William 0. Harris as an important characteristic of morality plays, in Skelton's 
'Magnyfvicence' and the Cardinal Virtue Tradition (Chapel Hill, 1965). See 
especially Chapter Four 'Fortitude and the Two-Part Morality Structure, pp. 71-126 
(pp. 71-2). 
38 'Acrasia' is the term in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (Book 7, chaps. 1-12) 
which is translated 'incontinency' or 'weakness of will', and is linked with 
effeminacy (a quality opposed to endurance). Aristotle's acrasia is linked with 
madness: 'outbursts of anger and sexual appetites and some other such passions, it 
is evident, actually alter our bodily condition, and in some men even produce fits of 
madness' (7,3). 
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Acrasia also appears in FO II, as the name of the enchantress who rules the 
Bower of Bliss, and who makes her lovers mad with pleasure, in order to cause 
their downfall into 'uses bad'. The drug in Lingua functions to madden the Senses 
by confusing their special properties, but without providing any special pleasure. In 
this it seems that Lin , while harking back to Aristotle, has created an original 
conception of the effects of 'acrasia', related to but independent of both the classical 
and the Spenserian models. Ironically, 'the use of language by men in an 
incontinent state means no more than its utterance by actors on the stage' (Ethics, 
7,3), a continuation in Aristotle which Lin 's learned audience may have 
appreciated. 
39 I discuss the tendency of the vice figure's language towards meaninglessness 
in Chapter Three, in connection with Mankind. 
40 E. R. Curtius, Ei n Literature and the Latin Middle Ages, tr. Willard R. 
Trask (London, 1953; first published in German, 1948), discusses the 
'inexpressibility' topos, pp. 159-162. 
41 Courage, Lingua, Richard III, and in some sense Faustus all move into this 
condition towards the end of their plays, when final destruction seems to be near. 
(See Chapter Two, note 21). 
42 Here is a small portion of Visus' self-description: 
The third's a lesser room of purest glass; 
The fourth's smaller, but passeth all the former 
In worth of matter: built most sumptuously, 
With walls transparent of pure crystalline. 
This the soul's mirror and the body's guide, 
Love's cabinet, bright beacons of the realm, 
Casements of light, quiver of Cupid's shafts, 
Wherein I sit. 
(Act 3, scene 6; p. 405) 
43 Lingua's struggles when arrested may be compared with those of Courage in 
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Tide Tarrieth No Man . 
44 The conceit in which her jail is described has much in common with 
? Puttenham's in Partheniades: 
A golden toonge in mouth of amber 
That oft is hard but none yt seethe; 
Without a garde of yvorye teethe 
Even arrayed, and richelye, all 
In skarlett, or in fine carrall 
Jean Wilson, Entertainments for Elizabeth I (Cambridge, 1980) quotes the lines, 
deriving them from pages 243-4 of E C. Wilson, England's Eliza (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1939). 
45 For this to be so, the play must have been written rather earlier than 1607, 
its date of first publication. This indeed seems extremely probable. The 
identification of Psyche with Elizabeth is supported by detail from the Accession 
Day Tilt of 1581. Here Sidney's Four Foster Children of Desire refers to Elizabeth 
as Psyche. See Jean Wilson, op. cit., pp. 63-85. In addition, that tilt used a device 
called a 'rowling trench' :a kind of artificial movable mountain, containing 
concealed musicians, which could be made to rear up to do homage to the Queen. 
This device could be what Lingua is referring to when she mentions an occasion 
when 'the hills leaped and the woods danced' (Act 3, scene 5; p. 394). Lingua's 
speech concludes with a reference to Arcadia, also cueing a memory of Sidney. 
England was characterized as Psyche in a latin Anti-Protestant play of 
c. 1595-1615, probably from the Jesuit College of Valladolid: 'England under the 
name of Psyche longs for the rose' (Chorus to Act I). (I am grateful to Alison 
Shell, St. Hilda's College, Oxford for this information. ) The uncertainty of the 
dating makes it impossible to say whether Lingua derives from Psyche or vice 
versa. 
46 The downfall of an ambitious woman in the presence of the Queen occurs in 
the 1592 Entertainment at Bisham, when Ceres' harvest cart collapses. 
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47 It may be relevant here to recall that a contemporary claim was made that 
Essex's rebellion was an attempt to purge the court of bad advisers, and not an 
attack on the Queen herself. See, for example, Alan Haynes, Robert Cecil. Earl of 
Salisbury (London, 1989), p. 64. Such an identification of Essex with Lingua, if 
tenable, would considerably narrow down the boundaries for the date of 
composition of the play. 
48 An example of the chattering woman is the Welsh wife Gwenthian in the 
Chettle, Dekker and Haughton version of Patient Grissil (1599). 
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CHAPTER SIX 
WOMAN AND CHAOS 
'dejyringe all christen men to beware of 
thys wycked jprite' 
When the concept of woman is involved with the stereotype of the vice 
figure, the way is open to read moral conflict as taking place between social groups, 
rather than within the individual. In my discussion so far, otherness has been seen 
to be constituted in relation to a very particular kind of self. That self was assumed 
to be the mankind figure - the struggling, fearful, inherently virtuous (or at least 
loss-minimizing) person, who was faced with moral decisions in this very material 
life. In Chapters Three and Four I looked at plays in which otherness has been 
defined as a lack of such conventional virtues as honesty, piety, and clarity of 
understanding. Those lacks could also be represented as a lack of social status, and 
a lack of subtlety in language skills. The paradox arises that the vice's linguistic 
flexibility and linguistic excess could, in the earlier moral plays, be perceived 
simultaneously as an incapacity with the meanings of spiritual discourse. In 
Chapter Three I discussed how these social and linguistic features were not initially 
essential to the representation of evil, but a set of conventional characteristics 
peripheral to the functional position of the vice figure as facilitator of the mankind 
figure's fall. Possibly because they proved to be entertaining, possibly because they 
raised important questions about the nature of language, these once-extraneous 
features came to be central to the characterization of the vice figure, and even to 
define it. In the heavily vice-laden plays of the 1570's and 80's, they had become 
readable as adequate indicators of evil in their own right. 
Alternatively, the development of vice-characteristics could sustain a reading 
of the character from a more generalized point of view. Powerful classes in society 
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have a vested interest in justifying the powerlessness of other groups. Thus 
characteristics of the abjected classes, such as unemployment, could conveniently be 
associated with evil. Works such as Harman's Caveat addressed themselves to a 
particular, propertied class of reader, or to an individual as representative of a class. 
This differs from a play such as Mankind which invokes a classless universality 
transcending the bucolic occupation of its main character. The changes in emphasis 
of the stage representation of the vice figures served to further an association 
between vice figures and the lowest classes of society, and a consequent 
particularizing of the mankind figure as essentially respectable. There is no doubt 
that this is a problematic move, given the ambivalent attitudes of society towards 
the audiences for plays. There are clearly several very different kinds of audience 
to be considered. Willis' reminiscence of a performance of The Cradle of Security, 
quoted in detail in Schell and Schuchter, makes it clear that performances in large 
provincial towns were put on for the influential, but also for the ordinary people. 
In the great houses and at court, entertainment was particularly directed to the tastes 
of the well-to-do and the nobility. Finally, a broad spectrum of the urban 
population was found in the audiences of the new public playhouses. This included 
the disreputable and the criminal, who found playhouses a useful consorting ground 
where they could mingle freely with more respectable groups. 
This already well-documented information, when put together with our 
knowledge of the increasingly demotic characterisation of the vice shows that it was 
no longer possible for every member of the audience to identify with the mankind 
figure and rejoice in the punishment of the vice. 
In this way, the conflict between good and evil, between self and other, can 
be seen as having a social dimension, and there are plays in which this social 
dimension has prime importance. Plays which begin as an 'Assembly of Gods' are 
typically founded in the social structure of a law court, and investigate an issue of 
public significance. They describe the effects of an opposition to happiness in 
social terms. When a conflict occurs, it is as a general dissent, spread amongst 
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many members of society, rather than located within the soul of any single 
individual, who can, like Mankind, represent each separate human being. Instead 
of the human microcosmos, such a play is concerned with the well-being of a 
macrocosmos: the body politic. In a 'social' moral play, then, the play's centre of 
gravity is the state of order itself. It is, of course, possible to impose a 'social' 
reading on any moral play by interpreting its characters and their interaction as 
figures for relations between social structures. This discussion is based on two 
plays already used in Chapter Five, The Play of the Wether and The Rare Triumphs 
of Love and Fortune. Although similar points could be made about numerous other 
texts, I have chosen to discuss eve and Fortune because it is a neglected play with 
many literary and dramatic virtues. 2 In The Play of the Wether and Love and 
Fortune, moreover, a social reading is invited by the terms in which the plays see 
themselves. 
-------whence springes this strife of late 
who are the authors of this mutenye: 
or whence hath sprung this civill discorde here: 
which on the sodaine strook us in this feare. 
If Gods that raigne in skyes doo fall at warre, 
No mervaile then though mortali men doo iarre. 
(A ii) 
Argument is not seen as a matter between individuals, but as 'mutenye' (a condition 
involving authority structures) and as 'civill discorde' (concerning the state as a 
whole). It is inevitably linked with the conflicts of mortal men, and though 'iarres' 
may simply mean disagreements, it is also a common word to apply to wars. 
It is to be expected that this alteration of structural emphasis from the 
individual to the social can be clearly observed in plays where vice figures are 
female. I have already documented that transition in the case of Mother Messe. 
The judge's diatribe against Mother Messe as an individual quickly moves to a 
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domestic rhetoric, which in turn encourages a picture of women as a pervasive 
threat in society. When plays became more interested in the individual and less in 
the allegorical representation of types, they did not shed the early moral plays' 
sense of adversarial otherness, but translated that, too, into naturalistic terms. The 
capacity of women to act as figures of otherness in both realms made them 
especially appropriate to transcribe moral disorder into the domestic terms of this 
new individuated realism. The link between the female vice and the 'social' moral 
play is not a perfectly consistent one, for there are several plays in which a male 
vice figure has the function of social disruption. However, even in those plays the 
vice figure operates in a feminized way, as an agent of chance. I shall return to this 
connection between the vice figure as a representative of chance and the allegorical 
image of randomness as a 'feminine' function in connection with The Rare 
Triumphs of Love and Fortune . 
The plays in which it is appropriate to discuss this re-location of dramatic 
otherness into the female are two of those from Chapter Five: John Heywood's 
Play of the Wether and the anonymous The Rare Triumphs of Love and Fortune. 
Significantly, both are believed to be court plays and both involve assemblies of the 
Gods. They begin with an overtly patriarchal structure, in which Jupiter is not just 
a God, but also a King and a father. He is thus triply the head of the structures into 
which human beings must fit: the spiritual/moral, the economic/political, and the 
emotional/age-based. All, of course, interlock philosophically in the sixteenth 
century, and each is capable of acting as a metaphor for either of the others. Such 
comprehensiveness suggests a desire for fullness: a fear that any mere metaphoric 
representation of the law-giving Father cannot be enough, but that every loophole 
must be anticipated and filled. With this degree of overkill present in the plays' 
statements of paternal authority, the nature of the subversive elements which disrupt 
Jupiter's order must be very significant indeed. It is, in fact, a relatively new 
critical idea that these plays offer any uncontained disruption at all. 3 
Both the plays show a fear of the female as disruptive, combining this with a 
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series of narrative moves designed to contain the disruption. These moves seek 
ultimately to end the play with an assertion of order, represented as equivalent to 
good. 
An outline of the The Play of the Wether (1533) has been given in Chapter 
Five. It has been argued that the play contains a statement about control and the 
monarchy. 4 It is a lesson to quarrelsome subjects not to be too demanding, and a 
compliment to the King about his importance as a wise moderator. The underlying 
structure of the play is thus an opposition between order and rebellion, and the prize 
to be gained is no longer the soul of mankind, but the smooth running of society. 
In both the individual and the social cases a kind of ideal state is put forward, away 
from which the organism is inclined to fall. What is of interest is the alteration in 
what is perceived as the subject of the play. In The Play of the Wether, the subject 
being fought over is the social and physical framework within which human life is 
conducted, in contrast to plays like Mankind, where the subject of the contention is 
the condition of a representative individual's soul. In The Play of the Wether the 
presence of this new subject is signalled by hints within the play at metaphysical 
concerns with the nature of the matrix within which human life is defined, in this 
case, time itself. 
Attention to the implications of the title yields interesting connections, for if 
anything is closely linked with the weather, it is the passage of time. The weather 
gods who provoke the debate are connected with the movement of day and night 
and with the cycle of the seasons. Here and there within the play the temporal 
order begins to break down. The action of the play takes place in a temporal limbo, 
signalled by a loss of control of time as well as weather in Jupiter's opening speech. 
This is effectively a prologue which explains the origins of the present situation. 
Jupiter refers to the earlier debate amongst the gods, reporting the scene and the 
cases they put to him. He is now embarked on a project to collect public opinion 
before giving his verdict. 
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The god is thus a figure of order and control over the play: he decides what 
is relevant in past history (the debate), and how it is to affect the present (the play 
will take place). His opening speech establishes an all-embracing order which 
defines his own status and that of all humanity. His control extends to a meticulous 
accuracy about his location of people and events in time. He places himself at the 
end of a long tradition of honour and power 'to large ... to recyte. ' (1.1) He also 
places himself in a present shared with those to whom he is speaking: this opening 
line refers to 'now'; he stands in high renown 'at this season' (1.12); he assesses 
how much information people should be offered, according to the current situation 
'as we se mete for tyme present' (1.16). In the very simplest of terms he also 
controls the future: 'to the mater gyve Bare and we shall say' (1.21). He is, it 
seems, contained by a very straightforward past-present-future pattern, which 
remains coherent when he moves into flashback to narrate that parliament of the 
gods and goddesses before which Saturn, Phebus, Eolus and Phebe conducted their 
argument. The gods and goddesses 'hath late assembled' (1.24); Saturn 'hath entred 
such mater as served his entent' (1.39). The assumption is that human time and 
divine time are one and the same. One might call this structure 'natural narrative 
time'. 
Linguistically, however, this structure is called into question by Jupiter's use 
of grammatical tense, suggesting that he has a relationship with a time beyond the 
natural narrative time of human affairs. It seems that he knows the future: 'As the 
thynge seife shall prove in experyment. ' He asserts his own existence in eternity by 
referring to the length of past history: 'We Jupiter were ever pryncypale' (1.7). It is 
within this perception of eternity that the continuous present tenses of God's 
parliament slip into the narrative. They feel natural because of the tautness of the 
rhyme royal metrical structure. This and the dignity of the rhyme scheme produce 
a smooth, persuasive effect on the reader. But the narrative is divided, 
simultaneously describing a past event and a present condition. Of Saturn, for 
example, Jupiter explains: 'How be yt he alledgeth that of longe tyme past' (1.43). 
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Saturn, therefore, did not just allege in the parliament, he continues to do so. 
'When' gains the force of 'whenever' in: 'When he hath laboryd all nyght in his 
powres/ His glarynge beames maryth all in two howres' (1.48-9); and in: 'For 
when he is disposyd his blastes to blow/ He suffereth neyther sone shyne rayne nor 
snow' (1.60-61). This is not the colloquial, historical present, but a continuous 
present tense. The upshot of the debate is: 'Thus can these. iiii. in no maner agre. ' 
(1.64). The dispute is as yet unended, for they inhabit a time in which godly 
personality traits are fixed and enduring. A second clue to the existence of an order 
alternative to that of 'natural narrative' is that Jupiter has pretensions to be treated 
as a Christian god - he describes himself as receiving 'honour' and 'laude' (1.3) and 
'glory' (1.4). He is also 'beyond the compas of all comparyson' (1.9). However, 
being divine in that sense would carry with it the concept of an immediate total 
knowledge of all time. What Jupiter has repressed, then, is what The Assembly o 
Gods knows: that Jupiter's order of things is constructed and partial. 5 His kind of 
narrative can only take place in 'natural' time, for all that he exists in perpetuity. It 
cannot take place within the eternity which is proper to a god. 
Jupiter undermines his own authority in other areas as well as the temporal. 
His claim to be beyond comparison is undercut by his own interest in comparatives: 
'For syns that heaven and erth were fyrste create/ Stode we neuer in suche 
triumphaunt estate' (1.13-14). It is also shaken by a flicker of self-doubt and 
reassurance: 'If we so have been as treuth it is in dede' (1.9). The effect is of a 
comically unconscious contradiction: the mock-heroic. Thus uncertain and 
referential, Jupiter is a joke god who depends on human praise for his sense of 
personal status. He has attempted to assert the existence of a 'human' time 
encapsulated by his own divine time, but his monologue, depending as it must on 
adverbs of time, and hence on the relativities of language, reveals an inability to 
sustain the distinction: the two temporal structures collapse into one another, with 
language subverting the patriarchal order. 
Once the temporal dimension has been called into question, the play shows 
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patriarchal law to be vulnerable on that level on which its very existence is 
established by the repression of 'other' forces. 
When Jupiter begins the play by calling for an assistant, Merry Report offers 
himself to the Law of the Father with a sincerity unusual in a vice figure, for he 
serves the god loyally. His gain in the business is in enhanced status. Initially a 
character whose 'apperence ys of to mych lyghtnes' (1.116), as the god's servant he 
gains power over others, and also believes himself to have moved up the social 
hierarchy: 'Not one of you that wyll make curtsy/ To me that am squyre for goddes 
precyous body' (1.196-7). He carries out faithfully his instructions to regulate who 
may approach the god according to their social rank. 
Jupiter: Here to receyue all sewters of eche 
degre 
And suche as to the may Seme moste metely 
We wyll thow brynge them before our 
maieste 
And for the rest that be not so worthy 
Make thou reporte to us effectually 
(1.170-4) 
The terms of the dispute have thus been defined as between the social 
orders. It would seem at first that we have here the multiple oppositions of a 
Derridean view of linguistic structure, and not the binary oppositions of naive 
structuralism or of the traditional morality play. However, the play proceeds to 
function in terms of opposed pairs - usually of equal status - such that no sense of 
otherness is created . 
Instead there is a sense of opposed similarities, of balanced 
argument, when for example the Wind Miller is confronted by the Water Miller, or 
the Ranger by the Forester. The term 'woman' disrupts this balancing act, for 
when the play attempts to set up another see-saw opposition between the 
Gentlewoman and the Launder, a more fundamental kind of otherness is uncovered, 
as we shall see. Even before their entry, however, Merry Report follows Jupiter in 
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perceiving that the symbolic order is founded on exclusion. He willingly, if 
mockingly, introduces both the Gentleman and the Merchant to Jupiter. 'yes mary 
can I and wyll do it in dede' (1.345). No investigation is required for him to decide 
that the Ranger must be excluded from direct contact with the god: 
Ranger: I wold fayn speke wyth the god Jupyter 
M. Report: That wyll not be but ye may do thys 
Tell me your mynde I am an offycer of hys 
(1.414-16) 
He proceeds to impose that status of exclusion on women, for he allows neither the 
Launder nor, significantly, the Gentlewoman to have direct access to Jupiter. 
That this exclusion can be read as the repression of the subversive other 
becomes clear when one traces the idea of the female through the text. Its first 
function is structural: once the disorder in the weather has been contained, its role is 
taken over by the Launder, in her confrontation with Merry Report. The second 
function is linguistic, for Merry Report's monologues about milling (lines 724-50 
and 760-74) turn out to be a protracted sexual innuendo. Armed with this hint, one 
finds much of interest in Merry Report's discourse. The order established at the 
beginning is an essentially masculist one, both symbolically, in the hierarchical 
description of time, and literally, in the characters who appear. Jupiter has 
appointed Merry Report to see that the social order is maintained: those of higher 
rank may speak directly to him. To begin with, it scarcely seems remarkable that 
the first three characters we meet are male. Women, however, are present in 
language. Merry Report, that vigorous, earthy babbler of supposedly spontaneous 
remarks is a kind of conduit of the repressed. He cannot stop talking about women, 
particularly in terms of bodily functions and sexuality. For example, when the 
Gentleman enters, preceded by the sound of a hunting horn, Merry Report pretends 
that he thought it was a woman farting: 
I went it had ben the gentylwomens blowynge 
But yt is not so as I now suppose 
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For women's hornes sounde more in a mannes nose 
(1.223-5) 
He also draws attention to the women in the audience, identifying them as proper 
objects of the Gentleman's hunt. 
Here he poynteth to the women 
He wolde hunte a sow or twayne out of this sorte 
(1.257) 
He mistakes, or pretends to mistake, the Merchant for a Priest, and enquires after 
his wife. 
Mayster person now welcome by my life 
I pray you how doth my mastres your wife 
(1.337-8) 
Merry Report, then, mentions women in order to denigrate them, a standard 
ploy in the moral interlude, since the vice figure, like the fool, enjoyed a particular 
licence to shock the audience and to utter obscenities. The interesting point here is 
that the obscenities are far from indiscriminate: almost all the crude jokes are to do 
with women, and many of these connect women and dirt. 
6 Overtly, the sexual 
woman is being cast out of the social order, but it is the very force of that casting 
out that constitutes the symbolic order within which Jupiter can function. The 
repression of that knowledge of the dependence of the established order on the 
'other' term is masked by a constant need to reinforce repression with half- 
denigratory, half-fascinated jokes. Merry Report is thus both the agent of 
repression and the sign of its failure. 
In this way The Play of the Wether demonstrates an obsessive consciousness 
of women. They are mentioned again and again in the course of nearly eight 
hundred lines, but do not appear. In that space of time, the pressure on the play to 
recognize this alternative state becomes more and more intense through the 
accumulation of references to it. The issue is shelved for a time while the Merchant 
and the Ranger follow the Gentleman as petitioners, but forces its way back into 
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consciousness when the Wind Miller wishes to explain how feeble the wind has 
become. 
Nor skantely shatter shytten sayle 
That hangyth shatterynge at a woman's tayle 
(1.526-27) 
We are thus gratuitously reminded of women; of an animal association ('tayle'); and 
of a link with excrement. The Wind Miller is characterized as both earthy and 
rhetorically forceful by his use of the insistently alliterative line. In addition, the 
recurring sibilants and assonating 'a's here give his lines a special force, and a tone 
of distaste. Pressure is building up, but before it finds its climax Merry Report 
leaves the stage, and we are treated to a concentrated piece of artistry in a formal 
debate between the Wind Miller and the Water Miller. One enjoys the points they 
make and also relishes the incongruity of hearing a legal debate conducted by 'lewd' 
characters. One effect of their debate is to enhance the unexpectedness of Merry 
Report's next speech, which contains some of the most explicitly coarse language in 
the whole tradition of the moral play. Merry Report offers a virtuoso narration of 
sexual relations between a bored man and his demanding wife, couched entirely in 
an extension of a double entendre on 'grinding', appropriate to millers (1.724-68). 
The latter are completely taken in and offer unintentionally relevant advice about 
the proper care of millstones. The genuine wit of this passage also contains a view 
of women as sexually aggressive and deeply threatening, which accords with and 
partly explains the denigration expressed in the earlier jokes. 
When representations of women eventually appear on stage, they are initially 
a balanced pair: the Gentlewoman and the Launder. The Launder, however, 
gradually steps out of this structure to confront Merry Report in the flyting 
described above. Although the Launder resembles Merry Report in many respects, 
she is also the sign of a variety of virtue different from that associated with Jupiter. 
The Launder is cleanly and hard-working, and capable of applying moral standards 
to other people's behaviour. Perhaps most significant is her love of the sun, which 
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keys in to that range of Christian imagery to do with the sun/Son of God 
connection, and which is overtly linked with both light and moral comprehension. 
In The Play of the Wether, then, we have a text which puts forward a 
many-levelled discourse about order and chaos. It seems to be specifically 
concerned with social order, as its use of occupational and class designations for the 
characters suggest. Within that context, the play attempts to establish woman as a 
term equivalent to disorder, without ever wholly succeeding. Its concluding 
confident assertion of the patriarchal order is already undermined by the assertion of 
an alternative virtue, which the Launder has symbolically put forward. Here, then, 
the opposition is not between forces of good and forces of evil, but between terms 
defined by the text as reason on one side and madness or folly on the other. Those 
terms are then represented as social organisation versus rampant self-interest, with a 
concealed gloss of them as male qualities versus female ones. Again, the subject of 
the conflict here is manifestly not the soul of mankind, nor even that of an 
individual. It is the maintenance of a beneficial state for the inhabitants of the 
social hierarchy. The condition of the people here supplants the soul of man as the 
centre of interest. Thus the introduction of a figure adumbrating the female vice 
has coincided with a change in the area in which the moral play operates. 
Before considering representations of women in The Rare Triumph, of Love 
and Fortune, some of the logical background needs to be sketched in. One of the 
key developments in the later vice figure is his ambivalence. In plays of the 1570's 
and 80's, especially the 'hybrid' plays such as Clyomon and Clamydes, Common 
Conditions and even Cambyses, the vice figure is commonly represented as a 
servant to a well-born hero-figure. This version of the principal Vice, may 'play 
with both hands' by deceiving his master, by telling lies, and by generally working 
for his master's worldly or (less commonly) spiritual destruction. For this reason, a 
vice figure who functions as a servant can be perceived as peculiarly unreliable. A 
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vice figure who, acting unpredictably, is also in an authorial position and so is 
capable of engineering situations which re-direct the hero's life-story, comes close 
to the position of a god. At the least, he could appear to the victim to be a 
controlling external element in the world. When the vice figure is also represented 
as Fortune, a play has moved to viewing the situation even more strongly from the 
point of view of the mankind figure as victim. At the same time, women were seen 
as unpredictable because illogical and, particularly important for this theory, they 
were seen as fickle in their affections, also interpreted as loyalties. Dramatically, if 
not elsewhere, the husband typically regarded his wife's friendship groups (her 
'gossips') as potentially threatening to his position of control. 
For these reasons, one cannot be surprised that the role of Fortune could 
combine both feminine characteristics and vice characteristics, and cross 
indiscriminately between the two. Indeed, no distinction needed to be made 
between the sources which fed this compendium of all that seemed to be most 
terrifying to the struggling individual: that loss of order could be externally 
imposed; that reason had no place in the world. 'Fortune' could image many 
concepts, including madness and power, meaninglessness and the revolt of the 
female against male ordering. Her wheel could raise the image of torture and the 
dismembered body. The only image that could contain Fortune herself was that of 
her wheel: the inevitable fall that must follow a rise. Yet Fortune was seen as 
controlling the wheel to some degree, affecting when it moved and how fast. 
Man's only way of dealing with that externalized figure of Fate was to practise 
resignation. 
The mythological image of Fortune with her wheel forcibly brings to mind 
that most common of female occupations: the spinning of wool or flax into yarn. 7 
An alteration in the stage behaviour of that quintessentially virtuous woman, patient 
Grissell, suggests the transition of the underlying suspect qualities in the emblem of 
the spinning woman. In Phillips' play of 1565-6 two stage directions instruct 
Grissell to spin. 
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heare enter Grissell, Syngyng and Spinning: wyth her parents and 
Indigent Pouertie. 
Later, at 1.1835-6: 
Go once or twice about the Staige, let Grissill/ Singe some songe, 
and sit Spinninge. 
The first instruction suggests a spindle, while in the second case a wheel is 
probable. Spinning and innocence could be associated emblematically at this 
period. It is in the 1570's and 80's that randomness, the vice figure and women are 
explicitly interconnected on the stage. By 1599, I suggest that spinning had become 
too ambiguous as a stage image, and Grissill is a weaver of baskets in the Chettle, 
Dekker and Haughton version of the play. In this version, Duke Gwalter first sees 
Grissill when she is carrying water from the well. Because of this developing link 
between Fortune and the spinning woman, the image of the recalcitrant Uxor Noe, 
and of the sinister, controlling Fortuna was enacted daily in every house in Europe. 
Subliminally every woman could be implicated in the emotional content of that set 
of images. 
I have already shown how the female gods in The Rare Triumphs of Love 
and Fortune can be treated as vice figures. The next move is to see how they fit 
into the patriarchal pattern which these Assembly-of-Gods-type plays inevitably 
create. 8 It is of interest that the inner plot to do with relationships and matters of 
the heart also shows a concern with structures of authority, while the outer plot, 
ostensibly about official hierarchy is much concerned with family relations. Thus 
neither part of the play escapes the theme of the extension of patriarchal structures 
through both the political and the familial worlds. 
As in the Heywood play and the ? Lydgate poem, this play begins with the 
gods in the traditional state of 'civill discord'. The difference is that discord here 
has a feminine quality which is both overt and profound. Not only is the dispute 
between two women, but the first agent of change on the stage is the female Fury, 
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Tysiphone, who is seen in a dumb-show spreading dissension among the gods, 
before any speech is uttered. Jupiter appears baffled by the problem which has, he 
says 'on the sodaine strook us in this feare' (1.10). Tysiphone is a creature of hell, 
but it is a pagan hell, populated by Furies and damned souls, and ruled over by 
Pluto. Indeed, this hell is not a subversive other in relation to Jupiter's heaven, but 
a co-operating part of the extra-human world. Both function according to the same 
patriarchal structure. 9 To see this in the conceptual terms of the moral play 
structure, it is as if Manichaeism had been recognised as dogma. Pluto is Jupiter's 
brother, so their daughters are cousins. Furthermore, the Fury's main task is to 
punish those who break Jupiter's laws. Tysiphone's speech, therefore, institutes an 
inclusive world of complex, close relationships. Here, all things are encompassed 
by a single comprehensible system. Beyond this, however, Tysiphone also 
embodies a certain wild spirit of casual malice which functions outside Jupiter's 
comfortably ordered system: 'unto all that liue and breathe, I wiche a worlde of 
woe. ' (1.62). This parting line is unnecessary, except to enhance the dramatic 
spectacle of the Fury's exit: 'gape hollow hell below'. The discord she has brought 
is in answer to what is perceived as a previous disruption of the proper order, when 
Venus' attacks on Fortune have sought to reduce the latter's status as a God. 
Even the gods are drawn with touches of naturalistic characterisation: 
Jupiter, supposedly the soul of paternal fairness, exhorts Venus to tell her story 
honestly, at the same time as he apologizes to her for offering such an instruction. 
There is a sort of domesticity in his apparent fear that she might touchily 
misconstrue his command. He hastily justifies himself, explaining that he is giving 
this instruction, not because he thinks she might be dishonest, but because 
scrupulous accuracy is necessary, given that Fortune is not present to defend 
herself. 
And Venus heere I charge thee on my grace, 
Not that I found thee heertofore untrue: 
But for thine aduersarie is not yet in place 
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thou tell uprightly whence your quarrel grew: 
what woords betwixt you therof did ensue. 
(1.90-94) 
Jupiter's syntax is scrambled in his attempt to retain his twin positions of distanced 
judge and loving father. He continues: 
Say lovely daughter tell us flat thy minde 
they shalbe blamed on whom the fault we finde. 
(1.95-6) 
One notices first the indecision in line 95, where the wooing tone of 'say lovely 
daughter' is overtaken by the slap of monosyllables, suggestive of the plain- 
speaking terms of the quarrel. But to what or whom does 'they' refer? At first they 
seem to relate to the 'woords', which, though shared 'betwixt you, are to be 
blamed on one. A more reasonable reading is that they, on whom the fault is laid, 
should be blamed. Jupiter here avoids hinting that blame might attach to Venus by 
moving into the indeterminacy permitted by the third person. 
Indeed, even that even-handedness does not please this spoilt daughter. Just 
as Jupiter feared, Venus reads his speech as an accusation of herself. 
what hath thy daughter so deserued? what doth she silly däe: 
Before ye thus to be abused with undeserued blame? 
(1.99-100) 
Venus then blends her legal arguments with a tone of clamorous demand and 
railing. It is even difficult to discover exactly what it is that she is objecting to. 
'thus' recurs, but its referent is unclear. 
But she no merveile though she seeke my seat thus to staine 
When otherwise she cannot tell, aduantage how to gain. 
(1.105-6) 
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Later in the same speech: 
Is this my soueraigntie, is this so glorious: 
Is this becomming thy renown, to quit thy daughter thus? 
(1.137-8) 
The lack of a clearly identifiable referent for all these incidences of 'this' also 
suggests a questioning of Jupiter's way of dealing with the situation as a whole, and 
a sweeping, inclusive authority over it. Venus appears to believe that the law 
should not apply to her, but that her position in the family should put her outside 
normal judicial processes. At the same time, she wants Jupiter to use the processes 
of the law to maintain that position. Her attack on his judgment in deciding that a 
hearing is necessary is deeply contradictory. Emotionally, it fits with the 
confusions arising from blending familial relations with the official hierarchy. The 
content of her argument is a claim to be more powerful than Fortune because more 
universal. She demands that her father keep his word that she should rule 'all 
things heer beneath the Moon' (1.134), 10 implying that this includes a superiority 
over Fortune. For all its apparent rationality, the tone of this appeal is pettish, 
brattish and spoilt. A sense of the intimate structure of family relationships has 
been set up and imposed on the formal structure of the court of law. Jupiter, 
finally, is placatory. 
When Fortune enters, her position in the debate appears to be fore-ordained: 
her initial speech locates the gods as the objects of her prayers, as well as of 
negotiation. In other words, she locates them above her before she tries to locate 
herself as their equal. The lowliness of her position is stressed: she needs 
permission to speak, for which not she but her father 'humbly' prays. She is part of 
a family structure parallel to that of Jupiter and Venus, and in this one too 
personalities intervene. Pluto was enraged on her behalf, but is now apologetic. 
My Father humbly praieth you to giue me leaue to speak 
And pardon him yt in his wrath he did your quietnes break 
(1.149-50) 
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Fortune's oratory is so smooth that one begins to doubt her sincerity. Perhaps her 
self-deprecatory opening remarks are mere deceit: the seeming harmlessness of the 
clever lawyer. Further, she appears to want to re-define the terms of the debate, 
claiming that she does not wish to contend with Venus for supremacy, but that she 
only wishes to claim her rightful level of respect. She accuses Venus of deceit, and 
in particular, of using empty language. Venus' presumed linguistic incompetence is 
the flip-side of a full capacity with gesture: 
I graunt she may doo much with her aluring smiles, 
But soon your Godheads can perceive her woordes be full of wiles 
(1.155-6) 
In contrast, Fortune displays a command of the felicitous phrase at that point when 
she identifies her power with that of mutability: 
therfore ye see al earthly thinges, are wearing out alwaies 
As brittle as the glasse, unconstant like the minde: 
as fickle as the whirling wheele, as wauering as the winde. 
(1.166-8) 
Fortune's examples reflect her own limitations. She refers to 'the minde' as 
changeable, not noticing that she here refers to all minds in general, not just to 
those 'beneath the moon'. Thus she suggests the possibility that even the gods' 
minds operate erratically, like human ones. 
Nevertheless, Fortune seems to have the best of the nimble stichomythic 
squabble with Venus that follows, and even Jupiter's partiality is swayed. 
'Affection shall not marre a lawfull cause' (1.200). He feels he cannot deliver a 
judgment without investigating the matter further. For this examples are needed, so 
he commands Mercury to bring on the ghosts of people slain by Venus and Fortune, 
respectively. This is an opportunity for a spectacular sequence of magical 
manifestations, a dumb-show performed to musical accompaniment. Mercury acts 
as commentator, with Vulcan supplying an antiphon of crudities based on his 
character as naive low-comic. 
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Oddly, Venus and Fortune have identical effects on people, since both cause 
destruction. The show, therefore, re-interprets the criteria of judgment originally 
laid down by Venus. It is established that no decision can be taken on the basis of 
this evidence. In a move parallel to the conjuration of women in The Play of the 
Wether, the dissension of the women in heaven releases Vulcan's lewdnesses. 
Vulcan is Venus' husband, but he behaves like a dim-witted member of the 
audience, and is much given to sexual innuendo. He functions in two modes: an 
elbow jogging familiarity, and a sense of amazement at dramatic devices. 11 Both of 
these are grounded in a total incapacity to see subtlety, and an equally 
comprehensive belief that his perceptions are shared by the audience. 
As described in Chapter Five, Jupiter now dictates the terms of a new 
contest. The goddesses are to take part in a kind of joust, and their weapons are to 
be human beings who are going about their daily lives. Jupiter decides exactly what 
they are to try to do, to whom, and how the result is to be measured. In this way 
the judge controls the disruptive, quarreling women and directs their energies. 
Jupiter has decided that display is not enough, and substitutes narrative. The 
immediate effect of this is to dispose of both Venus and Fortune to the sidelines of 
the stage (possibly to a gallery above), and to restrict their function in the narrative 
to framing the following three Acts with musical shows. 
The narrative of the Romance play-within-a-play is, predictably, complex 
and incredible, the more so since the Gods do more than set the crisis going, they 
intervene in the course of events. For this reason, the following summary of the 
plot is necessarily rather protracted. Fidelia, the daughter of Duke Phyzantius, is 
covertly in love with the virtuous and unknown orphan, Hermione. 
12 A clandestine 
meeting between the two young lovers is observed by Fidelia's brother Armenio, 
possibly thanks to Fortune's intervention. Armenio, outraged, confronts them, and 
is wounded in the ensuing fight. By chance (! ) Duke Phyzantius enters, and 
banishes Hermione, who flees with the Parasite Penulo to a cave in the woods. 
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Fortune's Triumph, accompanied by drums and trumpets, closes the Act. 
With Venus in command, we next meet the wronged hermit Bomelio, who 
apparently inhabits the same cave with his servant Lentulo. Although this is Venus' 
Act, mischief still thrives in the person of Penulo. He and Lentulo meet both 
verbally and in a fight near the cave. Penulo's plot to bring the antagonists 
Hermione and Armenio together fails. Instead, first Bomelio befriends Fidelia, then 
Armenio arrives and forces her to return to the court. Bomelio has recognized both 
of them, and calls down a curse of muteness on Armenio. Finally Bomelio and 
Hermione manage to meet, and are revealed to be father and son. They rejoice. 
This constitutes a triumph for Venus, who celebrates with viols. 
Act Four can only be described as astounding in its ludic extremity. It 
exploits the theatrical possibilities of hysterico/magical transformations and the 
revelation of secrets in a joyous playing-off of Romance capabilities against 
naturalistic expectation. This protracted sequence begins soberly enough with 
another 'low comic' passage between Penulo and Lentulo, during which Lentulo 
explains that he has fallen in love with Fidelia. Apparently Venus' effects have 
been rather arbitrarily spread. Bomelio, disguised as a physician and speaking in 
heavy francophone English mingled with macaronic courtesies, now appears and 
asserts his ability to cure many ills, including muteness. The scene lends itself to 
both comic and sinister overtones, blended with a dawning amazement at the 
capabilities progressively being revealed by the sometime hermit. Doubtless 
extemporizing, Bomelio explains to Phyzantius that Armenio's enchantment can be 
lifted if his tongue is washed with 'the deerest blood in the tenderest parte' (1.1185) 
of his worst enemy. Surprisingly, this enemy turns out to be neither Hermione nor 
Bomelio, but his sister Fidelia. After a pause for contemplation we are further 
informed that 'Tis in her pappes, her dugs vor der be de tenderest parte, / And de 
blood be deerest, it comes from de hart', (1.1217-18). 
The Duke's response cannot fail to bring the house down: 'This thing is 
somwhat easier if she consent therto, ' (1.1221). But his next line performs the same 
269 
sinister volte face which is this play's speciality: 'If not, I can inforce and make her 
it to do'. Convoluted syntax images the moral distortion involved in Phyzantius' 
thinking. Bomelio is now enabled to converse with Fidelia privately, and help her 
to escape from the Court for a second time. Meanwhile, back at the cave, 
Hermione has discovered Bomelio's books of black magic, and bums them in a 
passion of revulsion. Next, Penulo and Lentulo raise the alarm about Fidelia's 
second flight. When Bomelio and Fidelia arrive at the cave, the love duet between 
Hermione and Fidelia is soon broken by Bomelio's impassioned rage over the loss 
of his books. Amidst a flood of gutter curses he carries off Fidelia, leaving 
Hermione to mourn and identify his opponent, not as his father, but as 'The Fates 
and Fortune' (1.1522). Fortune's triumph follows, the drums and trumpets now 
augmented with comets and guns. 
Act Five sees an intervention in Fortune and Venus' dispute by Jupiter, 
through Mercury. Jupiter does not wish to see the matter fought out to the bitter 
end. They compromise with a non-intervention treaty, and the project of the 
remainder of the play is to find a resolution for the disasters they have created on 
earth. Invisible Mercury therefore soothes the insanely raging Bomelio into 
becoming a comic, dancing simpleton, and then into slumber. The new concord in 
the heavens is imaged by Mercury's use of both pipes and fiddles: Fortune's wind 
instruments harmonize with Venus' strings. When Hermione and Fidelia cast 
themselves on Phyzantius' mercy, he is at first suspicious and angry. Venus and 
Fortune have no choice but to show themselves to Phyzantius and persuade him to 
leniency, re-defining Bomelio as 'good Bomelio', and revealing Phyzantius's father 
as having been in error. Fidelia is now prepared to provide the blood that will free 
both Bomelio and Armenio, and the play ends in concord amongst both the mortals 
and the gods. 
Because the chaos stirred up by the rivalry between Love and Fortune is 
ultimately gainsaid by Jupiter, it seems that this play establishes the image of the 
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good father, and in doing so validates patriarchy. Jupiter's participation in a double 
structure involving political authority and paternal manoeuvrings has already been 
detailed. On earth, too, the relationship of father to child is central to the plot. 
Male control is structured by and connected with the lineage of paternity. Duke 
Phyzantius is father to two children, Fidelia and Armenio, and is in addition 
adoptive father to Hermione. He functions conventionally as a location of power, 
offering anger and retribution when his power is challenged. The presence of his 
power generates secrecy, within an economy in which information becomes 
valuable. Thus Fidelia and Hermione conceal their meetings, but Armenio conveys 
information about them. Following from his röle as a judge, Phyzantius determines 
who is the 'good' child and who the 'bad', and his power enables him to act on that 
judgment. Hermione thus was adjudged 'good' until his sexuality, directed towards 
Fidelia, seemed to intrude on the stasis of aristocratic interbreeding. 
Phyzantius's own father, now long dead, is crucial, for Hermione and 
Bomelio (and hence all the others) are living through the results of his actions. This 
Duke, too, acted on the basis of secret information when he banished Bomelio, 
never learning that the information was false. Thus Phyzantius, though apparently 
strong and just, is controlled by external circumstances laid down for him in turn by 
a father. In the course of normal life those circumstances can never be righted, for 
the father is now dead. For all his trappings of authority, Phyzantius is a 
remarkably powerless father. The list of his weaknesses is extensive. 
1) He lives the consequences of his own father's misjudgments. 
2) His daughter conducts a socially inappropriate love affair, whose secrecy 
has been successful until Fortune intervened. 
3) He cannot persuade: Fidelia's arguments against giving her 'deerest 
blood' counter his need to cure Armenio. 
4) He is incapable of curing his dumb-struck son. 'Phyzantius' is thus 
another spurious 'physician'. 
5) He cannot see through Bomelio's disguise. 
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It follows from all these weaknesses that Phyzantius cannot control 
language, desire or knowledge. Linguistically he is an empty sign, the mere 
appearance of a father. 
The pattern emerging from the play is one of paternal error and 
imperfection, combined with a certain level of power. The secrecy resulting from 
power itself has the potential to generate injustice, functioning to serve evil interests 
as readily as good. Phyzantius, then, emblematizes a critique of patriarchal 
structures. 
To oppose a fallible patriarchal structure with a better one is a common 
theory of rebellions. Bomelio appears on the scene to take up that position and 
demonstrate its inadequacy. Bomelio is puzzling because he implicitly subverts any 
concept of paternalism as unequivocally virtuous. The banished hermit is a locus 
for contradiction, which is in turn projected onto the anonymous Hermione. He is 
apparently ineffectual and pitiful, having been banished from the court, and having 
lost his son to Phyzantius. In this way, he seems at the end of Act Two to be 
submissive to the double paternal structure, and willing to renounce his own status 
within it. 
At first he gives a strong impression of benevolence by taking in the fleeing 
Hermione. In the damaging economy of secrecy and information, he appears to be 
virtuous, for he desires to reveal the secret of his true relationship with Hermione. 
We sense that he desires good generally, for his goal to unite the lovers is 
manifestly also the goal of the play. Suddenly, when he strikes dumb the 
voyeur/informer, Armenio, he appears to be a white magician. Here, it seems, is a 
supernatural power, alternative to that of the court or the Gods, and working to 
control the narrative. Bomelio's behaviour next begins to contradict this picture. 
The low comic devices, the undignified disguises and intemperate rages reveal 
Bomelio as a necromancer whose power has a fiendish source. We can only 
question the wisdom of Fidelia's decision to exchange the father who says 'no' for 
the father who promises satisfaction on dubious terms. Yet Bomelio's behaviour 
272 
does nothing to support Phyzantius as the 'good father'. Rather it continues to 
undermine the institution of patriarchy. 
Venus and Fortune function as authors, in relation to the play-within-a-play. 
But the matter goes further than this, for it seems that their feminine dissent has not 
just disturbed harmony on Mount Olympus, it has also released some sort of wild 
power in the world below. There is a strong suggestion that the goddesses are able 
to create characters. The surface assumption is that they can move people around. 
For example, Armenio observes the lovers only after Fortune has stepped in, 
though they have kept their secret successfully for some unnamed space of time 
before that. However, the name 'Armenio' is also very similar to 'Hermione' - 
almost an anagram. It is as if Fortune has cloned Hermione in order to create a 
new brother. In a love We where one party has mysterious origins, incest is always 
a fear. At an early stage of the play this seems to be a possibility, especially given 
the intensity of Armenio's reaction. The two now occupy identical spaces, for both 
are Princes and both in a filial relationship to Phyzantius, yet we only hear of 
Hermione's upbringing, not of Armenios. Armenio's desire is to obliterate 
Hermione utterly, and there is no explanation for this settled enmity - except 
perhaps that it has been constructed along with its owner by Fortune, to suit her 
ends. In normal circumstances, two objects cannot occupy the same space. In 
order for Armenio to survive, therefore, Hermione must vanish. 
Go wend thy ways obscurer then the night 
and Fortune for reuenge plague thee with spite 
(1.487-8) 
Bomelio, too, has an invented quality. From a practical point of view, his 
occupancy of the lovers' trysting place must have 
been extremely surreptitious to 
have continued unobserved for five years. Again, he has been prompted forward by 
a mysterious agency - perhaps not just into action, but into life itself. When 
Mercury soothes Bomelio asleep, he defines his rage as both 'madness' and as a 
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dramatic construction: 'That Beadlom up and down he replaies his part' (1.1605). 
Both of these 'invented' figures show great instability: sudden rages occur, 
unexpected information comes to light. It seems that Bomelio is being re-written as 
the play goes along. Both become mutilated, Armenio by loss of speech, Bomelio 
by madness. These two language disorders have the side-effects of neutralizing 
their sufferers as agents. Armenio becomes null once silent, functioning only as a 
motivating point to allow for Bomelio's antics, and as an additional piece of discord 
to be resolved at the end. In bringing forward Armenio and Bomelio, Fortune has 
also released a sense of passionate rage. Both of these characters feel strongly, and 
speak strong and attractive verse. One may contrast this with the cardboard 
repartee about jealousy with which the lovers spend their snatched hours together. 
It is different again from the kindly tone in which the supposedly furious Phyzantius 
banishes his betraying foundling, Hermione. Raging emotions have already 
appeared in this play, as part of the character of Fortune's representative, 
Tysiphone, but Fortune herself has had to deny these feelings in order to gain a 
hearing with Jupiter. It is not so surprising then that her creations should be the 
bearers of these suppressed emotions. 
Whether Fortune has created Bomelio or merely brought him into play, wild 
powers have been released. Bomelio himself is an alternative author (as well as an 
alternative father), and a particularly transgressive one. He possesses theatrical 
skills of disguise and comic accents, together with the authorial skill of formulating 
plots. For example, it seems he has invented the 'deerest blood' idea as a device to 
justify his being alone with Fidelia , but 
his invention becomes fact. It is not just a 
solution to Armenio's muteness, but ironically rebounds on himself as the necessary 
cure for his madness. There is also a suggestion that he has been using magic to 
challenge the Goddess Fortune herself. The book scene identifies Bomelio as a 
rival to Fortune, and thus as suffering an overweening pride. 
Not in that wanton youth, not in that plesant mate: 
Could Fortune with her ficklenesse his wonted mind abate. 
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He rather challengeth to doo her very woorst, 
And makes a semblance of delight, although indeede accurst. 
My father therupon devised how he might, 
Revenge and wreak him self on her, that wrought him such dispite. 
And therfore I perceiue he strangely useth it, 
Inchaunting and transfourming that his fancy did not fit. 
(1.1348-55) 
Bomelio, therefore has been attempting an exchange in an improper direction: the 
margin between gods and men can be broken by interference in one direction, but 
presumably only by prayer in the other. What Bomelio does is impermissible 
within the play's founding principles. Was he then the source of the original 
discord between Venus and Fortune? If so, we have here a very neat invasion of 
the frame by the inner play. 
Unfortunately Bomelio does not have total control: Fidelia rejects his initial 
friendly overtures; Hermione burns his books; and he appears to be incapable of 
deciding finally whether he is good or evil. His goals are good, his methods evil, 
and the love of the methods is dangerous to him. His madness signs the ultimate 
breakdown of his attempts to control the plot. 
Superficially, the inner play puts forward a traditional debate about the 
relative merits of virtue versus nobility, and resolves all difficulties with the happy 
discovery of Hermione's noble parentage. At another level the play consistently 
provides an analysis of male versus female control. With women established as 
causes of dissent in the heavens, the feminine principle is also established as the 
major disruption of happiness on earth. Indeed, one might see the play as 
identifying women and discord. Ultimately, of course, the closing scene locates all 
control with the male, but the ways in which the female principle are foregrounded 
are significant. 
The play crucially aligns happiness and the patriarchal order with stasis, and 
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so with no possibility for play, or for a play. The female, on the other hand, is 
aligned with rebellion, but also with passion, and with the initiation of the 'play 
world', thus with creativity and authorship. At this point the function of the female 
is very close indeed to that of the vice. 
Female powers rapidly become so strong that ritual blood-letting is 
demanded before male stasis can be re-imposed. Bomelio invents the ritual, but his 
status in the male/female opposition is in question. More importantly, Mercury 
supports the demand that Fidelia shed her heart's blood to restore her brother's 
speech. Female blood, then, has magic properties. (It has already been observed 
that neither of Armenio's more obvious enemies qualifies to do him this service. ) 
In that apparent opposition between stasis and creativity, we see an 
impossibility - the division of the world in a way which imposes non-existence on 
power. 13 One solution to this impasse is to see power/stasis as containing and 
generating the creativity that on one level it seeks to repress. Thus 'resistance is 
never in a relation of exteriority to power; rather resistances (plural) are inscribed in 
power "as an irreducible opposite". 
' 14 
The other condition for the restoration of order is that Phyzantius should 
accept his place as part of a concealed double patriarchal structure. His final 
benevolence depends on the gods' revealing themselves to him, and also on the 
narration of the secrets of his father's reign. Two secrets which signify his 
helplessness are also the source of his power to be magnanimous, and so to function 
as a king. At this point the action can be drawn to a close. 
Bomelio functions as a nodal point, at which the two systems come together, 
for although he is a father, he is also an occasional servant of the female principle. 
He is an important agent of both Venus and Fortune, and probably their 
construction. 
As a father he sets up an 'alternative patriarchy', which rivals both Jupiter's 
hierarchy and Phyzantius's. When he moves to appropriate Fidelia as another 
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child, he is a fake 'physician', in opposition to the genuine father Phyzantius. His 
hellish magic and conjuring powers rival those of the gods. Even when Bomelio is 
charmed and foolish, his spell over Armenio can only be lifted through the remedy 
he originally laid down. Bomelio's 'alternative patriarchy' is important, for, like 
the women, Bomelio stands as a sign of patriarchal failure, and thus for the chaos 
on whose repression the patriarchy is founded. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX 
1 William Punt, the endightement of mother messe (1548), in Three Tudor 
Dialogues, ed. Dickie Spurgeon, Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 319 (New 
York, 1978), (C iiii v). 
2 My opinion is contrary to that of, for example, Peter Saccio, in The Court 
Comedies of John Lyly (Princeton, 1969): 'Neither Love and Fortune nor ,h 
Cobbler's Prophecy is a particularly good or a particularly interesting play', p. 192. 
3 The inclination to recuperate these plays as political statements is especially 
noticeable in the case of The Wether. The recent edition of Heywood's plays by 
Richard Axton and Peter Happ6 finds a close connection between Henry VIII and 
the character of Jupiter. The Plays of John Heywood, Tudor Moral Interludes, 6 
(Cambridge, 1991). 
4 D. M. Bevington, 'Is The Play of The Weather Really About the Weather? ' 
Renaissance Drama, OS, 7, (1964), pp. 11-19. 
5 In The Assembly of Gods, the inability of the Gods to control Atropos is the 
key to a movement into an exposition of the story as a Christian allegory. 
6 By way of contrast, one may notice the scatological concerns in Mankind, 
which are not gender-specific. Fegens and Lucres contains both homosexual and 
heterosexual innuendo. 
7 Shakespeare makes the connection explicit in Antony and Cleopatra (IV, xv, 
43-4): '- -- let me rail so high/ That the false housewife Fortune break her wheel, '. 
The 'Riverside' Shakespeare, ed. Harry Levin and others (Boston and London, 
1974), pp. 1347-139 1. 
8 One may notice an interesting comparison with the very similar inner plot of 
the 'Tale of Hemetes' in the Entertainment at Woodstock (1575), in The Complete 
Works of George Gascoigne, ed. John W. Cunliffe, 2 vols (Cambridge, 1910; 
reprinted New York, 1974), II, pp. 473-510. Clearly, a Romance plot could stand 
as story in its own right, even when a semi-magical scene was built in to flatter the 
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Queen through the conditions of the plot's resolution. By contrast, the Love and 
Fortune structure introduces control as a theme by establishing a divine framework 
which is not outside the story. 
9 Tysiphone's status as out-of-control in this system is coherent both with the 
traditional behaviour of Furies, and with the points to be made below about female 
creativity. 
10 At this point Love and Fortune suggests a relationship with Spenser's 
'Mutabilitie Cantos'. There, however, the positions of Venus and Fortune have 
been combined, and it is Change with her 'ever-whirling wheele' (EQ, 7, vi, 1) 
who claims a right to rule not just 'beneath the moon' but also amongst the Gods. 
Like Venus, Mutabilitie is beautiful, she is mollifying towards Jupiter, and she 
refers to the moon. Like Fortune, she is an outsider in Heaven, she is related to 
Chance, and she is descended from a royal father. Mutabilities's behaviour in 
wrestling with the Moon for her seat has similarities with Fortune's desire to be 
instated as equal with the Gods. This last feature, of vauntingly occupying a high 
seat can be seen as a continuous tradition from Infans' occupation of Mundus' 
throne, through Mother Messe's claim to sit 'in the seace where the living God 
should sit', to Mutabilitie's challenge of orthodox belief. 
11 He echoes the kind of playfulness with theatricality that one associates with 
FFlgens and Lucres's A and B. He purports to perceive Jupiter as 'an honest man 
in the Parrishe' (1.251). He jokes about evacuation; he refers to eating fish in Lent; 
and he invites the audience to share his surprise at the Gods' speedy exit (a feature 
of the fashion of the mid-century for plays with much doubling). In all, Vulcan is 
like a character out of another, older play, left behind by a lost world of theatrical 
innocence and pantomimic broad humour. 
12 Jupiter, however, has already described him as 'a Prince beloved of his love' 
(1.258), so both the Gods and the audience are aware of some part of the plot's 
secret. 
13 This is comparable to the stone-like stasis that Humanum Genus must 
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achieve, hiding in the Castle of Perseveraunce in order to be acceptable to God. 
14 Jonathan Dollimore, 'The Dominant and the Deviant: a Violent Dialectic', 
in Futures for English (Manchester, 1988), pp. 179-190 (p. 180). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
WOMEN, SILENCE AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF VIRTUE 
So far, the figure of woman has appeared as an opponent of order, while the 
vice figure is a character specifically devised to represent wrongdoing in very 
similar terms. If the vice figure were to behave well or be reformed, it would no 
longer be a vice figure, nor, consequently, a figure of otherness. Woman seems to 
be more problematic, for however good she is, she can never be male. From this 
point of view, woman is always and inevitably other. Nevertheless, the paradigm 
for female possibility has long been contained by the joint images of Eve and Mary. 
Mary, clearly, is on the side of virtue and, indeed, of the kind of virtue that the 
patriarchy requires of both women and men. The question now arises: how do the 
plays present the 'good woman'? 
The woman who follows the instructions of the sixteenth century books on 
behaviour is two things above all: obedient and silent. I In other words, virtue is 
established as a linguistic condition: good actions are generated by other people's 
commands, while the ideal woman's own language is inadequate or incomplete 
exactly because it is subject to control beyond the standard grammatical and 
syntactic restrictions. Ideally, that incompleteness is voluntary and control is 
internal - the good woman knows when not to speak, and what not to say. 
Moreover, she has internalized that knowledge as her own desire. Thus the good 
woman is an emblem of the Law of the Father - the Non/m du Pere - and an 
extreme representative of the controls to which all language users must submit. 
For the mankind figure (including any female mankind figure) language is 
complex, to be interpreted, and the successful mankind figure concludes his play 
when he takes charge of interpretation, understanding how to 'get it right'. We have 
seen that standard moral maturity for a mankind figure involves a capacity to 
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interpret language metaphorically. In other words, the mankind figure has learned 
how to thread the maze of multiple interpretation with confidence that a correct path 
is available. Thus he enters into a fullness of language; a sense of completion that 
comes from having located the 'correct' metaphoric meaning, to add to the obvious 
literal one. The 'good woman' figure, by contrast, does not develop the mankind 
figure's capacity to manoeuvre the doubling of literal and metaphoric meanings. 
Instead, meaning continues to be established her. Because she submits to 
external interpretation, her access to language and semiotic systems is generally 
single. For the good woman figure, independent interpretation is not permitted: she 
must not generate re-readings. 
The mankind figure is seen as inherently virtuous, even though the human 
condition presupposes that he is in danger of falling into error. Through the 
sixteenth century, the figure of the 'good woman' loses this capacity to lapse and be 
reclaimed, since any fall comes to be seen as permanent. As 'good' she indicates 
absolute virtue, but as 'woman' she indicates ineradicable otherness. Within the 
semiotic of the good woman, then, is a sign of radical otherness under strong 
control. This figure is the mark of a fear of interpretation and a fear of creativity. 
It is part of the system that the strength of the control should be undetectable: the 
'good woman' is perfectly, effortlessly good. As a sign of perfect control, then, 
she is not only a sign of the Other, she is impossible. 
With reference to the moral play, two areas of interest emerge: How do the 
virtuous women of these plays measure up to the standards of silence and 
obedience? Secondly, and more significantly, what implicit judgments of their 
behaviour do the plays offer? 
I suggest that the sixteenth century shows a transition in attitudes to female 
virtue, moving from Mary Magdalene (in the Digby play), Lucres and Queene 
Hester, via Susannah and the Lewis Wager Mary Magdalene as transitional figures, 
to a group of heroines such as the Phillip Patient Grissell, Lavinia and Desdemona. 
Where good women of the first group could be read as mankind figures, this ceases 
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to be the case in the later moral play. Two effects appear: firstly that the 'perfect 
woman' is tacitly recognized as an impossibility by the plays. The second effect is 
to interpret one version of perfection - the 'silent woman' - as mutilated or 
inhuman. In other words, the plays recognize that it is problematic to describe 
silence as equivalent to virtue for a human being. It is noticeable that this occurs in 
the same period that the plays increasingly group women, speech and the vice figure 
together as a significant cluster, for it leaves no structural location for woman to 
occupy. All that remains is an extra-structural location, if one can use such a 
phrase, and that is a condition of absolute otherness. 
Early moral plays contain virtuous women who speak freely and well. 
Amongst these is the Digby Mary Magdalene (c. 1480-90)2 whose saintly mankind 
figure behaves in a way which is indistinguishable from such broadly contemporary 
generalized mankind figures as Mankind or Humanum Genus. The fall into 
temptation, the reformation and subsequent atonement are all similar. Furthermore, 
not only is Mary permitted to speak, her virtuous language is essential to the plot of 
the second part of the play. Mary is sent to convert the King of Marcyll 
(Marseille), a traditional figure resembling the Mystery Play Herod in his 
boastfulness and corruption. 
Kyng and quene converte xall e, 
And byn a-myttyd as an holy apostylesse 
All to lond xall be techyd alonly be the 
goddes lawys on-to hem 3e xall expresse. 
(1.1380-83) 
Speech here is both Mary's reward for her reformation and a source of power: she 
is given the importance and dignity of being the only missionary in Marseille. 
Later in the play, Mary is seen to preach in public, and to control the welfare of the 
King and Queen of the country. The status that the play claims for the virtuous 
woman's speech is thus supported by the images it offers of the virtuous woman 
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speaking. In the final scenes, Mary resolves to live in the wilderness, in a condition 
of humility, patience, charity and abstinence (1.1990-95). The play has no interest 
in dwelling on any possible suffering or loneliness involved in this programme. 
Instead it moves immediately into a celebratory mode, in which Mary is regularly 
transported to heaven to feed on manna, wonderfully accompanied by angels. That 
scene merges directly into one presenting her apotheosis, thirty years later. 
One might wish to read M= Magdalene as a play which sets out to 
repress female sexuality. As a mankind figure, however, Mary's career has 
followed a standard course, for moral plays were equally concerned to repress 
sexuality in general. Furthermore, years of holy bliss have accompanied Mary's 
virtue, during which it appears that she has enjoyed the most intense satisfactions. 
In Medwall's Fylgens and Lucres3 (c. 1500) we meet a virtuous woman who 
is highly articulate, and who is shown to be competent in negotiating the minefield 
of sexual and class politics without a false step. Fulgens and Lucres is not a moral 
play in any strict sense involving externality or the adversarial mode. On the other 
hand, Lucres is required to discriminate not between good and evil, exactly, but 
between good and better. (In fact, the play tactfully avoids drawing moral 
conclusions about the failings of the high-born Cornelius. ) Essentially Lucres is the 
arbiter in a debate play, but it is a moral debate, and the figures of A and B inhabit 
the role of those who tempt a mankind figure into making the wrong choice. In the 
Prologue to the play - the summary of plot offered by B- Lucres is all-powerful. 
The play itself, however, shows her initially to be properly obedient to her father's 
will. 
Cornelius reports to Fulgens: 
-she abideth to have youre counsell 
For as she seyth, she will no thing 
In suche mater to do withoute your counsell(yng) 
(1.324-6) 
Lucres's obedience is rewarded by her father's recognition of her right to choose: 
284 
Fulgens: 
How be it, certeynly I am not the man 
That wyll take from her the liberte 
Of her owne choice - that may not be! 
(1.336-8) 
Lucres proves herself capable of controlling emotion, desire and sexuality through 
reason. The crude puns made about her reflect on the characters who create them, 
and if anything point up her virtue by their manifest inappropriateness. 
Lucres kindly corrects B's error: 
Nay, nay, man, thow art farr amys! 
I know what thyn erande is, 
Though thow be neclygent. 
Of thy foly thou mayst well abasshe, 
For thou shuldis have sayde the holow asshe: 
That hole thy mayster ment 
(1.294-299) 
Her careful detail forces him back to the truth and to a more courteous tone: 
By God avow, I trow it was! 
I crye you mercy, I have done you trespas. 
But I pray you take it in pacyence 
For I mistoke it by necligence. 
(1.299-302) 
Lucres' fine control of expression enables her to recognize the political 
implications of her choices, and to defend herself effectively against criticism. 
Further, she can move into a careful, tutelary relationship towards A and B, the 
lower orders, in which her own dignity is unimpaired, and their understanding of 
the world improved. Lucres, then, is wholly the heroine of the play. She can only 
gain by speaking. 
One can see Lucres and the Mary Magdalene of the Digby Plays as 
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belonging to the same category of virtuous, articulate and powerful women. 4 By 
1567, when Lewis Wager's play5 was published, Mary Magdalene is almost 
unrecognizable as a transformation of the Digby character. In this context it is 
particularly significant to observe the behaviour that Mary is permitted following 
her repentance. Certainly there is a hint that she can be verbally powerful in her 
promise: 
I shall declare his mercy in towne and citie 
(H iiii v) 
The promise, however, goes no further. Mary leaves, and her presumed preaching 
is realized by the play as her absence from the stage. The scene presents instead an 
essentially digressive concentration on Christ and on the plotting against him by 
Symon, Infidelitie and Malicious Justice. That particular narrative strand is soon 
abandoned, never to reappear. One suspects that the play's main interest is in the 
early scenes, which occupy fully half the play in detailing Mary's seduction by 
Infidelitie and her life in sin with both relish and theatrical skill. 
When Mary returns to the stage for the closing scene, it is in order to be 
lengthily instructed in theology by two characters called Justification and Love. 
Thus even at this point Mary speaks little, though what she does say is represented 
as virtuous and admirable. A male mankind figure concludes his play by taking 
responsibility for the interpretation of spiritual truth: he may himself assume the 
characteristics of a sign, and assert the meaning of that sign; he may prepare to go 
into the world as a teacher of others. Mary, by contrast, is treated as if she is still 
incompetent with the interpretation of spiritual truth into language. 
At my being here euen now of late, 
It plea(ed my Lord Jesus of his great mercy 
To speake jentences here in my pretence. 
Of the which I haue no perfect intelligence, 
The fyrst is: Many fines are forgiuen hir fayd he, 
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Because She hath loued much, meanyng me 
(J ii) 
The knowledge that we might be justified in believing her to have gained is uttered 
for her, and her condition as a virtuous woman is to be attentive to male instruction. 
I pray you most holy Justification 
Of this fentence to make a declaration 
(J ii v) 
Justification's answer, and various expansions on it, take most of the eighty-two 
lines to the end of the play. Of this section, two groups of four lines each fall to 
Mary. Both express gratitude to God. Mary's knowledge has remained at the level 
of 'knowledge of sin' (J iii v). 
Thomas Garter's play, Most Virtuous and Godly Susanna6 (1578) 
demonstrates a mirror image of this attitude toward the ideal of female silence. 
Where Wager's Mary Magdalene is said to speak, but does not, Garter's Susanna is 
said to be silent, but becomes voluble at exactly the point where her silence is most 
emphasized. Her volubility is necessary to the plot, theatrically impressive, and 
definitively virtuous. 
In the course of the play, Susanna speaks freely, putting forward arguments, 
for example, to dissuade the Elder (here named Sensualitas) from his intentions. 
Alas me thinkes your thoughtes and wordes togither do not gree, 
You are of age, and know right well, that no Such jinne hould be, 
You know also God doth it curSe, and ecke our lawe on earth, 
Doth recompence Euch Sinners to, with harpe and cruell death. 
And therefore good my friend I fay, doe leaue as you begon, 
And I will holde me fo content, and hyde that you haue done. 
(1.753-8). 
Indeed, her appeals to God for help break off the threatened rape. 
Oh Lord, oh God, oh King of blif je, what stormes do Stop my breth, 
(1.767) 
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'Stop' here must mean 'hamper' or 'make irregular', rather than implying an 
inability to breathe, for there are five powerful lines of decision-making still to be 
uttered in this speech before the elders break into it by calling the servants. It is 
striking that they use the words that ought to come from Susanna: 'Help, help, oh 
help'. 
Here there are two clear occasions where female speech is virtuous. It is 
exactly this voluble virtue that leads to Voluptas' and Sensualitas' punitive 
accusations against Susanna's honour. 
At the trial scene, Susanna maintains the silence of injured virtue, against the 
expectations of the judge. It seems that speech here is seen by the judge and the 
onlookers as a conventional part of the judicial process. Furthermore, from the 
remarks of others in the court, it also seems that her earlier arguments against 
making unsubstantiated assertions are no more than rationalisations. 
Speake for thy seife it is high tyme, what haste thou to say then 
Wherefore thou oughtest not to dye, for I must sentence giue 
Speake forth or else I know not how, that longer thou shouldste Hue 
(1.1040-42) 
Susanna's impassioned eight-line reply is clearly inaudible to the Judge and the 
public, for the Judge continues as if she had not spoken and condemns her to death. 
Her prayer is addressed to God, and, of course, the audience. Thus though 
technically silent Susanna is verbally prominent. The judge acknowledges that 
agitation and some speech have taken place, but ignores their content. Her words, 
however, are effective on the planes both of theology and of theatre. At this point 
the S. D. instructs: 
Here the Iudge ryfeth, and Sufanna is led to execution, and God ray 
Jeth the spirite of Danyell 
(1.1061-2). 
These bald directions contain the potential for a sequence of actions passing through 
dignity and intensity into spectacle, and possibly of several minutes' duration. The 
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essence of a dumb show is its unnatural speechlessness. Here the spoken 
interactions of the courtroom are superseded by silence. This silence is broken by 
the male representative of God and virtue, when Danyell directs the judge to 
reconsider the case. Danyell denounces the judgment, and the judge responds 
particularly to his pronouncement, rather than to his person or his sensational 
appearance. 
I pray thee friend what meane thy wordes, which feeme of Tuche a 
waight 
(1.1065) 
Only male language can carry virtuous persuasion here. Susanna again prays in 
stage silence, for ten lines, describing her own worthlessness and vowing to spend 
all her life and breath in praising God. In other words she will be silent on all 
worldly matters, uttering nothing but prayers. 
Now Lord while life and dayes shall la$t, and till my breth be (pent, 
I will jet forth thy gloryous prayse, which is fo parmanent 
(1.1091-2) 
Once freed, Susanna keeps this promise with a public oration, in which she 
transforms herself into an example of God's help, in the time-honoured manner of 
mankind figures. Furthermore, she has the authority to explain in detail her own 
exemplary qualities and their application. 
See here good people, unto you all I fpeake 
How God doth helpe the innocent, and eake their forrowes breake, 
Let myne example comfort you, in all kinde of di ftrejse, 
That if you Suffer for his fake, he will your cares release. 
And let not feare of any man your con jtant hart remoue 
From him that thus molt constantly, his Dimple flock doth loue 
You fee I am at libertye, that ear$t hath bene in thrall, 
And thus will God deale with all Euch, as on his mercy call 
(1.1105-1112) 
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This is not, however, the end of the play, for Susanna's authoritative speech must 
be contained. There follow 290 lines containing the trial and execution of the 
elders, conducted with clowning verve. Ill Reporte, the principal Vice, is identified 
and executed in a scene which enjoys his verbal displays of skill as much as the 
inevitability of his fall. One effect of the scene, in this context, is to override the 
energetic presence of Susanna's speech and to re-locate her as absent and therefore 
silent, through the course of these rumbustious vulgarities. She returns, but now 
surrounded by her parents and husband, whose speeches dominate the conclusion. 
In short, though interested in asserting the silence of the virtuous woman, 
the play puts Susanna forward as a speaking subject. Ambivalence about the status 
of female speech appears firstly in the ambiguous audibility of her prayers; secondly 
in the appointment of Danyell as a male representative who speaks as Susanna's 
proxy; and finally in the use of two important scenes to conclude the piece in which 
she is either absent or speaks very little, even though it would be perfectly proper 
for her to dominate the play at this point. 
Phillip's Commodye of Pacient and Meeke Grissell7 (1565) sees 
female virtue in a more extreme light. The story itself is a very old one, based on 
the folk-tale of the human being who is 'tested' by a supernatural spouse. ' It is 
found in Boccaccio, taken up by Chaucer, then by Phillip and substantially modified 
by the collaborative group of Chettle, Dekker and Haughton. Each age offers a 
characteristic, and significant, reworking of the material. Here, I shall mainly be 
talking about the play by Phillip, with some reference to Chaucer's Clerk's Tale, 9 
and to the later play by Chettle, Dekker and Haughton. 10 
Patient Grissell is a moral play, not because of Grissell's virtue, but because 
it interprets Duke Guatier's experience as a kind of test, provoked by the external 
influence of Politicke Perswasion as the principal vice figure and tempter. The play 
also picks up, though lightly, on Chaucer's clerk's comment to the effect that 
obsessively patient people provoke unreasonable behaviour in their husbands. 11 
Grissell is thus the occasion of the temptation, and the Duke's own social position is 
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the innate condition which renders him liable to fall into the abuse of power. To 
read the story with this emphasis, however, is to skew it away from the prominence 
that the action gives to Grissell. 12 
The differences between Chaucer's version of the story and Phillip's point 
up the change taking place in the sixteenth century view of virtue. Phillip offers us 
a Grissell of almost unnatural gifts. Like Lucres, she already has a reputation for 
virtue. Lucres is adequately well-born, though not noble, while Grissell, in her 
poverty, could be seen as an exaggerated form of this 'dignity in the lower classes' 
theme. 13 When Chaucer's Duke returns from hunting, he passes through the 
village, under the eyes of the people. Chaucer presents a village, and a society of 
peers, among whom Griselda's family, though the poorest, clearly belongs. 
Amonges thise povre folk ther dwelte a man 
Which that was holden povrest of hem alle 
(Clerk's Tale, 1.204-5) 
They live in extreme poverty, but this condition is like that of other people, not 
unlike them. Griselda and her family are part of a society in which they have a 
public reputation and a status. When village maidens and gossips communicate the 
story of the Duke's wedding to one another, Griselda shares that sociable 
information. Phillip, by contrast, erases this society from his plot, and offers us a 
household which is isolated and vulnerable. He stresses that they lack the support 
of an adult male. Unlike Chaucer's Walter, Phillip's Duke encounters Grissell 
while in the process of hunting and discussing confidential affairs of state. One 
result of this is that Grissell's cottage seems to be situated in or near the woods and 
this produces resonant effects. Grissell, her parents and Indigent Poverty inhabit a 
kind of No Man's Land, socially and literally. The woods are traditionally the 
location of 'wild men', 14 and also of mystical experiences. ls Grissell's location 
and Guatier's discovery of her call to mind those medieval lyrics in which a noble 
hunter is struck by a religio-erotic experience of the Virgin Mary. Janickel's 
description of Grissell also raises Marian associations: 'My daughter is a Virgin 
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puer, and wanteth terren store' (1.698). 
Griffith's relation of Patient Grissell to folk-tale stories of human beings 
who are tested by magical spouses is clearly interesting and helpful. Unlike the 
human Griffith refers to, however, Grissell never fails in her patience, and our 
judgment hesitates over which of the principal characters in the play should be seen 
as the supernatural spouse and which as the tested human. 
Grissell is constructed in the powerlessness of poverty and low rank, as well 
as of femaleness. An initial low estate seems not to be essential to the tale of her 
patience, but it is stressed in all the versions. She reacts to the Duke's suddenly 
commanded betrothal with the simple obedience of a vassal, and subsequently 
believes herself to owe him enhanced obedience as a wife. His ill treatment of 
herself and her children is always met with acquiescence, characterized by silence as 
a refusal to complain. This contrasts with Chaucer's version, where Griselda makes 
substantial speeches of dignified submission. Grissell in herself is an inhabitant of 
the margins between the normal and the supernatural: her behaviour is exceptional, 
and noteworthy in its excessive virtue. 
The play itself contains a commentary on Grissell's behaviour, in the 
speeches of those other female characters who have suffered loss. The Countess 
Pango, Guatier's sister, presents an alternative model of natural grief. In The 
Clerk's Tale this character's husband is alive, and co-operates in the plot. Here, the 
Countess mourns her husband's death, complaining about unjust fate with 'grefe 
and dolefull paine', but is still open to comfort from her maid, and to distraction by 
events in the outside world: 
My heauie miede you comfort much, but nature shoes hir kynd 
For shoe hath welsprings to mine eyes, to morne his death assynd, 
His loue his faith so fully showne, to me his spoused mate, 
Doth giue me cause to poure out plaints, to shoe my haples fate, 
But who is that that now to us hasteth thus a pace. 
(1.1251-55) 
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More significant is the scene where Grissell's daughter is taken from her, 
ostensibly to be killed. Here, Grissell has one long speech of response. Her 
reaction moves through several phases, none of which involves other than 
acceptance of this fate. This form again resembles the medieval lyrics in which 
Mary laments for Christ on the Cross. Through lines 1097-1110, she reacts by: 1) 
questioning his words; 2) pitying herself; 3) wishing she had stayed poor; 4) asking 
women in the audience for pity, tears and wailing; 5) pitying the child; 6) 
criticizing the murderers; 7) resolving to be patient; 8) placing the problem with 
God and Time to be sorted out; 9) handing over the child to Guatier's pleasure. 
She then remains silent for eighty-three lines, during which the Nurse demonstrates 
an alternative approach, arguing for the child's life by putting forward cases, 
examples and precepts. Finally the Nurse offers to exile herself from court for the 
child's sake. Later, when the second child is threatened, the nurse is prepared to 
fight for it. Physically overpowered, she is prepared to continue the struggle by 
means of reason, and appeals both to natural feeling and to divine law: 
Giue heede to my teares, let my wordes pondred bee: 
To slaye this young Infant is contrary to reason, 
Thy raige and furye vouch thou, with pittie to season: 
Who would commit murther, or slaye an Innocent 
At anie mans chardge, and transgresse Gods commaundement, 
0.1425-29) 
Grissell cannot make these moves, simply because she is a type of patience 
and also of perfect wifeliness, for which we are invited to read perfect obedience. 
'Meke' has equal status with 'patient' in the title of the play, an ordering which is 
obscured by the familiar shortened title. Thus any action is denied her, even though 
an action against a wrong decision seems likely to be right. 16 Grissell therefore 
first speaks of passive behaviour, and then remains silent, elevating the virtue of 
obedience above all other virtues. The nurse points out the moral irrationality of a 
theory which leads to this result. The nurse, indeed, attacks obedience as it relates 
293 
to Dilligenc, and goes further to generalize her criticism: 
And knowe it is better to please God, then anie mortali man 
(1.1433) 
We are left to draw our own conclusions about Grissell's use of passivity to please 
Guatier. Grissell's patience is far from unproblematic, for it serves Guatier's 
political needs, not his moral well-being. Dilligenc's answer to the nurse echoes 
Guatier's statement to Grissell: 
But if I kill it not I my seife shall dye, 
Therfore better to slaye, then with the sworde to be slaine: 
(1.1435-36) 
Grissell does not attempt to weigh moral paradoxes, as a mankind figure might. 
The nurse has an interesting couplet which stresses Grissell's position: 
I mourne thee poore Grissill, thy hap I lament 
But thou in this case art merueilous pacient: 
(1.1468-69) 
The force of the words 'but' and 'merueilous' asks to be considered. 'But' suggests 
that a situation is about to follow which leads to some lessening of the previous 
statement: that Grissell's patience might make her less pitiable. This would be true 
if patience was not a great effort to her, as it is to ordinary people. 'Merueilous' 
might be read rather lightly, as 'extremely', or else one might give it its full 
possible weight: 'miraculously'. Grissell's behaviour then is presented as saintly, to 
an extreme that recognizes her response as humanly impossible. In spite of this, she 
is presented as an example of patience in adversity, for others to follow. 17 The 
Chaucer version recognizes how unlikely it is that real women might behave as 
Griselda does. Instead, a more general moral is put forward to do with behaviour 
in times of stress. 
This stone is seyd nat for that wyves sholde 
Folwen Grisilde as in humylitee, 
For it were inportable, though they wolde, 
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But for that every wight, in his degree, 
Sholde be constant in adversitee 
As was Grisilde; 
(Clerk's Tale, 1.1142-47) 
Given that Grissell is superlatively patient and obedient, one may wonder 
how she relates to the ideal of female silence. Although through large areas of the 
play her silence is made prominent, it is also true that she is permitted to speak at 
some length on several occasions. Those speeches, however, have a rather 
specialized content. Not only do they state Grissell's passivity, they enact it by 
refusing the modes of argument or exposition, or even of any emotional expression 
except pity. Grissell's speech when banished generates a conflict between the 
audience's expectations of a key dramatic character, and the actuality of Grissell's 
absolute acceptance. Grissell begins by detailing the history of her relationship with 
Guatier, and of her feelings about that relationship. Instead of drawing that 
evidence into a reasoned argument, however, she utters an elaborate acceptance, 
and the expectations raised by a listing of factual detail are disappointed. One 
expects a speech at this point to be argument in a debate, or dramatic involvement 
of the individual in the action, but this is a speech of passivity. It is, in a sense, an 
anti-speech, functioning to display her resignation. 
18 Indeed, from an early stage in 
the play Grissell's utterance has been emblematic rather than rationally 
communicative. Song, for example, has been used to perform functions of 
exposition and self-introduction. Grissell establishes herself as a sign of virtue in 
her 'maidens all come learn of me,. Within a spoken drama, song has an odd status 
for it can readily give an insincere impression, as if it were no more than a rendition 
of pre-existing words and music. Grissell's song of mourning for her mother's 
death also draws attention to tears as the non-verbal sign she chooses to use, instead 
of speech or explanation. 19 Grissell's speech-modes thus run persistently against 
the grain of conventional speech: they are emblematic rather than rational. In reply 
to the banishment speech, the maid once again offers the 'ordinary' point of view: 
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that it is proper to grieve. The maid is again astounded by the holy dedication, 
which allows Grissell to rejoice in her husband's prosperity. For us as well as the 
maid there is shock value in Grissell's appropriation of the order that maltreats her. 
The view that Grissell is unique is expressed within the play by Politicke 
Perswasion and, earlier, by Sobriete and Reason. If Grissell is unique, her example 
cannot possibly be imitated. Further, the example of Grissell is the example of an 
absence from that place in which the example can function, namely the secular 
world. 
Sith that my absence shall ioyes innumerable increase 
(1.1607) 
Self-negation here is balanced against a number of joys too large to count. In other 
words, her value as absence is seen as infinitely high. This is indeed the case, for 
the value of the absent or silent female is the whole world of the masculine order, 
created by defining the female as other and elsewhere. 
When the banished Grissell returns to the place that she came from, she 
performs a circle, which constitutes an assertion that her story can be concluded 
with no change. The beginning and the ending can be closed together in a timeless 
stasis, identical with the stasis that we have already observed as characteristic of the 
unimpeded masculine order. Her one request is of interest on several levels. In the 
first place, it is a request for further negation: that her body should be covered with 
a simple undergarment, a smock. Thus it seems she will not be looked at, 
ostensibly because to expose her body is to expose Guatier, but also because she 
does not wish to draw attention to herself. Nevertheless, to preserve the perfection 
of her unchanged return to her origins, the smock is not to be a gift or concession, 
but something she has bought with her virginity. Attempting in this way to live 
within an economy of perfection carries an unavoidable residue. The smock is also a 
sign of her sexual relationship with Guatier, as much as her body might have been, 
and so functions as a statement of their unalterable past. In this way it works 
against the attempted stasis, with exactly the appropriate power: that of sexual 
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rather than gender difference. That which Grissell says should not be displayed is 
not the sign of her coding as female, but the sign of her sexual association with 
Guatier. While gender difference is part of the static Symbolic code of Guatier's 
power, sexuality, as part of the Real, confronts that code. 
The play tacitly recognizes that this attempted absence of the female cannot 
be sustained, for it follows Grissell, not just as the centre of our attention, but also 
as the centre of attention for a whole group of people who accompany her. Her 
behaviour as negation is of interest, for she focusses the presence of others, through 
her journey of humiliation, which at one point she compares to the Stations of the 
Cross. 
For Patience to suffer this, bath armed my hart: 
This Crosse is not contemned, but willingly imbrased, 
On God my trust, and confidence is placed, 
(1.1706-8) 
The courtiers and the public join her, and she is seen through her effects on others. 
Even in her final resumption of her worldly position as Duchess, and 
expressions of great joy, Grissell moves towards negation. Her joys are 
'innumerable' (that word again), and tears prevent her from speaking. When she 
does make a suggestion, it is that they should all absent themselves. 
That this example of great virtue is impossible seems, finally, to be accepted 
both by Grissell herself, and by the courtiers. Guatier's praise, 'I have not seene 
thy lyke in all my dayes' (1.1940), is comically outbid by Reason's comment from 
the standpoint of a timeless allegory that he has 'not seene hir like since the time of 
my creasion' (1.1990). This is repeated by Sobriete. When Grissell advises against 
testing other women as she was tested, this seems not to be a statement of their 
inadequacy, so much as of the impossibility of any expectation that her conduct 
could be replicated. Her behaviour, because ideally obedient and patient, is thus 
represented as essentially inhuman. 
Not only is Grissell's virtue impossible, her 'silence' is clearly punished by 
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the further tests that it provokes in Guatier. Only when her speech becomes 
powerful and active does he raise the burden of his torments from her. There is no 
hint in Phillip's play that Guatier intends to take Grissell back when he sets the 
scene for his new marriage. Grissell is provoked into a soliloquy in which she calls 
on Patience and Constancie to help her in her struggle to bear suffering. It is no 
longer effortless for her to be unmoved, even glad at Guatier's prosperity. The 
trigger in dramatic terms is her substantial speech blessing him and the children 
(1.1911-1918). When Grissell has expressed some weakness, and at the same time 
moved to use language for effect rather than for its emblematic quality, her status as 
impossible saint has changed. At the same time Guatier is released from his 
obsessive condition as fiendish tormentor. The play moves into the mode of 
romantic comedy, with a happy ending between lovers who are seen as wholly 
human. Janickel appears onstage at the appropriate moment, in a manner identical 
with the coincidental endings of Romance. 
It is notorious that Romance endings are too tidy. Here too we are left 
feeling that time cannot be negated in this way, and that Grissell's twelve years of 
suffering are indelible: that aging, separation, and the past act here as the Lacanian 
Real, and as such resist the Symbolic order that Grissell imposes on them. 
Phillip's Grissell, then, functions as a sign of excessive compliance with the 
patriarchal law. By making Guatier's position seem preposterous and undesirable, 
she calls into question the virtue of his behaviour, and hence the moral feasibility of 
the structure in which their chosen sets of behaviour are embedded. 
From this discussion, and from the preceding chapter, a parallel pattern 
emerges in which the vicious woman moves towards speech and the virtuous woman 
towards silence. Both are punished as they reach the extremes of their movements. 
Lingua was punished by ridicule and imprisonment, and the silent Grissell by 
intensified trials and a move into absence. 
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Science; and Melibea in Calisto and Melibea. Respublica is clearly a mankind 
figure. 
5 Lewis Wager, The Life and Repentance of Marie Magdalene (1566-1567; 
c. 1550-1566), ed. John S. Farmer, Tudor Facsimile Texts (Edinburgh and London, 
1908; reprinted New York, 1970). 
6 Thomas Garter, The Commodve of the moste vertuous and Godlye Susanna, 
ed. B. Ifor Evans and W. W. Greg, Malone Society Reprints (Oxford, 1937). 
7 John Phillip, The Play of Patient Grissell, ed. Ronald B. McKerrow and 
W. W. Greg, Malone Society Reprints (Oxford, 1909). 
8 On this theme, see D. D. Griffith's fascinating monograph, The Origin of the 
Griselda Story (Chicago, 1931). 
9 References to The Clerk's Tale are to The Riverside Chaucer, ed. Larry D. 
Benson, third edition (Oxford, 1988), pp. 137-153. Following the most common 
usage, I refer to Chaucer's heroine as Griselda, Phillip's as Grissell and Chettle, 
Dekker and Haughton's as Grissil. 
10 Patient Grissil (1603,1599), Shakespeare Society (London, 1841). 
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But wedded men ne knowe no mesure, 
Whan that they fynde a patient creature. 
(Clerk's Tale, 1.622-3) 
12 This is one reason why the Chettle, Dekker and Haughton version is not 
relevant to this argument. There, the Duke is a focus of attention, and suffers from 
his treatment of Grissil at least as fervently as she. 
13 The theme is a common one for set debates. See for example ? Rastell's 
Gentleness and Nobility. 
14 Richard Bernheimer describes the wide variety of possible relationships that 
folk tales narrate between 'wild' people and humans, including the thirteenth 
century epic of Wolfdietrich, in which a wild woman wins the love of a prince. 
Wild Men in the Middle Ages" A Study in Art. Sentiment and Demonology (New 
York, 1970; first published, 1952). 
15 Numerous fourteenth and fifteenth century religious lyrics contain a situation 
in which someone goes to the woods (among other possible locations) to 'play', and 
there encounters a spiritual revelation. See Religious Lyrics of the Fourteenth 
Century, ed. Carleton Brown (Oxford, 1924), nos. 10,11,95,105,107,117,121, 
130; Religious Lyrics of the Fifteenth Century, ed. Carleton Brown (Oxford, 1939), 
nos. 2,39,78,105,147,178,186. 
A further Marian hint comes from Grissell's line 'much musyng in my 
mynd', which in its alliterative use of 'musyng' echoes a line from a Marian carol 
'Quid petis, 0 fili? ' 
Musyng on her manners so nigh marr'd was my main 
Saue it pleased me so passingly that passed was my pain 
(Musics Britannica, 18, no. 105) 
'Musyng' appears in Carleton Brown (1924), no. 132, and Carleton Brown (1939), 
no. 73. This evidence is no more than suggestive, since 'musyng' is also to be 
found in a variety of other situations. 
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16 The same question of how virtuous it is to obey bad orders is raised in 
Shakespeare's Henry V, (IV, i, 130-185), The Riverside Shakespeare, ed. Harry 
Levin and others (Boston and London, 1974), pp. 935-975. A similar issue lies 
behind the argument with which Emilia deflects Desdemona's much simpler 
question about adultery. Othello, (IV, iii, 68-87), ibid., pp. 1203-1248. 
17 In 1566, it could not be politically innocent for a play to enact subjects 
pleading with a monarch to marry and get heirs. To display marriage as 
unthreatening might be seen in the same way: as an encouragement to Elizabeth to 
marry. 
18 This point, crucial to the Phillip play, is no longer present in the Chettle, 
Dekker and Haughton version, where their 'Grissil' speaks within emotionally 
credible conventions, and reserves obedience to the Duke to her actions alone. 
19 See Appendix E for a discussion of the ambiguous qualities of weeping on 
stage. 
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CONCLUSION 
'Otherness in the Morality play? But that's 
everything. ' 
In a way, this remark is inevitably true, for the entire world view of these 
plays is adversarial, and so from time to time any feature of the world may take on 
the aspect of otherness. What is of interest, though, is to determine the moral 
plays' particular areas of interest, as indicated by their allocation of the mode of 
allegorical externality. 
Otherness is a complex term and I have not set out to simplify it. Instead I 
have operated investigatively, putting a selection of modern theories of otherness 
together with close readings of the moral plays. What has this method revealed 
about the moral play which was not known before? 
The concept 'otherness' is useful in three polarizing structures . In the first, 
otherness as an imposed, external structure, associated with virtuous characters, 
generates a view of its opposite, the human being, as spontaneous or wilful. This is 
based in the naive mankind figure's feeling that rules are irrelevant, and so must 
stem from a source outside himself. Secondly, when otherness appears as chaos, as 
it often does in the vice figures, their unstructured verve is opposed to the human 
being as desirous of order. This was the view of religious orthodoxy, that rules 
saved the mankind figure from the sinful other lodged within. In the third 
structure, otherness as the female adopts both of the first two functions, appearing 
at times as a paradigm of virtuous behaviour, at times as the wayward in opposition 
to male order and propriety. In each of these forms, otherness is a way of making 
sense of the world: a necessary term in the construction of a comprehensible and 
reassuring coding of reality. 
Both 'good' and 'evil' therefore, may appear as external to the human being, 
whether opposed to his most deeply imbued nature, or to his spiritual best interests. 
#0 
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When the other appears as good, it is in conflict with the mankind figure's physical 
nature, and its function is to control that physicality. It may do this by suggesting 
that immediate pleasure will lead to future suffering, or, similarly, that present self- 
denial will lead to future happiness. The problem is to find a way of explaining 
this convincingly to a character who cannot comprehend the spiritual half of those 
equations: the 'future suffering' and the 'future happiness'. This is the pattern of 
the early moral plays: a mankind figure is embedded in the vigorous enjoyment of 
present life, and perceives advice about the soul or the afterlife as so much 
irrelevant twaddle. The Pride of Life and Youth contain the best examples of this 
attitude. The mankind figure's incomprehension of his life's pattern is explicable in 
terms of linguistic incapacity, for a pre-linguistic (or pre-Symbolic) intellect has 
trouble with structural terms involving time. More crucially, it cannot comprehend 
the metaphoric language of spiritual advice, for such advice necessarily involves a 
capacity to use language ambiguously, substituting not just for the thing itself, but 
also for the concept that attaches to that thing. Such basic terms as 'suffering' and 
'happiness' cannot be literal: Heaven and Hell are both absent to one who is hale 
and hearty. In general, a physical reminder of mortality is required to shock the 
mankind figure into an understanding of his own place in temporal structures, and, 
following that, in linguistic ones. 
Early moral plays show an educative process, in which the mankind figure 
must learn to value the metaphoric and excise the literal. Any loss that one might 
believe to accompany that excision is masked by categorizing the physical as 
undesirable or evil, and thus transforming it into the other. Congruent with that 
process, the metaphoric is appropriated to the self. When the plays systematically 
categorize the excised aspect of the self as other, they present it as laughable, dirty, 
and degraded in various ways. Mankind and The Play of the blether, for example, 
both associate otherness with scatological humour and with meaningless utterances. 
The moral plays, therefore, try to strike a balance between the theological need to 
represent the other as repulsive, and the theatrical gains yielded by constructing an 
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entertaining and attractive vice figure. 2 Clearly, though, they overdo the treatment, 
and through the sixteenth century the irresponsible 'low other' comes to take over 
the moral play to the point where a wholly new dramatic structure appears to be 
developing. Fulwell's Like Will to Like (1568), for example, apparently loses its 
relation with any discussion of the nature of truth because there is no forum in 
which that discussion can take place. In some plays, the abolition of the mankind 
figure means that there is no longer a location where 'good' and 'evil' can interact, 
while in others, the traditional debates about right and wrong and about reality are 
subsumed by galloping vice-play. In Like Will to Like, form is etiolated in favour 
of sheer physicality. When a play contains nothing but vice-play, the fissive 
properties of language have taken over. In its developed form, viceoplay is a 
specific, and extreme, example of the loss of meaning through multiple ambiguity. 
It is as if deconstruction were the only theory of language available, or as if a 
psyche were pure, unstructured id. Furthermore, developments in the conventional 
behaviour of the vice figure threaten the validity of the binarist view of the human 
situation. When the vice figure implicitly refuses to remain a definable term, it 
inadvertently demonstrates the fissive properties of language, and so deconstructs 
the moral plays' polarized picture of the world. 
Woman as low or wicked other takes on many of the vice figures' 
characteristics, but at the same time vice figures share many of the qualities 
stereotypically attributed to woman in her role as spiritual threat. It seems probable 
that assigning vice characteristics to the figure of woman on the stage contributed to 
the historical deterioration in the status of women. 3 In some plays, on the other 
hand, the figure of woman is put forward as a pattern of virtuous behaviour. This 
pattern is only partly intended for women to follow. Women's virtue, especially 
that of the good wife, was also traditionally seen as instrumental in the 
encouragement of male virtue. 4 When the image of the good woman is staged, 
however, it subverts the binarism of good versus evil, for the plays tacitly 
acknowledge that polarized extremes of virtue are impossible. Even emblems of 
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perfect silence, or perfect patience are revealed to be impractical as patterns to be 
imitated. 
Lacanian theory prompts the consideration of the plays' own psychological 
insights in conjunction with their linguistic practices, and produces a view of the 
mankind figure as a maturing self. From Lacan comes the idea that the moral plays 
themselves display, that it is the absence or repression of something essential to the 
self that constitutes language. The negative that bans physical pleasure and creates 
desire is also the foundation of that structuring that enables conceptualisation, 
abstract thought and language. 
The plays' view of spiritual 'truth' winning over physical 'falsehood' is 
subverted from one direction by a psychoanalytic view of the continuing presence of 
the repressed. This is, indeed, the condition which the moral plays dramatize, for, 
as a coherent group, they narrate the endless plasticity and vitality of those figures 
that image the repressed. 
From another direction, Derridean deconstruction of the concept of 'truth', 
following its categorization as a linguistic concept, informs my reading of the moral 
plays' view of the world as insistently binarist and adversarial. Their 
conceptualisation of the world is thus linguistic, and their subsequent subversion of 
that view irresistible, for the plays do not in the end offer us that uneasy but reliable 
co-existence of the structuring and the repressed. Vice figures, for example, do not 
merely go through a cycle of ebullience and suppression, they break out of that 
cycle to rewrite the moral play conventions, and attack the concept of plot 
altogether. Only on that large-scale level of the genre are they finally contained. 
The forces at work in the plays thus parallel the forces at work within language, 
eternally exploding meanings, and eternally striving to recuperate the fragments of 
the explosion into meaningful conceptual structures. 
305 
Feminist awareness of the construction of stereotypes fosters insight into the 
intrication of vice-traits with stereotypical femaleness. The structural otherness of 
women in society gathers power from the cross-referencing on stage of stereotypes 
of evil and of the female. By putting feminism together with deconstruction, I 
revise the conventional idea of the function of the perfect woman in the plays. Far 
from supporting orthodoxy by exemplarizing virtue, the image of the good woman 
renders the binarist view of the world suspect, through its implied impossibility. 5 
Thus even in what appears to be their most secure haven, the structures of 
patriarchy question themselves. 
In these ways, then, otherness in the plays deconstructs the binary world 
view in which both it and they are constituted: the plays criticize their own founding 
principles in apparently simple terms, but ones whose interactions produce endless 
complexity. 
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NOTES TO CONCLUSION 
1 John Goode, June 1989. 
2I do not, however, intend to suggest that the stage behaviour of the virtuous 
characters is not entertaining: it has its own attraction, which one might summarize 
as based in qualities of beauty, impressiveness, poetic speeches, and a sense of 
reassurance. 
3 Work on the frequency and content of witch trials needs to be correlated 
with this material, but is outside the scope of a study of the moral play. 
4 See The Book of the Knight of tour-Landry, ed. Thomas Wright, EETS, 
OS, 21 (London, 1868), which lists amongst the wife's duties to her husband: 'to 
praye for hym benignly and paciently, to counsaile hym for the welthe of his 
soule, and so to deturne hym from eueri euelle dede, in as moche as is in her 
powere; for therto is bounde euery good woman', p. 134. 
5 It is of interest that this image is called into question in exactly the period of 
religious 'iconophobia', when many exemplary pictures were seen as spiritually 
damaging objects. See Tessa Watt, Cheap Print and Popular Piety. 1550-1640, 
Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History (Cambridge, 1991). 
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APPENDIX A 
THE CHOICE OF HERACLES' 
Scholars invariably relate the origins of the moral play to the Psychomachia 
of Prudentius, in which a group of allegorical vices and virtues do battle for 
supremacy on the field of 'Microcosmos' -a locution for the human spirit. There is 
no doubt that this way of seeing the human being's orientation to moral problems 
was a popular one in Medieval and Renaissance literature. ? Lydgate's Assembly of 
Gods* or. The Accord of Reason and Sensuality in the fear of Death, for example, 
draws on it substantially. There are, however, aspects of the Psychomachia which 
do not fit very happily with the founding concepts of the moral play. In the first 
place, it contains no character which represents mankind. The struggle takes place 
with humanity as the battlefield, but in no way is he a participating character in the 
sequence of events. There is no suggestion that his own thought or struggle - or 
culpability, for that matter- might have any capacity for influencing the outcome of 
the battle. Although the moral plays' mankind figure seems in many ways to be 
impossibly passive and easily lured from one course of action to another, 
nevertheless it is always he who must choose. Responsibility for the choices made 
and the use of rational persuasive techniques are intrinsic to the plot of the plays. 
one reason why we have been misled into focussing on the Psychomachia is that a 
pitched battle in a style very similar to the one in that work does in fact take place 
in one of the earliest plays, The Castle of Perseveraunce. This resemblance is a 
distraction, for, within the plot of that play, the battle quickly takes second place to 
a display of attempted persuasions aimed by the vice figures at Humanum Genus. 
Though clearly it is one source for moral play modes of perception, the 
ychomachia is unsatisfactory when one considers the moral play from the point of 
view of externality and a self/other distinction. 
The famous 'Choice of Heracles' of the fifth-century sophist, Prodicus, 
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reported by Xenophon has been neglected in the search for morality play 
antecedents. I 
First one notices that Heracles is at a specific stage of life, and that life is 
imaged as a journey. 'When Heracles was setting out from childhood towards 
manhood, ' Furthermore, he is at that point in his career that the earlier moral plays 
find particularly interesting: 'at the age when the young become independent .. '. 
One thinks of Youth, of Nature, The Four Elements, and Nice Wanton, as well as 
of the opening scenes of Mundus & Infans and the Digby Mai y Magdalene. 
Vice and Virtue in this text are generalized figures, like the characters who 
advise the mankind figure, not abstractions of specific qualities such as the Seven 
Deadly Sins. The scene is a 'dramatic' one, involving movement as well as speech: 
'the first of the two continued to advance in the same way, but the other, wishing to 
forestall her, ran up to him and said: .. .' This encapsulation of meaning in 
movement and gesture, together with the description of costume and make-up, 
invite a staged imitation. 
The dialogue here is interested in interpretation as a factor in the 
development of the protagonist's moral awareness, in exactly the same manner as 
the moral plays. The figure of Vice that confronts Heracles has two names: a true 
name, and a euphemistic version of the same form. 'My friends call me Happiness, 
but people who don't like me nickname me Vice. ' Thus, like the vice figures, she 
raises the question of ambiguous interpretation of moral actions. She attributes 
naming to taste, rather than to a relationship between description and truth. A 
feature of very many of the moral plays is a re-naming scene, in which the vice 
figures decide to conceal their true names behind euphemistic aliases. Again, 
though, the 'true' name of the lady Vice is publicly available: Heracles has genuine 
choice. The capacity he must develop in order to choose correctly is understanding, 
exactly as Mankind, Humanum Genus and all the others must. 
The figures of Vice and Virtue compete for the attention of their auditor. 
Vice is constructed as seductive through a concern with clothing. 'robed in a way 
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that revealed as much as possible of her charms. She kept on examining herself, 
and watching to see if anyone was looking at her, and glancing at her own shadow. ' 
One might in particular compare this with the famous stage direction in Lewis 
Wager's Merry Magdalene: 2 'here entreth Mary Magdalene, triflyng with her 
gannentes'. 
Like the plays, the ethical situation is rendered in terms of movement: the 
mankind figure gm with the vice figure, usually to an inn, or to some location 
representative of degeneracy. In the same way, Heracles, at a crossroads, is invited 
to follow one path or another. In neither case is the nature of this evil location 
visible, except through the figure of Vice itself, though both Vice and the moral 
plays' vice figures describe it in glowing terms which are accurate exactly because 
of their ambiguity. 'You shall refrain from nothing from which you can derive any 
advantage, because I authorize my followers to benefit themselves from all 
quarters. ' 'Advantage' and 'benefit' in this offer can refer only to physical 
indulgence, not to 'spiritual' benefits such as a good reputation or a sense of 
personal worth. 
For the final point about this text, I turn to an interesting comment by Jon 
Whitman: 'Perhaps the most immediately revealing feature of this brief, limited 
vignette is that it considers Heracles, a man celebrated for his heroic exploits, not 
really from the outside, but almost from the inside, confronted by his own 
options., 3 Indeed, the opening line suggests that the whole thing may have taken 
place within Heracles' imagination. One does not, then, need the Psychomachia in 
order to find a text in which a psychological condition is externalized. 
The arguments are strong for including the 'Choice of Heracles' in the 
sources of the moral play. This does not mean that one should dispense with other 
sources entirely, for clearly both 'Heracles', the Psychomachia, and the debate 
forms, such as the various parliaments of Gods, all contribute to the construction of 
the moral play. I argue here for a more even-handed vision of the classical origins 
of the form. 
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NOTES TO APPENDIX A 
1 'Memoirs of Socrates' in Conversations of Socrates, tr. Hugh Tredennick, 
tr. and ed. Robin Waterfield (London, 1990). 
2 The Life and Repentance of Marv Magdalene (1566), ed. J. S. Farmer, Tudor 
Facsimile Texts (1908; reprinted New York, 1970). 
3 Jon Whitman, Allegory: The Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval 
TechniQue (Oxford, 1987), p. 23. 
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APPENDIX B 
CODED LIST OF VICE CHARACTERISTICS 
(This list is intended only as an aid to locating the full discussion of particular vice 
characteristics in Chapter Three. It does not include every aspect of the 
characteristics discussed, in the interests of manageability. 
P1 Vices operate in crews, typically of one chief and either two 
or three subordinates. 
P2 They are inordinately vigorous, bursting into activities such as 
dancing, wrestling and brawling at the least provocation. 
P3 They eat and drink to excess and offer the mankind figure 
journeys to the stews and to taverns full of meat and drink. 
P4 They are uninhibited about defecation. 
P5 They have easy access to sex. 
P6 Both major and minor vice figures go in for fighting and 
brawling. 
P7 The principal Vice may flaunt a 'dagger, with which he may 
fight with others or alone. 
P8 A mock tourney sometimes occurs, involving the use of 
kitchen utensils as armour. 
P9 Vices show clear indications of ubiquity. 
P10 Parallel to their ubiquity in space is an imperviousness to 
time. 
P11 They may ultimately be punished by banishment, often 
to Hell, or by beating or other humiliations. 
P12 Their class is distinctive. They are most commonly 
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'masterless men. Vice figures sometimes claim to be ex- 
sailors or ex-soldiers. 
P13 These low characters evince a love of fine clothing and a 
strong wish to sport the latest fashions, particularly if these 
are extreme, and hence ridiculous or wicked in some way. 
P14 Vices are often usurers. 
P15 They may be physically grotesque, sometimes having large or 
'bottle' noses. They may have ugly faces, or large heads. 
There have been suggestions that vice figures were played in 
masks. 
P16 They may assert or display lineal descent from the Devil. 
Verbal Characteristics 
vi They are inordinately garrulous. 
V2 The vices are interested in one another's exploits. They 
question one another on their lives in the elsewhere of off- 
stage and before-now. 
V3 They habitually refer to the dangers of hanging and going 
to Hell. 
V4 Vices are braggarts. 
V5 They employ a wide variety of styles from repartee to 
argument to narrative monologue. Thus they are linguistically 
versatile. 
V6 They are particularly skilled at persuasive argument. 
V7 The vices abuse conventional language forms by blaspheming 
and using foul language. 
V8 Vice figures use parodic nonsense phrases to mock the logical 
argument that is the characteristic diction of the pious 
characters. Similarly, aureation and Latinity are mimicked in 
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abusive dog-Latin. 
V9 The vices use ludicrous literalisms. 
V10 They indulge in puns or wilful mishearings. 
Vii They have a habit of accidentally-on-purpose uttering a true 
opinion, then quickly retracting it and offering a similar- 
sounding honourable remark instead. 
V12 Vices are addicted to discursive and often digressive 
monologues, including autobiographical monologues about 
impossibly protracted journeyings through many countries, 
and adventures in many towns, usually within England and 
France. 
V13 They can hear and be conjured up, like any devil. 
V14 The vice figures are particularly addicted to proverbs and 
sententiae. 
V15 Vice figures distinguish themselves from the speakers around 
them by the use of contrasting verse forms. 
Controlling 
Moves 
Cl. The principal Vice wishes to control his own unruly crew 
through beatings and orders. They, in their turn beat one 
another up when the opportunity arises. 
C2 Vices attempt to control the mankind figure, through 
argument and appeals to his physical needs. 
C3 The principal Vice adopts a tutelary relationship towards both 
the mankind figure and the vice-crew. 
C4 He makes controlling moves towards the audience by entering 
into colloquy with them through his use of knowing asides 
and of monologue, both techniques which can generate a 
collusive atmosphere. 
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C5 He sets out to control the overt plot by re-defining the good 
characters as mockable, impractical, boring, and 
incomprehensible. 
C6 His frequent formation of schemes, and their working through 
locate him as an alternative author. 
C7 Stage directions on occasion specifically give vices and other 
low characters freedom to improvise. 
Lying and Double-dealing 
Ll The simple utterance of falsehood. 
L2 He may re-interpret the virtuous character's counsel in order 
to lure the mankind figure into dissolute ways. 
L3 He may appeal to literality disguised as common sense in 
order to re-direct the mankind figure's good intentions. 
IA The principal Vice may be represented as morally 
'ambidextrous', more like the figure of Fortune than like a 
descendant of the Devil. 
LS Lying is often intensified when the lie involves the conveying 
of a false message, or a false letter. 
L6 The name-changing which is so significant to many vice plays 
also falls into the category of alternative interpretation 
mentioned above. 
Relations with and Resemblances to Women 
Wi Vices have access to illicit sex as part of their location in and 
near taverns. 
W2 Their coarse language frequently tends towards sexual 
innuendo. 
W3 In relation to women a vice-figure can himself take on the 
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aspect of a victim. 
W4 Vice figures denigrate their wives as shrews and live in fear 
of both their sexual demands and their physical violence. 
W5 Women, too, were reckoned to be excessive talkers. 
W6 Women's discourse was deemed to be empty. 
W7 Women's 'illogical' speech is like the vices' non-sequiturs and 
nonsense narratives. 
W8 Both vices and women are seen as dangerously persuasive, 
often to an almost mystical extent. 
Music. Singing and Noise 
M1 Vice figures have a predilection for music-making in general, 
and singing in particular. 
M2 Song acts as another of the vice's controlling devices. It 
occupies the auditory space, precluding other dialogue. 
M3 Controlling the pace and articulating scenes, the vices' songs 
structure a play. 
M4 Vice figures make a show of insincere weeping. 
MS Demonic, or uncontrollable laughter signals a vice figure's 
glee, usually over someone else's misfortune. 
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APPENDIX D 
CHANGING PROPORTIONS OF VICE-PLAY 
(Figures have been rounded to the nearest whole percent. ) 
Date Name of Play Lines % Vice % Virtu % Mixed 
1470 Mankind 919 54 36 10 
1539 Wit and Science 1121 24 49 26 
1547 Impatient Poverty 1079 35 16 48 
1550 Nice Wanton 552 53 29 18 
1550 Lusty Juventus 1168 40 37 22 
1553 Respublica 21231 36 20 44 
2123 562 20 24 
1558 Mary Magdalene (Wager) 2115 56 23 21 
1559 Patient Grissil (Phillip) 2141 21 53 26 
1560's Enough is As Good 1632 52 24 24 
1567 Conflict of Conscience 2160 44 26 29 
1568 Like Will To Like 1243 77 16 6 
1569 The Longer Thou Livest3 1988 41 23 36 
1576 Tyde Tarrieth 1780 67 23 9 
1577 All For Money4 1564 60 21 19 
65 16 19 
60 16 24 
1579 Wit and Wisdom (Merbury 778 57 37 6 
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NOTES TO APPENDIX D 
1 Excludes songs, which are required by the stage directions, but whose length 
and content are not specified. For example, S. D., 1.65: 'Adulation, Insolence, 
Oppression intrant cantantes'. The overall effect of excluding the songs is very 
slight as virtues and vices have two songs each. Counts all scenes in which 
Respublica and the vices are on stage together as mixed. 
2 Counts the shared scenes either vice-dominated or virtue-dominated, except 
where they are especially evenly balanced. 
3 All For Money contains a debate scene, which makes problems for this kind 
of analysis. The first set of numbers counts that scene as 'mixed'. A second 
problem resembles those found in Rgýi liica, for there is a scene involving Dives 
and Judas which is vice-dominated in the sense that the display of evil is the main 
dramatic interest, but virtue-dominated in that these two are seen suffering. The 
first set of numbers therefore allocates that scene to the virtues, the second to the 
vices (which I feel is correct) and the third to the 'mixed' category. 
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APPENDIX E 
THE WEEPING ACTOR 
The identification of virtue with silence and tears poses problems on that 
level where stage images intersect with images applied to women in real life. As 
silence came increasingly to be stressed, it was also often associated with tears as an 
expression of suffering and virtue. However, tears on the morality stage were 
already a powerful signifier of insincerity, especially when applied to the vice 
figures. 
It is a convention that vice-figures, and especially major Vices, weep on 
stage. Clearly this is seen as important for the role, for it features in the otherwise 
infrequent stage directions. This behaviour has three functions. Firstly it works on 
the level of theatrical convention for the audience's benefit, establishing this 
character as a vice. Secondly, on the level of plot, it deceives the mankind figure 
into believing in the vice's sincerity by playing on his emotions. A good early 
example of this is in Nature II (Henry Medwall). Sensuality weeps to entrap man 
into returning to his frivolous companions out of pity for their sorrow. (Here a 
whole vice-crew sets up a hideous wailing off-stage): 
Then he wepyth (S. D., 1.80) 
And ye saw the sorowfull countenaunce 
Of my cumpany, your old acquayntaunce, 
That they make 
For your sake, 
I dare say ye wold mone theym in your mynde 
They be so louyng and so kynde 
That I am sure 
Yf ye endure 
In thys peuyshe opynyon, 
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It wyll be theyre confessyon! 
There ys none other remedy 
But for sorow they shall dye. 
(1.83-94) 
(The persuasion is effective. ) 
The audience, understanding the convention, can delight in watching gullibility led 
by the nose. Finally, this behaviour entertains as stage spectacle, offering noisy, 
excessive behaviour outside the range of what was normal or acceptable. For 
example, in Mankind, New Guise, Nought and Nowadays all howl and weep 
vociferously at 1.417. Once the victim has left the stage, weeping is on some 
occasions followed by loud laughter, for example in Impatient Poverty, 1.508, when 
Envy weeps to see Conscience leave, but laughs once he has gone. In a similar 
way, in Enough is as Good as a Feast Covetous indulges in a very obviously fake 
display of grief, 1.699-710. 
So far I have rehearsed the evidence for a rather familiar point: the vice, as 
a figure who pretends to be what he is not, affects to weep as one prominent feature 
of his display. This point, however, has an important consequence. The Vice is an 
actor amongst other actors, but the 'falseness' of his weeping is not mimetic in the 
way that the behaviour of the other characters is. Thus, the vice is a character who 
plays a part: uniquely on the morality stage, an actor plays a character who is in 
turn an actor. One signal to the audience of the presence of this character is his 
weeping. To weep on the morality stage was to define oneself as a liar, and 
perhaps even more importantly, as an actor. 
However, women too had an important relationship with tears. The conduct 
books specified that this relationship should exist, and put forward tears as the 
virtuous alternative to speech. The author of Hic Mulier (1620) sees tears as a 
woman's proper weapon: 'the weapon of a vertuous woman was her tears, which 
every good man pitied' (sig. Biü). Where a bad wife railed, a good wife was silent; 
if she was ill-treated, words were still out of order but tears were then permissible 
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as a way of working on the controlling male's conscience. There is even a popular 
historical story of a queen and her waiting women whose silent tears pleaded 
successfully with the läng to save a group of rebels from execution. 
Clearly some sort of double-bind is created here, whereby a weeping 
individual in the real world could resemble a vice, or a virtuous woman, or perhaps 
even both at once. As further cues of femininity became attached to the vice-figure, 
the possibility for such metonymic confusion increased. 
There is significant evidence that confusion was possible, for the virtuous 
women of the plays do not weep. Neither of the Patient Grissils weeps, nor does 
Susannah: they are allowed, respectively, silence and apparently inaudible prayer. 
One may speculate that the danger of an ambiguous interpretation meant that 
weeping was excluded for these characters. Othello demonstrates what these plays 
must avoid for their heroines: 
Oh devil, devil 
If that the earth could teem with women's tears 
Each drop she falls would prove a crocadile 
(IV, i, 239) 
With tears the sign of deceit on the popular stage, it becomes clear that a 
woman weeping is at best an ambiguous sign. 
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